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Far-Right Vanguard: The Radical Roots of Modern Conservatism
Donald Trump shocked the nation in 2016 by winning the presidency through an ultraconservative, anti-immigrant platform, but, despite the electoral surprise, Trump's far-right views were not an aberration, nor even a recent phenomenon. In Far-Right Vanguard, John S. Huntington shows how, for almost a century, the far right has forced so-called "respectable" conservatives to grapple with their concerns, thereby intensifying right-wing thought and forecasting the trajectory of American politics. Ultraconservatives of the twentieth century were the vanguard of modern conservatism as it exists in the Republican Party of today.
Far-Right Vanguard chronicles the history of the ultraconservative movement, its national network, its influence on Republican Party politics, and its centrality to America's rightward turn during the second half of the twentieth century. Often marginalized as outliers, the far right grew out of the same ideological seedbed that nourished mainstream conservatism. Ultraconservatives were true reactionaries, dissenters seeking to peel back the advance of the liberal state, hoping to turn one of the major parties, if not a third party, into a bastion of true conservatism.
In the process, ultraconservatives left a deep imprint upon the cultural and philosophical bedrock of American politics. Far-right leaders built their movement through grassroots institutions, like the John Birch Society and Christian Crusade, each one a critical node in the ultraconservative network, a point of convergence for activists, politicians, and businessmen. This vibrant, interconnected web formed the movement's connective tissue and pushed far-right ideas into the political mainstream. Conspiracy theories, nativism, white supremacy, and radical libertarianism permeated far-right organizations, producing an uncompromising mindset and a hyper-partisanship that consumed conservatism and, eventually, the Republican Party.
Ultimately, the far right's politics of dissent—against racial progress, federal power, and political moderation—laid the groundwork for the aggrieved, vitriolic conservatism of the twenty-first century.
Far-Right Vanguard chronicles the history of the ultraconservative movement, its national network, its influence on Republican Party politics, and its centrality to America's rightward turn during the second half of the twentieth century. Often marginalized as outliers, the far right grew out of the same ideological seedbed that nourished mainstream conservatism. Ultraconservatives were true reactionaries, dissenters seeking to peel back the advance of the liberal state, hoping to turn one of the major parties, if not a third party, into a bastion of true conservatism.
In the process, ultraconservatives left a deep imprint upon the cultural and philosophical bedrock of American politics. Far-right leaders built their movement through grassroots institutions, like the John Birch Society and Christian Crusade, each one a critical node in the ultraconservative network, a point of convergence for activists, politicians, and businessmen. This vibrant, interconnected web formed the movement's connective tissue and pushed far-right ideas into the political mainstream. Conspiracy theories, nativism, white supremacy, and radical libertarianism permeated far-right organizations, producing an uncompromising mindset and a hyper-partisanship that consumed conservatism and, eventually, the Republican Party.
Ultimately, the far right's politics of dissent—against racial progress, federal power, and political moderation—laid the groundwork for the aggrieved, vitriolic conservatism of the twenty-first century.
328 pages, Hardcover
Published October 29, 2021
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July 27, 2021
A must read for those interested in understanding the roots of today's acerbic, populist conservatism.
John S. Huntington, a professor of history at Houston Community College, offers an in-depth revisionist history of ultraconservatism in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. Traditionally, academics have attributed the success of the modern Republican Party beginning in the 1980s to the ability of mainstream Republican leaders to hold in check extremist elements within the party. Thus, the party's recent extremist turn in the twenty-first century was seen as an aberration or as a novel development without precedent. In Far-Right Vanguard, Huntington challenges this traditional narrative of the modern Republican Party by detailing how over the decades the party's platform, agenda, and strategies have been shaped by the far right, even as earlier mainstream leaders tried to distance the party from ultraconservative's most xenophobic and racist views.
Just as Qanon, far-right media commentators, and militia groups have forced so-called "respectable" Republicans today to grapple with their concerns and in the process incorporate them into mainstream politics, so too did the campaigns of earlier ultraconservative groups, such as the John Birch Society, Christian Crusade, and For America shape mainstream conservatism. This conservatism, which initially crossed party lines, by the end of the 1960s found an exclusive home within the Republican Party. Dixiecrats, social traditionalists, evangelical fundamentalists, and other ultraconservative groups felt betrayed first by Roosevelt's promotion of social welfare programs in the 1930s and later by the Democratic party's increasing embrace of unionism and civil rights in the 1960s and 1970s. With the Republican Party's 1964 nomination of ultraconservative Barry Goldwater, some conservatives within the Democratic Party, including South Carolina's Strum Thurmond and Texas's J. Evetts Haley, switched allegiance to the Republican Party. Explaining his decision, Strum Thurmond declared that the Democratic Party had "invaded the private lives of people" while fostering "lawlessness, civil unrest, and mob actions." He also described Lyndon Johnson as a "traitor to the South." This heated rhetoric found its way into countless 1964 Republican Party pamphlets, not to mention became the subject of numerous best-selling paperback books (sold at airports and on newstands) by conservative pundits of the era, including those by Phyllis Schlafly (A Choice, Not an Echo) and by John A Stormer (None Dare Call it Treason).
Obviously, there was no internet or social media at this point, so the reach of these vitriolic texts was not as widespread as it would have been today. But the extreme rhetoric contained in these texts was eerily like that heard during and following the 2016 and 2020 election cycles. When Johnson defeated Goldwater by a landslide, contemporary commentators described his defeat as the death knoll for extreme conservatism in the United States, and for a decade this seemed to be the case. But as Huntington notes, Johnson's landslide victory obscured from view the fact that ultraconservatism was growing in the United States, even if it could not yet win elections. The 1964 election witnessed the emergence of a new generation of far-right activists who had solidified their influence over the Republican base and over party machinery. Not to mention for the first time since the Civil War, the Republican Party carried several Southern states. The defeat, rather than discouraging the far right, excited them, because roughly 27 million Americans had voted for a far-right candidate.
Huntington does an excellent job of showing the connections between far-right conservatism of the mid-twentieth century and the far-right conservatism that increasingly determines the direction of the current Republican Party. As Huntington elucidates, once the Republican Party became the party of conservatism, moderate leaders despite multiple efforts never succeeded in marginalizing extremist elements because ultimately, they drew from the same ideological well. Thus, while they tried to tone down the rhetoric of the far right, that is, white supremacy, social traditionalism, and xenophobia, they never disavowed these ideologies. In short, the only thing that has changed in the twenty-first century is that ultraconservatives within the party now have a firm grip on power. Rather than spewing their vitriol from the margins in hopes that some mainstream Republicans would translate their positions into policy, ultraconservatives now advance their conspiracy theories about the Covid-19 vaccination, the 2020 election, and the January 6th insurrection from within the halls of government.
I would like to thank the author, publisher, and NetGalley for an advance copy of this book in exchange for a fair and honest review.
John S. Huntington, a professor of history at Houston Community College, offers an in-depth revisionist history of ultraconservatism in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. Traditionally, academics have attributed the success of the modern Republican Party beginning in the 1980s to the ability of mainstream Republican leaders to hold in check extremist elements within the party. Thus, the party's recent extremist turn in the twenty-first century was seen as an aberration or as a novel development without precedent. In Far-Right Vanguard, Huntington challenges this traditional narrative of the modern Republican Party by detailing how over the decades the party's platform, agenda, and strategies have been shaped by the far right, even as earlier mainstream leaders tried to distance the party from ultraconservative's most xenophobic and racist views.
Just as Qanon, far-right media commentators, and militia groups have forced so-called "respectable" Republicans today to grapple with their concerns and in the process incorporate them into mainstream politics, so too did the campaigns of earlier ultraconservative groups, such as the John Birch Society, Christian Crusade, and For America shape mainstream conservatism. This conservatism, which initially crossed party lines, by the end of the 1960s found an exclusive home within the Republican Party. Dixiecrats, social traditionalists, evangelical fundamentalists, and other ultraconservative groups felt betrayed first by Roosevelt's promotion of social welfare programs in the 1930s and later by the Democratic party's increasing embrace of unionism and civil rights in the 1960s and 1970s. With the Republican Party's 1964 nomination of ultraconservative Barry Goldwater, some conservatives within the Democratic Party, including South Carolina's Strum Thurmond and Texas's J. Evetts Haley, switched allegiance to the Republican Party. Explaining his decision, Strum Thurmond declared that the Democratic Party had "invaded the private lives of people" while fostering "lawlessness, civil unrest, and mob actions." He also described Lyndon Johnson as a "traitor to the South." This heated rhetoric found its way into countless 1964 Republican Party pamphlets, not to mention became the subject of numerous best-selling paperback books (sold at airports and on newstands) by conservative pundits of the era, including those by Phyllis Schlafly (A Choice, Not an Echo) and by John A Stormer (None Dare Call it Treason).
Obviously, there was no internet or social media at this point, so the reach of these vitriolic texts was not as widespread as it would have been today. But the extreme rhetoric contained in these texts was eerily like that heard during and following the 2016 and 2020 election cycles. When Johnson defeated Goldwater by a landslide, contemporary commentators described his defeat as the death knoll for extreme conservatism in the United States, and for a decade this seemed to be the case. But as Huntington notes, Johnson's landslide victory obscured from view the fact that ultraconservatism was growing in the United States, even if it could not yet win elections. The 1964 election witnessed the emergence of a new generation of far-right activists who had solidified their influence over the Republican base and over party machinery. Not to mention for the first time since the Civil War, the Republican Party carried several Southern states. The defeat, rather than discouraging the far right, excited them, because roughly 27 million Americans had voted for a far-right candidate.
Huntington does an excellent job of showing the connections between far-right conservatism of the mid-twentieth century and the far-right conservatism that increasingly determines the direction of the current Republican Party. As Huntington elucidates, once the Republican Party became the party of conservatism, moderate leaders despite multiple efforts never succeeded in marginalizing extremist elements because ultimately, they drew from the same ideological well. Thus, while they tried to tone down the rhetoric of the far right, that is, white supremacy, social traditionalism, and xenophobia, they never disavowed these ideologies. In short, the only thing that has changed in the twenty-first century is that ultraconservatives within the party now have a firm grip on power. Rather than spewing their vitriol from the margins in hopes that some mainstream Republicans would translate their positions into policy, ultraconservatives now advance their conspiracy theories about the Covid-19 vaccination, the 2020 election, and the January 6th insurrection from within the halls of government.
I would like to thank the author, publisher, and NetGalley for an advance copy of this book in exchange for a fair and honest review.
February 17, 2023
While this is not an easy book to read, it is a very important one!
Because it delves deeply into the roots of today's off-the-wall conspiracy theories, lies, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-everything about immigrants, it has a few mouthfuls of insults, rotten language, and a host of very bad actors that is just a lot of "crap" to read about. However, it serves to show how the current effort to misinform, mislead, and undermine our democratic republic is NOT a recent phenomenon but, rather, one that has deep roots in our past.
The other reason it can be difficult -- sometimes bordering on the tedious -- is that Huntington is a true first-person, original-document quoting scholar. To substantiate his arguments, each chapter is filled with a stunning number of direct quotes, either from speeches or personal conversations, or from printed material. A wise and necessary thing to do given how the Right seeks to delegitimize any and all who question their positions.
Here is Huntington:
“The [20th-Century] ultraconservative revolt was not simple backlash politics, but a movement with deep roots weaving through both parties and tracing back to the previous century. The nativism, laissez-faire economics, and white supremacy that permeated late nineteenth century America formed the far right’s ideological heritage. In the early twentieth century, rampant paranoia about cultural decay, communist infiltration, and racial upheaval further directed the ultraconservative political compass. This ideological seedbed bolstered the far right’s perception that the New Deal had sparked an existential crisis between a free society and state paternalism. Red-baiting rhetoric…doubled as both a strategy to encourage political involvement and a cipher for larger structural critiques about the purpose and purview of government….
“Though some ultraconservatives maintained their party affiliations, the far right as a whole was less driven by partisan loyalties than by a sense of ideological purity and righteous aggrievement. Ultimately, the far right’s ideological blend of economic libertarianism, social traditionalism, anti-statism, white supremacy, and conspiratorial anti-communism catalyzed right-wing action during an era of liberal hegemony.” (P. 14)
While the popularity of the New Deal programs – combined with the unified national spirit that was a response to World War II – somewhat silenced the far right for a time, post-war developments quickly provided them with renewed causes and opportunities to again seize both regional and national stages.
The first was the Cold War, which brought back all of the Red scare tropes originally voiced after the Soviet Revolution of 1917 but with the additional twist that “now” righteous Americans were not only facing a world-wide coordinated threat by “the Communist powers,” but also threatened by internal subversion. Hence the creation of the infamous House Un-American Activities Committee and the ruinous actions of Senator McCarthy who essentially found a communist underneath every federal bureaucrat’s desk.
The second was the virulent reaction to desegregation, begun by the Supreme Court decisions regarding schools in 1954 but accelerating in response to a resurgence among American citizens demanding equal rights for all. Once again the old warnings about states’ rights being violated by overstepping federal agents were dusted off, and the American Nazis, the ever-virulent Ku Klux Klan, and a rising number of armed militants received new energy and new recruits.
The third was the ongoing absorption of disparate far-right elements into the Republican Party, making one of the two national parties – for the first time in US history – the “home” of the increasingly radical far-right. Goldwater was the first politician to attract a number of them to the Republican Party, but it was only after Nixon skillfully used his messaging to indicate that he was on the side of both the “whites” and the “conservatives” that heretofore independent organizations increasing folded into – or, at the least, coordinated their messaging with – the Republican Party.
The fourth was the establishment of various organizations dedicated to spinning everything through the far-right’s lens, including think-tanks, media chains, and the rise of far-right talk radio and Fox “News.” While there had always been various newspapers taking sides in political issues from the very beginning of the Republic, these new mass-market inventions represented an entirely different level altogether. Coupled with the ending of the “fairness doctrine” in the second half of the 20th century – it played a vital role in insisting that broadcasters make every attempt to portray both sides of issues – this allowed for an increasingly sophisticated and coordinated stream of misinformation and outright lies that overwhelmed citizens, leading to our present sad state of affairs where a lot of people “don’t know whom to believe” and a whole lot of others do – their tribe’s spokespersons!
Huntington writes that it was the Tea Party that best “illustrated the continuation of far-right thought…. Exploding into public consciousness after the inauguration of America’s first black president…the Tea Party was often depicted in popular media as a small-government, low-taxes movement loosely aligned with GOP principles. However, activists carried the same social and racial aggrievements as the midcentury far right. In fact, there are many connections between the two movements: bot claimed an affluent, educated, middle-aged or older, majority-white membership; both found a great deal of support in the South; both held anti-statist, libertarian beliefs; both view nonwhites and immigrant groups as a latent threat to American society; both proffered conspiratorial views; and both utilized media strat3egies to promote their ideas.” (P. 217)
It is my own personal view that all of this has been made much worse by the decline of thoughtful reading that requires thinking. Our current period of virulent far-right activities and propaganda has marched apace with the substitution of soundbites, audio and video clips, “news” streams, and other media that are intended to rally, persuade, and denounce far more than they are to inform, promote thought, or suggest true solutions for the lower-emotion prompting media of newspapers and magazines. The latter, for one thing, are not ephemeral. One can read an article and then go back to it to see if its argumentation is supported by the facts or evidence in it. One cannot do this with electronic media.
I fear that far-too-many of us have forgotten that citizens in a democratic republic must always be vigilant in order to avoid being played like a puppet-on-a-string. Instead, we seem to enjoy rooting for our side and doing much worse than booing at the other.
Our republic has faded into a garish imitation of the Roman coliseum, only now we do not watch lions gobbling up Christians but, rather, our fellow citizens tearing each other up.
What entertainment! What a buzz!
What a disgrace!
Because it delves deeply into the roots of today's off-the-wall conspiracy theories, lies, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-everything about immigrants, it has a few mouthfuls of insults, rotten language, and a host of very bad actors that is just a lot of "crap" to read about. However, it serves to show how the current effort to misinform, mislead, and undermine our democratic republic is NOT a recent phenomenon but, rather, one that has deep roots in our past.
The other reason it can be difficult -- sometimes bordering on the tedious -- is that Huntington is a true first-person, original-document quoting scholar. To substantiate his arguments, each chapter is filled with a stunning number of direct quotes, either from speeches or personal conversations, or from printed material. A wise and necessary thing to do given how the Right seeks to delegitimize any and all who question their positions.
Here is Huntington:
“The [20th-Century] ultraconservative revolt was not simple backlash politics, but a movement with deep roots weaving through both parties and tracing back to the previous century. The nativism, laissez-faire economics, and white supremacy that permeated late nineteenth century America formed the far right’s ideological heritage. In the early twentieth century, rampant paranoia about cultural decay, communist infiltration, and racial upheaval further directed the ultraconservative political compass. This ideological seedbed bolstered the far right’s perception that the New Deal had sparked an existential crisis between a free society and state paternalism. Red-baiting rhetoric…doubled as both a strategy to encourage political involvement and a cipher for larger structural critiques about the purpose and purview of government….
“Though some ultraconservatives maintained their party affiliations, the far right as a whole was less driven by partisan loyalties than by a sense of ideological purity and righteous aggrievement. Ultimately, the far right’s ideological blend of economic libertarianism, social traditionalism, anti-statism, white supremacy, and conspiratorial anti-communism catalyzed right-wing action during an era of liberal hegemony.” (P. 14)
While the popularity of the New Deal programs – combined with the unified national spirit that was a response to World War II – somewhat silenced the far right for a time, post-war developments quickly provided them with renewed causes and opportunities to again seize both regional and national stages.
The first was the Cold War, which brought back all of the Red scare tropes originally voiced after the Soviet Revolution of 1917 but with the additional twist that “now” righteous Americans were not only facing a world-wide coordinated threat by “the Communist powers,” but also threatened by internal subversion. Hence the creation of the infamous House Un-American Activities Committee and the ruinous actions of Senator McCarthy who essentially found a communist underneath every federal bureaucrat’s desk.
The second was the virulent reaction to desegregation, begun by the Supreme Court decisions regarding schools in 1954 but accelerating in response to a resurgence among American citizens demanding equal rights for all. Once again the old warnings about states’ rights being violated by overstepping federal agents were dusted off, and the American Nazis, the ever-virulent Ku Klux Klan, and a rising number of armed militants received new energy and new recruits.
The third was the ongoing absorption of disparate far-right elements into the Republican Party, making one of the two national parties – for the first time in US history – the “home” of the increasingly radical far-right. Goldwater was the first politician to attract a number of them to the Republican Party, but it was only after Nixon skillfully used his messaging to indicate that he was on the side of both the “whites” and the “conservatives” that heretofore independent organizations increasing folded into – or, at the least, coordinated their messaging with – the Republican Party.
The fourth was the establishment of various organizations dedicated to spinning everything through the far-right’s lens, including think-tanks, media chains, and the rise of far-right talk radio and Fox “News.” While there had always been various newspapers taking sides in political issues from the very beginning of the Republic, these new mass-market inventions represented an entirely different level altogether. Coupled with the ending of the “fairness doctrine” in the second half of the 20th century – it played a vital role in insisting that broadcasters make every attempt to portray both sides of issues – this allowed for an increasingly sophisticated and coordinated stream of misinformation and outright lies that overwhelmed citizens, leading to our present sad state of affairs where a lot of people “don’t know whom to believe” and a whole lot of others do – their tribe’s spokespersons!
Huntington writes that it was the Tea Party that best “illustrated the continuation of far-right thought…. Exploding into public consciousness after the inauguration of America’s first black president…the Tea Party was often depicted in popular media as a small-government, low-taxes movement loosely aligned with GOP principles. However, activists carried the same social and racial aggrievements as the midcentury far right. In fact, there are many connections between the two movements: bot claimed an affluent, educated, middle-aged or older, majority-white membership; both found a great deal of support in the South; both held anti-statist, libertarian beliefs; both view nonwhites and immigrant groups as a latent threat to American society; both proffered conspiratorial views; and both utilized media strat3egies to promote their ideas.” (P. 217)
It is my own personal view that all of this has been made much worse by the decline of thoughtful reading that requires thinking. Our current period of virulent far-right activities and propaganda has marched apace with the substitution of soundbites, audio and video clips, “news” streams, and other media that are intended to rally, persuade, and denounce far more than they are to inform, promote thought, or suggest true solutions for the lower-emotion prompting media of newspapers and magazines. The latter, for one thing, are not ephemeral. One can read an article and then go back to it to see if its argumentation is supported by the facts or evidence in it. One cannot do this with electronic media.
I fear that far-too-many of us have forgotten that citizens in a democratic republic must always be vigilant in order to avoid being played like a puppet-on-a-string. Instead, we seem to enjoy rooting for our side and doing much worse than booing at the other.
Our republic has faded into a garish imitation of the Roman coliseum, only now we do not watch lions gobbling up Christians but, rather, our fellow citizens tearing each other up.
What entertainment! What a buzz!
What a disgrace!
March 23, 2023
Some fascinating history, marred by conceptual confusion and an ideologically driven agenda.
This book is a history of far-right or "ultra-conservative" politics in 20th century America. The main idea seems to be ultraconservatism is not some "fringe" element of American conservativsm that can be easily dismissed, but rather a "vanguard" that paved the way for the more mainstream conservatism of the late 20th century, and the Trumpism of today.
I learned a lot from this book. Some of the discussions are about relatively well known figures and organizations like George Wallace and the John Birch Society, but even here Huntington provides a wealth of information and context that helped to round out my understanding. And there are some fascinating stories that I'd simply never heard before, such as an account of FDR seizing control of the department store Montgomery Ward and ordering the Chairman, Sewell Avery, to be physically removed from his office by armed soldiers.
But Huntington's discussion is marred by two serious problems. The first is a failure to clearly explain what he means by "ultra-conservatism," and to distinguish between different (and often incompatible) strands of "right-wing" thought. Early in the book, for instance, he asks us to imagine the American political spectrum as a straight line with communism at the far left and the American Nazi Party on the far right. The implication here seems to be that Nazism is the most "extreme" form of conservatism, but what on earth can this mean? What is the variable that is being measured on this line, such that a moderate dose makes one Goldwater conservative but a larger dose makes you a Nazi? Where do libertarians fit on this spectrum? Huntington seems to lump libertarians like Leonard Read in with ultra-conservatives, apparently on the grounds that both groups disliked communism. But this ignores the serious and sometimes explosive disagreements that took place between libertarians and conservatives over the course of the 20th century - from Buckley's disdain for Rothbard and Ayn Rand to disagreements over the role of religion in public life, international policy, and so on. The fact that Huntington can write that "radical libertarianism" came to "consume the Republican party" suggests that his understanding of libertarianism might be a bit rough around the edges.
The other major flaw of this book is an almost complete failure to see the world through the eyes of the people he is writing about. Huntington is clearly not a conservative, let alone an "ultra" conservative. And that's fine. Plenty of good histories of the right have been written by people who don't share their beliefs. But good history requires making a good faith effort to understand why people thought what they did. If you can't do that, then you run the risk of caricaturing and thus misrepresenting their views, rather than accurately reporting them.
For Huntington, ultraconservatives seem to be motivated by nothing more than selfishness, racism, and delusion. Virtually nowhere in the book is there any attempt to explain why conservatives might have rejected the New Deal, or why they might have worried about the growth of state power. Even their anti-communism is derided. Not only is it left entirely unexplained, Huntington mostly chalks it up to conspiratorial thinking. In fact, Huntington employs the word "conspiratorial" or related terms one hundred and eighty nine times throughout the book, almost always as a modifier of "anti-communism." Because what else could lead one to oppose communism but a belief in conspiracy theories, right? [Yes, I know, it's weird that I counted. But I listened to an audiobook version of the book, and was so struck by how many times I heard the word 'conspiratorial' that I had to download the PDF to do a word search.]
This book is a history of far-right or "ultra-conservative" politics in 20th century America. The main idea seems to be ultraconservatism is not some "fringe" element of American conservativsm that can be easily dismissed, but rather a "vanguard" that paved the way for the more mainstream conservatism of the late 20th century, and the Trumpism of today.
I learned a lot from this book. Some of the discussions are about relatively well known figures and organizations like George Wallace and the John Birch Society, but even here Huntington provides a wealth of information and context that helped to round out my understanding. And there are some fascinating stories that I'd simply never heard before, such as an account of FDR seizing control of the department store Montgomery Ward and ordering the Chairman, Sewell Avery, to be physically removed from his office by armed soldiers.
But Huntington's discussion is marred by two serious problems. The first is a failure to clearly explain what he means by "ultra-conservatism," and to distinguish between different (and often incompatible) strands of "right-wing" thought. Early in the book, for instance, he asks us to imagine the American political spectrum as a straight line with communism at the far left and the American Nazi Party on the far right. The implication here seems to be that Nazism is the most "extreme" form of conservatism, but what on earth can this mean? What is the variable that is being measured on this line, such that a moderate dose makes one Goldwater conservative but a larger dose makes you a Nazi? Where do libertarians fit on this spectrum? Huntington seems to lump libertarians like Leonard Read in with ultra-conservatives, apparently on the grounds that both groups disliked communism. But this ignores the serious and sometimes explosive disagreements that took place between libertarians and conservatives over the course of the 20th century - from Buckley's disdain for Rothbard and Ayn Rand to disagreements over the role of religion in public life, international policy, and so on. The fact that Huntington can write that "radical libertarianism" came to "consume the Republican party" suggests that his understanding of libertarianism might be a bit rough around the edges.
The other major flaw of this book is an almost complete failure to see the world through the eyes of the people he is writing about. Huntington is clearly not a conservative, let alone an "ultra" conservative. And that's fine. Plenty of good histories of the right have been written by people who don't share their beliefs. But good history requires making a good faith effort to understand why people thought what they did. If you can't do that, then you run the risk of caricaturing and thus misrepresenting their views, rather than accurately reporting them.
For Huntington, ultraconservatives seem to be motivated by nothing more than selfishness, racism, and delusion. Virtually nowhere in the book is there any attempt to explain why conservatives might have rejected the New Deal, or why they might have worried about the growth of state power. Even their anti-communism is derided. Not only is it left entirely unexplained, Huntington mostly chalks it up to conspiratorial thinking. In fact, Huntington employs the word "conspiratorial" or related terms one hundred and eighty nine times throughout the book, almost always as a modifier of "anti-communism." Because what else could lead one to oppose communism but a belief in conspiracy theories, right? [Yes, I know, it's weird that I counted. But I listened to an audiobook version of the book, and was so struck by how many times I heard the word 'conspiratorial' that I had to download the PDF to do a word search.]
October 25, 2021
Some recommend that the audience should not read the book and just skip it. I am of a different opinion - the book is good to read, especially if you are interested in politics and political ideas and movements.
The book examines the influence of the far-right in American politics, their development, and ideology. But the book can also be read as historical material.
The book examines the influence of the far-right in American politics, their development, and ideology. But the book can also be read as historical material.
August 9, 2022
Great look into the centuries old history of conservatism
August 18, 2021
In coming to a rating for Far-Right Vanguard: The Radical Roots of Modern Conservatism by John S Huntington I was torn between basing it strictly on how enjoyable the read was and how well the history is presented or also including how important I think this information is for people to understand right now. Because of the value I place on it I bumped it up slightly.
Many of us have made comments along the lines of how what passes for conservative thought right now is an anomaly and not indicative of "true" conservative thought. Or how there has been a gradual shift, considerably less gradual over the past few decades, to the right so that what was once well right of center is now just to the left of center, which we sometimes blame on the left not standing together enough to stop the insanity. This book lays out the history of how the right has always held these extreme views but tempered them for public consumption. In fact, they have made a point of showing how they don't incorporate their fringe elements while also including the basic concepts those fringe elements advocate.
This is not a "microhistory," this is a detailed history of one of the two major political parties in the United States. Anyone making it sound too narrow is being dismissive because they support those fringe elements. Such as a faux educator on one website who regularly posts one and two star reviews that serve as nothing more than proof that he did not read or engage with the text and holds the far right's beliefs close to his rotting heart.
This is an actual history, something that is often missing when we talk about how and why things are going as they are. These are verifiable facts and well known connections, with quotes that will drop your jaw, though they are just as likely to be heard now as they were in the 30s, 40s, and 50s.
If you want a better idea of how we got here, if you don't mind knowing that your parents' and grandparents' conservatism wasn't nearly as rational as they claim, you need to read this book. The irrationality and cruelty did not start with Reagan or even Trump, it just reached new depths with them. It has been a steady progression ever since FDR and the New Deal scared them into thinking that everyday people might gain the rights they think they already have.
Reviewed from a copy made available by the publisher via NetGalley.
Many of us have made comments along the lines of how what passes for conservative thought right now is an anomaly and not indicative of "true" conservative thought. Or how there has been a gradual shift, considerably less gradual over the past few decades, to the right so that what was once well right of center is now just to the left of center, which we sometimes blame on the left not standing together enough to stop the insanity. This book lays out the history of how the right has always held these extreme views but tempered them for public consumption. In fact, they have made a point of showing how they don't incorporate their fringe elements while also including the basic concepts those fringe elements advocate.
This is not a "microhistory," this is a detailed history of one of the two major political parties in the United States. Anyone making it sound too narrow is being dismissive because they support those fringe elements. Such as a faux educator on one website who regularly posts one and two star reviews that serve as nothing more than proof that he did not read or engage with the text and holds the far right's beliefs close to his rotting heart.
This is an actual history, something that is often missing when we talk about how and why things are going as they are. These are verifiable facts and well known connections, with quotes that will drop your jaw, though they are just as likely to be heard now as they were in the 30s, 40s, and 50s.
If you want a better idea of how we got here, if you don't mind knowing that your parents' and grandparents' conservatism wasn't nearly as rational as they claim, you need to read this book. The irrationality and cruelty did not start with Reagan or even Trump, it just reached new depths with them. It has been a steady progression ever since FDR and the New Deal scared them into thinking that everyday people might gain the rights they think they already have.
Reviewed from a copy made available by the publisher via NetGalley.
December 3, 2021
Really enjoyed this new book from John Huntington. HJ reframes the history of conservatism by arguing that far right or ultraconservatives formed the foot soldiers, networkers/organizers, and energizers of the rise of the conservative movement in the United States. He profiles groups like the Birchers, For America, America First, Christian Crusade, and the Jeffersonian Democrats from the New Deal to the 1968 election, in which George Wallace ran as probably the most successful far right candidate pre-Trump. JH shows how this version of the far right faded in the 70s but also melded into mainstream conservatism, rising up again in the form of talk radio, far right website, the Tea Party, and Trump. HJ does a big service for other historians in tracing this strain of conservatism and showing its relevance to the larger narrative.
One of the big issues in the historiography of conservatism is the extent to which we should draw distinctions between the mainstream, establishment, non-crazy conservatism of Buckley, Friedman, Reagan, the Bushes, and the National Review from the radical and crazy fringes. Huntington differentiates between the radicals and the mainstream but flips the overall script by saying it was the extremists who provided the energy and the organizing power to create a conservative media and political infrastructure that the mainstream could draw on for success. They, for example, were the key backers that got Goldwater to the nomination for the GOP in 64. Of course, the far right can be distinguished from the mainstream because the far-right is openly conspiratorial, rejected both parties for most of this time span, is openly racist, and is fully apocalyptic. It's hard not to see a difference between the ravings and conspiracy-mongering of JH's main characters and the more nuanced positions of the Buckley crowd. Nonetheless, JH offers an important challenge to today's moderate and anti-Trump conservatives who act like he came out of nowhere or that his brand of conservatism is in fact a betrayal of the movement. The crazy has always been there, JH shows, and the mainstream has long played a dangerous game of riding the crazy (or gatekeeping, in academic parlance) while trying to stay in charge and keep the most insane ideas from coming to fruition. As of 2016, they officially failed in that task.
This is definitely a book for academics, but it's concise, well-written, and interesting. Certainly scholars of American politics should pick it up, and I think the generalist in U.S. history would enjoy it as well. A few small critiques: JH sometimes uses language that detracts from objectivity (so and so "crowed). I think the story he tells is powerful enough that this isn't needed. In addition, there are a few times where I would have liked to see him make more thorough connections between the far and mainstream right. He does this in a brief sense in the conclusion, and I'm generally convinced by his argument, but I'd like the see the links nonetheless. None of this detracts from an important and thorough study, of course.
One of the big issues in the historiography of conservatism is the extent to which we should draw distinctions between the mainstream, establishment, non-crazy conservatism of Buckley, Friedman, Reagan, the Bushes, and the National Review from the radical and crazy fringes. Huntington differentiates between the radicals and the mainstream but flips the overall script by saying it was the extremists who provided the energy and the organizing power to create a conservative media and political infrastructure that the mainstream could draw on for success. They, for example, were the key backers that got Goldwater to the nomination for the GOP in 64. Of course, the far right can be distinguished from the mainstream because the far-right is openly conspiratorial, rejected both parties for most of this time span, is openly racist, and is fully apocalyptic. It's hard not to see a difference between the ravings and conspiracy-mongering of JH's main characters and the more nuanced positions of the Buckley crowd. Nonetheless, JH offers an important challenge to today's moderate and anti-Trump conservatives who act like he came out of nowhere or that his brand of conservatism is in fact a betrayal of the movement. The crazy has always been there, JH shows, and the mainstream has long played a dangerous game of riding the crazy (or gatekeeping, in academic parlance) while trying to stay in charge and keep the most insane ideas from coming to fruition. As of 2016, they officially failed in that task.
This is definitely a book for academics, but it's concise, well-written, and interesting. Certainly scholars of American politics should pick it up, and I think the generalist in U.S. history would enjoy it as well. A few small critiques: JH sometimes uses language that detracts from objectivity (so and so "crowed). I think the story he tells is powerful enough that this isn't needed. In addition, there are a few times where I would have liked to see him make more thorough connections between the far and mainstream right. He does this in a brief sense in the conclusion, and I'm generally convinced by his argument, but I'd like the see the links nonetheless. None of this detracts from an important and thorough study, of course.
December 12, 2021
Presne:
"However, numerous right-wing skeptics have voiced concerns about Trump’s effect on conservatism. David Frum, a speechwriter for President George W. Bush and noted Never Trumper, opined, “Trump is changing conservatism into something different. In writing Trump out of the movement, Frum donned the mantle of conservative gatekeeper, reflecting Buckley’s attempt to sideline the Birchers sixty years prior. But Frum repeated Buckley’s mistake by ignoring that “respectable” and radical conservatives draw from the same ideological well.
The only difference is that now ultraconservatives wield legitimate power, and they show little interest in relinquishing their grip. After losing the 2020 presidential election to Democrat Joe Biden, Trump touted debunked conspiracies about voter fraud and filed lawsuits and threatened officials in numerous states in an effort to overturn the election results. His actions were not an aberration or those of an autocratic lone wolf—as this book goes to press, twelve senators and over one hundred members of the U.S. House, all Republicans, have joined Trump’s attempt to undermine democracy by disputing the Electoral College results. Former president Barack Obama summarized the radicalization of modern conservatism and the Republican Party by stating, “This is not normal. These are extraordinary times. And they’re dangerous times.”Whether or not America’s illiberal turn is an ephemeral shock or a sign of dark times ahead, one thing is certain: the midcentury far right laid the foundation for the acerbic conservatism coursing throughout the country today."
"However, numerous right-wing skeptics have voiced concerns about Trump’s effect on conservatism. David Frum, a speechwriter for President George W. Bush and noted Never Trumper, opined, “Trump is changing conservatism into something different. In writing Trump out of the movement, Frum donned the mantle of conservative gatekeeper, reflecting Buckley’s attempt to sideline the Birchers sixty years prior. But Frum repeated Buckley’s mistake by ignoring that “respectable” and radical conservatives draw from the same ideological well.
The only difference is that now ultraconservatives wield legitimate power, and they show little interest in relinquishing their grip. After losing the 2020 presidential election to Democrat Joe Biden, Trump touted debunked conspiracies about voter fraud and filed lawsuits and threatened officials in numerous states in an effort to overturn the election results. His actions were not an aberration or those of an autocratic lone wolf—as this book goes to press, twelve senators and over one hundred members of the U.S. House, all Republicans, have joined Trump’s attempt to undermine democracy by disputing the Electoral College results. Former president Barack Obama summarized the radicalization of modern conservatism and the Republican Party by stating, “This is not normal. These are extraordinary times. And they’re dangerous times.”Whether or not America’s illiberal turn is an ephemeral shock or a sign of dark times ahead, one thing is certain: the midcentury far right laid the foundation for the acerbic conservatism coursing throughout the country today."
October 24, 2022
Huntington has written a very good book on the people who represented the far-right fringe from the New Deal until Nixon's election. There's a lot of really good work on capsule biographies of the major far-right leaders of these decades, as well as histories of how their organizations grew, changed tactics, and sometimes contracted. One of the major focuses of this work is also how all the groups and their leaders interacted, often working together while disagreeing over tactics (especially whether to take over a major political party or to form a third party). Their work popularizing each others' drives and ideas, as well as larger campaigns including Goldwater's and Wallace's presidential runs, served to grow their networks and strengthen the ultraconservative movement even when they lost electorally.
I wish there was more work on the mechanisms of how these leaders mobilized and connected with their rank-and-file members - Huntington is happy to quote speeches and essays, but how this actually reached ears and where the actual people who make up the grass roots of these organizations came from are underdeveloped. I get that the 'little people' of these movements didn't leave their papers to university libraries, but I'd like more work on the connection between these leaders and their followers as more than numbers of readers or people attending a speech. Especially considering how similar all these views are to the modern Republican party, I want to know more about how people were convinced, where they came from, and what they believed and thought before they somehow became radicalized. But as a history of the leaders of the lunatic fringe that has now seized a major party, this is a great, pathbreaking work.
I wish there was more work on the mechanisms of how these leaders mobilized and connected with their rank-and-file members - Huntington is happy to quote speeches and essays, but how this actually reached ears and where the actual people who make up the grass roots of these organizations came from are underdeveloped. I get that the 'little people' of these movements didn't leave their papers to university libraries, but I'd like more work on the connection between these leaders and their followers as more than numbers of readers or people attending a speech. Especially considering how similar all these views are to the modern Republican party, I want to know more about how people were convinced, where they came from, and what they believed and thought before they somehow became radicalized. But as a history of the leaders of the lunatic fringe that has now seized a major party, this is a great, pathbreaking work.
December 27, 2021
Very informative but wades into a very fine level of detail too fast. The epilogue gives some wider-lens perspective but feels rushed. I need to re-read to just get a better handle of this vast cast of characters. Having said that, this book is clearly deeply researched and makes a very solid case for the continuity of ideas (if not maybe the continuity of a group) that fuel a movement, now in firm control of political institutions in the US.
April 5, 2025
Not the easiest read, but absolutely packed with information and history. Clearly a carefully researched picture that actually passes through the veneer of intellectual respectability put forth by some pushing from the right. A wild thing to read while currently experiencing Project 2025 play out.
January 26, 2022
I am undoubtedly the target audience for this book: I studied far-right European politics. While I enjoyed it immensely, I understand that the average reader might not. It is certainly a dense text. I would recommend something lighter for someone hesitant to dive into an academic text on this matter (perhaps The Twilight of Democracy by Anne Applebaum). Back to Huntington's book: the outline of how radical right politics took off in the United States Huntington provides is comprehensive—and amusing to me, as it so clearly is an echo of a global trend. I highly recommend this book for any reader interested in gaining an understanding of the development of populist extreme right radicalism; particularly in the face of our rapidly polarizing political state, this is an incredibly important book.
December 26, 2022
This book follows the rise of unapolegetically right wing politics in the mid-twentieth century in its various faces and iterations.
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