War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War

Cambridge Military Histories

by Antulio J. Echevarria II

Antulio J. Echevarria II reveals how successive generations of American strategic theorists have thought about war. Analyzing the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy Mitchell, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Henry Eccles, Joseph Wiley, Harry Summers, John Boyd, William Lind, and John Warden, he uncovers the logic that underpinned each theorist's critical concepts, core principles, and basic assumptions about the nature and character of war. In so doing, he identifies four paradigms of war's nature - traditional, modern, political, and materialist - that have shaped American strategic thought. If war's logic is political, as Carl von Clausewitz said, then so too is thinking about war.

Genres: Military Fiction

308 pages, Kindle Edition

Published February 18, 2021

Reviews

[Terry Tucker · Rating 3 out of 5]

This would be a good reference book for a 1st and 2nd year military studies student

From the authors introduction, this title of this book stands for a general way of thinking about war. It refers to the reasoning that underlies a theorist’s critical concepts, core principles and basic assumptions about the nature and character of war. This book is different from Russell Weigley’s infamous classic, The American way of War, in three respects. First, it draws on material that was not available to Weigley, second it carries the Analysis beyond the 70’s where Weigley stopped and delivers a broader socio cultural context across the 20th century.

This book examines the ideas of twelve major US strategic thinkers: Mahan, Mitchell, Brodie, Osgood, Schelling, Kahn, Eccles, Wylie, Summers, Boyd, Lind and Warden. These twelve represent a reasonable cross section of military and non-military perspectives. Admittedly, not all of these twelve qualifies as a strategic theorist. Mitchell and Summers were critics; Boyd, Lind and Warden were concerned about refining Operational Art. What they all have in common is that they attempted to transform the American approach to war and each of them has partially succeeded.
This book reflects, through analysis, is that there are at least four models or paradigms of war that were or are the foundation of US strategic thinking: traditional, modern, materialist, political. In many respects, these four paradigms show little evidence of having shifted. The major change in US thinking came when Howard and Paret translated On War and the love hate relationship with Clausewitz has had its peaks and valleys since. As a side note. The Oct 2022 version of FM 3-0, Operations has finally given Clausewitz his rightful place with some unusually good interpretations- but I digress.

This book consists of four parts. Part I looks at First Principles and Modern War (Mahan and Mitchell); Part II looks at the Revolt of the Strategy Intellectuals ( Brodie, Osgood, Schelling and Kahn)’ Part II is the Counterrevolution of the Military Intellectuals ( Eccles, Wylie and Summers); and Part IV explores the Insurrection of the Operational Artists (Boyd, Lind and Warden.

The book ends with a conclusion which is really an summation and survey of the book. The notes and bibliography are a great resource as well. My only complaint is that the author offers no indication where US strategic thinking is headed. After reading this book, the reader will be left to draw his own conclusions. Mine? After looking at the 2022 edition of FM-3 Operations, the US Military has updated many new words and definitions, but the focus – still – is on Large scale military operations following the paradigms of modern, materialistic warfare with a touch of politics- the Clausewitz interpretations into doctrine are unusually good