Having been an investor in two of Neil Woodford's funds, selling out in early 2019 for a small loss, and having read with much interest the ups and very hefty downs of Woodford's career, this book was an obvious read.
Owen Walker, the author, is a writer at the Financial Times and one whose articles on Woodford were always important reads. He has written a book that properly dissects Woodford's rise as the UK's answer to Warren Buffet (some would say) and his downfall. Downfall relates, of course, to just his business dealings which collapsed in 2019. It does not refer to his own wealth as, like many in similar situations, Woodford and his co-conspirator, Newman, extracted tens of millions of £'s from these ventures throughout the good and bad periods.
The story of a man who became prized amongst the investment community and seen as magical by the retail investors that invested in his companies is compelling and well-told. It is written in the style of a very good journalist who understands the need of a reader to be engaged, able to learn from the story and also to understand the environment in which Woodford became so wealthy while, at the same time, he dealt a financial death-blow to thousands.
This is, perhaps, an area of real interest to me: how those who are real entrepreneurs, who build businesses but create nothing, are able to extract wealth from willing investors that know little about what the investment is about and who know little of the risk that they are so undertaking. This interest extends to the many organisations and laws that are set up to oversee these businesses but prove how poor they have been in their task.
I wonder if there has been a case where the authorities have stymied such disasters rather than being reactive, coming on the scene long after the damage has been done and then promising to learn lessons from the disaster. The lessons are always out of date by the time of the next disaster as the professionals engaged in these businesses are far more capable than those carrying out the oversight.
'Built on a Lie' is a title that could extend to much of the financial services industry. Honesty, integrity and reliabilty are mere words to much of it as the downfall of mortgage-backed securitisation firms showed in the USA in 2008. The lure of returns is short-term and Woodford's 'patient capital' stance - aimed at backing hi-tech businesses through the long-term - cme to nothing (a) because he became too entranced by the companies and did poor due diligence on them and (b) meanwhile pillaging the businesses he had set up.
It is not merely unedifying to view how individuals behave so badly but also quite revolting to see how the organisations such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) missed so many obvious signs to intervene early because (a) a paucity of systems and capabilities (b) a perceived desire to 'engage' with individuals that clearly took them in.
Caveat emptor - buyer beware - is not something we now have to apply to most goods we buy. Specifications demanded by law suffice, usually, to provide the buyer with enough certainty that what they are sold will be what is received. It is not true for financial services. Caveat emptor remains the only truth attainable in the shadowy world of finance.