The Pultizer Prize and National Book Award-winning author of Around the Cragged Hill reflects on the political events and policies of latter part of the twentieth century, discussing the Cold War, recent changes in the former Soviet Union, and their implications.
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
I read this book in particular because I wanted to know what the historian and former ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia thought of the turmoil of the late eighties and early nineties which culminated in the war in then my country. What I found in the book was a chapter with concise recent history of the Balkans. It did not quench my thirst which is more a compliment than a reproach to the author. Naturally, several chapters are dedicated to the Soviet Union / Russia. There, a reader of other works of Kennan will find some repetition, but I value his insights and educated opinions so much that it did not bother me at all. A relatively short paragraph on Ukraine is more telling than hundreds of recent news from this troubled country. This book might be a worthwhile overture into Kennan's work for uninitiated readers.
This is a collection of essays, speeches, critiques, and letters.
They're short, which means there's not a lot of depth. Kennan is great at depth, so I think this volume is not his best work.
A bit less than half the book is the end of the Cold War, but several topics are covered. Anybody interested in US foreign policy of the period should read it. I like that there are no predictions here. Kennan analyzes a problem and lays out the issues. His concern is what we must understand before we act.
This bit jumped out at me: "The interests of the national society for which government must concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life, and the well-being of its people."
I don't think I've ever come across a better description of government's purpose.
This collection brings together articles, speeches and other works of the historian and diplomat from a period covering the heart of the Cold War through the fall of the Soviet Union. It is an interesting look back at this period through the eyes of a well-known expert in Russian history. About being a historian he writes, “...there are certain professions... in which one does not inquire anxiously into the results of one’s efforts, and the writing of history is one of them. The effort, here, is its own reward. The results are the concern of a Higher Authority.”
I read this book as a follow-up to Kennan's "Sketches from a Life," but sad to say this book is a mixed bag of some really excellent analyses of Soviet-American relations and some by now very dated shorter commentary articles from newspapers. Just as anybody else, Kennan should be excused for not being prescient about the fall of the Soviet Union.