Konspirační teorie

THINK (Polity)

by Quassim Cassam, Alžběta Vargová (Translator)

Quassim Cassam je profesorem filosofie na University of Warwick; předtím učil v Cambridge, na University College London, a téměř dvacet let v Oxfordu. Původně se věnoval tématům z metafyziky, filosofie mysli a epistemologie. Ve své prvotině Self and World (1997) dokazoval, že vědomí sebe sama coby tělesa ve světě jiných těles je nutnou součástí zkušenosti já jakožto subjektu. V monografii Self-Knowledge for Humans (2014) ukázal, že tradiční modely sebevědomí neberou v úvahu iracionální postoje, jimž lidé podléhají. S Johnem Campbellem napsal knihu Berkeley's Puzzle. What Does Experience Teach Us? (2014), v níž každý z nich hájí odlišnou teorii smyslové zkušenosti: Campbell "relacionismus", čili tezi, že zkušenost je vztah mezi subjektem a objektem, nezávislým na mysli, zatímco Cassam "reprezentacionalismus", neboli názor, že smyslová zkušenost reprezentuje své předměty jako nezávislé na mysli. Nověji se Cassam zabývá aplikovanou epistemologií, zvláště epistemickými neřestmi, postpravdou a konspiračními teoriemi. Ve Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political (2019) vysvětluje a klasifikuje epistemické neřesti (jako jsou úzkoprsost, intelektuální arogance, zbožná přání a předsudky), čili povahové rysy a postoje škodící poznání.

V Konspiračních teoriích (Conspiracy Theories, 2019) rigorózně a přitom srozumitelně objasňuje povahu těchto teorií, důvody jejich popularity, a příčiny jejich škodlivosti.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Politics, Psychology, Conspiracy Theories, History, Academic

127 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2019

About the author

Quassim Cassam is professor of philosophy at the University of Warwick. He writes on self-knowledge, perception, epistemic vices and topics in Kantian epistemology.

Reviews

[Julian Worker · Rating 4 out of 5]

This fascinating book written in plain English by a philosopher at the University of Warwick states that conspiracy theories need to be understood first and foremost in political terms and that the intellectual character of conspiracy theorists is a side issue.

Ethical considerations are important too.

This book is about the politics of conspiracy theories and how they are basically a form of propaganda.

The response to these theories needs to be political too.

Conspiracy theorists are never wrong of course and conveniently ignore or dispute all facts and rebuttals that don't fit in with their opinion.

This is another fascinating book from Polity Books.

[Sandro · Rating 2 out of 5]

I had high expectations for this book which unfortunately weren't met. Cassam presents interesting models for understanding the nature of conspiracy theories. His separation into Conspiracy Theories vs. conspiracy theories sometimes seemed laborious. The book was clearly written with a broad audience in mind as Cassam references some of the most popular conspiracy theories (or, was he would have it, Conspiracy Theories), ranging from the assassination of JFK to 9/11. Donald Trump and his dissemination of a 'fake news' conspiracy is briefly mentioned in passing at the end of the book. This is presenting an interesting premise for a next publication. Nonetheless, the analysis of Conspiracy Theories as political propaganda seemed a bit superficial and doesn't explain why people who do not participate in the everyday business of politics (non-voters) subscribe to conspiratorial mindsets. I agree with Cassam on the importance of being suspicious and critiquing of conspiracy theories, however, I wouldn't credit him with putting me in this position.

[Joshua Stein · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have lots of thoughts about this book. The first thing to do is note that it is a terrific and well written introduction to applying some epistemology and political philosophy to an increasingly important issue. Cassam is clear and the moves are easy to follow. The book is short, which is hard for me because I wanted more and more discussion, but ultimately that makes it a valuable introductory text and is an indicator of the general quality.

The focus on the political dimensions of Conspiracy Theories (the capitalization representing the more appropriately defined body, as employed by Cassam) makes for a useful discussion. One challenge in these cases is that the focus is fairly local, centering on the cases in the anglophone world (basically the UK and US), while there are some interesting weird cases in other regions. I think this is an enormous boon to the study, and I'm glad that he didn't steer away from it.

[Aušrinė · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kaip žmogus, kuris su sąmokslo teoretininkais susiduria artimų žmonių aplinkoje, o kartais (ne)tyčiomis užklysta ir į grynai sąmokslininkų susibūrimus (ir bando juose neišprotėti), jau senokai norėjau paskaityti šią bei dar kelias kitas panašias knygas. Nes, na, nervina. Ir tuo pačiu įdomu, ką apie šią problemą turi pasakyti ją nagrinėjantys asmenys. Pasakyti turi ką, ir tai, mano nuomone, itin vertinga.

Šita trumpa knygutė gali pasitarnauti kaip puikus įvadas į sąmokslo teorijų tyrinėjimus. Tiksliau - Sąmokslo Teorijų, kaip kad akcentuoja pats autorius. Anot jo, sąmokslai bei teorijos apie sąmokslus yra žmonijai natūralus reiškinys, tačiau Sąmokslo Teorijos pasižymi išskirtinai negatyvia prasme ir turi tam tikrų joms būdingų savybių. Kokių? Raginčiau paskaityti patiems.

Pats Quassim Cassam yra filosofas - tai jaučiasi ir knygoje (nei gerąja, nei blogąja prasme; tiesiog jaučiasi filosofiškas braižas). Rašo grynai akademiškai, aiškiai ir be nukrypimų. Pateikia pavyzdžius. Per visą knygą kartu keliauja daugiausia amerikietiškos teorijos apie 9/11, Kenedžio nužudymą bei Sandy Hook Elementary School susišaudymą, bet užsimenama ir apie gausybę kitų atvejų. Knyga suskirstyta į keturias dalis: apie tai, kokia sąmokslo teorijų prasmė, kodėl jos tokios populiarios, kokią daro žalą ir kaip į jas reaguoti. Kiekvienoje iš jų paliečiami svarbūs, nebūtinai akivaizdūs momentai/argumentai.

Kuo toliau, tuo labiau konspiracininkai mane varo į neviltį (realiai reikėtų kuo greičiau pradėti rimtą kritinio mąstymo skatinimo programų integraciją į mokyklas), bet šita knyga truputėlį nuramino. Joje pateikiama nemažai gerų įžvalgų, pastebėjimų tiek apie Sąmokslo Teorijas, tiek apie pačius Teoretininkus. Giliausiai įsirėžusi mintis, ko gero, apie tai, kad už Sąmokslo Teorijų dažniausiai slepiasi politinė propaganda. Kad tai yra grynai politinis reikalas. Arba, kaip keliose vietose pabrėžė autorius, reikia atsižvelgti į klausimą Cui bono? Kam tai naudinga?

Rekomenduoju tiems, kuriuos irgi erzina sparti šių laikų dezinformacijos sklaida bei tiems, kurie linkę abejoti. Na, ir dar tiems, kurie nori apie šią temą sužinoti daugiau, bet nenori paskirti tam daug laiko. Knyga viso labo 125-ių puslapių ilgio.

P.S. Knygoje gausu įvairių šaltinių bei nuorodų į kitus veikalus, straipsnius, tinklalapius ar vaizdo įrašus. Viena knyga, kurią buvau nusižiūrėjusi jau seniau, kaip šaltinis figūravo ir šioje knygoje. Tai Rob Brotherton "Suspicious Minds: Why We Believe Conspiracy Theories", kurią ketinu perskaityti ateityje.

[Brittany · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The problem is that rebutting a theory won't necessarily persuade its supporters to give it up. Rebutting is one thing; persuading is another; it is theories that are rebutted (or not), but people who are persuaded (or not). Whether a theory has been rebutted depends on whether it has in fact been proved to be false using good arguments and trustworthy information. Persuasion also requires that the person you are trying to persuade accepts that his theory has been disproved."

[Peter Dunn · Rating 5 out of 5]

A lot is packed into this short book. It’s a good straight forward analysis of the phenomenon, and it comes with a well thought out common sense approach as to how to deal with it - well at least how best to deal with something that is almost impossible to fully resolve….

[Mark Milne · Rating 1 out of 5]

Quassim Cassam, with his book “Conspiracy Theories,” is another academic philosopher trying to write something relevant in the face of the failure of Western philosophy to answer any of the questions people are actually curious about. As if we need philosophers to help us to understand such everyday subjects as who might have shot a president. This little book won’t surprise anyone. Cassam describes SOME people, their motivations, their personalities, but he definitely does not shed any important light on this subject.

In his book, Cassam does not try to diffuse any of the explosive theories that typically receive the CT dismissive label. That would actually take some effort and some research. Instead, he simply armchairs things, ponders the terminology and keeps everything at a very general level. It probably took him one day to write this little book.

Apparently the only thing Cassam offers here is the unoriginal notion that Conspiracy Theories (the capitalization here is in keeping with Cassam’s lame attempt to define and set apart what he calls “real” Conspiracy Theories as opposed to true explanations for events that also happen to involve conspiracies) are not really efforts to reveal the truth, but are rather mere politically-driven rants by fools and quacks.

This is now what philosophers are for. We really needed him to enlighten us on that observation. But sadly, although that undoubtedly describes the motivations of some people, one size does not fit all. Cassam should know better. Any thinking person should know better.

Cassam does point out that - of course - many if not most well-known “conspiracy theories” actually involve what you can call the officially accepted conspiracy theory, such as the George W. Bush Administration’s official conspiracy theory explaining the events of 9/11, and the nutter Conspiracy Theory concerning the same event, which is simply (arrogantly) any 9/11 theory that disagrees with the official government explanation. The point is: conspiracies do exist. Many historical events involve real conspiracies! Thank you Cassam, for that. We had no idea.

The problem with Cassam and everyone else taking his line, is that this really boils down to the fact that the term “conspiracy theory” is dangerous, or problematic, when used to describe what many times really is NOTHING more than a difference of opinion. The expression is normally used by those in agreement with the explanation offered by the most powerful - and most corrupt - group taking sides. Cassam says that it is the Conspiracy Theorist who holds a political grudge, who spouts propaganda, when of course there are people on ALL sides of the debate who can be so described. This is the problem: people try to take shortcuts to thinking and instead just start name-calling. “Oh, you’re just a Conspiracy Theorist!”

Of COURSE there are many ridiculous and contrived explanations - on BOTH sides - but that realization doesn’t really get us any closer to understanding what happened. It just means we need to be cautious and examine all the evidence before making a judgment. I doubt Cassam did that when he casually dismisses unofficial explanations of, for example, 9/11 or the Kennedy assasinations (John and Bobby).

There are certainly some events where the explanations opposing “official” ones are quite clearly the product of exaggerated or poor thinking. Chemtrails comes to mind. But in all cases, nothing beats careful consideration of evidence, and at least a modicum of respect for those with other views. Most people involved in the bebates have no first-hand knowledge, and no expertise to make real judgement calls. This includes Cassam, a philosopher who has no expertise in any of the technical fields drawn upon to provide insight into so many of the disputed events. All of us have to remember that. The best we can do is weigh the evidence and dig into the backgrounds of those experts providing testimony and try not to be fooled. Because in some cases, someone is willingly trying to fool us, either to cover something up, or to defend a person, tradition, heritage or conviction.

Cassam writes that “Conspiracy theories in the ordinary sense are extraordinary. They have a bunch of special features that make them different from [other] accounts of conspiracies.” He does not say what this “bunch of special features” is though, which is pretty surprising considering that for ages, philosophers have been very keen to put philosophy on the firm and “rigorous” footing of a Science, rather than consider hard subjects like metaphysics.

But again, people using the CT label are arrogant and feel secure in their position of power. So when Cassam asks “Why are Conspiracy Theorists so confident that things aren’t as they seem?” we have to laugh at the audacity. Notice, please, that by assuming that the person he disagrees with is attempting to describe things in a way that is at odds with “how things seem” he is essentially saying “why do you insist that what is clear to everyone else, what is obvious, is somehow wrong?”

Is it really that in a given case of a contested event (one where someone starts the CT name-calling) things “aren’t as they seem” or is it in fact that the different opinions represent just other explanations for an event or series of events that may not “seem” any one way in particular to anyone, yet still need an explanation? Does Cassam believe that those present at the assasination of John Kennedy, if questioned immediately following the tragedy, would have said that “it seems that a man named Lee Harvey Oswald just killed the President,”?

Obviously not. It seemed that he was shot. He was. More than that, one cannot say without an intense examination of evidence. The event does not easily boil down to what “seems” to have happened at all. The same goes for the 9/11 events. But apparently for Cassam, what happened, why, and how, are readily apparent.

[Pavol Hardos · Rating 3 out of 5]

Filozof Quassim Cassam v tejto útlej knižke veľmi stručne a prehľadne rozoberá povahu konšpiračných teórii, nielen v ich poznávacej, ale aj v ich etickej a politickej dimenzii. Ponúka tu ich krátku charakteristiku, prevádza nás výskumom o ich popularite, ale zároveň vysvetľuje prečo môžu byť nebezpečné, na čo svojim nositeľom slúžia, a na záver ponúka aj jednoduchý návod, ako na ne najlepšie reagovať.

Cassam správne zdôrazňuje, že sprisahaní je nespočet, mnoho historicky významných ich je navyše dobre zdokumentovaných, preto sa aj snaží rozlíšiť medzi teóriami o konšpiráciách a konšpiračnými teóriami. Tým druhým prisudzuje kvality, ktoré z nich robí toľko diskutovaný problém. Na rozdiel od faktami podložených teórií o konšpiráciách, konšpiračné teórie sú podľa Cassama charakteristické svojou špekulatívnosťou, opozičnosťu, ezoterickosťou, amatérskosťou, pred-modernosťou a uzavretosťou pred protiargumentami.

V druhej kapitole sa venuje psychologickému výskumu, ktorý skúma, prečo sú konšpiračné teórie tak populárne, resp. prečo máme tendenciu im veriť a šíriť ich. Zároveň tu však správne poukazuje na to, že vnímať túto otázku čisto z psychologického hľadiska je nešťastné a obmedzujúce. Stráca sa tu napríklad ich ideologický aspekt, t.j. rolu, ktorú zohrávajú vo formovaní vnímania politickej reality.

Za najväčšie pozitívum knihy považujem práve skutočnosť, že opúšťa mnoho ráz prežuté a obmedzené vnímanie konšpiračných teórii ako dôsledok kognitívnych zlyhaní a nerestí. Cassam tu, podľa mňa správne, poukazuje na ich politický aspekt – na úlohu, ktorú hrajú vo formovaní o obrane svetonázoru ich proponentov.

Konšpiračné teórie slúžia ľuďom, ktorí ich šíria a ktorí im veria, ako politická propaganda; ich účelom (nie nevyhnutne uvedomeným) je vysvetliť svet v súlade s politickými hodnotami ich nositeľov. To je zásadný poznatok, ktorý musí stáť aj na začiatku akýchkoľvek úvah o boji proti konšpiračným teóriám – vzdelávanie, poúčanie o dôveryhodných zdrojoch a kognitívnych skresleniach, či budovanie kapacít pre kritické myslenie nemusia stačiť, keď na počiatku je tu súbor istých politických hodnôt, často v službách nedôvery, nenávisti a vylúčenia.

Práve negatívne dôsledky konšpiračných teórii – kam môžeme rátať aj extrémizmus, politiky nenávisti, terorizmus, ale aj spochybňovanie vedeckého poznania, napr. pri otázkach životne dôležitých pre verejné zdravie (očkovanie) a pre udržateľný život na planéte (ľudskou aktivitou spôsobované zmeny klímy) – potom rozoberá v tretej kapitole. Nielenže šíria nenávisť a nedôveru, ale politicky paralyzujú a odvádzajú pozornosť od skutočných – často skôr štruktúrnych – problémov a našej schopnosti ich riešiť.

V poslednej štvrtej kapitole napokon Cassam rozoberá spôsoby ako na konšpiračné teórie reagovať. Zdôrazňuje tu poznatok, že reakcia na konšpiračné teórie musí mať aj svoju intelektuálnu aj politickú dimenziu – pomenovať nielen jej intelektuálne zlyhania, ale aj ideologické ciele, ktorým slúži.

Kniha nepribližuje obsah konkrétnych konšpiračných teórii, príklady s ktorými ilustruje svoje argumenty sú buď dostatočne dobre verejne známe, alebo ich v krátkosti uvedie, ale kniha nemá slúžiť na vyvracanie niečoho, čo už je dobre zdokumentované inde. Jej cieľom je priblížiť širšej verejnosti základné filozofické poznatky o povahe konšpiračných teórii – ukázať, ako o tomto fenoméne lepšie rozmýšľať a najmä, ako sa mu lepšie postaviť. To sa knižke, domnievam sa, podarilo. Jej argumenty sa ľahko sledujú, je písaná zrozumiteľným, netechnickým jazykom. Laickej verejnosti ponúka základný pohľad do problematiky, ale zároveň môže poslúžiť aj odbornejšej čitateľskej obci, tým ako posúva problematiku konšpiračných teórii z oblasti sociálnej epistemológie a psychologického výskumu aj smerom k otázkam morálnej a politickej filozofie.

[Max · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good review of some of the literature around conspiracy theories, but the arguments made by Cassam are very variable in quality. At times he spends too much time on analytic distinctions which needn't be discussed at length; at others he makes compelling arguments without developing them fully. In the space of a few pages, he can move from identifying fallacious thinking in other people to falling into imprecise thought himself. This is not what I expected from a philosophy professor who has spent much of his career on some of the most challenging texts.

That's not to say it's without merit. I've got to acknowledge that it's published in the "THINK" series at Polity - and it will make you do that. If you're up for reading critically, this is worth a spin.

[Róisín Finn · Rating 1 out of 5]

I know it's a bit of a philosophy trope but this guy is literally incapable of answering a question. There is little point in naming a chapter with a question, going off on a dozen tangents, then saying "so who knows!" I didn't read a single chapter where I finished and thought "wow I really feel more informed about this now"

[Bowman Dickson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Meh! Interesting but academic. Would have been interesting to add some info about specific conspiracies or make it more of a story.

[Barry Hammond · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great, compact little book which talks about the real point of conspiracy theories, why they are so popular, the problem with them, and how to respond to them. It covers both the psychological aspects of conspiracy theories and their political function as propaganda. A focused discussion that provides great insight. Worthwhile to clarify thinking about the subject. - BH.

[Bill Weaver · Rating 2 out of 5]

I confess that this book is not to my liking but hope that you don’t think I am either a “conspiracy theorist” or capital-C capital-T “Conspiracy Theorist” as the author makes the distinction key to his argument. I should mention this argument is fairly airtight and logical as it should be since this guy is a professional (“expert”) philosopher. Still I find something unpleasant about it which I will attempt in my own (amateurish) fashion to explain. These “Conspiracy Theories” he discusses are awful and deserve to be laughed out of court, yes. So why don’t I like this book? The Prof highlights the “seductive” quality of these “stories that people want to hear.” (p. 31) So we are suddenly in the realm of folklore, which stands in opposition to ‘official’ accounts. I am suddenly reminded of the elite fears about tabloids in the 80s and the increasing ‘irrationality’ in society (see The Bosom Serpent by Schechter). Most interesting of all in the present tome under discussion is the author’s mention of the study showing conspiracy theories have decreased from 1890 to 2010 (p. 32). If this trend continues, what’s all the fuss? The author cites some “harm” caused by these theories which yes I agree can be palpable, but Alex Jones lost in court didn’t he? The Prof is not satisfied with legal system verdicts perhaps, as he says “the response to [Conspiracy Theories] should be political”, (p. vii) so fight fire with fire, I get it. From the systems theory or sociological perspective, one could just as easily view the Prof’s battle cry against “Conspiracy Theory” as part of an ongoing collapse of differentiation leading up to a terroristic regime, where academia, the law, politics, religion and maybe even art become indistinguishable from each other. To put it in layman’s terms, one can see politics creeping into everything these days. I’m sure this is not (exactly) what the Prof has in mind, but communication systems have a mind of their own. One might begin with the most benign of intentions, yet who can say exactly where all those other observers will take it once they really get going? “Conspiracy Theories . . . are speculative, contrarian, esoteric, amateurish and premodern.” (p. 28) Yes, yes and yes, but so are human beings. “Once you’ve given up on the idea that (Conspiracy Theories’] point is to tell the truth, a different account of their function is called for.” (p. 28) The difficulty here too is that the point of politics is not to tell the truth either. I’m not saying that all politics is propaganda, so I am in no way apologizing for repugnant views. I am only saying that politics is on an emotional level and ultimately codes ‘power/opposition’ not ‘true/false’. So as any amateur systems theorist would say, fighting ‘power’ with ‘opposition’ or vice versa is not the same thing as fighting lies with truth.

[Wannes Van den Bulck · Rating 4 out of 5]

Conspiracy Theories vs conspiracy theories zo’n vervelend en moeilijk onderscheid doorheen het boek - voor de rest VERY INTERESTING #3stars

[Simon Howard · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is Professor Quassim Cassam’s philosophical analysis of conspiracy theories, first published in 2019. At only 125-pages, it is a relatively brief and light read. Overall, I found it a little unsatisfying: the length dictated that the book could not explore some of its concepts in detail, and I was a little disappointed at some of the obvious omissions.

For example, one section of the book deals with why people believe in conspiracy theories. From a philosophical perspective, the interesting question here is really about the nature of belief, particularly as Cassam asserts that people often claim to simultaneously believe mutually exclusive conspiracy theories (e.g. believe both that Diana was murdered, and that she faked her own death and is still alive). I can see why Cassam didn’t start exploring the philosophy of belief in such a short book, but at the same time, the omission left me wanting.

All of that said, the central message that we need to consider conspiracy theories more in terms of politics and less in terms of intellect was thought-provoking and, I think, pretty well argued.

Quotes:

It's true, of course, that things sometimes happen for a reason—but not the reasons cited by Conspiracy Theories. Kennedy died for a reason: Oswald decided to shoot him and had the skill or luck to do it. But why did Oswald decide to murder Kennedy in the first place? And why was Oswald himself shot by Jack Ruby while in police custody? From a modern (as distinct from premodern) perspective, all we can really say is: shit happens.

—

The religious impulse is to look for meaning, and one way to satisfy that impulse is to be a Conspiracy Theorist.

[Nuno · Rating 4 out of 5]

This short book is a nice introduction to an analysis of conspiracy theories. Mind you, you will not read about any one conspiracy theory in particular, because the aim of this book is not to show you why this or that particular conspiracy theory is true or not; instead, the author starts from the premise that conspiracy theories are all implausible.

And in order to do so, the author first starts by discriminating between reasonable conspiracy theories (the Gunpowder plot and Watergate were provided as examples, but there are definitely more) and Conspiracy Theories - with capital C and T -, which we all recognise when we see but frequently have trouble defining (from old-timers such as the JFK assassination and the 9/11 Truther movement, to more modern ones, not mentioned in this book, like the supposed political appropriation of the Coronavirus crisis by Bill Gates).

Afterwards the author tries to explain what makes Conspiracy Theories so popular. The answer (spoiler alert!)? It's complicated. And indeed it is. The authors goes through some psychological research that aims at explaining or at least at finding trends amongst hardcore believers of CT, but the conclusion is far from settled. Still, there are some take-home messages: CTs fill the need to find order in a complicated, chaotic world; they confirm some of our biases - which is particularly true for marginalised segments of society or for demographic groups that have been victims of actual conspiracies; and (here's an important point), conspiracy theories are a form of propaganda dissemination, regardless of whether the producers of a given CT believes in it or not. As an example for the latter point, the spread of the CT by the USSR that HIV was created in an American lab in order to get rid of the African American population. But, even when CTs are not developed by state agents, the author of this book suggests that most CTs have political undertones - usually far-right undertones, as judging from the history of Conspiracy Theories.

After attempting to figure out the appeal of Conspiracy Theories, and indeed suggesting that they have some soothing effect in their adherents - not unlike the effect that religion (perhaps another form of CT?) has -, the authors writes about the problem with Conspiracy Theories. Some other authors suggest that CTs have no problem for anyone apart from the Conspiracy Theorist, usually resulting in their allienation because of their constant proselitising of CTs. On the author hand, the author of this book claims that CTs harm extends beyond their fans to the wider population. Case in point, the abovementioned HIV conspiracy theory which resulted in people in South Africa not getting access to HIV medication. Besides, CTs erode trust in expert testimonial (for example, many anti-vaxxers consider that information given by blog posts written by someone with no expertise in medicine or biology is just as valuable as the testimonial of a medical doctor or clinical researcher). Also, the author suggests that CTs take attention away from actual issues - issues that may even be real conspiracy theories. As an example, the author suggests that the 9/11 Truther movement actually benefitted the Iraq invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which was also based in CTs related to WMD and Iraq's involvement in 9/11). To understand this association, read the book :)

After explaining why Conspiracy Theorists shouldn't be left unchecked wreaking havoc over social media, the author finishes the book by providing some guidelines on how to respond to CTs. It shouldn't come as a surprise that the author never suggests to directly confront the hardcore CT believer; s/he is essentially immune to persuasion, due to the self-sealing property of CT (i.e., all evidence you provide against a CT will be disregarded because it is part of the plot to conceal the very same CT).

The strategies suggested by the author consist on rebuttal of CT arguments (when engaging in conversation with people that are not already hard-core believers); education of children for critical thinking and to be able to discern trustworthy from untrustworthy information; outing of CTs history association with extreme-right ideologies.

I am not completely convinced about these three strategies, as I could imagine how a CT would respond to all of them: the first one would be ignored (see two paragraphs above); the second one would be called state propaganda, indoctrination and brainwashing; and the third would be called a strawman fallacy, because not all CTs are fascists (which is true, and the reason why this barely matters is also explored by the author in the book).

Overall, it's worth reading. It is a short book, easy to read, and it only sins for being a bit too superficial. I would definitely be interested in reading a more in-depth book by the author on this fascinating and scary topic.

[Dominic · Rating 4 out of 5]

Capital C, T — Conspiracy Theories (Quassim Cassam)

A brief, clear, and enjoyable read. Cassam (who writes in a very different style to his papers!) introduces us to capital C, capital T Conspiracy Theories, explains why people believe them and why they are pernicious, and what we can do about them. The core argument is that Conspiracy Theories are not, at their core, epistemological pathologies (although this is true), but political ones. That is: they are propaganda, motivated by and advancing some political agenda or ideology.

According to Cassam, Conspiracy Theories are speculative, contrarian, esoteric, amateur, premodern, and self-sealing. Speculative: based on conjecture not knowledge, guesswork not evidence. Contrarian: Occam’s Razor never applies, there is a fundamental mismatch between what we see and what actually is. Esoteric: driven by wild imagination and aesthetics. Amateur: produced and consumed by non-experts. Premodern: a belief that complex events are capable of being controlled by small groups acting in secret — shit doesn’t just happen. Self-sealing: believers are resistant to rebuttal and persuasion (due to living in an epistemic bubble). These six properties make Conspiracy Theories highly unlikely to be true, so we must confront that they are almost always forms of political propaganda rather than sincere attempts at truth. Additionally, they have a deep history with the extreme right.

In chapter 2, Cassam discusses a rough probabilistic model around the risk factors of why people believe Conspiracy Theories. Extremist ideologies, membership in victimised communities and other marginalisation (e.g. economic, social) come up. This raises a question — one that has been put to me personally before — that if belief is based on unfortunate circumstances (perhaps of some sort of oppression) then shouldn’t we have sympathy for both the Theories and the Theorist? Are we too quick to judge what is a coping mechanism? Cassam argues that we should, to a degree: but we must remember that extremist ideologies that are associated with Theories and their pernicious effects are repugnant. I agree.

This does raise some further questions. Per Elizabeth Anderson (chapter 1, Political Epistemology ed. Edenberg & Hannon), expressions of belief in Conspiracy Theories might not be sincere belief but identity-expressive speech. Since they’re political, it’s merely political cheerleading — echoing the party line. We should confront this with actively harmful Conspiracy Theories like those of anti-vaccination. Does identity-expressive speech turn into identity-expressive action even when these beliefs are not sincerely held?

In any case, Cassam spends a chapter highlighting the danger of Conspiracy Theories and excoriates apologists for them. The left, sometimes willing to entertain otherwise Theories with an anti-Semitic character is highlighted here, and Cassam agrees with Walzer (“A Foreign Policy for the Left”) that “the enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.” It is, indeed, possible to criticise government without endorsing beliefs that have racist origins. Cassam cites the example of the Confederate flag here: no matter what someone displaying it may proclaim, the flag itself has a history and meaning that individuals don’t get to decide.

Cassam spends the final bit of the book talking about what we should do. There’s a hard-core of conspiracy theorists that it’s not practical to confront. Because Theories are self-sealing anything we do is likely to reinforce their beliefs. But perhaps we can convince moderates. Rebut, highlight the political nature of Conspiracy Theories, and invest in media literacy and other epistemic education. I think there’s much more to be said on policy, but the book is meant to be short.

[Jonathan Fryer · Rating 5 out of 5]

As someone who writes and broadcasts predominantly about the Middle East I am confronted by conspiracy theories on a daily basis. Some go global, like the theory that the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York was an inside job by the CIA, possibly with Mossad support. Or that Princess Diana was the victim of an assassination plot by the Duke of Edinburgh in order to stop her marrying a Muslim. Perhaps one shouldn’t grace such fantastic notions with the respectable academic word “theory”; that certainly is the view of Quassim Cassam, Professor of Philosophy at Warwick University, whose short but thought-provoking book Conspiracy Theories draws a distinction between rational conspiracy theories (like the 1605 Gunpowder Plot) and Conspiracy Theories (with a capital C & T) that are utter bollocks. Well, he doesn’t actually employ that term, but his language and style are easily accessible and at times folksy. Professor Cassam’s central argument is that conspiracy theories are a form of political propaganda and that therefore the response to them also has to be political. With President Donald Trump churning out fake news in Washington on a daily basis in counterpoint to the disinformation being pumped out of Russia and China, politicians globally do need to be on conspiracy alert.

Conspiracy theories date back far into history, one particularly long-lasting and pernicious one being that Jews are plotting to take over the world. But whereas in the past it took time for such tropes to circulate, these days, thanks to the Internet, conspiracy theories can reverberate almost instantaneously. Countering the falsehoods is not necessarily a straightforward business, as those of us who were trying to avert Brexit discovered. Moreover, Quassim Cassam helpfully points out that when trying to deal with conspiracy theorists one needs to understand that the conspiracy mindset is an ideology rather than a personality trait. Besides, when engaging with conspiracy theorists one runs the danger of drawing attention to their wacky ideas. Not that this should dissuade those of us who value truth from standing up to them. That is particularly true for people working in the media — for whom this little book can serve as a useful primer — but for the population at large. Indeed, because the Internet is now all-pervasive, especially in developed countries, it is important that part of education — even at primary school level — should equip people at an early age with critical thinking skills and what the author refers to as “intellectual virtues” to help them distinguish between truth and lies, information and disinformation.

[Katherine Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

Conspiracy theories aren't just "interesting". They're dangerous.

Quassim Cassam, professor of philosophy at Warwick, writes in clear and simple terms about how conspiracy theories aren't created for the purpose of finding truth but for furthering an economic or political agenda. The ones with the most to gain from conspiracy theories are those selling them and those benefiting from the political confusion or panic such theories can sew.

This book doesn't detail any modern conspiracy theories or lend credence to those theories by giving them space on the page. Instead, he describes common aspects of conspiracy theories and how those aspects are designed to keep conspiracy theories engaging. They make the believer feel special, like they're in on a secret only few people are privileged enough or smart enough to figure out - and we are all so susceptible to that kind of thinking, even if we aren't conspiracy theorists ourselves.

I was most intrigued with the prevalence of Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and how such theories played a role in the Holocaust and are still in the manifestos of present day terrorist groups such as Hamas. Conspiracy theories can and do cost lives and lending any credence to any conspiracy theory lends credence to them all because those who believe one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe more and more conspiracy theories, even about unrelated topics.

Cassam presents this book as a simple call to action to debunk conspiracy theories in ways that fit the psychology of conspiracy theorists. When logical appeals and evidence aren't enough, we have to get to the heart of attacking the politics behind the propaganda. Cui bono? That's the question.

We can't afford to ignore conspiracy theories. There's simply too much at stake.

[Eddie]

What makes conspiracy theories a problem?
Conspiracy theories have always existed — traditionally understood as secret plots or hidden agendas. Until recently, most people dismissed them as ridiculous ideas, such as claims that the Earth is flat. Theories that few people genuinely believe aren’t the real issue.

For Quassim Cassam, however, the term conspiracy theory refers to speculative, contrarian, and often politically motivated claims. These characteristics make such theories highly unlikely to be true in practice. Their real danger lies in their political function: for instance, Holocaust denial isn’t simply a mistaken historical claim but one that serves far-right, antisemitic objectives.

Why do people believe them?
Conspiracy theories attract followers because they appeal to emotion, provide simple narratives for complex problems, and offer a sense of certainty or belonging. Yet they also erode trust in democratic institutions, spread misinformation that can endanger lives (such as vaccine denial), and feed extremist or divisive political movements.

How should we respond to them?
Simply presenting the facts often fails to change minds, and censorship can make matters worse. Cassam argues instead for promoting critical thinking and epistemic virtue—the intellectual habits that help people reason well and seek truth. Building trust in institutions through transparency, and recognising the political motives behind many conspiracy theories, are also key steps in countering their influence.

[Peter Geyer · Rating 4 out of 5]

I leafed through this interesting book on the way to a meeting, but forgot to include it amongst my purchases, so wandered in the bookshop again on the way back to the train.

This book is about discussions around conspiracy theories, who holds them and why. A philosopher, Quassim Cassam alerts the reader to what seems a robust discussion within his profession which includes some direct personal criticism. He also ventures into the field of psychological measurement and comments on what seems a dubious enterprise of a relevant scale.

The latter presumes that there's something pathological about being a believer in conspiracy theories, no matter what they may be. The author suggests this is dubious in many ways and really it does lead to the idea that someone who holds any related view must be pathological in some way. One can see this line applied to climate change deniers, whatever the reason for their denial.

Cassam holds that reasons for adhering to such theories are ideological and this seems a plausible way to go about it, particularly if the usual remedy of providing fact to counter the conspiracy theorist's beliefs doesn't appear to work.

This book is nicely written, slim enough to be read in a train journey, although longer than mine. Maybe if the train was late, or you arrived early. I thought the author's proposal was sound and was amused at the measurement strategy.

[Mark Reece · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this short tract, Cassam defines conspiracy theories and describes what he considers to be their purpose, which is political propaganda. That is the central argument and the main insight of the book. It is a sound argument; Cassam highlights the fact that anti-semitism is the intellectual force behind many conspiracy theories, despite their disparate nature.

Perhaps a little more could have been made of the way that many conspiracy theories rely on a version of the 'great man' theory of history, in which small groups supposedly arrange events in secret. Some proponents of conspiracy theories seem to find comfort in the idea, which is implicitly authoritarian in nature- if social ills can be traced back to cabals, then one need only eliminate the cabals, rather than considering questions of political philosophy, what forms of constitution are most likely to produce justice, and so on.

The argument and writing are a little plodding in places, and the recommendations at the end of the book are not revelatory. However, this is an interesting overview of the topic.

[José Pereira · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not perfect, but a good example of thoughtful public philosophy. Engaging writing, clear and pedagogical argumentation, fresh and characteristically philosophical approach to a relevant topic.
The view defended by Cassam - that conspiracy theories are always ideologically grounded and essentially a propaganda instrument - is also persuasive and non-obvious, I think.
There are certainly some problems with the account: the connection of conspiracism to extremism, rather than to radicalism and steadfastness; the absence of an account of “unlikely to be true”, which makes Cassam vulnerable to accusations of status quo bias; a certain exaggeration of the harms inflicted by the common/low-level conspiracy theorist. But it does what it should do; it brings some clarity to a fraught discussion through careful, common-sense distinctions and analysis.

[Neal Tognazzini · Rating 3 out of 5]

Picked up this book hoping it would give me some good fodder for a Critical Thinking course I teach each quarter. It has some nice ways of putting things, for sure, and I appreciated that the author identifies the core characteristics of conspiracy theories: that they are speculative, contrarian, esoteric, amateurish, premodern, and ultimately politically motivated. But the overall treatment strikes me as a bit too “light”, with a lot of the points seeming just like common sense. Also a bit hard to see who the audience is exactly. Conspiracy theorists won’t read it, and people like me are already convinced that conspiracy theories are dangerous and that we need to better educate people to enable them to resist the temptations.

[Adam84 · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ve zkratce bych knihu popsal jako čtenářsky vstřícnou brožuru pro začínající bojovníky v boji proti konspiračním teoriím.

Autor má zdravý etický pohled a je schopen ho v knize stručně a uspořádaně prezentovat, jen kvůli malému počtu stránek a popularizačnímu charakteru knihy je nucen zúžit perspektivu pouze na politickou propagandu jako hlavní jádro problému konspiračních teorií, což hloubavý čtenář jistě shledá nedostatečným... co naplat, pro něj kniha určena není.

S tímto bych knihu doporučil jako vstup do problematiky a nebo klidně jako vhodnou pro účely základních či středních škol... a vlastně proč ne, vždyť i sám autor klade v závěru důraz na vzdělání, jako základ v boji proti konspiračním teoriím.

[Matt · Rating 2 out of 5]

Honestly I feel like I really didn’t learn much in this book. I would have expected more from an established philosopher writing on this topic. Many of the ideas here just seem self evident and the conclusions are lacking. The tedious distinction between small c conspiracy theories and capital C Conspiracy Theories is pushed endlessly despite it being fairly arbitrary, and we’re finally told that big C Conspiracy Theorists are essentially a lost cause and structural educational changes are the only solution. Sure, I agree, but how exactly do we go about making those changes? The whole book just feels dry and dumbed down. Not a great read on the topic.

[Stringy · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well-reasoned and persuasive take on conspiracy theories, or as he prefers, Conspiracy Theories. He says they are best thought of and combatted as a type of political propaganda rather than as a failure of logic or lack of information.

My only (tiny) quibble is that he assumes that you already know that most Conspiracy Theories have their roots in anti-Semitism. I only knew this from reading Voodoo History a while back. If he’d demonstrated it in this book, it’d be a one-stop book to recommend to anyone interested in the topic.

[ValeryVal · Rating 5 out of 5]

Realmente aprendí muchas cosas que no me hubiese planteado por mí misma. Empecé el libro sin ningún tipo de expectativas, lo vi anunciado de pasada en un vídeo de YouTube y, como me gustó la portada, decidí comprarlo para aprender algo nuevo. Creo que, para personas como yo, sin un conocimiento previo de la materia, está bastante bien para enseñar una imagen global del problema. A veces el escritor se repite y menciona varias veces ciertos aspectos, pero creo que sirven muy bien para afianzar aspectos importantes. El libro es como ver una TED TALK un tanto larga, pero interesante.

[DaN McKee · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brief book with a simple and compelling message: conspiracy theories are not theories and cannot be analysed or rebuffed as such. They are pieces of political propaganda, and so engagement with them as “theories” and attempting to “disprove” them in the hope of changing someone’s mind is not the best approach. However, the book also looks at the epistemic damage caused by belief in such theories and the role these pieces of political propaganda play in facilitating epistemic vandalism.

[Rachael Kosinski · Rating 5 out of 5]

A friend let me borrow this because he had to read it for a college class and it was very interesting! I always kind of thought conspiracy theories were silly and for a laugh, but the author did a very good job of pointing out that they are no such thing and should be taken very seriously and not indulged in the slightest. A good read, especially for the current political climate of fake news.