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Divine Providence: The Molinist Account
Divine Providence is a remarkable book that should quickly earn its place as the leading authoritative contemporary exposition and defense of Molinism. ―William Hasker, author of God, Time, and Knowledge Thomas P. Flint develops and defends the idea of divine providence sketched by Luis de Molina, the sixteenth-century Jesuit theologian. The Molinist account of divine providence reconciles two claims long thought to be that God is the all-knowing governor of the universe and that individual freedom can prevail only in a universe free of absolute determinism. The Molinist concept of middle knowledge holds that God knows, though he has no control over, truths about how any individual would freely choose to act in any situation, even if the person never encounters that situation. Given such knowledge, God can be truly providential while leaving his creatures genuinely free. Divine Providence is by far the most detailed and extensive presentation of the Molinist view ever written. Middle knowledge is hotly debated in philosophical theology, and the controversy spills over into metaphysics and moral philosophy as well. Flint ably defends the concept against its most influential contemporary critics, and shows its importance to Christian practice. With particular originality and sophistication, he applies Molinism to such aspects of providence as prayer, prophecy, and the notion of papal infallibility, teasing out the full range of implications for traditional Christianity.
276 pages, Paperback
First published February 28, 1998
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
November 11, 2024
I feel like 3 stars might be a little unfair, because it's a convincing book (even if I'm disposed to agree with most of it), and it's mostly compelling. My own takeaway might be a little off for two reasons. First, I have no experience with symbolic logic and while that isn't necessary for reading this book, it would help, especially with the section on "bringing about." Second, it gets pretty far into the weeds, and some of those arguments get trickier even as they seem less important (I think his chapter on praying for things to have happened is actually stronger and longer than necessary, and he could have gotten to his result more simply).
That said, I suspect this is one of the key works on the subject and my review is as much about me as about the book. For philosophers of religion who really want to talk middle knowledge and its relationship to a number of concepts, this book is likely essential, for its overview, its engagement with other positions, and its application to other theological questions.
That said, I suspect this is one of the key works on the subject and my review is as much about me as about the book. For philosophers of religion who really want to talk middle knowledge and its relationship to a number of concepts, this book is likely essential, for its overview, its engagement with other positions, and its application to other theological questions.
August 25, 2019
A very good book that outlines the philosophical foundations of Molinism, offers a defense against attacks from determinists and open theists, and applies the precepts of Molinism to other areas of theology (infallibility, prophecy, and prayer). You'll need to have some philosophical background to follow many of the arguments in this book, so if it's been a few years since your intro to philosophy class in college, brush up on that before tackling this book. Both defenders and detractors of Molinism will find this book useful.
February 9, 2017
I read a lot of this book for my independent study on free will and greatly enjoyed it! I'm not a Molinist (or even necessarily a libertarian) but I thought this was a compelling account of middle knowledge and various possibilities regarding the framework behind divine foreknowledge.
April 2, 2018
Provides a good overview and defense of the Molinist perspective on divine providence, though a discussion of the Problem of Evil would have added to the overall quality.
October 22, 2022
Very good. A lot of this went over my head, but I guarantee that whenever I interact with Molinist material further, I will revisit this work extensively.
July 30, 2016
This is a very good book on Molinism. I'll be drawing from this for years to come. The only drawback is Flint's catholicism leads him to apply middle knowledge in silly ways, such as in a defense of papal infallibility.
Notes:
(1) Defines Orthodoxy in such a way as to include both Roman Catholics and evangelicals. This is fine for his purposes.
(2) Twin bases of Molinism : 1. gods decreed Providence
2. Human freedom. (17)
(3) excellent philosophical breakdown of determinism, compatiblism, and libertarianism (23, 24)
(4) Even on christian libertarianism, the agent is not an unmoved mover but is rather reactive in his freedom (34)
(6) The truth of a proposition must be thought of as prior to the fact that someone knows that truth, it seems evident that the true future contingent should be seen as explanatorily prior to God's foreknowledge of it (45)
(7) God knows that Cuthbert will buy the Iguana because Cuthbert will buy the Iguana - not in the sense that cuthbert's future action causes God's prior knowledge, but in the sense that God's knowledge, though flowing from the same Divine act which gives rise to Cuthbert's buying the Iguana, is logically posterior to the Cuthbertian action" (45)
(8) "on the Thomist alternative, every possible world is feasible - every possible world is such that God could have created it had he chosen to do so" (86)
(9) Concurrence (87)
(10) Incredible explanation of how God is not responsible for sinful actions on compatiblism. Rather than "concurring" with a sinful action, God instead concurrs with other conditions that permit the act. Or else he withholds a restraining concurrence. Consequently God is not responsible for the evil act (88)
(11) Personal note: if God is responsible for all the conditions leading up to my act, it's not very helpful if I cannot break that momentum in the moment of truth. It would be like pushing my daughter in a shopping cart and then letting go. I'm hardly exonerated with the defense that I wasn't physically pushing at the time she crashed.
(12) “But then, Asks Molina, how can the Thomist maintain that God intends that, say, Cuthbert not mistreat his iguana when he withholds from Cuthbert a necessary condition for his not sinning? How can God fault Cuthbert for sinning if God decides not to grant him the very assistance without which sinning is inevitable?” (92)
(13) "Consider the woman who throws a rope to a drowning man. Suppose that no further activity on her part determines either that he grasps or that he reject the rope. Should he grab it, we might well say that his doing so was a free action. But it would be preposterous to say that the process of being saved from drowning began with his grasping the rope. Clearly it began with her offering him the rope in the first place" (112)
(14) The extent to which the Molinist can affirm predilection (119)
(15) The grounding problem with molinism: according to Molinism, God uses his foreknowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which are contingent and prevolitional in deciding which persons to create in which situations. But if such conditions are contingent, they might not have been true. So then, what makes them true? Or, to phrase this question more carefully: who or what actually causes the ones that are true to be true, and the ones that are false to be false? And who's actual activity are we to find adequate metaphysical grounds for such truths? (123)
(16) Personal note: surprisingly, Flint doesn't offer an escape from the grounding problem. Why am I not disturbed by the grounding problem? If I begin with the conception of God's omniscience as God knowing all true propositions, why can't I say that God knows what a person would do under certain circumstances, even if they don't do it?
(17) "His decision to create our friend Cuthbert and put him in situation C is is based in part on his middle knowledge of what Cuthbert would freely do in that situation" (161)
Notes:
(1) Defines Orthodoxy in such a way as to include both Roman Catholics and evangelicals. This is fine for his purposes.
(2) Twin bases of Molinism : 1. gods decreed Providence
2. Human freedom. (17)
(3) excellent philosophical breakdown of determinism, compatiblism, and libertarianism (23, 24)
(4) Even on christian libertarianism, the agent is not an unmoved mover but is rather reactive in his freedom (34)
(6) The truth of a proposition must be thought of as prior to the fact that someone knows that truth, it seems evident that the true future contingent should be seen as explanatorily prior to God's foreknowledge of it (45)
(7) God knows that Cuthbert will buy the Iguana because Cuthbert will buy the Iguana - not in the sense that cuthbert's future action causes God's prior knowledge, but in the sense that God's knowledge, though flowing from the same Divine act which gives rise to Cuthbert's buying the Iguana, is logically posterior to the Cuthbertian action" (45)
(8) "on the Thomist alternative, every possible world is feasible - every possible world is such that God could have created it had he chosen to do so" (86)
(9) Concurrence (87)
(10) Incredible explanation of how God is not responsible for sinful actions on compatiblism. Rather than "concurring" with a sinful action, God instead concurrs with other conditions that permit the act. Or else he withholds a restraining concurrence. Consequently God is not responsible for the evil act (88)
(11) Personal note: if God is responsible for all the conditions leading up to my act, it's not very helpful if I cannot break that momentum in the moment of truth. It would be like pushing my daughter in a shopping cart and then letting go. I'm hardly exonerated with the defense that I wasn't physically pushing at the time she crashed.
(12) “But then, Asks Molina, how can the Thomist maintain that God intends that, say, Cuthbert not mistreat his iguana when he withholds from Cuthbert a necessary condition for his not sinning? How can God fault Cuthbert for sinning if God decides not to grant him the very assistance without which sinning is inevitable?” (92)
(13) "Consider the woman who throws a rope to a drowning man. Suppose that no further activity on her part determines either that he grasps or that he reject the rope. Should he grab it, we might well say that his doing so was a free action. But it would be preposterous to say that the process of being saved from drowning began with his grasping the rope. Clearly it began with her offering him the rope in the first place" (112)
(14) The extent to which the Molinist can affirm predilection (119)
(15) The grounding problem with molinism: according to Molinism, God uses his foreknowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which are contingent and prevolitional in deciding which persons to create in which situations. But if such conditions are contingent, they might not have been true. So then, what makes them true? Or, to phrase this question more carefully: who or what actually causes the ones that are true to be true, and the ones that are false to be false? And who's actual activity are we to find adequate metaphysical grounds for such truths? (123)
(16) Personal note: surprisingly, Flint doesn't offer an escape from the grounding problem. Why am I not disturbed by the grounding problem? If I begin with the conception of God's omniscience as God knowing all true propositions, why can't I say that God knows what a person would do under certain circumstances, even if they don't do it?
(17) "His decision to create our friend Cuthbert and put him in situation C is is based in part on his middle knowledge of what Cuthbert would freely do in that situation" (161)
September 2, 2012
Of the work as a whole, I commend Divine Providence: The Molinist Account as the most philosophically sophisticated, thorough, book-length, single-author treatment of Molinism to date. Though this is highly qualified praise, it is nonetheless high praise. Flint has alone generated a sustained, thorough, and plausible defense of Molinism.
Though each chapter is a philosophical gem in its own right, I particularly enjoyed some key insights from chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5. (The curious treatment of papal infallibility in chapter 8 was also of interest to me, even as a Protestant, since it clarifies and defends a Catholic tradition long overlooked, under-appreciated, and misunderstood by Protestants.)
I will be brief. Chapter 1 identifies libertarian freedom and meticulous providence as the 'twin pillars' of Molinism, each pillar being commonly accepted and theoretically desirable theses among Christians. Chapter 3 explores alternative accounts of providence, and Flint's characterization of morally unacceptable riskiness in openist theology proper is challenging to such theology. Chapter 4 focuses on Thomistic objections to Molinism, often voiced today in Calvinistic circles. Flint responds to each objection, and in a way that this former Calvinist can appreciate. Chapter 5 includes what Alvin Plantinga has described as a "magisterial treatment" of the infamous grounding objection. Flint's reply, which he builds on from Freddoso (1988), is, I think, the most plausible reply to the grounding objection to date.
The content of the book is theoretically thick, and is probably best not undertaken by persons lacking training in philosophy. A more widely accessible defense of Molinism can be found in William Lane Craig's essay "A Middle-Knowledge View" in *Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views*. But for the philosophically sophisticated, this is Molinism par excellence.
Though each chapter is a philosophical gem in its own right, I particularly enjoyed some key insights from chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5. (The curious treatment of papal infallibility in chapter 8 was also of interest to me, even as a Protestant, since it clarifies and defends a Catholic tradition long overlooked, under-appreciated, and misunderstood by Protestants.)
I will be brief. Chapter 1 identifies libertarian freedom and meticulous providence as the 'twin pillars' of Molinism, each pillar being commonly accepted and theoretically desirable theses among Christians. Chapter 3 explores alternative accounts of providence, and Flint's characterization of morally unacceptable riskiness in openist theology proper is challenging to such theology. Chapter 4 focuses on Thomistic objections to Molinism, often voiced today in Calvinistic circles. Flint responds to each objection, and in a way that this former Calvinist can appreciate. Chapter 5 includes what Alvin Plantinga has described as a "magisterial treatment" of the infamous grounding objection. Flint's reply, which he builds on from Freddoso (1988), is, I think, the most plausible reply to the grounding objection to date.
The content of the book is theoretically thick, and is probably best not undertaken by persons lacking training in philosophy. A more widely accessible defense of Molinism can be found in William Lane Craig's essay "A Middle-Knowledge View" in *Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views*. But for the philosophically sophisticated, this is Molinism par excellence.
December 31, 2009
A definitive book on the Molinist perspective. Written from a philosophers perspective, it will not attract the lay Christian reader, but this is not a good excuse for not picking it up. Flint's work will challenge and offers a strong argument for a Molinist view of Providence pace Thomism and Adam's grounding objection.
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