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Introduction to Geopolitics
This new updated edition presents the overarching themes of geopolitical structures and agents in an engaging and accessible manner, which requires no previous knowledge of theory or current affairs. It helps readers understand the geopolitical implications of COVID-19, China’s pronounced role in the world, the relative decline of the US, and the Black Lives Matter movement. Using new pertinent case studies and guided exercises, the title explains the contemporary global power of the United States and the challenges it is facing, the changing foreign policy of China and other countries, the persistence of nationalist conflicts, migration, cyberwar and cyberactivism, terrorism, energy geopolitics, and environmental geopolitics. Expanded case studies of the South China Sea disputes and China’s Belt and Road Initiative emphasize the multi-faceted nature of conflict. The book raises questions by incorporating international and long-term historical perspectives and introduces readers to different theoretical viewpoints, including feminist contributions. The new edition features fresh discussion of island geopolitics, the Anthropocene age, and geoeconomics. Introduction to Geopolitics will provide its readers with a set of critical analytical tools for understanding the actions of states as well as non-state actors acting in competition over resources and power. Both students and general readers will find this book an essential stepping-stone to a deeper and critical understanding of contemporary conflicts. The companion website will enable readers to apply the themes of the book to the constant shifts in current affairs to enable deeper understanding. It will provide access to weekly essays showing how the themes explain current events.
- GenresPoliticsPhilosophySchool
308 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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April 18, 2012
I am always flattered when a scholar finds my area of expertise, international relations, more interesting than her own. I strongly champion interdisciplinary approaches to important research questions, but “interdisciplinary” does not mean abandoning the tenants of one’s field for those of another. A case in point is Colin Flint’s Introduction to Geopolitics 2nd. (Routledge, 2001).
Flint’s work is an exemplar of what has come to be called by some “critical geography,” in contradistinction to “classical geopolitics” and “feminist geopolitics.” Flint purports to “challenge” the former and “engage” the latter, portraying “classical geopolitics” as “white, male, elite, and Western situated knowledge.” “Feminist geopolitics,” by comparison, avoids the “binary” categories that plague “classical geopolitics,” and elaborates instead upon the “complexity of people’s positions and the connectivity between people and places.” While the works of classical geopolitical scholars like Halford John Mackinder (Democratic Ideas and Reality), Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Karl Haushofer were intended to inform and guide the ambitions of white, Western imperialists, including and especially Hitler’s Nazis, critical and feminist geopolitical scholars seek to promote “interpretations of world events that are counter to dominant government and media representations” and to encourage “practices by individuals, groups of citizens, indigenous people, etc., to resist the control and classification imposed by states and other power institutions, such as the World Bank.”
In short, “critical geopolitics” as practiced by Flint applies the insights and criticisms of “post-modern, social constructivist” works to the field of international relations. Geography as such is relegated to an artifact of power politics and the various social constructions created and used by dominant social forces to perpetuate the domination and exploitation of subordinate social entities.
Applying social science to particular political agendas, whether Mackinder’s imperialism or Flint’s anti-imperialism, does not necessarily render the fruits of an academic enterprise wrong. There is much to admire about Flint’s approach and I am personally inclined to share his opinions. The post-Westphalian, territorial, sovereign state is unquestionably a social construction located within a specific historical context. World political authority has not always been structured thusly and there is no reason to assume that it will always be organized as such. The extent to which the current organization of world political authority fails to protect nations, groups, and individuals is a legitimate concern and a damning criticism of the system of nation-states. There are other, more equitable ways by which to imagine the organization of political authority on planet Earth, and the future viability of the human race may well depend upon the timely elaboration of alternatives.
My criticism of Flint lies not in his contribution to international relations theory but rather the virtual absence of geographic analysis in his book. He describes his field as a part of “human geography,” which I suppose is different from “physical geography.” Flint does not carefully distinguish “geopolitics” from “political geography.” Just as Political Scientists famously “put the state back in” their theories (Power, States & Sovereignty Revisited, Stephen Krasner), perhaps it is time for Human Geographers to “put geography back” into theirs.
Consider, for instance, Flint’s key concepts of “place” in terms of “location,” “locale,” and “sense of place.” Here, location means “function,” locale means “institutions,” and sense of place means “identity.” Other, traditional geographic concepts like resource endowment, climate, natural obstacles, transportation and communication corridors, population distribution, neighbors, isolation, and agricultural and industrial capacity receive short shrift from Flint, and then in only the most abstract fashion. Flint connects deserts, mountains, forests, plains, headwaters, watersheds, lakes, oceans, and sheltered harbors with neither function nor identity, although common sense and the historical works of the ages tell us differently.
Like other social constructivists, Flint grapples with the relationship between “structure” and “agency.” Tellingly, Flint’s definition of “structure” includes “rules and norms” but not geography. For Flint, a “country’s code” is more determinative of its foreign policy than its geography. These codes include “calculations” about one’s actual or potential allies/enemies. The extent of an enemy’s threat or the value of an ally’s help, however, is unrelated to its distance from or proximity to the country in question, in Flint’s analysis. Michael W. Doyle (Ways of War & Peace: Realism, Liberalism, & Socialism) and others have argued convincingly that distance matters in the calculations of a country’s situation, notwithstanding the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and thermonuclear weapons.
I also question Flint’s methodology when it comes to determining a country’s “code.” For this Flint relies on the official documents and policy statements of prominent intellectuals and statesmen. George F. Kennan's “X” article and Paul H. Nitze’s “NSC-68” along with the writings of Mackinder and Mahan are illustrative here. Irrespective of whether these works are definitive with respect to the “American code,” and the work of Morton Halperin, Graham T. Allison, and others should counsel caution, Flint proceeds to explain the “codes” of Russia, India, and China without citing any authoritative documents whatsoever. Flint includes non-state actors as important “agents” in geopolitics without suggesting what “code” may be animating those actors, if any. The United States has articulated a code with respect to Al Qaeda, but what is Al Qaeda’s geopolitical code, if any? Is Al Qaeda’s code morally superior to that of the United States because the Islamist group resists the domination of “white, male, elite, and Western situated” oppressors? Those who, like Prof. Flint, explicitly make normative evaluations an essential part of their scholarship owe their readers an answer to the tough questions along with the easy ones.
Explaining state behavior is difficult but divining the intentions, motivations and “codes” of foreign policy-makers is even more difficult, if possible at all. How reliable are public justifications and rationalizations as actual explanations for foreign policy actions? Allen Dulles taught us the meaning of “plausible deniability” while Robert K. Merton explained the notion of “unintended consequences.” Deceit and mendacity seem integral to politics whether in the family, the workplace, or international affairs. Machiavelli Nicolo Machiavelli instructs the Prince to have no concern about lying if “without which the preservation of his state would be difficult.” Donald Rumsfeld reminds us that, in addition to “known knowns” and “known unknowns,” there are also “unknown unknowns.”
My international relations students have a poor understanding of geography and its relationship to world politics. Not only can they not distinguish the Baltics from the Balkans, but they do not understand the critical importance of the Øresund Strait to the states of the Baltic Basin or the Dalmatian Coast to the Balkans. The Rhine, the Caribbean, and the Sea of Japan have important implications for international relations; without understanding those implications, students have a hard time understanding the origins of World War I, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Korean War. If, like me, the Reader seeks a good introductory text concerning geopolitics, Flint’s work is not the place to start.
Flint’s work is an exemplar of what has come to be called by some “critical geography,” in contradistinction to “classical geopolitics” and “feminist geopolitics.” Flint purports to “challenge” the former and “engage” the latter, portraying “classical geopolitics” as “white, male, elite, and Western situated knowledge.” “Feminist geopolitics,” by comparison, avoids the “binary” categories that plague “classical geopolitics,” and elaborates instead upon the “complexity of people’s positions and the connectivity between people and places.” While the works of classical geopolitical scholars like Halford John Mackinder (Democratic Ideas and Reality), Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Karl Haushofer were intended to inform and guide the ambitions of white, Western imperialists, including and especially Hitler’s Nazis, critical and feminist geopolitical scholars seek to promote “interpretations of world events that are counter to dominant government and media representations” and to encourage “practices by individuals, groups of citizens, indigenous people, etc., to resist the control and classification imposed by states and other power institutions, such as the World Bank.”
In short, “critical geopolitics” as practiced by Flint applies the insights and criticisms of “post-modern, social constructivist” works to the field of international relations. Geography as such is relegated to an artifact of power politics and the various social constructions created and used by dominant social forces to perpetuate the domination and exploitation of subordinate social entities.
Applying social science to particular political agendas, whether Mackinder’s imperialism or Flint’s anti-imperialism, does not necessarily render the fruits of an academic enterprise wrong. There is much to admire about Flint’s approach and I am personally inclined to share his opinions. The post-Westphalian, territorial, sovereign state is unquestionably a social construction located within a specific historical context. World political authority has not always been structured thusly and there is no reason to assume that it will always be organized as such. The extent to which the current organization of world political authority fails to protect nations, groups, and individuals is a legitimate concern and a damning criticism of the system of nation-states. There are other, more equitable ways by which to imagine the organization of political authority on planet Earth, and the future viability of the human race may well depend upon the timely elaboration of alternatives.
My criticism of Flint lies not in his contribution to international relations theory but rather the virtual absence of geographic analysis in his book. He describes his field as a part of “human geography,” which I suppose is different from “physical geography.” Flint does not carefully distinguish “geopolitics” from “political geography.” Just as Political Scientists famously “put the state back in” their theories (Power, States & Sovereignty Revisited, Stephen Krasner), perhaps it is time for Human Geographers to “put geography back” into theirs.
Consider, for instance, Flint’s key concepts of “place” in terms of “location,” “locale,” and “sense of place.” Here, location means “function,” locale means “institutions,” and sense of place means “identity.” Other, traditional geographic concepts like resource endowment, climate, natural obstacles, transportation and communication corridors, population distribution, neighbors, isolation, and agricultural and industrial capacity receive short shrift from Flint, and then in only the most abstract fashion. Flint connects deserts, mountains, forests, plains, headwaters, watersheds, lakes, oceans, and sheltered harbors with neither function nor identity, although common sense and the historical works of the ages tell us differently.
Like other social constructivists, Flint grapples with the relationship between “structure” and “agency.” Tellingly, Flint’s definition of “structure” includes “rules and norms” but not geography. For Flint, a “country’s code” is more determinative of its foreign policy than its geography. These codes include “calculations” about one’s actual or potential allies/enemies. The extent of an enemy’s threat or the value of an ally’s help, however, is unrelated to its distance from or proximity to the country in question, in Flint’s analysis. Michael W. Doyle (Ways of War & Peace: Realism, Liberalism, & Socialism) and others have argued convincingly that distance matters in the calculations of a country’s situation, notwithstanding the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and thermonuclear weapons.
I also question Flint’s methodology when it comes to determining a country’s “code.” For this Flint relies on the official documents and policy statements of prominent intellectuals and statesmen. George F. Kennan's “X” article and Paul H. Nitze’s “NSC-68” along with the writings of Mackinder and Mahan are illustrative here. Irrespective of whether these works are definitive with respect to the “American code,” and the work of Morton Halperin, Graham T. Allison, and others should counsel caution, Flint proceeds to explain the “codes” of Russia, India, and China without citing any authoritative documents whatsoever. Flint includes non-state actors as important “agents” in geopolitics without suggesting what “code” may be animating those actors, if any. The United States has articulated a code with respect to Al Qaeda, but what is Al Qaeda’s geopolitical code, if any? Is Al Qaeda’s code morally superior to that of the United States because the Islamist group resists the domination of “white, male, elite, and Western situated” oppressors? Those who, like Prof. Flint, explicitly make normative evaluations an essential part of their scholarship owe their readers an answer to the tough questions along with the easy ones.
Explaining state behavior is difficult but divining the intentions, motivations and “codes” of foreign policy-makers is even more difficult, if possible at all. How reliable are public justifications and rationalizations as actual explanations for foreign policy actions? Allen Dulles taught us the meaning of “plausible deniability” while Robert K. Merton explained the notion of “unintended consequences.” Deceit and mendacity seem integral to politics whether in the family, the workplace, or international affairs. Machiavelli Nicolo Machiavelli instructs the Prince to have no concern about lying if “without which the preservation of his state would be difficult.” Donald Rumsfeld reminds us that, in addition to “known knowns” and “known unknowns,” there are also “unknown unknowns.”
My international relations students have a poor understanding of geography and its relationship to world politics. Not only can they not distinguish the Baltics from the Balkans, but they do not understand the critical importance of the Øresund Strait to the states of the Baltic Basin or the Dalmatian Coast to the Balkans. The Rhine, the Caribbean, and the Sea of Japan have important implications for international relations; without understanding those implications, students have a hard time understanding the origins of World War I, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Korean War. If, like me, the Reader seeks a good introductory text concerning geopolitics, Flint’s work is not the place to start.
May 20, 2021
Let me start by paying this book its due: the book is very methodological and pedagogical, especially that the author himself assumes the reader has no prior knowledge in political sciences and explains every step methodically.
The author uses Modelsky’s model to explain geopolitics, criticizing it when he must. (Surely, that someone named Modelsky is known for creating a model is one of these winks of history).
However Modelsky’s model suggest the USA is the world leader in the 1900’s so some debate ensues on how to qualify the USSR role - but why assume the USA was the world leader? Wasnt the 1900’s a century with two world leaders?
When in the 4th chapter, the author starts analyzing hollywood movies, the book starts to feel like a conspiracy theory.
Moreover, in many parts, geographic concern is absent, at one point one asks what is the specificity of geopolitics compared to other political sciences studies.
And by this time, i got the impression the author is adept of critical theories, and the book took a turn to woke-land.
The author also tackles orientalism, without any critical examination, agreeing and expanding Said’s thesis, then stopping to adress a snaring remark over Huntington’s “bloody borders of Islam”. The edition I’m reading is a bit old, before the early 2010’s vindicated Huntington’s theory.
And honestly, when almost half of the chapter related to terrorism is about Timothy McVeigh and bombings of abortion clinics by Christian fundamentalists (with no numbers to back up anything), it gets ridiculous.
And in discussing rape in Soudan, more focus is made on the evils of the patriarcal society of the victims than on the evil doings of the agressors or their codes or geography.
I wanted to read an academic book about geopolitics, and found this PDF free online - perhaps because it is an older edition - yet, i can say that i ended it without ever finding out what is the particularity of geopolitics within politics - yet, i won’t be too ungrateful as to deny that i learned many concepts that were clearly explained such as geopolitical codes or boundaries/borderland/borders. But ultimately it is the focus on modern critical theories paradigms that put me off and made me feel i was being taught just one aspect of the matter - the « woke » paradigm.
The author uses Modelsky’s model to explain geopolitics, criticizing it when he must. (Surely, that someone named Modelsky is known for creating a model is one of these winks of history).
However Modelsky’s model suggest the USA is the world leader in the 1900’s so some debate ensues on how to qualify the USSR role - but why assume the USA was the world leader? Wasnt the 1900’s a century with two world leaders?
When in the 4th chapter, the author starts analyzing hollywood movies, the book starts to feel like a conspiracy theory.
Moreover, in many parts, geographic concern is absent, at one point one asks what is the specificity of geopolitics compared to other political sciences studies.
And by this time, i got the impression the author is adept of critical theories, and the book took a turn to woke-land.
The author also tackles orientalism, without any critical examination, agreeing and expanding Said’s thesis, then stopping to adress a snaring remark over Huntington’s “bloody borders of Islam”. The edition I’m reading is a bit old, before the early 2010’s vindicated Huntington’s theory.
And honestly, when almost half of the chapter related to terrorism is about Timothy McVeigh and bombings of abortion clinics by Christian fundamentalists (with no numbers to back up anything), it gets ridiculous.
And in discussing rape in Soudan, more focus is made on the evils of the patriarcal society of the victims than on the evil doings of the agressors or their codes or geography.
I wanted to read an academic book about geopolitics, and found this PDF free online - perhaps because it is an older edition - yet, i can say that i ended it without ever finding out what is the particularity of geopolitics within politics - yet, i won’t be too ungrateful as to deny that i learned many concepts that were clearly explained such as geopolitical codes or boundaries/borderland/borders. But ultimately it is the focus on modern critical theories paradigms that put me off and made me feel i was being taught just one aspect of the matter - the « woke » paradigm.
March 25, 2024
It’s a textbook, so it takes awhile to read. That said, it’s fascinating. I’m hoping to take its lessons into my PhD program and perhaps eventually meet Colin Flint. Very well written for those interested in a top academic’s take on geopolitics, and does an excellent job of deconstructing the “pop” geopolitics we’re all used to seeing.
October 24, 2025
Just I want to write the last paragraph of book :
The world is big. Some people are unable to comprehend that simple fact. They want the world on their own terms, its peoples just like them and their friends, its places like the manicured little patch on which they live. But this is a fool- ish and blind wish. Diversity is not an abnormality but the very reality of our planet. The human world manifests the same reality and will not seek our per- mission to celebrate itself in the magnificence of its endless varieties. Civility is a sensible attribute in this kind of world we have; narrowness of heart and mind is not.
(Chinua Achebe, Bates College commencement address, 27 May 1996)
The world is big. Some people are unable to comprehend that simple fact. They want the world on their own terms, its peoples just like them and their friends, its places like the manicured little patch on which they live. But this is a fool- ish and blind wish. Diversity is not an abnormality but the very reality of our planet. The human world manifests the same reality and will not seek our per- mission to celebrate itself in the magnificence of its endless varieties. Civility is a sensible attribute in this kind of world we have; narrowness of heart and mind is not.
(Chinua Achebe, Bates College commencement address, 27 May 1996)
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March 7, 2022Poor, don't bother. Written for undereducated High School students, which I guess matches the author's target audience of University freshmen in the US. The book is highly US-centric and goes through ugly contortions attempting to be totally PC. There are even spelling and grammar errors.
October 25, 2021
Great book which gives a good introduction into modern geopolitics
August 9, 2023
Still don't get a number of things, but that's my skill issue rather than the book's
February 9, 2013
الكتاب اكاديمي ..يحاول الوقوف في عرضه لمفهوم الجيوبولتيك في موقف الحياد (وان كان يفقد القدرة في بعض الاحيان على الالتزام بذلك وذلك طبيعي نظرا لطبيعة الموضوع)....العرض مبسط والامثلة وافية وطريقة الشرح وافية..كتاب جيد جدا في مجاله ولكن فقط يحتاج ان يكون القارئ على دراية مسبقة بطبيعة الجيوبولتيك ومجالها
September 2, 2015
a bit of a boring read.
November 17, 2013
A thorough and nuanced introduction to the concepts involved in critical geopolitics.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews