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A Defense of Abortion / Eine Verteidigung der Abtreibung (Englisch/Deutsch): Great Papers Philosophie
Ist das Recht des Fötus auf Leben höher einzuschätzen als das Recht der Mutter auf ihren eigenen Körper? 1971 diskutierte Judith Jarvis Thomson diese Frage in einem berühmten Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie werden ohne Bewusstsein an den Blutkreislauf eines schwer erkrankten berühmten Violinisten angeschlossen, um dessen Leben zu retten. Dürfen Sie sich später entfernen und so den Tod des berühmten Künstlers in Kauf nehmen? Thomson bejaht dies und überträgt das Ergebnis auf die Debatte um Abtreibung. Der klassische Text erscheint hier in neuer Übersetzung und mit einem den Argumentationsgang und die Wirkungsgeschichte rekonstruierenden Kommentar. Die Reihe "Great Papers Philosophie" bietet bahnbrechende Aufsätze der - Eine zeichengenaue, zitierfähige Wiedergabe des Textes (links das fremdsprachige Original, rechts eine neue Übersetzung). - Eine philosophiegeschichtliche Wie dachte man früher über das Problem? Welche Veränderung bewirkte der Aufsatz? Wie denkt man heute darüber? - Eine Analyse des Textes bzw. eine Rekonstruktion seiner Argumentationsstruktur, gefolgt von einem Abschnitt über den Autor sowie ein kommentiertes Literaturverzeichnis. E-Book mit Seitenzählung der gedruckten UB-Ausgabe sowie mit Originalpaginierung.
115 pages, Kindle Edition
Published November 13, 2020
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 30 reviews
November 15, 2021
Why not include philosophy papers in my goodreads goal? The language is so dense that 20 pages of philosophy is like 100 pages of a novel.
Clear paper with interesting examples, and my prof loves talking about how important Thompson and this paper was to the world of ethics.
Clear paper with interesting examples, and my prof loves talking about how important Thompson and this paper was to the world of ethics.
July 28, 2021
1) The comparison the essay makes between claiming that a fetus is the same as a human and claiming that an acorn is the same as an oak tree is excellent and convincing.
2) I like the hypothetical thought experiment of a person being connected to your circulatory system for 9 months without your consent, however unplugging him would make him die, this frames the abortion debate from the right to life to one about competing rights between your bodily autonomy and the other person’s right to life.
3) She brings up a case of competing rights where hypothetically you have the right to life, but you have a fatal disease and the only thing that can cure you of your disease is a celebrity touching your forehead, although you have the right to life you have no right to demand the celebrity fly across the country and touch your forehead.
I think in this case through this hypothetical scenario she’s showing how absurd the right to life taken to the extreme can be.
4) She makes an equivalence between blaming someone for getting pregnant from voluntary intercourse to blaming someone for opening a window which allows a burglar to climb in because the person who opened the window should have bene aware of the risks of crime arising from not securing your home. She says it’s absurd and I agree.
5) She differs the term “right” and what someone “ought” to do. Not doing something you “ought” to do like share your chocolates with your younger brother when you were given all of it while he wasn’t given any at all means that you’re selfish but your younger brother does not have a “right” to your chocolates.
6) She states that there is no law in any country or place where you are required to put yourself in danger to protect someone's life, for example having to fight off the murderer if someone was being murdered. Thus, it makes no sense for there to be a law restricting abortions.
I think what makes this piece so important is that people in support of abortion and people who oppose abortion simply cannot agree on when a fetus is granted personhood. Thus, framing it as a debate over bodily autonomy and competing rights makes this a really groundbreaking piece.
2) I like the hypothetical thought experiment of a person being connected to your circulatory system for 9 months without your consent, however unplugging him would make him die, this frames the abortion debate from the right to life to one about competing rights between your bodily autonomy and the other person’s right to life.
3) She brings up a case of competing rights where hypothetically you have the right to life, but you have a fatal disease and the only thing that can cure you of your disease is a celebrity touching your forehead, although you have the right to life you have no right to demand the celebrity fly across the country and touch your forehead.
I think in this case through this hypothetical scenario she’s showing how absurd the right to life taken to the extreme can be.
4) She makes an equivalence between blaming someone for getting pregnant from voluntary intercourse to blaming someone for opening a window which allows a burglar to climb in because the person who opened the window should have bene aware of the risks of crime arising from not securing your home. She says it’s absurd and I agree.
5) She differs the term “right” and what someone “ought” to do. Not doing something you “ought” to do like share your chocolates with your younger brother when you were given all of it while he wasn’t given any at all means that you’re selfish but your younger brother does not have a “right” to your chocolates.
6) She states that there is no law in any country or place where you are required to put yourself in danger to protect someone's life, for example having to fight off the murderer if someone was being murdered. Thus, it makes no sense for there to be a law restricting abortions.
I think what makes this piece so important is that people in support of abortion and people who oppose abortion simply cannot agree on when a fetus is granted personhood. Thus, framing it as a debate over bodily autonomy and competing rights makes this a really groundbreaking piece.
October 24, 2020
super cool philosophical text. it was very well written; it didnt use archaic or dense language that i usually see when reading philosophy or academic papers. i highly recommend it for anyone interested in new ways of looking at abortion, and how to defend it to people that are vehemently pro-life.
June 16, 2024
Really nice essay, one of the best things I've read in a while, and full of strange analogies that end up making a lot of sense. This is also a great example of defending your position against the strongest version of your opponent's argument. In this case, Thomson defends that abortion is not impermissible even if we were to grant that a fetus is a fully fledged human person from conception, even though she says she doesn't think life begins at conception herself. She mentions how most opponents of abortion simply argue that a fetus is a life, and from that assume from here it's obvious that abortion is impermissible. But her essay shows this line isn't as obvious as they make it out to be.
The author first starts of with the most easily defensible version of the argument, cases of rape, and then builds on this for the rest of her essay. The first case starts by claiming the fetus does have a right to life, but she asks whether this right to life outweighs the mother's conflicting right to bodily autonomy. To test this, she gives us the main analogy she uses in the essay, which is to imagine you are kidnapped and woke up plugged into a dying violinist. The only way to keep this violinist alive is through constant blood transfusions from you to him, as unplugging would kill him. After 9 months, the violinist will have recovered and you can go about your life. In this case, we can agree the violinist has a right to life, but it would seem wrong to ask that because of this right to life, you are not allowed to unplug from him. For Thomson, this case is similar to pregnancy due to rape, as you were initially kidnapped to help the violinist and didn't consent to helping him. Additionally, we see the initial assumption that one's right to life is always sacred is no longer plausible. There seem to be some cases, such as the one above, where a competing right such as bodily autonomy outweighs it.
The next case is one in which the mother's life is in jeopardy from carrying the pregnancy to term. This would be similar to the violinist case above, but this time if you don't unplug from the violinist, you would die. To Thomson, this case is quite intuitive: "If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug yourself from that violinist to save your life." In a case of self-defense like this, you don't seem obligated to value someone else's life over yours.
She then moves to a question which I never thought of before, which is that, in a case of self-defense, whether or not a third party is able to act on your behalf. We can consider an analogy where you are in a tiny house, with a rapidly growing child. The child is growing so fast it will soon crush you. In this case of self-defense, even if the child is innocent, it seems permissible to kill the child before it kills you. However, a third party watching may not be able to make this same decision, as this would be to choose between you and the child. Thomson notes that while the third party doesn't seem to be in a position to decide who lives or dies, the person who is about to be crushed should be able to. This would be similar to a woman performing an abortion on herself in the case that her life is in danger, but not granting a third party can do so.
But Thompson does think that a third party can intervene. She notes that the small house example above isn't exactly the same as a pregnancy, since in a case of pregnancy, the mother owns her own body in which the child is growing. This would be like the mother being the owner of the house in the case above rather than just being in it. For Thompson, the act of ownership here makes it so a third party should choose the owner of the house over the child when the mother's life is at risk. To demonstrate, she gives the following example: "If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat, which he needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also needs to keep him from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says 'I cannot choose between you' when Smith owns the coat." It seems here that the just thing to do is that a third party should give precedence to the owner of the coat when deciding which person to give it to, meaning that a third party should also give precedence to the mother who owns her body when deciding to save her life or the fetus's. However, this doesn't mean the third party is always obligated to act, especially since their action results in a life ending. It just means they can move from "I cannot choose" to "I choose not to act", meaning they or somebody else could act here without being unjust.
She then moves to the case where the mother's life is not at stake. First, she reiterates that we should remember though the violinist has a right to life, this doesn't override your autonomy to unplug yourself from them, since this would be unjust to you. Because of this she makes an amendment to to the right to life: "the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly." In the case before of pregnancy after rape, she notes this seems like a just violation of the right to life. Thus, going forward we should ask if the following cases of abortion are cases of a just violation of the fetus's right to life.
Next she discusses cases of voluntary intercourse, asking that in this case if the fetus have more of a right to use the body. Additionally, since the fetus is dependent on the mother, the mother might have some special responsibility to it, unlike a violinist who is a stranger to her. For this, she gives us 2 example. The first is, imagine that you leave your window open and a burglar enters. It would be odd to say that the burglar can now stay in the house since by opening the window, she is partially responsible for him being there, especially if she took precautions like having bars installed on the windows. Then she asks that instead of a burglar, imagine if "people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery." In this case, you also took precautions, but in the rare case a person-plant drifts in begins to develop, Thomson thinks that they surely they don't have the right to use your house. She notes that there is always more to do to prevent the person-plant from drifting in, you could not have any furniture, for instance. But this starts to seem absurd, as the same could be said that someone who is pregnant from rape should have had a hysterectomy to not be pregnant. In these cases, it seems like if necessary precaution was taken, it is unjust to say that someone is responsible and should raise the child.
She also discusses the possible special relationship parents have for their children, as parents are generally compelled to provide support for their children, as grounds for a similar relationship existing between mother and fetus. This would be different from the violinist who you don't have a special relationship with. Here, she says that this "special responsibility" only exists if one explicitly or implicitly assumes it. For instance, "if a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot not withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it." So in the above case of the person-plant drifting in despite all the precautions, it doesn't seem that any implicit responsibility exists between you and the person-plant. Additionally, just because the mother is biologically related to the fetus also doesn't seem to grant any more of a responsibility than the above case.
Thompson next makes a distinction between actions that are obligatory, and actions that are simply good or nice, but supererogatory. To do this she changes the violin example such that you need to only be attached to him one hour to save his life. Here, she still maintains the principle is the same that your right to your body overrides his right to life whether attached to him for one hour, 9 months, or 9 years. While it would be very indecent of you to let him die since you could save his life at very little cost to yourself, she still maintains it would only be supererogatory rather than obligatory to do so. She compares this to a hypothetical situation where a pregnancy by rape was only 1 hour: "even supposing a case in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to allow the unborn person to use her body for the hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so; we should say that she is self-centered, callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she refuses. The complaints are no less grave, they are just different." However, she notes that this doesn't follow in a 9 month pregnancy. She says that in these cases, someone who does carry the one hour pregnancy might be considered a "minimally decent Samaritan", while someone who carries the full 9 month or 9 year pregnancy might be called a "good Samaritan" or even "excellent Samaritan", as they have done something that might be called good, but not obligatory. However, Thomson seems to think that we should strive to meet the baseline of "minimally decent Samaritan".
The then discusses the possible upshot of her "minimally decent Samaritan" bar that we want to be above, which is that "there may well be cases in which carrying the child to term requires only Minimally Decent Samaritanism of the mother, and this is a standard we must not fall below." For instance, "if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad." While even in this case Thomson would argue that technically there might be a right to have an abortion, this is closer to the analogy of the violinist needing only one hour of transfusions to live, where it would be the minimally decent thing to do to help the violinist. Finally, she notes that there is only a right for an abortion, not to secure the death of the child at any time. For instance, if you unplug yourself from the violinist and he survives, you don't have to right to kill him anyway as he is no longer violating your bodily autonomy. This would be similar to the case where after the child is born in which one no longer has the right to end their life. This might also entail that if the fetus being kept alive by a means outside the mothers body, such as by some sort of machine, it would not be permissible to abort the fetus in this case.
This is the end of her essay, though I wanted to talk about one aspect of her discussion of the one hour, 9 month, and 9 year pregnancy that I found interesting. Thomson starts with the intuition that because asking you to stay attached to the violinist for 9 months is unintuitive, we can say the right of bodily autonomy is stronger than the violinist's right to life here. She then maintains this is also true for the one hour case. However, I wonder if one could make the opposite move to say that because it's intuitive to think that asking to stay attached to the violinist for one hour to save it is good, we must maintain that this is also true for the 9 month case. This might be reminiscent of a consequentialist perspective, such as one popularized by Peter Singer. He famously gives the example of if you see one child drowning in a pond, it intuitively seems obligatory you jump in and save it at little cost to yourself, even if you ruin the expensive suit you're wearing. He then expands this to all people, saying it's always obligatory to make a smaller sacrifice if it has a much larger positive consequence like saving lives. If Singer were to analyze the violinist case, he might say that for both the one hour and 9 month case, you are obligated to sacrifice something minimal in order to save the life of the violinist. This makes me wonder how we can reconcile moving in either direction based on our initial intuitions being plausible.
Overall this is a really thought provoking essay. It is also easily readable, short, and free online: https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vance....
The author first starts of with the most easily defensible version of the argument, cases of rape, and then builds on this for the rest of her essay. The first case starts by claiming the fetus does have a right to life, but she asks whether this right to life outweighs the mother's conflicting right to bodily autonomy. To test this, she gives us the main analogy she uses in the essay, which is to imagine you are kidnapped and woke up plugged into a dying violinist. The only way to keep this violinist alive is through constant blood transfusions from you to him, as unplugging would kill him. After 9 months, the violinist will have recovered and you can go about your life. In this case, we can agree the violinist has a right to life, but it would seem wrong to ask that because of this right to life, you are not allowed to unplug from him. For Thomson, this case is similar to pregnancy due to rape, as you were initially kidnapped to help the violinist and didn't consent to helping him. Additionally, we see the initial assumption that one's right to life is always sacred is no longer plausible. There seem to be some cases, such as the one above, where a competing right such as bodily autonomy outweighs it.
The next case is one in which the mother's life is in jeopardy from carrying the pregnancy to term. This would be similar to the violinist case above, but this time if you don't unplug from the violinist, you would die. To Thomson, this case is quite intuitive: "If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug yourself from that violinist to save your life." In a case of self-defense like this, you don't seem obligated to value someone else's life over yours.
She then moves to a question which I never thought of before, which is that, in a case of self-defense, whether or not a third party is able to act on your behalf. We can consider an analogy where you are in a tiny house, with a rapidly growing child. The child is growing so fast it will soon crush you. In this case of self-defense, even if the child is innocent, it seems permissible to kill the child before it kills you. However, a third party watching may not be able to make this same decision, as this would be to choose between you and the child. Thomson notes that while the third party doesn't seem to be in a position to decide who lives or dies, the person who is about to be crushed should be able to. This would be similar to a woman performing an abortion on herself in the case that her life is in danger, but not granting a third party can do so.
But Thompson does think that a third party can intervene. She notes that the small house example above isn't exactly the same as a pregnancy, since in a case of pregnancy, the mother owns her own body in which the child is growing. This would be like the mother being the owner of the house in the case above rather than just being in it. For Thompson, the act of ownership here makes it so a third party should choose the owner of the house over the child when the mother's life is at risk. To demonstrate, she gives the following example: "If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat, which he needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also needs to keep him from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says 'I cannot choose between you' when Smith owns the coat." It seems here that the just thing to do is that a third party should give precedence to the owner of the coat when deciding which person to give it to, meaning that a third party should also give precedence to the mother who owns her body when deciding to save her life or the fetus's. However, this doesn't mean the third party is always obligated to act, especially since their action results in a life ending. It just means they can move from "I cannot choose" to "I choose not to act", meaning they or somebody else could act here without being unjust.
She then moves to the case where the mother's life is not at stake. First, she reiterates that we should remember though the violinist has a right to life, this doesn't override your autonomy to unplug yourself from them, since this would be unjust to you. Because of this she makes an amendment to to the right to life: "the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly." In the case before of pregnancy after rape, she notes this seems like a just violation of the right to life. Thus, going forward we should ask if the following cases of abortion are cases of a just violation of the fetus's right to life.
Next she discusses cases of voluntary intercourse, asking that in this case if the fetus have more of a right to use the body. Additionally, since the fetus is dependent on the mother, the mother might have some special responsibility to it, unlike a violinist who is a stranger to her. For this, she gives us 2 example. The first is, imagine that you leave your window open and a burglar enters. It would be odd to say that the burglar can now stay in the house since by opening the window, she is partially responsible for him being there, especially if she took precautions like having bars installed on the windows. Then she asks that instead of a burglar, imagine if "people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery." In this case, you also took precautions, but in the rare case a person-plant drifts in begins to develop, Thomson thinks that they surely they don't have the right to use your house. She notes that there is always more to do to prevent the person-plant from drifting in, you could not have any furniture, for instance. But this starts to seem absurd, as the same could be said that someone who is pregnant from rape should have had a hysterectomy to not be pregnant. In these cases, it seems like if necessary precaution was taken, it is unjust to say that someone is responsible and should raise the child.
She also discusses the possible special relationship parents have for their children, as parents are generally compelled to provide support for their children, as grounds for a similar relationship existing between mother and fetus. This would be different from the violinist who you don't have a special relationship with. Here, she says that this "special responsibility" only exists if one explicitly or implicitly assumes it. For instance, "if a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot not withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it." So in the above case of the person-plant drifting in despite all the precautions, it doesn't seem that any implicit responsibility exists between you and the person-plant. Additionally, just because the mother is biologically related to the fetus also doesn't seem to grant any more of a responsibility than the above case.
Thompson next makes a distinction between actions that are obligatory, and actions that are simply good or nice, but supererogatory. To do this she changes the violin example such that you need to only be attached to him one hour to save his life. Here, she still maintains the principle is the same that your right to your body overrides his right to life whether attached to him for one hour, 9 months, or 9 years. While it would be very indecent of you to let him die since you could save his life at very little cost to yourself, she still maintains it would only be supererogatory rather than obligatory to do so. She compares this to a hypothetical situation where a pregnancy by rape was only 1 hour: "even supposing a case in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to allow the unborn person to use her body for the hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so; we should say that she is self-centered, callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she refuses. The complaints are no less grave, they are just different." However, she notes that this doesn't follow in a 9 month pregnancy. She says that in these cases, someone who does carry the one hour pregnancy might be considered a "minimally decent Samaritan", while someone who carries the full 9 month or 9 year pregnancy might be called a "good Samaritan" or even "excellent Samaritan", as they have done something that might be called good, but not obligatory. However, Thomson seems to think that we should strive to meet the baseline of "minimally decent Samaritan".
The then discusses the possible upshot of her "minimally decent Samaritan" bar that we want to be above, which is that "there may well be cases in which carrying the child to term requires only Minimally Decent Samaritanism of the mother, and this is a standard we must not fall below." For instance, "if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad." While even in this case Thomson would argue that technically there might be a right to have an abortion, this is closer to the analogy of the violinist needing only one hour of transfusions to live, where it would be the minimally decent thing to do to help the violinist. Finally, she notes that there is only a right for an abortion, not to secure the death of the child at any time. For instance, if you unplug yourself from the violinist and he survives, you don't have to right to kill him anyway as he is no longer violating your bodily autonomy. This would be similar to the case where after the child is born in which one no longer has the right to end their life. This might also entail that if the fetus being kept alive by a means outside the mothers body, such as by some sort of machine, it would not be permissible to abort the fetus in this case.
This is the end of her essay, though I wanted to talk about one aspect of her discussion of the one hour, 9 month, and 9 year pregnancy that I found interesting. Thomson starts with the intuition that because asking you to stay attached to the violinist for 9 months is unintuitive, we can say the right of bodily autonomy is stronger than the violinist's right to life here. She then maintains this is also true for the one hour case. However, I wonder if one could make the opposite move to say that because it's intuitive to think that asking to stay attached to the violinist for one hour to save it is good, we must maintain that this is also true for the 9 month case. This might be reminiscent of a consequentialist perspective, such as one popularized by Peter Singer. He famously gives the example of if you see one child drowning in a pond, it intuitively seems obligatory you jump in and save it at little cost to yourself, even if you ruin the expensive suit you're wearing. He then expands this to all people, saying it's always obligatory to make a smaller sacrifice if it has a much larger positive consequence like saving lives. If Singer were to analyze the violinist case, he might say that for both the one hour and 9 month case, you are obligated to sacrifice something minimal in order to save the life of the violinist. This makes me wonder how we can reconcile moving in either direction based on our initial intuitions being plausible.
Overall this is a really thought provoking essay. It is also easily readable, short, and free online: https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vance....
December 21, 2022
Thomson pursues the line of thinking that a pro-choicer can take if they assume (for the sake of argument) that an embryo is a human from the point of pregnancy. The result is a fascinating line of argumentation, which disappointedly, she doesn't argue sufficiently (in my opinion). Most notably, she asserts that the embryo doesn't have a right to the mother's body, gives an analogy, and leaves it at that. Um, while I tend to agree with her conclusion, the jump from the analogy to conclusion is far from trivial (and honestly, is unclear at best and has some glaring holes at worst). I'll explore this further and maybe post notes. Okay bye.
September 24, 2021
It's a good reading , but I think Thomson played with a circular argument and misleading ones , the example of the violinist doesn't fit completely on the child mother case , there is many factors whose are involved in abortion should be discussed more closely.
July 2, 2021
Džudit je bila cenjeni američki filozof, uglavnom okrenuta etici i metafizici.
U ovom eseju izložila je svoje argumente u korist medicinske prakse abortusa, kao ženskog prava na reproduktivno zdravlje. Kroz analogiju sa hipotetičkom situacijom ''moralne dužnosti'' spašavanja violiniste kojem otkazuju bubrezi, a vi mu jedino odgovarate po analizi krvi, Džudit objašnjava razliku između toga da ste vezani za violinistu sat vremena i devet meseci ili devet godina. U prvom slučaju, bilo bi moralno nepristojno odbiti žrtvovati svoje telo i vreme za život druge osobe, a u drugom slučaju niko nema pravo da korsiti vaše telo bez vaše dozvole. Naravno, uzima ona u obzir ''specijalne vrste odgovornosti'' majke prema detetu, ali takav odnos se uspostavlja tek nakon što se dete rodi. Pravi i analogiju sa biblijskom pričom o dobrom Samarićaninu i spominje i užasan zločin nad Kiti Đenoveze kad je 38-oro ljudi svedočilo tom ubistvu ne čineći ništa!
U ovom eseju izložila je svoje argumente u korist medicinske prakse abortusa, kao ženskog prava na reproduktivno zdravlje. Kroz analogiju sa hipotetičkom situacijom ''moralne dužnosti'' spašavanja violiniste kojem otkazuju bubrezi, a vi mu jedino odgovarate po analizi krvi, Džudit objašnjava razliku između toga da ste vezani za violinistu sat vremena i devet meseci ili devet godina. U prvom slučaju, bilo bi moralno nepristojno odbiti žrtvovati svoje telo i vreme za život druge osobe, a u drugom slučaju niko nema pravo da korsiti vaše telo bez vaše dozvole. Naravno, uzima ona u obzir ''specijalne vrste odgovornosti'' majke prema detetu, ali takav odnos se uspostavlja tek nakon što se dete rodi. Pravi i analogiju sa biblijskom pričom o dobrom Samarićaninu i spominje i užasan zločin nad Kiti Đenoveze kad je 38-oro ljudi svedočilo tom ubistvu ne čineći ništa!
December 7, 2025
why women should have the RIGHT to get an abortion for dummies.
honestly it’s like a person who does not want to change. Their opinion will never change their opinion and even if it’s presented to them in a very easy fashion. So while I do think that this paper is actually really good. I mean the way I read it, and I was like it’s a good read, but it’s not gonna reach the audience that it desperately needs to reach so it’s just sort of like it’s a very sad thing that’s happening. Basically, because while I love this paper, I’m very sure that the people were supposed to actually read it and maybe question there way of thinking a bit. I just read the first 23 pages and they’re gonna be like oh well fuck this. So yeah, overall a good, yes.
honestly it’s like a person who does not want to change. Their opinion will never change their opinion and even if it’s presented to them in a very easy fashion. So while I do think that this paper is actually really good. I mean the way I read it, and I was like it’s a good read, but it’s not gonna reach the audience that it desperately needs to reach so it’s just sort of like it’s a very sad thing that’s happening. Basically, because while I love this paper, I’m very sure that the people were supposed to actually read it and maybe question there way of thinking a bit. I just read the first 23 pages and they’re gonna be like oh well fuck this. So yeah, overall a good, yes.
May 29, 2025
Short yet powerful. Judith presents us with multiple thought provoking hypothetical situations which allows any reader who may be on the fence regarding abortion a way of looking at the topic from a different lens. Had to read this for my philosophy class and I’m glad I did!
February 13, 2025
Initial Premise That Thomson Aims To Make Irrelevant: "the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception."
According to Thomson, premises that attempt to conclude when a fetus becomes a human being rely on arbitrary drawing a line in which before the line, the fetus is not a person, and after the line, the fetus is a person. The issue with this is not only that the line is arbitrary but that this attempt is absurd when applied to other scenarios: take, for example, the process of an acorn becoming an oak tree. It would be wrong to claim that an acorn is an oak tree.
Nonetheless, even if this premise is resolved and agreed upon, it does not follow that abortion is immediately morally impermissible.
The Unconscious Violinist Argument:
To Thomson, the individual whose kidneys are being used has every right to storm out of the hospital and allow the violinist to die; but why does she say this?
Thomson begins by making a distinction between rights and oughts: to have a right to do something is to have a justifiable claim to act without interference, while to ought to do something is to have a moral obligation to act, even if one has the right not to. From this distinct, what rights do we have?
While not explicitly stated in the argument, I would claim that Thomson implicitly claims the existence of the right to property.
Most people would agree, and even if they do not agree, I am sure they are intuitively attracted to the idea that each individual has a right to life. However, it can be challenging to argue for a direct right to life without an appeal to religion; as well as, it can be challenging to define the parameters of a right to life. With these issues at play, a right to property is a much more attractable starting point.
Quoted from the Mises Institute,
With a right to property present, a right to life is implied.
When property rights are executable, extortion and slavery is prevented. But the moment property rights are not deemed worthy of acceptance, A can extort B without any sort of consequence.
However, just as one might be able to claim property rights, it is not such that there are cases in which one ought to do something. For example, consider the following: A town is reliant on a creek that provides the citizens with water. If person A owns the creek, they do have the right to fence off the creek and not provide the town with any sort of water. But to do such a thing would be ridding the rest of the town from a necessary resource. Therefore, person A ought to provide the water as a good for others to purchase and share.
Thomson demands that society accepts this right to property as it is intuitive and preventive, but even so, this does not mean that an individual must exercise the absolute value of the right to property at all times.
While it might be said that the individual ought to allow the unconscious violinist to use his kidneys for a few hours or a few days, it would be absurd to assume that the unconscious violinist use the individual's kidneys for weeks, months, or years.
From this discussion a counter-arguments presents itself: the act of indulging in intercourse affirms consent for the fetus to utilize the space and resources of the mother. To respond to this, Thomson writes,
From these analogies, it is most logical to claim that there are indeed particular cases in which abortion is morally permissible; for it is absurd to say that all cases of intercourse involve an explicit invitation to the fetus to utilize the mother's resources.
But even if there is a case of explicit invitation, based on the idea of self-ownership, the moment the mother no longer consents, the fetus is treated as an unjust user of the mother's resources.
Nonetheless, Thomson is by no means in support of late-term abortions (and I fully agree). While it might be consistent with the legality of self-ownership, it should not be considered moral: for the mother to put off evicting the fetus until the very end is undeniably irresponsible and inconsiderate. And moreover, if the late-term abortion fails and the child lives, the mother is by no means in power to secure death of the child.
Post-Discussion Note: Thomson's argument closely resembles the position of evictionism (a libertarian-backed compromise to the pro-choice versus pro-life argument). A comprehensive writing of this position is attached.
According to Thomson, premises that attempt to conclude when a fetus becomes a human being rely on arbitrary drawing a line in which before the line, the fetus is not a person, and after the line, the fetus is a person. The issue with this is not only that the line is arbitrary but that this attempt is absurd when applied to other scenarios: take, for example, the process of an acorn becoming an oak tree. It would be wrong to claim that an acorn is an oak tree.
Nonetheless, even if this premise is resolved and agreed upon, it does not follow that abortion is immediately morally impermissible.
The Unconscious Violinist Argument:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says, "Tough luck, I agree, but now you've got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him."
To Thomson, the individual whose kidneys are being used has every right to storm out of the hospital and allow the violinist to die; but why does she say this?
Thomson begins by making a distinction between rights and oughts: to have a right to do something is to have a justifiable claim to act without interference, while to ought to do something is to have a moral obligation to act, even if one has the right not to. From this distinct, what rights do we have?
While not explicitly stated in the argument, I would claim that Thomson implicitly claims the existence of the right to property.
Most people would agree, and even if they do not agree, I am sure they are intuitively attracted to the idea that each individual has a right to life. However, it can be challenging to argue for a direct right to life without an appeal to religion; as well as, it can be challenging to define the parameters of a right to life. With these issues at play, a right to property is a much more attractable starting point.
Quoted from the Mises Institute,
"The right to self-ownership asserts the absolute right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being a human being, to 'own' his or her own body; that is, to control that body free of coercive interference. Since each individual must think, learn, value, and choose his or her ends and means in order to survive and flourish, the right to self-ownership gives man the right to perform... these vital activities without being hampered and restricted by coercive molestation."
With a right to property present, a right to life is implied.
When property rights are executable, extortion and slavery is prevented. But the moment property rights are not deemed worthy of acceptance, A can extort B without any sort of consequence.
However, just as one might be able to claim property rights, it is not such that there are cases in which one ought to do something. For example, consider the following: A town is reliant on a creek that provides the citizens with water. If person A owns the creek, they do have the right to fence off the creek and not provide the town with any sort of water. But to do such a thing would be ridding the rest of the town from a necessary resource. Therefore, person A ought to provide the water as a good for others to purchase and share.
Thomson demands that society accepts this right to property as it is intuitive and preventive, but even so, this does not mean that an individual must exercise the absolute value of the right to property at all times.
While it might be said that the individual ought to allow the unconscious violinist to use his kidneys for a few hours or a few days, it would be absurd to assume that the unconscious violinist use the individual's kidneys for weeks, months, or years.
From this discussion a counter-arguments presents itself: the act of indulging in intercourse affirms consent for the fetus to utilize the space and resources of the mother. To respond to this, Thomson writes,
If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say, "Ah, now he can stay, she's given him a right to the use of her house—for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle.'' It would be still more absurd to say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we imagine it is not a burglar who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in. Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not—despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective. Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this won't do—for by the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving home without a (reliable!) army.
From these analogies, it is most logical to claim that there are indeed particular cases in which abortion is morally permissible; for it is absurd to say that all cases of intercourse involve an explicit invitation to the fetus to utilize the mother's resources.
But even if there is a case of explicit invitation, based on the idea of self-ownership, the moment the mother no longer consents, the fetus is treated as an unjust user of the mother's resources.
Nonetheless, Thomson is by no means in support of late-term abortions (and I fully agree). While it might be consistent with the legality of self-ownership, it should not be considered moral: for the mother to put off evicting the fetus until the very end is undeniably irresponsible and inconsiderate. And moreover, if the late-term abortion fails and the child lives, the mother is by no means in power to secure death of the child.
Post-Discussion Note: Thomson's argument closely resembles the position of evictionism (a libertarian-backed compromise to the pro-choice versus pro-life argument). A comprehensive writing of this position is attached.
April 2, 2024
L'argomento del violinista è l'argomentazione più idiota che la mente umana potesse mai partorire.
July 13, 2022
written a bit repetitively, chunky
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. [If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but] in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.
argues that it is unjust and deeply immoral to force someone to give up their own autonomy to save another “persons” life even if it makes you look bad, therefore IF the fetus is a person (which it isn’t) it would be morally ok to “end” its life aka get an abortion
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. [If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but] in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.
argues that it is unjust and deeply immoral to force someone to give up their own autonomy to save another “persons” life even if it makes you look bad, therefore IF the fetus is a person (which it isn’t) it would be morally ok to “end” its life aka get an abortion
August 7, 2025
statpadding(?)
this is the first book where I have highlighted so well, taken so many notes, and just thought about the content to the degree I have so far. In the past, I would've sped through and called it a day. I'm still gathering information, so my contention is not complete yet; hopefully it will be my first post on my blog.
most arguments pro-choice these days don't really go into the choice part and instead argue the personhood of a zygote, or fetus, and whatnot. refreshing, but it's also one of the two main abortion essays? from 1971?
will now read Marquis' argument. I will say though, the "pro-life" argument is a lot easier to defend, because it's so easy to just say > conception = life > killing innocent life is bad > therefore abortion is bad.
this is the first book where I have highlighted so well, taken so many notes, and just thought about the content to the degree I have so far. In the past, I would've sped through and called it a day. I'm still gathering information, so my contention is not complete yet; hopefully it will be my first post on my blog.
most arguments pro-choice these days don't really go into the choice part and instead argue the personhood of a zygote, or fetus, and whatnot. refreshing, but it's also one of the two main abortion essays? from 1971?
will now read Marquis' argument. I will say though, the "pro-life" argument is a lot easier to defend, because it's so easy to just say > conception = life > killing innocent life is bad > therefore abortion is bad.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 28, 2023
might as well add this paper to my goodreads since it is just that good and everyone should read this before formulating their view on abortion and debating it with others. there is no wonder why this paper is so groundbreaking, it’s absolutely brilliant. thomson has such a succinct way of explaining her points and she provides excellent analogies to support her claims. i cannot wait to use this paper as a reference in future debates. this is an essential read for those in our modern times. plz plz plz read it !!
June 5, 2024
Das Buch gibt sehr gute Strategien, wie man mit Pro Life Idiots argumentieren kann. Was man beim Buch beachten muss ist das es Anfang der 70er Jahre veröffentlicht wurde, darum einige Themen und Ansichten nicht geteilt werden. Laut Prof. Sliwa war Thomson die erste renommierte Autorin, die das erste mal aus der Perspektive der Person, die den Ball of 'life' trägt, schreibt. Geht schnell zum lesen und ist eine gute Einführung in die Argumentation zum Thema Abtreibung. Wird in paar Monaten nochmals gelesen
April 16, 2025
This is one of the most profound and essential philosophical works dealing with the ethicality of abortion and an absolute must read for pro choice advocates. The biological argument is a losing battle (not for any lack of veracity but out of dogmatic stubbornness). To challenge the narrative by ceding the point and questioning that even if life were to begin at conception (which Thomson does dispute) is clever and does a masterful job in articulating the shortcoming of the pro life argument even if extrapolated to its extreme. The arguments presented are well thought out and terse, albeit imperfect. For a first of its kind, such imperfections are more than acceptable as the ideas introduces are thought-provoking and have only continued to be built upon in the field of ethics.
It's a short read and absolutely worth your time.
It's a short read and absolutely worth your time.
May 1, 2023
I would recommend this to people who are trying to expand their knowledge of the debate around abortion and people who are trying to find ways to support their (pro-abortion)stance on it.
I think that because this uses something other than whether the fetus is a person to form arguments and because of the analogies, this book would be very helpful for that.
I think that because this uses something other than whether the fetus is a person to form arguments and because of the analogies, this book would be very helpful for that.
October 5, 2023
Really interesting read but I feel like at certain parts it was dense, repetitive, and missed the mark. What does a violinist have to do with reproductive rights??? I feel like Thompson could've articulated certain aspects of their argument better and made it clearer to readers what exactly they were attempting to convey. 3.5 stars.
Read
June 7, 2022tbh by this same logic it is not unjust for others to refuse vaccines to potentially save the lives of others and idk if this means Thomson is missing a qualification or if I just need to accept a truth that immediately feels demonstrably false
March 16, 2023
Read for my Bioethics course, as an exemplary reading of philosophical arguments. Cleared up logical fallacies on the most used arguments in the abortion discussion and demonstrated how to present strong and valid arguments.
December 6, 2024
It’s nice to read and definitely something that most if not all people should think about. For me personally it got most interesting once I understood that abortion isn’t just about wants or not wants it’s as well about rights and needs and justifies.
Recommendation !
Recommendation !
Read
January 29, 2025A very well thought out essay. I appreciated that Thomson brought up valid arguments from both sides and then came to the conclusion after deliberating. The train of thought is easy to follow and thought provoking. Overall well written.
May 18, 2024
4/5
Ich finde Thomsons Argumentation sehr schlüssig und nachvollziehbar.
Ich finde Thomsons Argumentation sehr schlüssig und nachvollziehbar.
March 24, 2025
Disappointed that trolleys weren’t mentioned a single time.
December 6, 2025
The BEST Defense of Abortion.. Must Read
April 24, 2023
« Les antiavortements sont tellement déterminés à établir l’indépendance du fœtus, en vue d’établir son droit à la vie sur un pied d’égalité avec celui de la mère, qu’ils ont tendance à négliger les soutiens qu’ils pourraient gagner en faisant valoir que le fœtus est au contraire dépendant de la mère, pour ainsi inférer qu’elle a à ce titre une responsabilité toute particulière, une responsabilité qui donne à l’enfant à naître des droits sur elle DONT NE DISPOSE AUCUNE PERSONNE AUTONOME”
— Tout a été dit.
— Tout a été dit.
May 29, 2023
Les débats entre pro-choice et pro-life se résument souvent à savoir si le fœtus est un être humain ou non. Judith Thomson prend au sérieux l'argument pro-life selon lequel le fœtus est un être humain, et décide d'argumenter en faveur du droit à l'avortement sur les mêmes prémisses que ses opposant.e.s.
December 18, 2022
First read: 4 stars
Second read: 5 stars
Second read: 5 stars
September 13, 2023
j’ai trouvé le livre très intéressant et j’ai aimé le fait que l’autrice se base sur le point de vue des pro-life. j’ai aussi trouvé la comparaison au violoniste intéressante
July 8, 2024
Definitely made many disagreeable points but all in all one of the best pieces of provocative, practical philosophy I have read.
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