The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy

by Andrew D. Lambert

How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914—but shaped Britain’s success in the Second World War and beyond

Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854–1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy.

Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914–18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill’s conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett’s ideas continue to influence British thinking.

Genres: History, Military History

544 pages, Hardcover

Published December 14, 2021

About the author

Andrew Lambert, FRHistS, is a British naval historian, who since 2001 has been the Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies, King's College London

Reviews

[Casey · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great book, providing a professional biography of Sir Julian Corbett and a detailed overview of his strategic concepts. The author, noted naval historian Andrew Lambert, combines a chronological narrative of Corbett’s life work with an extrapolation of his unique British way of war. Lambert explains Corbett’s strategic approach for an island sea power as maritime-centric, focusing on economic warfare, amphibious operations, and supporting continental allies, rather than decisive naval engagements or mass land campaigns. Controlling seaways maximized strategic options, an essential effort for this Clausewitzian construct. In Lambert’s telling, Corbett’s bete noire are the continentalists, with their “German way of war,” and the Jominian Mahanists, whose desire for a structured decisive Naval battle negated the benefits of using the maritime sphere and all the levers of power to attain strategic dominance. As with any explainer for past theories, the line where Corbett’s concepts end and Lambert’s interpretation begins is murky throughout the book. Nevertheless, this work is very insightful for understanding a maritime centric strategy and the needed educational and bureaucratic structure for its implementation. Required reading for anyone seeking to understand the effective use of the maritime domain to attain grand strategic ends.

[And · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very interesting to fill the context around the even more interesting 'Some Principles of Maritime Strategy'. Which I highly recommend, I very much enjoyed it and can't wait to read it again.

This book, however, tells us about Corbett the man and the challenges he faced in his work.

Warthodoxy was (arguably is, insofar as history is taught) about defeating the enemy in a grand and decisive land battle between armies. Churchill was guilty of this, even as First sea lord (WWI).

Even the navy weren't in full support of Corbett's doctrine due to his focus on the Clausewitzian notion of war being a battle of economic will. At least Corbett specifies the economic side, I haven't read Clausewitz yet. But the naval warthodoxy was the glorious Nelson and Trafalgar. Again, a grand and decisive battle. Naturally, naval commanders want more glory!

For a (small) island nation with a (reasonably) large navy, better to utilise the sea in a fashion that suits us. Control the seas, get command of the sea, protect communication lines and trade routes. Deny the enemy the same.

That is what is most feasible. It seems most natural to the Brits, and now, probably, the US as well. We just have to endeavour to maintain a large enough navy. Or grow it further.

This has the benefit of saving our soldiers from the maximal meat grinder those especially attritional nationalities will try to tempt us into. They should in fact be kept from such tactics in order to remain a threat as an expeditionary force. In short, to harass the enemy.

Our land power cousins can (should, would) and probably will form and hold lines on land.

It almost seems as though we all shall pay a terrible price. Is it not better to pay upfront and in cash (on a larger navy), rather than with our lives and/or the lives of our children down the line.

Apologies to non Brits. This is my synthesis of the author's arguments. Not necessarily my own opinion(s). I do however prefer this idea to that of being sent to a trench to be maimed by drones.

((Credit WC though, he engaged in the naval arms race, even after advocacy of the opposite so as to afford liberal work day reform). Too keen was he for invasion and occupation (Constantinople). Although, Corbett did approve of the invasion of Gallipoli, if it were reinforced appropriately and successful. But again, for command of the sea to deny the enemy economic trade routes.)

Another key point for Corbett was the emphasis of the civilian command of army and navy. This was the norm then, as it is now, and should remain. Because the navy is the not end, as those commanders seeking glory in the grand battle, but the means to the end. The navy (and army etc) are the tools we use to enact our strategy. That's why we focus on the economy and not "killing Germans" as it was then.