When France Fell: The Vichy Crisis and the Fate of the Anglo-American Alliance

by Michael S. Neiberg

Shocked by the fall of France in 1940, panicked US leaders rushed to back the Vichy government--a fateful decision that nearly destroyed the Anglo-American alliance.



According to US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the "most shocking single event" of World War II was not the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but rather the fall of France in spring 1940. Michael Neiberg offers a dramatic history of the American response--a policy marked by panic and moral ineptitude, which placed the United States in league with fascism and nearly ruined the alliance with Britain.

The successful Nazi invasion of France destabilized American planners' strategic assumptions. At home, the result was huge increases in defense spending, the advent of peacetime military conscription, and domestic spying to weed out potential fifth columnists. Abroad, the United States decided to work with Vichy France despite its pro-Nazi tendencies. The US-Vichy partnership, intended to buy time and temper the flames of war in Europe, severely strained Anglo-American relations. American leaders naively believed that they could woo men like Philippe P�tain, preventing France from becoming a formal German ally. The British, however, understood that Vichy was subservient to Nazi Germany and instead supported resistance figures such as Charles de Gaulle. After the war, the choice to back Vichy tainted US-French relations for decades.

Our collective memory of World War II as a period of American strength overlooks the desperation and faulty decision-making that drove US policy from 1940 to 1943. Tracing the key diplomatic and strategic moves of these formative years, Shadow of Liberty gives us a more nuanced and complete understanding of the war and of the global position the United States would occupy afterward.

Genres: History, World War II, France, Nonfiction, Military History, American History, Politics

320 pages, Hardcover

First published October 19, 2021

About the author

Michael S. Neiberg is the Stimson Chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He has also taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy and the University of Southern Mississippi.

Reviews

[Ian · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a diplomatic rather than a military history, focusing on the U.S. Government’s recognition of, and indeed backing for, the Vichy France regime in preference to the Free French during WW2, a policy that continued for a surprisingly long time. I found it an unexpectedly interesting read.

As many people know, after WW1 the US reduced spending on national defence to an absolute minimum, since in the 1920s the country faced no existential threats. Even when renewed threats began to emerge from Germany and Japan, they seemed remote to Americans. In any case, the French Army would take care of its German counterpart, or so everyone thought.

The collapse of France in May/June 1940 sowed total confusion within the US Government. The British immediately wrote off the Vichy regime as collaborationist and recognised De Gaulle and the FF as the legitimate government of France. For the US, not yet at war, the choice was less obvious. Their main priority was over the control of the French Navy, which remained intact and undefeated. If Germany got its hands on the French fleet, it would mean them gaining a world class navy to add to an all-conquering army. There was also the Caribbean island of Martinique, where there was a large French naval base. Basically the US Government decided to recognise the Vichy regime and to use American economic power to try to moderate its behaviour, with the ultimate aim of ensuring Vichy did not openly join the Axis powers. The US supplied food and oil to Vichy France, subject to an inspection regime to ensure these supplies were not transferred to Germany.

Dr. Neiberg suggests that US diplomats developed an intense mistrust of De Gaulle, and allowed their personal issues to get in the way of a dispassionate assessment of policy. They maintained a strong commitment to Vichy despite ever mounting evidence of the regime’s increasing closeness to Nazi Germany.

A surprising incident arose over the French ruled islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which lie just off the coast of Newfoundland. The islands had no military forces though there was a radio transmitter which the Vichy governor used to broadcast Axis propaganda to French-speakers in Canada. On Christmas Eve 1941 De Gaulle sent troops to occupy the islands. U.S Secretary of State Cordell Hull reacted with fury to the news, denouncing it as a breach of the Monroe Doctrine and making a hyperbolic comparison between the FF and the Nazis. Astonishingly, he demanded the Canadian government send military forces to restore the Vichy regime. According to Lester B. Pearson, a future Canadian PM, Hull was bluntly told that Canada was not a banana republic that could be ordered around by the US. In the end, Hull was forced to back down by Roosevelt, for whom the relationship with Britain took priority over the relationship with Vichy.

During Operation Torch, some Vichy generals ordered their forces to resist the Allied landings, until US generals cut a deal with Admiral Darlan, the Vichy commander. Under the deal Darlan was left in charge of French North Africa. The Vichy regime even refused to repeal the antisemitic laws it had introduced. The deal was concluded for pragmatic military reasons but it horrified the American public (not to mention the Free French and the French Resistance). One prominent American journalist wondered whether the deal with Darlan meant that Vidkun Quisling would be put in charge of a liberated Norway. On hearing news of the deal, Eisenhower remarked that he needed a good assassin, (and he got his wish).

There is some evidence to suggest that the US maintained contact with the Vichy Leadership as late as December 1943, but eventually they had to accept, with great reluctance, that De Gaulle was the man who represented the people of France.

My favourite non-fiction books are those that provide me with new insights, and this definitely met that criterion. For me, this was a completely new angle on an aspect of WW2 diplomacy.

[Cropredy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've read a ton of history books on World War II ever since I was a teen so I'd like to think I know more about the subject than the average bear. But this book covered a facet of World War II that I really didn't know and was thought-provoking as well.

After France fell to the Germans in June 1940, how much thought have you given to America's relationship with the Vichy rump state? Probably not much - for most people, America didn't engage with Vichy until just before the North African invasion when we tried to get the French commanders in Algeria/Morocco to stand down and not oppose the landings. But that was November 1942, 29 months later. What happened in between?

This is where this book is especially valuable and to my well-read brain, revelatory.

The classic post-June 1940 narrative is about the Battle of Britain, Lend-Lease, Churchill's desperate attempts to get the Americans involved, the US military buildup and the struggle at home between isolationists and interventionists. Where did France fit into that classic narrative? Not at all.

But, oh no, as this book so eloquently unwinds the story. American leaders and public opinion were galvanized by the new strategic threat from Vichy French territory. Panic ensued that Vichy would allow the Germans to operate from Dakar (interdicting trade from the Southern Hemisphere, notably Brazil), the French Caribbean (Martinique, Guadeloupe) - within bomber range of Florida not to mention the havoc on sea routes , and even St. Pierre & Miquelon, small islands off the St. Lawrence Seaway. Plus, of course, the French had a modern surface fleet including battleships and a carrier.

This shock to the US strategic posture aided immeasurably at preparing the nation's industries for war, the mobilization of troops, and the acquisition of public opinion support. And I thought it was all those gallant Brits in their Hurricanes and Spits or being bombed during the Blitz that moved the needle.

And there's more -- The Brits, despite their distaste for de Gaulle backed him as the leader of the Free French but the Americans truly detested de Gaulle and opted to recognize Vichy, deluding themselves that diplomacy could keep Vichy neutral and those overseas French possessions out of German military control. It was like how America, with a visceral opposition to Iran in 1979 after the Iranian Hostage crisis, backed Saddam in his war with Iran. Realpolitik with fascists has been a long tradition apparently.

The book is an easy read as Neiberg is a good writer. An understanding of Atlantic hemisphere geography helps. There are a few photos of important personnages.

I was left wanting more ...

* Why didn't the Germans exploit the French overseas possessions? (Neiberg touches on this briefly in the Conclusion)
* Why didn't the Germans seize the French Navy?
* Pierre Laval - a truly awful character - his character could have been more fleshed out given his relative obscurity to American readers.

Quibbles:
The book is written mostly from American sources, liberally infused with quotes. I'd have liked to have seen more from French and German sources (not that there's zero).

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

While Neiberg wrote this book as a case study of how governments behave in the case of shock and emergency, with the working assumption that he would find circumstances of ruthlessly carrying through on a course of expediency, and with the period expectation that the ends would justify the means, that is not what his conclusions wound up being. The more Neiberg considered the evidence, the more he found a situation of FDR's administration desperately casting around, in the case of the Vichy government, for a policy that kept the remaining French resources out of German reach, while at the same time maintaining a semblance of respectability. What this practically meant is according recognition to Petain for too long, and then cycling through a range of possible partners in a determined effort to avoid dealing with Charles de Gaulle; at least until there was no other option. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in particular, does not come out of this study looking especially sensible or realistic. This is really not news, but what Neiberg does really well is put the contingency back in the story, so, if you have no familiarity with this tawdry tale, this is a book well worth reading.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Now that we know how history turned out, it's hard to remember that nothing was obvious at the time, during those critical years before the tide had turned and Naziism seemed doomed to defeat. This book is a well-written summary of American policy at the time. Mostly we backed the wrong people!

During the Summer of 1940, right after Germany's unexpected success in its invasion of France, most Americans assumed that all of Europe including Britain would eventually fall to the Third Reich. In that context it made sense for the US to officially recognize the Vichy government as the true French government, despite the efforts of the Resistance.

This is a useful and readable account of a period of history where American policymakers made mistakes that ultimately were ignored because of how it all ended. I found it a useful reminder that leadership can fail even when the result succeeds.

[Charles · Rating 4 out of 5]

Only the Germans were Coldly Realistic About Vichy France

The quick defeat of France by Germany in six weeks of May and June, 1940, came as a shock to France, Britain, the United States and, not least, Germany. The United States had counted on French resistance to result in a stalemated war, similar to World War I, which would give time for America to rearm.

For the Germans, there were advantages to the creation of a weak French government in Vichy that could administer about a third of the country. German troops who otherwise would be engaged as an occupying force could be freed for the planned invasion of Britain and later for the actual invasion of Russia. As the war continued, the Nazis saw France as a source of food, production capacity, and manpower which they could seize at will. There was never a thought of considering France again a world power, not in the present and not in the future.

For many on the French right, a fresh start from the despised prewar French government was attractive. Petain’s government offered protection from the left’s proposed redistribution of wealth and was an opportunity to reassert traditional values. The Catholic Church saw the Vichy government as protection from the atheist Third Republic governments. The French Communists reluctantly accepted Vichy because Berlin and Moscow had a non-aggression pact. And many French politicians had the unrealistic belief that, after a brief period, Germany would recognize France as a near-equal European partner and ensure her continued dominion over French colonies around the world.

Author Michel Neiberg quotes one contemporary as having a more realistic assessment: “A banana republic with no bananas.”

The fall of France ended all Congressional resistance to military expenditure. The Federal budget of $9 billion was increased to $12 billion for the army and navy alone.

Meanwhile, as chronicled by Neiberg, the U.S. launched a diplomatic initiative to woo Vichy away from Germany. The thought was that food, money, and diplomatic recognition would keep France neutral, ensure that the French navy didn’t fall into German hands, and that French possessions and ports in Africa and the Caribbean would never be allowed to fall under German control. The British were outraged that American aid was delivered to Vichy, believing that it would simply be siphoned off by the Germans.

Jewish writer Andre Maurois, in exile, pleaded with Americans to recognize that France had a rope around its neck and had no choice but to “be subservient to the conqueror.”

For those who have read quite a lot about World War II it comes as a surprise that America not only established diplomatic relations with Vichy France but continued to have an ambassador, William Leahy, in place in February, 1942, well after Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war against the U.S.

Meanwhile Vichy leaders, much as the Japanese and Germans, underestimated the ability of America to rearm for war. One French cable suggested such rearmament could only be achieved by 1950! By contrast, the Germans could turn up the heat on France at any time.

Much of Neiberg’s book deals with the controversy over “who can lead France if not Vichy?” FDR and the American government disliked de Gaulle who was Britain’s reluctant choice. America’s choice was Henri Giraud, who seemed a “Hollywood Story” in demeanor, but could not mobilize the French in North Africa.

As Britain and the United States contemplated the invasion of North Africa, this was an area of major economic importance to the French. French North Africa provided 75% of the nation’s food and accounted for 20% of France’s total economic output The region was home to one million Europeans. Vichy had no desire to cede control of the region to the Allies.

The French military leader in North Africa was Jean-Francois Darlan, whom the Americans courted and bribed. Darlan had been among the most pro-German of the French military leaders, and courting this man was highly controversial. But the objective was to prevent French resistance to American landings and thus to prevent needless combat deaths. Cutting a deal with Darlan stunned and outraged many in the American administration. Eisenhower, when hearing of the deal, blurted, “What I need around here is a good assassin.” Although a link to the Americans has never been established, Darlan was indeed assassinated shortly after the landings were completed.

At the conference in Casablanca in January, 1942, the British and Americans addressed the question of the future leadership of France, one of the few political issues on the agenda. The Americans hated the idea of de Gaulle, but as we now know, he was the one military leader with the distance from Vichy and the political skills to lead France in the immediate postwar period and to later return to resurrect much of France’s influence in world affairs.

Neiberg has provided a readable chronicle of issues that engaged a great deal of American diplomatic effort from 1940 to 1944 but which have fallen into obscurity in the postwar period. The story is fascinating and well told.

[Justin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loved this book. A look at WWII through the eyes of French policy amongst the Allies. Not too long - the sweet spot on this topic. We didn’t get minute details on every little thing, but a good, broad picture of how different Allies relied on France to stop the Germans and then how they treated a defeated Vichy France. I wish there would’ve been more discussion about why exactly it was that France collapsed - there was a lot of mentions of why the various actors thought it fell but we didn’t hear the author’s opinion. Was it the decadence of the third republic? The socialist government? The fault of the Versailles Treaty? I don’t know and the author didn’t really give his opinion. That said, I learned a ton about the United States’s Vichy policy and the rise of Charles de Gaulle. Wild recommend.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Those who make an industry of likening America to Weimar Germany would more profitably study the French Third Republic and its vile Vichy successor. This is a pretty good book that outlines the U.S. tilt toward Vichy even as Great Britain put forth De Gaulle as leader of a free, "fighting" France.

I think Michael Neiberg is right to stress how France's defeat shocked American policymakers and public alike into realizing just how deeply military cuts and isolationism had damaged the nation's physical security. Neiburg aims to dismantle the thesis of William Langer, among others, that a need to prevent closer Vichy-German cooperation, i.e. Hitler getting his hands on African bases and the still formidable French naval fleet, and a similar need to minimize conflict with French forces during Operation TORCH-- the invasion of North Africa-- justified the Roosevelt Administration's pro-Vichy tilt.

While I agree with Neiberg that Langer, et. al. overestimated Vichy's ability, and indeed inclination, to act independently of Nazi Germany, I don't think he definitively knocks down either of the two justifications above. The book doesn't really explore whether a stronger anti-Vichy policy in fact would have led to a turnover of bases and ships to Hitler, or quantify how much time/how many lives were saved by making the unpopular deal with Admiral Darlan in North Africa.

4 stars.

[Joel · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was such a pleasure to read and a fast read at just 250 pages. I obviously knew the basic story of the Fall of France but to read about all the craziness going on behind the scenes, the prickly personalities, the massaging of enemies and friends to gain influence, not to mention how influential the fall was on the opinion of the American people and everything that happened next, including Pearl Harbor. You really felt the decisions being made in real time making this play out like a thriller as much as an historical analysis. Highly recommend.

[Shane Gower · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love all of Dr. Neiberg’s books, but if you ever get a chance to hear him speak do it! This may not be overly exciting for the typical person, but any student of World War II will appreciate this examination of America’s relationship with France during the war. You might also appreciate all of the references to the film Casablanca!

[Craig · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book

This book actually gave me a few new insights into Vichy France, the crazy tangle of French politics, and the American relationship with it during WW2.

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael Neiberg provides a wealth of illuminating facts here. He points out that contemporaries were shocked by the fall of France, and that the United States began to seriously gear for war following this event.

He seems to suggest that France's defeat was even more of a shock for the American people than was Pearl Harbour, which is an interesting idea.

The core of his work is that the United States was pursuing a false policy in adhering to Vichy long after it had become clear that Vichy was a broken reed that could not serve American purposes.

On a similar note, the text establishes that the Americans were reluctant to work with de Gaulle, and continued to cast about for alternatives such as Giraud and Darlan. The Darlan affair is covered in considerable depth, and Neiberg suggests that Darlan might even have become the leader of postwar France had he not been conveniently assassinated.

The Darlan affair and the whole dalliance with Vichy was a stain on American foreign policy that is difficult to reconcile with America's self-image. The British were disgusted with Darlan, and with the deal the Americans made with him.

This is all in all a fascinating story that is frequently overlooked. As Neiberg points out, histories of World War Two often include France only up until French defeat in 1940, and then seem to cast her aside as if she no longer had any part to play.

This book goes some way towards redressing this neglect, for France remained as a major player, if only in terms of the strategic value of her empire.

De Gaulle's success was also of monumental importance for the postwar world, for de Gaulle largely revived and directed French power, which might have gone very differently if someone else had taken the reins.

The problem of France caused much friction between the British and Americans, and one is left sympathising with Neiberg's thesis that the Americans could have done much better and eliminated much misunderstanding had they jettisoned Vichy and embraced de Gaulle earlier.

[Lloyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book explores the victory by Germany over France in 1940. That victory, led to the division of France into a German occupied zone and a “Free” France zone, which become know as Vichy France. Vichy, a former resort town in France became the capital city of Vichy France. One of the issues the author makes clear, is that Vichy France was not free. They were always under direct control of Germany. The officials of Vichy France tried to deceive the rest of the world that they were truly independent of Germany. They used the examples that Vichy controlled France’s colonial empire and the French naval fleet as proof of their independence. They even tried to convince their own county men of that myth and may have inadvertently even (at times) convinced themselves. But the Vichy French provided many supplies produced in Vichy to the ongoing German war effort. Vichy even sent French workers to Germany to work in their factories to free up German men for their armed forces. Vichy told themselves that such cooperation with Germany would lead to Vichy and all of France gaining the spoils of war if and when Germany won the war. Initially, France believed that Germany would be able to quickly force Great Britain to surrender to the Germans and thus win the war. There are also good points about how France lost to Germany, how divided and conflicted the French leadership was among themselves as well as how America and Britain championed two different French Generals to be the dominant leader who would resurrect France once German forces were driven out by the Allies. This split between the USA and Great Britain caused a great deal of friction in their alliance. Vichy France is usually passed over with minimal discussion in most histories of World War II. This book provides a great explanation of how France’s defeat had consequential effects on World War II and the impact the creation and existence of Vichy France had on the war.

[Evan Þ. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This's really two books put together.

The first book tells the eye-opening story of the United States' reaction to the sudden fall and surrender of France in 1940. Neiberg contends this was what shook America out of its isolationist complacency and launched it into playing a leading political and military role in the world: America had been depending on the friendly western European powers of Britain and France to defend the Atlantic world, but suddenly France wasn't able to and - worse - its colonies threatened to become hostile bases.

And, he backs it up with evidence. I hadn't known at all how many American headlines suddenly prophesied doom from Nazi planes and ships based in French colonies. I hadn't connected this with the sudden acclamation of the internationalist Wilkie for the Republican Presidential nomination, giving bipartisan support to America's new role. Even more, I hadn't realized how Congress swiftly - within weeks - shifted from opposing a rise in military appropriations to supporting even greater appropriations.

The second book between these covers is the tale of America's flirtations with Vichy France, hoping to drag it onto the Allied side, before finally, reluctantly, admitting defeat and supporting De Gaulle. I'd read this tale before, and there isn't much new here. Neiberg connects this with America's shock at France's fall and eagerness to find someone to fill the hole of a French government, but I don't think he backs up this attribution of motive.

Still, I think it's worth reading for the first book alone.

[Martinocorre · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mamma mia che bel libro!

Michael Neiberg racconta magistralmente uno psicodramma dove si intrecciano i destini, le volontà e le idiosincrasie di tanti uomini e tante Nazioni nel corso della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.
Roosevelt, Churchill, De Gaulle, Petain, Giraud, Laval, Darlan, Eisenhower, Cordell Hull, Stimson, Lord Halifax, agenti segreti, generali, diplomatici, donne fatali, giovani idealisti, vecchie carogne; questo è un saggio storico ma sfido uno sceneggiatore o un romanziere eccezionale a scrivere una trama più ricca di colpi di scena, di personaggi giganteschi divorati da odio smisurato o passione colossale, in cui assieme alla tragedia spesso compare la farsa, più o meno crudele.

Il crollo improvviso della Francia nel giugno del 1940 è uno choc per tutto il cosiddetto mondo libero e per gli Stati Uniti in particolare, ancor più di Pearl Harbour. Da qui in poi per gli americani sarà tutta una rincorsa a recuperare il terreno perduto, in primis gioco-forza solo diplomaticamente, corteggiando l'imbarazzante regime di Vichy, e poi creando una fitta rete di informatori nel Nord Africa francese, prima possibile base per la riconquista dell'Europa.
Se vi viene in mente il film Casablanca, con i suoi covi di spie e le atmosfere noir, ecco, avete capito alla perfezione! Però, sappiate che ad un certo punto vi aspetterete di veder comparire i Fratelli Marx da un momento all'altro.

[Justus Page · Rating 4 out of 5]

Neiberg explores an underplayed topic in the larger picture of the Second World War and American superpower status; the fall of France, and the relationship between the US and Vichy France.

American policy in regards to Vichy France was wildly unpopular at home, and was hard to justify, but a handful of politicians, amidst the chaos of a new global threat, chose a path that created endless friction between us and our Allies. Our diplomatic recognition of Vichy and our continual attempts to care for them and woo them ended up being fruitless and did more to damage the reputation of the US as the standard bearer of democracy across the globe.

The links shown between American fears about global security and acceptance that war would come eventually were all sparked by the fall of France, which did more to change the DNA of the US than probably any foreign event since the country’s founding. To see the repercussions that decisions like Vichy caving into Japanese insistence on having free use of Indochinese ports had a major impact on the pacific war and the ensuing souring of US-Japanese relations.

The only issue I have with the book is the larger points get rather repetitive, but the story and the message are fascinating and enlightening to understanding the Second World War in a better context.

[Scott Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

(3.5 stars) This work is primarily straight international relations policy between the US and France, especially how America dealt with the Vichy Regime and those opposed to it. While it doesn't get a lot of coverage in the American mythology of World War II, the US had significant ties and involvement with Vichy France, which given its association with the Nazis and what the regime did under Nazi direction, it is not surprising that those ties are not well-highlighted. Still, it is significant and plays a major role in America's actions during the war, from before America's involvement to how America tried to balance the various Vichy/Free France agendas before the invasions of North Africa in 1942.

The writing is informative, but this reads like a college textbook. You will learn, but it is not always the most engaging of stories. You only get a smattering of understanding of the Vichy regime, and there is a sense that the author assumes the reader knows enough about Vichy before opening the front cover. One interesting note is that the titles are all quotes from Casablanca, which was probably where most Americans first heard and saw anything related to Vichy France.

A decent read and research work, but maybe not one that is a must for the home library.

[Paul Ataua · Rating 3 out of 5]

The formation of the Vichy government following the capitulation of France is a fascinating topic. Seen through some eyes as the only option given the growing belief that Germany was sure to have won the war within six months and collaborating with the visitors might save France’s colonies being redistributed , its borders being redrawn and it’s international status lost. On the other side, as Robert O Paxton argues in the wonderful ‘Vichy France’, the Vichy government had its own agenda in many ways and was ready and not forced to introduced measures that did not benefit the French and were not forced by the German Oppressors. This book adds to the story by considering the question of why The USA initially sided with The Vichy Government and against De Gaulle and the Free French who were supported by the British. Fascinating addition to the period aimed at investigating the dark underside of the war to avoid just telling the story we want to believe. Generally enjoyed the read and the references to the movie Casablanca in a couple of chapter titles such as ‘A beautiful friendship? ’ and “As Time Goes By’ brought a smile to my face.

[GuyBanff · Rating 5 out of 5]

More Information on Vichy St Pierre & Michelon Islands

This is a long overdue reconsideration of the self serving distortions of the real history of German allied France in WWII, so long invented by post war politics.

I believe an interesting facet of the Allied/Vichy relationship still overlooked is Canadian liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie-King's recognition of Vichy France, and the Provincial Quebec's pro Vichy sentiment.

Dr Neiborg gives one of the rare mentions of De Gauls siezure of the St Pierre Islands off of Newfoundland, but he does not give an account of the convoluted role of the Liberal party's involvement. PM Mackenzie-King did not want the Islands siezed from Vichy because of Vichy popularity in Quebec, and Mackenzie's willingness to kill English Canadians in order to appease pro Vichy feelings in Quebec. I believe Mackenzie requested
Roosevelt and Cordell Hull stop the invasion as it may have hurt his re election chances in Quebec.

[Alecia · Rating 4 out of 5]

I listened to this audio version, and would have given at least 4.5 stars, but the narrator sounded wooden and robotic for much of the book. He seems to have loosened up near the end, but it took some getting used to. At first I suspected it was AI, but I guess not. At any rate, a very good, thought-provoking book pinpointing this era, decisions made and the results of these decisions making history. The ethical problems posed continue to fascinate me, and the reality of what actually transpired continues to inform about human nature, resonating to today and beyond. I'm not sure how long my deep dive into this specific era will continue, but I will do audio history books or other non fiction that interests me and might be too dense to read. This was a good book, for reading or listening.

[Gary Holtzman · Rating 4 out of 5]

It seems impossible given the volume of WWII books that come out each year to find a fresh take, but this really does illuminate an aspect of the story that is often overlooked, at least by non-specialists. Most of us who just know the basics of the war tend to think that once the US joined the war, even if FDR personally didn't like De Gaulle, we were all in for the Free French cause.

Neiberg shows this was very much not the case. The US government resisted recognizing De Gaulle and his movement until nearly the end. They tried to keep working with Vichy well after Pearl Harbor. This was a major source of tension between the British and the Americans which had a much greater impact than I, and I suspect many others with only a casual interest i this period, realized.

[Gabriel Stein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent, easy to read and well researched

This is an excellent, easy to follow, yet well-researched book into one of the stranger episodes of the Second World War: the relationship between the United States and France. It covers the implicit American reliance on the French Army and thus the shock of its sudden collapse in 1940; then the puzzling and misguided long-lasting hostility to de Gaulle and the Free French (driven very much by FDR’s belief that he understood France much better than anyone else, including the British and the French themselves); and the consequences thereof. Strongly recommended.

[Blair Lele · Rating 5 out of 5]

As it focusing on political policy and the Allies, I found it very interesting to learn just how chaotic and messy the detente between France, Britain and the US was, strained, stressed and unable to feel confident that they had a clear strategy to win the war and to achieve peace. Mr. Neiberg’s honesty in explaining the maneuvers and steps taken from Paris to North Africa and in between in Vichy, France, helps the novice historian like me grasp the painstaking process of 1942-3, in re-taking France, and it’s significance to our ability to overtake the Germans.

[Kevin Keating · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was kind of a tough book to listen to as an audiobook. Lots of new characters and moving parts, generally with the thesis that the US was caught blindsided by the fall of France and then we mishandled everything up to late 1943 as far as France was concerned. Lots of intrigue; would've been helpful to have the hardcopy book to refer back to. Not sure I bought into the thesis anyway, which also says that France up until 1940 was the bulwark against nazism in Europe, rather than a willing collaborator.

[Bookluvr7 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not knowing a ton about World War II besides Germany and the Holocaust, this book was foundational in a lot that happened in World War II but from the French and American side. This tells the story of when France fell and what the repercussions of it were especially between Vichy France and Free France and how America got caught up in both. It was very informative and thoroughly interesting from the first page. Will remember the information in this book for awhile. Super good! 5/5 stars!

[Daniel Byrd · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book offers a fresh perspective on World War II that is often overlooked. I really appreciated the historical work done to complete this work as well as the support the author gave for his argument. It was difficult to follow along at times, however, due to the sheer number of names the author decided to use at any given time. It makes the work a bit choppy and lacks a cohesive flow as the author goes from topic to topic.

[Yannick M · Rating 4 out of 5]

Decent book, didn't really keep my attention however. Partly due to the fact that most of the events described here (except the initial American rethinking of foreign policy after the fall of France) didn't seem that consequential to me and partly due to the fact that I had already watched the summary here.

[Al · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well-researched and provides great insight to the incredibly complex situation which the US and Great Britain had with France after the capitulation to the Nazis and the incredible fear in this country over what could have happened if the Germans had taken over the French fleet which could have given them access to North and South America.

[A · Rating 2 out of 5]

Ok- only read first 100 pages, so an unfair review. Just didn't work for me - i suppose i was already familiar enough with the author's version of the story to not be learning anything. The Casablanca chapter headings didn't help.

[YogScott · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author makes claims in the early portion of the book that seem to somewhat exceed the evidence presented, but that’s a quibble. The main thesis and the bulk of the story, which wasn’t as well known to me, was interesting and well written.

[robert · Rating 3 out of 5]

Audio. A Military History Book Club selection. Interesting info about America's reaction to the fall of France and her interaction with Vichy. But this info could have easily been handled as a chapter in a broader history of WW2. Way too much minutia. Vichy was covered much better in other books.