The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia, Volume 5: The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931-1933

The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia #5

by Robert William Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft

This book examines the Soviet agricultural crisis of 1931-1933 which culminated in the major famine of 1933. It is the first volume in English to make extensive use of Russian and Ukrainian central and local archives to assess the extent and causes of the famine. It reaches new conclusions on how far the famine was "organized" or "artificial," and compares it with other Russian and Soviet famines and with major twentieth century famines elsewhere. Against this background, it discusses the emergence of collective farming as an economic and social system.

Genres: History, Soviet History, Soviet Union, Russia, Economics, Nonfiction, Theory

572 pages, Hardcover

First published April 3, 2004

About the author

Robert William Davies was a British historian, writer and professor of Soviet Economic Studies at the University of Birmingham. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London in 1950 and his Ph.D. in Commerce and Social Science from the University of Birmingham.

Reviews

[Michal Lipták · Rating 4 out of 5]

(In which Wheatcroft and Davies don't consider Holodomor to be genocide.) The gist of the book is summarized in final paragraph:

We do not at all absolve Stalin from responsibility for the famine. His policies towards the peasants were ruthless and brutal. But the story which has emerged in this book is of a Soviet leadership which was struggling with a famine crisis which had been caused partly by their wrongheaded policies, but was unexpected and undesirable. The background to the famine is not simply that Soviet agricultural policies were derived from Bolshevik ideology, though ideology played its part. They were also shaped by the Russian pre-revolutionary past, the experiences of geography and the wheather, and the modus operandi of the Soviet system as it was established under Stalin. They were formulated by men with little formal education and limited knowledge of agriculture. Above all, they were a consequence of the decision to industrialise this peasant country at breakneck speed.

What precedes it is detailed overview of statistics and correspondence which convincingly attest to this description, which add many nuances, and which will often make you want to tear your hair out in indignation at the stupidity of Bolsheviks.

Stalin is not necessarily the "main character" here, but the view of him which emerges aligns in my opinion with Kotkin's thesis that Stalin was not cynical opportunist and manipulator, but "true revolutionary" acting upon strong convinctions. First five-year plan was phantasmagoric, but it was put forward with strong conviction of the superiority of Communism over capitalism. When it failed miserably, it must had been due to machinations of class enemies and "kulak elements". Holodomor thus represents a failure of genuine revolutionary politics.

What Soviets basically tried to do was to compress centuries of Western industrialisation into five years. Industrialisation was often brutal in the West, too (in certain sense, American Civil War can be understood as fight over industrialisation; the process of enclosures and destruction of English peasant class was protracted, but violent - one can read about both in Barrington Moore's classic), but in first five-year plan the brutality was condensed and intensified. Soviets could have looked at Western industrial states and try to find better ways - instead, they found even worse way. Economically speaking, Soviet Union did ultimately become industrial state, but Bolshevik "shock therpay" irreparably traumatized and alienated the population, and thereby utterly discredited and destroyed the state socialist experiment in the bud. It was political failure, and moral abomination.

[conec · Rating 5 out of 5]

Stephen Wheatcroft is well received Australian historian who has written on pre-revolutionary Russian and Soviet history. R.W Davies is a British historian who has worked in the same field as Wheatcroft. The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 was published in the early 2000s and is becoming a staple for understanding industrialization and agriculture under Stalin. This book provides the most thorough and least biased understanding of collectivization. Compared to other historians, Davies and Wheatcroft have done the most archival research and have constructed the most cohesive body of work regarding collectivization. Lewin and Conquest rely mostly on political history, and Viola relies on social history most heavily. Davies and Wheatcroft have a solid balance between political, economic, and social history in their book. The book serves as an exploration into the topics of collectivization, dekulakization, grain collection, the famine and its causes. Toward the end of the book, the authors refute several commonly accepted notions from other writers and trace the historiography for us.
The Years of Hunger traces the cause of the famine to poor collectivization policy which was rushed into too soon coupled with unfortunate circumstances. For example, there were rules which restrained the amount of cropland allowed and required overuse of legitimate cropland. Unusual weather did not complement these policies, especially since farmers were only allowed to plant only during certain periods. Wheatcroft and Davies present to us several examples of communication between party members, some which reflects poorly on them and some that demonstrates obvious intention to alleviate the negative consequences of collectivization. Through documents like these, the authors destruct the anti-Stalin, famine-as-genocide angle taken by Viola and Conquest. Conquest, who holds that Stalin “wanted a famine” either failed to take into account many of the factors which Wheatcroft and Davies expounded upon, or he purposely ignored them to better serve his theme of collectivization as a civil war. Though the book is rich in archival sources, it assumes that reader is familiar with the historical context of the years going into collectivization and focuses directly on the years of the famine.
Other sources depict Stalin as a cruel autocrat, and in many ways at fault for the shortcomings and problems of collectivization. Wheatcroft and Davies give several examples of instances where Stalin made good choices when dealing with the mistakes of inept bureaucrats. Also, contrary to popular opinion and scholarship, they expel the idea of Stalin’s leadership crushing all opposition by force and show that he had more flexibility. This book does not take the stance that famine was deliberated against Ukraine, but rather that it was an unfortunate and unplanned consequence of poor planning. In fact, the authors point out that there exists no proof of a deliberate famine. Instead, they provide us with conversations within the party which were evidence of their attempts to end the famine. With the emphasis on failed planning and policy, as well as unpredictable economic conditions, The Years of Hunger furthers the notion of a quicksand society.

[Gafitastonti · Rating 5 out of 5]

mom i swear i didn't break the vase it was the class enemies

[Uuu Ooo Bbb · Rating 4 out of 5]

History presented through statistics, political memos, detailed examination of political and economic institutions. Not a very exciting read on one side, but on the other gives a lot of authority to the analysis presented. Seems to give a balanced view, not blaming Stalin and soviet authorities for purposedly engineering the famine while not absolving them from policies that caused it either.

[Cecilia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thorough exploration of the agricultural factors that lead to the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933, which is a perspective that is not often considered. Conclusions that are made are backed up by statistics.

[Denis D · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most thorough and up-do-date analysis of Soviet policies in the countryside.