The March of Autocracy: Australia's Fateful Choices

Australian Foreign Affairs #11

by Jonathan Pearlman (Editor), Priya Chacko (Contributor), Liam Cochrane (Contributor)

‘China is an emergent empire of a kind never seen before … It’s not a gunpowder or dreadnought battleship or B-52 bomber empire. It’s an information empire, propelled by commercial interests.’ –John Keane
The eleventh issue of Australian Foreign Affairs examines the rise of authoritarian and illiberal leaders, whose growing assertiveness is reshaping the Western-led world order. The March of Autocracy explores the challenge for Australia as it enters a new era, in which China’s sway increases and democracies compete with their rivals for global influence.

John Keane probes Western misconceptions about China to show why its emerging empire might be more resilient than believed.
Natasha Kassam & Darren Lim explore how Xi’s China model is reshaping the global order.
Sam Roggeveen considers Washington’s stance on China and whether Biden can seek to restore US primacy.
Linda Jaivin discusses how Australia might use its strengths as a middle power to combat China’s influence.
Huong Le Thu suggests how Australia can improve its South-East Asian ties.
Kate Geraghty lays bare the horrific impact that war can have on women.
Melissa Conley Tyler reveals the crippling impact of Australia’s underfunding of diplomacy.
PLUS Correspondence on AFA10: Friends, Allies and Enemies from Charles Edel, Rikki Kersten and more.

Genres: Nonfiction

141 pages, Kindle Edition

First published February 22, 2021

Reviews

[Lisa · Rating 4 out of 5]

A lot has happened since this edition of Australian Foreign Affairs landed in my post box last year, but still, the first essay, 'Enter the Dragon, Decoding the new Chinese empire' offers interesting insights.  Written well before the Pelosi stunt and the backlash from China, it made me suspect something that I haven't read anywhere in the mainstream media or even at John Menadue's Pearls and Irritations.  What if all that firepower wasn't intended to 'punish' or 'threaten' but was a signal to China's domestic audience?  What if it was meant to show them what China could do, if it chose?  The Chinese people have endured two centuries of humiliation — what if the agenda was really to assert that China is confidently en route to world pre-eminence (and that a militarily overstretched and fiscally overburdened America can't do much about that?)

John Keane, professor of politics at the University of Sydney is the author of The Life and Death of Democracy.  It's 992 pages long; I'm never going to read it.  But I can read his essay instead, and it makes compelling reading.  'Enter the Dragon, Decoding the new Chinese empire' isn't an apology for a China we don't much like. It's about facing up to a reality rather than indulging in wishful thinking.  It's about addressing misconceptions that are dangerous:

Like bellows to a fire, fallacies about China are inflaming controversies and stoking divisions.  These misconceptions are dangerous because they spread confusion, attract simpletons, poison public life and blur political judgements.  (p.8)

The first fallacy that Keane addresses is that China is commonly said to have a totalitarian political system.  Strictly speaking, he writes:

... totalitarianism refers to a one-party political order ruled by violence, a single "glorious myth" ideology, all-purpose terror and compulsory mass rallies.  The bulk of Chinese people would say that daily life in their country just isn't like that.  The Mao days are over. (p.8)

China is ruled, says Keane, by a 'phantom democracy' put in place by leaders who seek to win the loyalty of the population.  They know that mere power does not enable enduring rule.  They know that the symbols of economic progress aren't enough either.  They reject power-sharing, but they mimic electoral democracies.  President Xi practises the common touch with well-crafted "surprise" appearances with the people.  There are village elections and the spread of "consultative democracy" into city administration and business.  They use digital media to shape public opinion via a giant information-gathering apparatus...

...which uses data-harvesting algorithms to send summaries of internet chatter to officials in real time, often with advice about terms to use and avoid during public brouhahas. (p.11)

China's leaders know that government stability rests on public opinion.  

Ignored by those who view China as a country run by totalitarian bullies and authoritarian autocrats, this principle is of utmost importance in grasping that the new Chinese despotism is equipped with shock absorbers, and therefore more resilient and durable than many suppose. (p.12)

...the rulers of China acknowledge that power doesn't ultimately flow from the barrels of guns, or from Xingjiang-style interrogations, arrests and internments.  They admit that little sustains the political order beyond the population's loyalty — their willingness to believe that the system addresses their complaints, and that democracy with Chinese characteristics is therefore better than its ailing 'liberal' alternative. (p.12)

The second set of misconceptions addresses China's burgeoning global role. Like America, China abhors the term 'empire', but (like America), that's what it is. Already.

[Empire] is the word that's needed to describe accurately China's rising global role in such fields as finance capital, technology innovation, logistics, and diplomatic, military and cultural power. (p.14)

To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2022/08/14/e...