泥足巨人: 苏德战争前夕的苏联军队

The Red Army

by [美] 戴维·格兰茨(David M. Glantz)

通过介绍苏德战争爆发前的苏联红军的建设情况，军事历史学家戴维·格兰茨在本书中有力地反驳了西方近年来出现的关于苏德战争爆发原因与责任的错误说法。

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Russia, Nonfiction, War, Russian History

Paperback

First published May 1, 1998

Reviews

[Carlos Wang · Rating 5 out of 5]

一樣，可讀性不高，但做為資料卻是“巨人的肩膀”。作者寫本書是針對“蘇聯是否曾想在41年對德先制攻擊”的論爭做回應，而同時也了答覆了“為何史達林無視各種即將開戰的現象堅持不會被攻擊”。確實，蘇聯隨著國際局勢已經開始在備戰，但它的擴張與動員速度，是其社會跟工業經濟無法負荷的，加上「大清洗」嚴重傷害了紅軍的骨幹，這些要恢復至少要五年以上。深知這點的史達林評估至少42年夏天之前都無法跟久經沙場的德軍抗衡，所以才努力地避免讓希特勒想對他動手，更遑論“先制攻擊”，無論這是多一廂情願。至於德國，儘管情報有很多缺失，但它們確實已經發現巨人正在覺醒，如果非要一戰的話，趁早下手是“正確”的，因為一旦等紅軍改革完後，它將會是一股可怕的軍事機器。

[Mark · Rating 1 out of 5]

Another excellent reference, but just a reference. Even Glantz's opinions appear to be expressed as facts and statistics.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 4 out of 5]

The numbers are still shocking. Between the outbreak of WWII in September 1939 and the day of the German attack in June 1941, the USSR increased the theoretical size of its Red Army from 1.5 million to 5.4 million men, having little doubt that war was coming. But in the three months after Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army lost 2.8 million men, and in six months it would lose 4.3 million. Dead, wounded and missing, to be sure; but for Red Army soldiers, becoming a prisoner of war was a virtual death sentence.

Glantz explored the archives to better understand the causes of a defeat of this magnitude. His book is filled with numbers, statistics, lists, tables, and it is more than a little dry. But it reveals that a major cause of the defeat was this rapid expansion itself, and the failure of the Soviet economy to support it: There were not enough weapons for all these soldiers, and not even enough uniforms; there was not enough ammunition and not enough food. The support and transport services were not up to the task of supplying this huge force, and failed to bring supplies and materiel to the front. Of the 16,000 modern tanks that this reformed army would require, some 90% still had to be built. Units that had equipment were often forced to leave part of it behind because they had no transport. Most had to make do with much less than half of their equipment, and the reserves that were hastily called up to stem the tide were even less fortunate.

A disastrous situation was worsened by a lack of leadership and training. Stalin's purges in the pre-war period had cost the Red Army about 50,000 officers, including 80% to 90% of the senior commanders at army, corps and division level. The combination of this indiscriminate slaughter with a rapid expansion of the army left inexperienced and poorly trained officers in charge almost everywhere. The soldiers were often no better trained, and some units that were equipped with modern tanks lost half or more of them on the march, because the drivers had received only a few hours of training and could not operate them properly. As repair and recovery services were lacking too, these accidental losses frequently became definitive.

Between all the statistics, information about the consequences "on the ground" is scarce. Glantz briefly tells the story of a unit equipped with heavy, modern KV tanks: As they had no ammunition, they proceeded to ram the lighter German tanks. They had some success with this until they ran out of fuel as well, and then enemy sappers blew up the immobilised giants one by one. However, as Glantz admits, information on the Soviet soldier as an individual is scarce in the archives. So one has to make do with reports from commanding officers, such as Major General Ermakov, who soberly commented that the situation of his 2nd Rifle Corps was "rather difficult" because it had (a) no ammunition, (b) no fuel, (c) no food, (d) no transport (...), (e) no communications (...), (f) no hospitals. And all this while the German army was rapidly advancing on his position.

In between the remorseless statistics is some interesting information on how this army was organised (or attempted to be organised) with attention for the changes introduced after observing the German victories in 1939 and 1940. Changes in leadership resulted in structural reforms as well as force expansion, with renewed thinking about the use of tanks, artillery and aircraft. Glantz doesn't mention it, but German forces in 1941 were often surprised by the tactical initiative and skill shown by their opponent, even if it was completely irrelevant in the bigger picture. One does get the strong impression, however, that all this focus on the newest weaponry resulted in a fatal neglect of the army's logistics and rear services.

It makes for grim reading. But with all its reports, tables and statistics, it is not very engaging. Glantz does make an effort to establish responsibility and points the finger squarely at the Communist party and Stalin. The latter's refusal in June 1941 to believe entire mountain ranges of evidence that pointed to imminent war, seems to less inspired by "acute paranoia", as Glantz call it, than by desperate wishful thinking to avoid responsibility for a looming disaster.

Glantz does conclude that in the end, the Soviet Union's ability to mobilise huge forces and to continue to mobilise huge forces was decisive. The Third Reich expected to defeat the USSR in a few months (which is why it neglected to winter-proof most of its army) and indeed in those few months it did manage to wipe out virtually the entire Red Army as it had existed in the western sector. But it failed to anticipate the ability of the USSR to create another army, an even bigger one, to fight on.

[Al Johnson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Glantz earns a four star rating from me due to the originality of his research and work. Looking at the Soviet army prior to 1941 is usually limited to Finland, or the one or two books (usually heavily error prone) on Nomonhon. However, a staff level planning view of what the Soviet Army leadership were thinking and how their plans matched or did not to the reality of war is fascinating. It is a must read for any student of the Eastern Front in WW2 on this basis alone.

However, there are some glaring omissions which almost made me give it a 3 star. The massive support that the Soviet Union provided Germany with from August of 1939 through June 1941 is omitted along wiht the severe war scare with Japan. Glantz has unfortunately carried over a singular narrative that has the focus entirely on Germany even when Germany was the biggest ally and Stalin was more worried about the UK or Japan. This is not reflected in his research and it would make a fine update or even a second book to delve into the continency plans for the UK and Japanese conflict with Germany as ally from the period 1939 to 1941. The battle assessments from Finland, the border with Manchuria (indeed, even the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet Union in 1927-1928), the excursions into China to exterminate the ethnic Kyrgystani and other ethnic groups from territory Russia recently captured and occupied, would be additional material necessary to understand more in depth the views of the General Staff in their assessment and planning process.

Despite these omissions, the book remains an excellent reference to understand the buildup to WW2 for the Soviet Union.

[CASPER HILEMAN · Rating 5 out of 5]

Colonel David Glantz analyzes how the largest, best-trained, and highly equipped army in Europe and possibly the world could have been so unprepared for the Second World War. This is an excellent history with minutiae translated from Russian into English. If you have an interest in the Soviet Front during the Second World War Mr. Glantz is the undisputed expert.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Crammed with statistical detail and a little bit repetitive, but a sobering overview of Soviet military readiness on the eve of World War 2. One of the hypothesis Glantz is answering in this book is one posed by some revisionist historians who argue that the German attack was pre-emptive and the Soviets were the ones who were about to wage aggressive warfare. As Glantz shows, the Soviets were woefully unprepared for the German attack with most of their forces not up to full strength. And as a result of the Stalinist purges, their leadership was also not ready for the task of leading any kind of attack (let alone a defense against the German onslaught). Despite the tremendous defeats in the early part of the war, the Soviets were basically able to trade bodies and space for time to build their military. The survivors of the brutal year of 1941 became the core of a reborn Soviet army that marched to victory all the way to Berlin. This book is highly technical and isn't a good introduction to the topic of the east front in WW2, but if you have some background in the topic it is worth at least skimming this for some keen insights. Glantz cites many sources that would be interesting to follow-up on.

[Kyle Worlitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read like a manual at times. Reminds me of the Wehrmacht in 1945. Every single reasonable idea a Soviet general had was summarily rejected by Stalin. Hitler later played the same game to disastrous effect for Germany. I guess these demagogues just can't resist.