Hitler's American Gamble: Pearl Harbor and Germany’s March to Global War

by Brendan Simms, Charlie Laderman

A riveting account of the five most crucial days in twentieth-century diplomatic history: from Pearl Harbor to Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States

By early December 1941, war had changed much of the world beyond recognition. Nazi Germany occupied most of the European continent, while in Asia, the Second Sino-Japanese War had turned China into a battleground. But these conflicts were not yet inextricably linked—and the United States remained at peace.

Hitler’s American Gamble recounts the five days that upended everything: December 7 to 11. Tracing developments in real time and backed by deep archival research, historians Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman show how Hitler’s intervention was not the foolhardy decision of a man so bloodthirsty that he forgot all strategy, but a calculated risk that can only be understood in a truly global context. This book reveals how December 11, not Pearl Harbor, was the real watershed that created a world war and transformed international history.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Germany, American History, Japan, War

510 pages, Hardcover

First published October 28, 2021

About the author

Brendan Peter Simms is Professor of the History of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. Simms studied at Trinity College Dublin, where he was elected a scholar in history in 1986, before completing his doctoral dissertation, Anglo-Prussian relations, 1804-1806: The Napoleonic Threat, at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Tim Blanning in 1993. A Fellow of Peterhouse, he lectures and leads seminars on international history since 1945

Reviews

[Manny · Rating 4 out of 5]

At 08.00 local time on December 7, 1941, Japanese planes launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and sank or put out of commission a large part of the US Pacific Fleet. At 15.00 local time on December 11, Hitler declared war on the US. But why did Hitler do that, and what happened between these two events? This book goes into a great deal of detail in presenting the story.

The structure is nice and looks like the result of an impressive amount of work. There's an introductory chapter giving us the background and a concluding chapter telling us what happened later. In the middle, we have one fifty page chapter per day. The authors mostly just tell us what was happening at various places around the world. Obviously we get to hear about the Axis and Allied leaders: Hitler in Germany, Tojo in Japan, Mussolini in Italy, Roosevelt in the US, Churchill in the UK. But we also follow local commanders in various theatres of war and ordinary people in many countries who left diaries and other records.

There was a lot happening. As well as the raid on Pearl Harbour, there was the second Japanese air/sea attack that sank the British battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse three days later; the German front was collapsing near Moscow and getting into trouble around Leningrad; there was heavy fighting in Northern Africa; British convoys were taking American supplies to the Soviet Union through the Arctic Ocean; a huge amount of negotiation was going on between the many countries concerned, with diplomats working until 3 am; Jews were being rounded up and killed in increasing numbers; and hundreds of millions of ordinary people were just going about their normal wartime lives. The book does a great job of walking the camera around, updating us on these dozens of parallel stories and keeping us interested in each one without drowning us in information. I think it would make a fantastic movie.

The big question, though, is why Hitler did it. What made him declare war on the most powerful country in the world, and what would have happened if he hadn't? The book makes it clear that he didn't need to declare war on the US. Despite their agreements, neither the Allies nor the Axis were forced to declare war on an opposite party if they didn't see a strategic advantage in doing so. In particular, the Russians didn't declare war on the Japanese, since they were fighting for their lives against the Germans, and the Japanese didn't declare war on the Russians, since they were already thinly stretched against the Americans and the British. The Americans tried to persuade the Russians to change their minds, and the Germans did the same with the Japanese, but nothing happened. The two countries respected their non-aggression pact until a few days before the end of the war.

Germany made a disastrous mistake when it declared war on the US. Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, but it was extremely difficult to persuade the American people that it was a good idea. "America First" sentiment was strong. Most people didn't want to get into any war. Once Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, things changed, and they thirsted for revenge. Some people thought Germany was behind the attack - it was amusing to see how many racist American and British generals simply refused to believe that non-white people could organise complex military operations and win major battles against whites. But most of the country wasn't interested. On Dec 6, vast consignments of American tanks, planes, guns, ammunition and oil were being loaded up and sent in ships to help the Brits and the Russians. It was of vital importance; during the defence of Moscow, over a third of the Russian tanks and planes had come from the US. As soon as the war with Japan started, the orders changed. Material that had already been put into ships ready for the voyage across the Atlantic was taken off. Churchill was so worried that he immediately said he would visit Washington to discuss the new situation. Roosevelt wanted to delay the meeting.

Why did Hitler do it? It seems he thought the US would inevitably declare war on him if he waited, so he decided to seize the initiative and attack them first while they were off-balance. If he really believed that the US was run by a shadowy cabal of Jewish plutocrats whose most cherished dream was the degradation and enslavement of the master race, it made sense. And he was the Führer, whose word could not be questioned. When war was declared at a spectacular rally held in an opera house (the old Reichstag had still not been rebuilt after the fire), the leaders of his puppet governments applauded. But the top generals didn't applaud. They knew what was going to come, and they realised that they had sealed their own fate by supporting this charismatic lunatic who was so good at energising the base by telling outrageous lies.

The authors say that the Axis would have lost anyway, even if Hitler hadn't declared war when he did. But they also say that December 11 1941 was arguably the most important day in world history. I'm not quite sure how to reconcile those two statements.

This really is a thought-provoking book.

[Darya Silman · Rating 5 out of 5]

A historic revelation about why Hitler shouldn't have declared war on the United States.

Historians Brandon Simms and Charlie Laderman, in their book 'Hitler's American Gamble: Pearl Harbor and Germany's March to Global War,' create a revealing, captivating account of the five historically significant days from December 6th to December 11th, 1941. The book begins with an overview of the situation before December 6th, covering the reasons behind the Axis cooperation, the Lend-Lease agreement between Britain and the USA, and conditions in the different war theatres. Military actions raged on two continents, but the war still couldn't be called a world war. The authors show how each country acted according to its ideological, geopolitical, and economic considerations. For Japan, Italy, and especially Germany, the war was a way to create a new world order in which they would play the superior role above the empires of the US and Britain. It was 'them,' haves of the world, against 'us,' the have-nots. Opponents of the Axis powers were merged into one 'Anglo-Saxon plutocracy,' pushed forward by the international Jewry and big corporations. Seeking allies, Hitler had to partially abandon his rhetoric about the supremacy of the white race, picturing the future world divided into two spheres of interest.

The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a shocking surprise to the Allied forces as well as Germany and Italy. The British and Americans continued to demonstrate underestimation of Japan's war capacities even after it destroyed Pearl Harbor, invaded the Philippines, and sunk two British battleships, the Prince of Walse and Repulse, leaving the Indian and Pacific Oceans unprotected.

The authors disprove conventional wisdom: the Japanese attack didn't mean an automatic American entry into the war due to the strong opposition from anti-interventionists at home that continued even after December 7th. It was Hitler's declaration of war that changed the balance within Congress.

The book provides a fascinating, paramount study of international and domestic politics. It uses every source of information possible: correspondence, newspapers, diaries, archives, observations of average citizens, among the few. From high-ranking officials to the ghetto Jews, from America, France, Britain, Russia, to Japan; the study covers everybody and everything. It's unequivocally a must-read for people interested in politics and World War II.

For me, it's one of the best history books this year.

I received an advance review copy for free, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.

[Bill Hall · Rating 2 out of 5]

The title of the book by Simms, Hitler's American Gamble, was somewhat deceptive and led me to believe this work would address in depth Hitler's calculation in declaring war on the U.S. To my disappointment, the book turned out to be a rather long history of the events leading up to America's entry into World War II, a story that for the most part I had already read elsewhere. The decision to go to war is so critical and fundamental that analyzing the motivations and expectations of a belligerent can be a fascinating enterprise. I wish this book had approached its supposed topic much more thoroughly from that perspective.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

I liked the approach, focusing on one day at a time, all around the world. The story was quite absorbing. Still, there was too much focus on the Americans, with relatively little on Germany and Japan, and next to nothing on Stalin. The book didn't really live up to its title or central argument, because there was too little information about how Hitler decided to declare war on the US.

> Negotiations effectively collapsed on November 26, 1941, when Hull handed Japanese diplomats Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu a list of demands. Japan, Hull insisted, must withdraw entirely from China and Indochina and abjure the Tripartite Pact. There was no time limit specified, but in the fevered atmosphere in Tokyo, Hull’s note was regarded as an “ultimatum.” Nomura believed that it made war inevitable.

> the Germans and Italians would agree that in the event of the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, they would both immediately come to the aid of Tokyo and wage war against the Americans with all their might. Unlike the Tripartite Pact—which was defensive and only committed the contractants to come to each other’s aid if attacked by the United States—this agreement was, implicitly, offensive in nature. Moreover, it was to be kept secret and only published in the event of war, and was thus not intended to deter Roosevelt. Instead, the planned agreement was plainly intended to encourage a Japanese attack on the United States

> Senator Arthur Vandenberg ruefully remarked, “The interventionist says today—as the president virtually did in his address to the nation—‘See! This proves we were right and this war was sure to involve us.’ The non-interventionist says (and I say)—‘See! We have insisted that this course would lead to war and it has done exactly that!’”

> King realized just how significant a moment this was. His understanding of American politics meant he knew to whom the Allies should be grateful: “We have to thank Germany and Italy, not the people of the U.S. themselves for the U.S. coming into the war.”

> “When Pearl Harbor happened,” the president’s economic adviser John Kenneth Galbraith recalled, “we were desperate.… We were all in agony.” This was because he and like-minded British sympathizers feared that the administration would be “forced” by the public “to concentrate all our efforts on the Pacific, unable from then on to give more than purely peripheral help to Britain.” To the amazement of the president and his advisers, Hitler made the “truly astounding” and “totally irrational” decision to declare war on the United States. Galbraith remembered an indescribable “feeling of triumph” upon hearing the news from Berlin: “I think it saved Europe.”

> Whether Roosevelt had wanted to enter the war against Hitler as a full-scale belligerent before December 7, 1941, remains unclear. The president, in the words of Rexford G. Tugwell, one of his advisers and subsequently one of his most perceptive biographers, “deliberately concealed the processes of his mind. He would rather have posterity believe that for him everything was always plain and easy… than ever to admit to any agony of indecision.”

> Hitler also told the gauleiters of his intention to “make a clean sweep” in the “Jewish question.” He was referring to central and western European Jewry, the hostages who were now held responsible for the behavior of the United States, as the Führer had long threatened they would be. He reminded the gauleiters of his threat in 1939 to retaliate against Jewry in the event of their “plunging” Europe into war. “The world war is here,” Hitler continued, “[and] the extermination of the Jews must be the necessary consequence.”

> The American entry into the war closely coincided with the end of the German advance and the success of the Soviet counteroffensive before Moscow.

[Sacha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fünf Tage im Dezember von Brendan Simms

⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ (4*)

Nach mehr als 2 Monaten habe ich es endlich geschafft. 😁 Ich habe dieses Buch direkt zu Weihnachten bekommen, als es im Dezember erschienen ist und ich muss sagen, es war keine einfache Lektüre aber win wirklich tolles, spannendes Buch.

Das ganze dauerte so lange, weil ich zum einen weniger Zeit hatte und zum anderen, jeder Satz so viele Informationen enthielt, dass man nicht einfach mal eben drüber weg lesen konnte. Ich habe auch versucht Ereignisse oder Informationen die mir noch unbekannt waren jeweils zu googlen und das alles verlangsamt die Lesegeschwindigkeit enorm.

Das Buch an sich, fand ich wirklich richtig gut und interessant. Ich interessiere mich sehr für Geschichte und darf von mir behaupten, dass ich auch viel weiss, aber trotzdem gab es einiges, was mir so noch nicht bekannt war. Zusätzlich, war es für mich spannend zu sehen, wie der diplomatische Apparat und die einzelnen Staatsmänner miteinander oder gegeneinander agierten. Welche Ängste man hatte, welche Sorgen oder auch welche Ansichten und „Gewissheiten“. In der Mitte gab es dann die eine oder andere Länge, da hätte man das Buch gut 100 Seiten kürzen können. Dass sich die Briten und die Soviets Sorgen betreffend der Leih-Pacht-Verträge machten, haben wir dann nach dem 10x auch alle verstanden. Aber darüber kann man hinweg sehen, wie ich finde, da die restlichen Einblicke unglaublich gut waren. 🙂👍🏻

Eine Empfehlung für alle die Geschichte lieben oder ein grosses Interesse am 2. WK oder Pearl Harbour haben. 😁👍🏻

[Jean-Luc · Rating 5 out of 5]

A compelling and fascinating account of the very few days it took for WWII to become a global conflict from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,December 7th 1941 to the infamous speech Hitler gave 4 days later on the 11th declaring war to the United States. An amazing and gripping day by day breakdown of all the events that brought the scales down towards a catastrophic outcome, from the American wrath and its declaration of war against the Japanese imperialist agression to the German Machiavellian decision to throw down the towel in order to launch its mad & almost doomed to fail invasion of the Soviet Union. A magnificent and very detailed tapestry of the madness that gripped the World at the end of 1941 and the few days that changed the 20th century forever. Highly recommended to anyone interested by WWII and to be enjoyed without any moderation whatsoever Many thanks to Netgalley and Basic Books for this terrific ARC

[Kenneth Brachfeld · Rating 4 out of 5]

Learned quite a bit. Well written, moves quickly.

[Laurent Franckx · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the big traps in the study of history is to look at the past and to think that the way things developed was more or less unavoidable, simply because we know the final outcome.
This is certainly the case with World War Two, where generations have been taught that "the French surrendered after a few weeks, but the British bravely fought on, because they correctly anticipated that one day the US would join the war on their side". Well, when you grow up, you learn that the US actually only joined the war because they were attacked first, but even then most of us see a direct road leading from Pearl Harbour to D-Day. The reality is rather different: even after Pearl Harbour, the US only got involved with the war in Europe after Hitler moved first against the US.
Simms and Ladermann take us on a day by day, almost hour per hour account of what happened between Pearl Harbour and Hitler's fateful decision to take on the most powerful country in the world, through the eyes of people who were direct eyewitnesses of the events. They don't limit themselves to the perspective of the great and mighty, but also let us peek into the lives of ordinary citizens all over the world. And, once you look at the events without the benefit of hindsight, you understand that the first days after the attack, people had concerns that we have forgotten to consider from our perspective. Would the US completely end Lend Lease support to the UK and the USSR? Would the USSR declare war on Japan? Would the USSR allow US bombers to take off from Vladivostok to bomb Japan? Would Vichy France join the war on the side of the Axis? Would Thailand resist the Japanese invasion? Would Japan directly attack the West Coast of the US? Was Germany involved in the preparation of the attack against Pearl Harbour?
The best thrillers are the ones where you know the outcome right from the beginning but you still cannot put away the book. Simms and Ladermann have written a real page-turner, which conveys very well the extreme pressure that people must have experienced back then.
One important warning: if you are not familiar with the overall history of World War Two, you may be overwhelmed a bit by the huge number of names and events in the book.

[The White Tiger · Rating 2 out of 5]

Thesis: Hitler's decision to declare war on the United States was a shocking, world-altering decision that was not necessarily predestined to occur because of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor despite what popular collective memory believes.

Style: Hitler's American Gamble is a narrative history following a detailed chronological account of the days immediately preceding Hitler's declaration of war on the United States. The story jumps from place to place too frequently.

Thoughts: This book does not clearly articulate WHY Hitler chose to declare war on America. The war declaration appears to be already made and it is just a matter of timing in Simms and Laderman. While the timing was a key issue and interesting to unravel, the factors that weighed on Hitler's mind when making the decision are not clearly articulated, at least not as well as in Klaus H. Schmider's Hitler's Fatal Miscalculation: Why Germany Declared War on the United States. Simms' and Laderman's research is incredibly thorough and presented in a manner that captures the zeitgeist of the times similar to Paul Jankowski's All Against All: The Long Winter of 1933 and the Origins of the Second World War,

[Steven Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The dates December 5 through the 7th, 1941 mark the parameters of the most consequential week of the 20th century or perhaps any other time in history. It was during that week that the Soviet Union began a major counter offensive against the Nazis who were threatening Moscow, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, and Hitler declared war on the United States. It was a perilous time for the British who had endured Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe’s blitz over London and other cities, fears of Japanese attacks against British held territories in Asia, and Churchill’s fear that the only thing that could save his island empire - the entrance of the United States into the war against Germany would not occur as Washington would now focus on Japan after Pearl Harbor. The event that saved the British was the Nazi dictator’s declaration of war against the United States, an act that should be difficult to understand since Germany was already fighting a devastating two front war.

Historians have questioned for decades why Hitler would take on the United States when Germany faced so many obstacles. The German alliance with Japan was defensive predicated on an attack on Japan which the events of December 7th made obsolete. In analyzing Hitler’s decision making historians fall into two camps. The first, Hitler was a nihilist who was driven by an egoistic personality in making numerous irrational decisions. The second school of thought has ferreted out a semblance of strategic calculations in his decision making. In his latest book, British historian Brendan Simms and his co-author Charlie Laderman entitled, HITLER’S AMERICAN GAMBLE: PEARL HARBOR AND GERMANY’S MARCH TO WAR support the latter analysis which is consistent with Simms’s 2019 biography of Hitler when he argued that Hitler was well aware of American power and war with the United States was inevitable therefore his decision was pre-emptive.

Whichever argument one accepts it is clear that Simms and Laderman have made a compelling case in analyzing Hitler’s thought process the first part of December 1941 which led him to declare war on America. Along with this analysis, the authors dig deeply into the state of the war as of early December, the realpolitik practiced by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, and the key role played by the Japanese government.

The authors have written a detailed description of the uncertainty that existed between December 5-12, 1941. It seems as if the reader is present as decisions are made by the main participants hour by hour. The blow by blow account is incisive and the results of Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United states would launch a global war. The authors make a compelling case that before the onset of war the Japanese government did not trust Hitler as they feared the Nazi dictator would seize Vichy French colonies in Southeast Asia. Simms and Laderman provide an accurate appraisal of the background history leading to December 7th. They raise interesting points, many of which have been written about by previous historians.

Lend Lease plays a significant role in the thinking of all the participants leading up to and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The authors are clear and correct when they argue that the American aid policy infuriated Hitler. For the Fuhrer it reinforced the connection in his mind that capitalism, Jews, and American policy were all part of a conspiracy against Germany. From Hitler’s perspective American actions were driving Germany towards war against the United States. For example, in March 1941 the American navy began to protect British convoys across the Atlantic. In addition, the U.S. would expand its defensive zone all the way to Greenland and reinforce its Atlantic Fleet. Lend Lease also played a key role in Hitler’s thinking even after December 7th. The authors spend a great deal of time discussing how Churchill and Roosevelt believed that the Nazis pressured the Japanese to attack developing the hope that the Japanese attack would force an American declaration of war against Tokyo and forcing Washington to reduce its aid to England and the Soviet Union because of its own needs in the Pacific. Hitler was under no illusion concerning US military production, but he would come to believe that the Nazis should strike before the American military-industrial complex could reach maximum production.

As Hitler contemplated declaring war against the United States, Churchill and the British government desperate for continued Lend Lease worried that the aid would be reduced because of US needs in East Asia. Churchill was especially concerned because of the ongoing fighting in North Africa and the threat to the Suez Canal. In fact, the authors point out that aid was stopped for a brief period as disagreement arose between Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Lend Lease administrator Edward Stettinius.

From the Japanese perspective they were unsure if they could rely on a German declaration of war. The authors mine the commentary of Japanese leaders particularly Foreign Minister Shigenari Togo who did not trust that Germany would join the war against the United States.

Roosevelt was concerned about America Firsters and isolationists in Congress. Both groups were willing to fight the Japanese but were against involvement in Europe as they refused to fight for what they perceived to be British colonial interests. FDR walked a fine line and refused to meet with Churchill after December 7th as to not exacerbate domestic opposition. Hitler’s declaration made it easier for Roosevelt to declare war on Germany and overcome isolationist opposition.

The coming Holocaust against European Jewry played a role in Hitler’s strategy. The Nazi dictator saw the Jews of Europe as hostages to keep FDR from taking further action against Germany. It did not stop the murderous horror taking place in eastern Europe but as long as the US did not enter the war the fate of western European Jewry would be postponed. However, the authors argue effectively argue that once Hitler declared war against the United States, in his mind they were no longer a bargaining chip in dealing with Washington. He was now free to conduct his Final Solution against western and central European Jews.

The authors astutely point out the role of racism in the war. John W. Dower’s amazing study, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR is the best study of the issue arguing that war in the Pacific was a racial war. For Simms and Laderman the decision making process on the part of Anglo-American military planners was greatly influenced by their low opinion of Japanese military capability. Leadership on both sides of the Atlantic could not fathom the idea that the Japanese had the ability to launch intricate attacks such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, Malaya, the Philippines, Guam, Singapore, Southeast Asia at the same time. This type of thinking also resulted in disaster for the Royal Navy as Japanese bombers destroyed Force Z that included the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales.

Simms and Laderman do an excellent job delving into the calculations of the major participants in the coming war. The significant issues apart from Hitler’s decision as to whether he should declare war on the United States included whether Stalin should declare war on Japan? How would England and the Soviet Union make up for the shortfall of Lend Lease aid in the immediate future? How would FDR overcome domestic opposition to US participation in the European War and so on?

The authors also do an admirable job integrating the opinions of people across the globe concerning the implications for Japanese actions in the Pacific. People as diverse as the former mayor of Cologne Konrad Adenauer (and future German leader after WWII) to everyday citizens on the streets of Berlin, London, Leningrad, intellectuals in Poland to soldiers on the eastern front. For all the key was what would Hitler do – would he declare war on the United States and unleash a global war as Mussolini had warned or would he allow Japan to take on the American colossus themselves.

Overall, Simms and Laderman have written a thought provoking book that breaks down the December 5-12th 1941 period for three-fourths of their narrative that includes an important introduction that sets the scene for Hitler’s decisions and the implications that the decisions would have for the future of the war which would not end until August 1945.

[Bob · Rating 5 out of 5]

Harry S. Truman said, "The only thing new in the world is this history we do not know." Those words are most fitting in describing this book. The co-authors did extensive research in describing the events leading up to Germany's declaration of war on the U.S. on 11 December 1941--four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This shows that the commonly accepted view that Adolf Hitler rashly took Germany into war against the U.S. wasn't true, but rather this was a calculated move. This book also shows the tension felt by the British and Soviets in the period of 7-11 December, regarding the continued Lend-Lease supplies from the U.S. A highly readable book that I highly recommend to World War II students.

[Tracie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Even though President Franklin D. Roosevelt called December 6, 1941 a "Day of Infamy," after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Japan officially declared war on the United States, Great Britain, Holland and China just hours after the attack, it took the United States longer to reciprocate. It took some days to try to fathom what the destruction of so much of the navy in men and ships might lead. In fact, it was Adolf Hitler who declared war on the United States in a 90 minute Reichstag speech on December 11th before FDR really acted. The authors give some background prior to December 6 but then it is a day by day account through that December and then picks up the relationships of the "United Nations," the Soviet Union and the Axis powers until the end of the war. The United States population was so divided on even the lend-lease aid to Greta Britain and the Soviet Union that Roosevelt had to constantly read popular opinion information from trusted pollster Hadley Cantril. The racism of many in the United States and Great Britain in underestimating the Japanese and other Asians and also the anti-Semitism is sad and hard to read the quotes from. The authors write in a way that helped me keep track of who was who, where people were, when they were, and why some decisions probably were made. Thanks to the publisher and NetGalley for an advanced copy in exchange for an honest review.

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hitler’s Misjudged Calculation Ensured Allied Victory

After Pearl Harbor, America’s war with Japan’s Axis allies, Germany and Italy, was automatic. No, it wasn’t. Authors Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman set the record straight in a riveting account of the five days in 1941 between the Japanese attack on December 7 through December 11 when Hitler declared war on the United States.

Americans and British were so racist and disdainful of the Japanese as backward Asians that many assumed that Hitler’s Germany had orchestrated the attack on Pearl Harbor and on British possessions in Asia. Some thought that the Japanese attack planes must have been piloted by Germans and some even claimed to have seen the Nazi Swastika on attacking aircraft.

In fact, Hitler was as surprised as Americans about the Pearl Harbor attack. And while the Axis alliance called for Germany and Italy to come to Japan’s aid if Japan was attacked, there was no such obligation if Japan started a war. Furthermore, as Robert Sherwood, FDR’s speechwriter observed, “The Nazis were honor bound by their pledges to the Japanese, but they had not shown much inclination to let such bourgeois-democratic considerations interfere with their own concepts of self-interest.”

The authors brilliantly recount the five days of uncertainty during which it was unclear whether the United States would sharply reduce its supply of war materials to Britain and Russia, and redirect such production to the Pacific to counteract Japanese aggression. Almost hour by hour the authors shift the narrative about calculations at the leadership level in the U.S., Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

Hitler expected that the U.S. for the foreseeable future would be distracted by Japan and kept from interfering in Europe. American war supplies were being sent in increasing quantities to Britain and Russia and although the U.S. was not a formal belligerent, its Navy was protecting convoys half way across the Atlantic. The news of Japanese success also came at a welcome time as Germany was experiencing setbacks for the first time on the Russian front and in North Africa.

Churchill would write, in his history of World War II, that the news of Pearl Harbor brought America into the conflict and that, “We had won after all.” But that was hardly his thought at the time, as he worried that America would avoid formal war with Germany and devote its full military production to fight Japan. Indeed, the immediate action of the United States was to halt shipment of war materials headed to Britain — and even to unload some supplies from ships about to sail — until the U.S. military could assess its immediate needs in the Pacific.

Shifting to the scene in London in the days following Pearl Harbor, the authors provide a vivid portrayal of Churchill’s agony as he feared the U.S. would continue to postpone a declaration of war against Germany and would sharply reduce support of Britain and the Soviet Union. Indeed, FDR dodged the question for five days as he assessed domestic opposition to war with Germany. Churchill made repeated attempts to come to Washington to meet with FDR but was rebuffed, adding to the Prime Minister’s anxiety. FDR, for his part, was looking over his shoulder at the isolationist sentiment that he still faced and worried that a visit by Churchill would be seen as undue influence as America assessed its military needs in the Pacific.

The Japanese had given the Germans little indication of their plans to declare war on the United States and no forewarning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. But now, in Tokyo, there was sudden concern that Japan would face America alone. This was complicated by Berlin’s desire for the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union and confront Stalin with a two-front war. Japan had its hands full and declined to do that. But it was eager for America to be forced to fight a two-ocean conflict. In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, there was desire in Tokyo as well as in London and Moscow for Germany and the United States to be at war.

Many readers, this one among them, will be surprised at the continued strength of the isolationist sentiment in America even after Pearl Harbor. Montana Senator Burton Wheeler stated there was no reason for the United States to immediately declare war on Germany and Italy. This was also the position taken by Senator Hiram Johnson of California and Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, never mind America First leaders such as Robert Wood and Charles Lindberg.

Finally, on December 11, in a 90-minute tirade that catalogued the dictator’s complaints against FDR and against Jews, Hitler declared war on the United States. A side melodrama was Mussolini’s attempt to upstage Hitler by timing his declaration of war against the United States some 15 minutes before Hitler spoke.

Even after Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, former President Herbert Hoover and presidential candidate Norman Thomas did not feel discredited in their non-interventionist beliefs by Japan’s attack, but instead observed that they had predicted that FDR’s embargoes on Japan and supply to Britain would drag America into war. Vandenberg wrote in his diary, “We insisted that this course would lead to war and it has done exactly that.”

With Hitler’s declaration of war, anti-interventionist resistance was completely broken. Congressional approval of of war against Germany and Italy was unanimous, following a similar action on December 8 against Japan.

Authors Simms and Laderman have succeeded admirably in capturing the drama and uncertainty that prevailed over this critical five-day period. The entry of the United States in a truly world war can seem, eighty years later, as inevitable. But that was certainly not the case as perceived at the time and the progression of the war — indeed its final outcome — might have been different if Britain and Russia received limited assistance to fight Germany as America threw its full resources against the Japanese.

[CASPER HILEMAN · Rating 5 out of 5]

December 7th, 1941, Pearl harbor guarantees the United States will enter a conflict in the Pacific. Halfway around the World in Berlin, the attack would be a pleasant surprise to the megalomaniacal leader of the newly risen German Empire Adolf Hitler. Already in a low-grade conflict in the Atlantic Ocean Hitler would ham-handedly lead his nation through his charge d' affairs Hans Thomsen to war on December 11th. This was the great blunder among many blunders committed by Hitler and the greatest gift to the free world. This is the story of those five days.

[Kevin Keating · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am really interested in the subject but don't know that this was the best handling of the subject possible. Seemed a little redundant at times and was kind of a slog. The last chapter, summarizing and adding some what-if scenarios was really good though. I was surprised and disappointed the authors didn't address the controversy, even in passing, over whether Roosevelt might have known about the Pearl Harbor attack and allowed it to occur for the greater purpose of getting America in the war. Our unpreparedness in Hawaii and the Philippines, when we knew we were almost at war with Japan, was pretty unforgivable. But it did get to the heart of the question of why Japan attacked us, and why Germany (Hitler really) decided he needed to declare war on the US. Had he not done so, many alternative histories would probably have been better for the Germans, the European Jews, and American youth. There is an extent to which Roosevelt is responsible for the outcome, which was really not that great, considering the possible alternatives. Anyway, I gave it 4 stars because it was heavily researched, well written and gave me much information. It might have been a bit over-long though.

[Ted · Rating 3 out of 5]

Much ado about nothing. A long chronology of events leading up to Germany's decision, which does not seem entirely planned or desired by the leadership in Berlin.

[Marsha Valance · Rating 4 out of 5]

In their thrilling, authoritative study, "Hitler's American Gamble", Brendan Simms & Charles Laderman retell the story of how the 5 crucial days (December 7-11, 1941) in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack shaped both World War II itself & the postwar world.

[Vali Benson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A riveting account of the antecedence of WWII. Author Brendan Simms pays particular attention to the events of December 7, 1941 with a detail and richness that are both entertaining and enlightening. Highly recommended for war scholars, history buffs and fans of well written non-fiction.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

My thanks to NetGalley and the publisher Perseus Books for a copy of this military history.

Hitler's American Gamble: Pearl Harbor and Germany’s March to Global War by historians Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman is a examination of the five days following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and Adolf Hitler's declaration of war on the United States. Their argument is that the most important day in the war was the December 11 declaration rather than the Japanese attack, as it made the war much easier to sell to a divided America who had no interest intervening in world affairs.

Pearl Harbor was as much a surprise to the Axis powers of Germany and Italy as it was to the Allies. Prejudice had much to to with this as no one thought the Japanese had the capacity to fight a war, and not against the racially superior West. As countries fell and ships were sunk, the Allies found themselves in a very confusing place. One that Hitler, declaring war first thought would win him a strategic advantage in Russia and finally in Europe.

The book is very well researched and readable. Their are many famous names and people, and not so famous but important to the story, that they could easily be lost. The authors are very good at making sure this does not happen. Their arguments are backed by plenty of evidence and presented well. One of the better books on World War II in quite awhile. I like the approach of just studying, with plenty of background one small snippet of time. A snippet that was very important to history.

[Bernard · Rating 2 out of 5]

I picked up a book that was supposed to explain why Hitler declared war on the US. The book does not discuss this decision much after reading it; I find myself as confused as before.

The central thesis of this book is to present a case that until Hitler declared war on the 11th, it was unclear whether the US would go to war against Germany.

We have a history of the events of many people between Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941, and Hitler's declaration of war on the 11th. Most of these people and events quoted are irrelevant to this decision.

Now I am dubious of many of the scenarios offered in this book, for example, the Japanese attacking British possessions in the Pacific, e.g. India only. Well, what good would that do the Japanese? They needed many resources and, in particular, oil badly. The same criticism could be made of an attack on Russia. The Japanese targeted the Dutch East Indies for their rich oil resources, which would become a vital asset during the war. Without oil, they could take but not hold anything. With Britain and France neutralised in 1941, the only force standing between them and their imperial expansion was the neutral United States. The Japanese did not make this decision lightly.

Now while reading this book, the thought went through my mind that Hitler had not declared war. US lend-lease would still be going to Britain and Russia. Britain and the US would be allied in the war in the Pacific, and the US warships would still be fighting in the Atlantic German U-boats. FDR still wants war, and he says in his speeches that the Nazis are responsible for Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, polls show that the US public did not want war with Germany but accepted that war with Germany was inevitable. FDR probably had the numbers then, and most historians believe that he waited as he knew from the cracking of the Japanese codes that Hitler would declare war, putting the onus on the decision safely on Hitler. How long is peace going to last? Sooner something will flare up. Since in ww2, it was almost a year later before large numbers of US land forces fought German forces, I doubt much would have changed.

We also have a secondary thesis that much of Hitler's mass killing of Jews in central and Eastern Europe was because these people Hitler thought were hostages to US behaviour, and since the US was at war, there was no reason to put it off. I enjoyed this discussion, but it is irrelevant to the central thesis. It should be in a different book. There is much discussion on when this decision was made. On July 31, 1941, Hermann Goering sent an official order to Reinhard Heydrich, the SS's head of the security branch, to authorise a "Final Solution of the Jewish Question." The exact meaning behind this order is unclear, but most scholars believe the decision was in effect before Pearl Harbor in the autumn of 1941. So I am dubious but willing to give it a fair go if someone can put more work into this thesis.

Finally, let me say that the writers are wrong when they claim that Hitler, in his political testament, blames "international money and finance conspirators" for his defeat. He saw them as potential winners of the conflict; he blamed the war on "international statesmen either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests." These writers are trained historians; how could they miss this fact?

[John Ryan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book mostly deals with less than a week – the time between Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and when Germany declared war on the United States. And in doing so, the reader better understands the pressure on key players, the lack of understanding of where the parties – and enemies but also allies – were and the impact of actions players took to win a world war. This book gives a better understanding on how much pressure was on Roosevelt – on Churchill and even on the Axis powers.

By 1941, the Nazi’s had a population of 290 million people under their control – more than the United States and urban Brittan combined. The incredible research and details makes what looks like black and white in many history books much more detailed, more questionable, and more conflicting than what is universally understood. Brittan’s didn’t like Americans and Americans didn’t trust Brittan. Germany’s Nazi’s spoke about creating an Aryan nation yet was allied with Japanese. Churchill didn’t trust Roosevelt and Roosevelt held his cards close to his chest, not letting even his aides know his next move. Roosevelt had to deal with the “America First” movement, even when the leaders of the movement understood that Hawaii was attacked.

It was not a perfect world even before the world. While what Hitler was doing was horrific, the world was much of the haves and have nots, something that Germany used to press their case. As Japan was on the brink of attacking American and Hitler was nearly ready to attack the United States, the white men dominated East Asia with the English, the Dutch and Vicky French colonies. More so, Mao was a minor communist player in northwest China and German cities were nearly untouched. Jews were under attack but still present in Europe. How different this place would be in a few years.

The other thing that was shocking was the lack of information principals had during WWII. Simms and Laderman expose the lack of information Roosevelt had on how horrific the attack had been on Hawaii, when Churchill learned of the attack, he thought it was Pearl River in China, and Hitler learned of the attack through the enemies channel, BBC. When Mrs. Roosevelt was flying out to San Francisco after the attack, she heard that San Francisco was attacked yet she continued to fly out there only to learn that the city had not been attacked.

Most importantly, the book casts WWII as a struggle between established power and their hungry challengers. There was also a racial component, outlining the unfair treatment that Japanese felt for years. Friends of yesterday could be foes of tomorrow; nothing could be taken for granted. When Japan attacked the United States, even some of their top lieutenants, thought it was a mistake. The same was true when Hitler declared war against the United States. We will not fully know what their populations were thinking because, unlike the United States or England, there were no polls, free press or random interviews.

The details in this book were amazing, although at times it moved very slowly. The world was truly in suspense whether Hitler was going to declare war against the United States. Brittan, even Churchill, was left wondering if Roosevelt was going to bring the United States into the war against the Nazi’s. No one expected Japan to take on the United States – and many “Japanese elite” thought it was the wrong move. Roosevelt thought that Japan were pawns of Hitler. These facts and mystery of war reminded me of the best documentary I ever saw, The Fog of War Leaders making decisions based on their assumptions of the war that were often not correct. The authors did an amazing job citing letters and journal entries from major figures to share what people were thinking at the time.

Simms and Lademan point out repeatedly that Hitler used the European Jews as “hostages” by Hitler in his fight with the United States, saying that as the war was cast with the largest superpower, the massive elimination of people who were Jewish went to unprecedented levels. This is the one portion of the book that I didn’t agree. Even this book covers how Jews is Eastern Europe were being ruthlessly massacred and European Jews were gathered, and cremations were built. It seems to me that Hitler and his antisemitic goons had a plan outlined in Hitler’s book and would move forward regardless. What was interesting is, once again, reading an account of how few neighbors spoke up or argued or fought against the massive killing of their neighbors.

On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribute – the owner a major opponent of intervention – broke the story of Roosevelt’s War Plan. That reporting set off so many actions – including Democratic Montana Senator Wheeler launching an investigation into the president’s plan, the White House scrambling for a purpose of the plan, and Hitler knowing that his suspicions were right.

It was interesting how Roosevelt and Churchill bonded – during a three week visit from Churchill at the White House. The two and aides met at night for drinks and card games – and solidarity. The authors cited one fairly well-known story about how Roosevelt strolled into Churchill’s White House bedroom, finding him naked from a bath. Churchill evidently put out his arms and said something like, as the leader of Brittan had nothing to hide from the President of the United States.
Their relationship forever changed. The Allies were able to coordinate better, muscled by American’s dedication of manufacturing resources to the war effort. The Axis powers never coordinated since Hitler resisted, was not strategic, and the relationships had never bonded. That – and American’s manufacturing dominance – won the war by the democratic nations.

This well documented book contributes to anyone’s knowledge of not just WWII but the assumptions made by leaders to determine actions, often not correct in any future war.

[Zachary Barker · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have finished reading “Hitler’s American Gamble: Pearl Harbour and Germany’s March to Global War” by Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman.

Why did Hitler declare war on America and doom Nazi Germany and the Axis to an almost certain defeat? This book centres around this question. But instead of treating it like an essay question, it tells the story of the war from the decision level and down to the ground level over the fateful days between 7th December and 11th December 1941. On 7th December 1941 the Japanese Empire attacked Pearl Harbour firmly fixing the United States into a war with Japan. But would a US Government declaration of war on Germany and the rest of the Axis follow? Ultimately Hitler made this question irrelevant by announcing Nazi Germany’s declaration of war on the US. Mussolini as deluded and opportunist as ever made a smaller announcement of the same thing minutes before Hitler did.

Admittedly, when I realised the way the authors would address this question, by charting the course of events between those dates outlined I was a bit dismayed. Was this a cynical exercise to indulge in a historical narrative without answering the question? Or were they answering the question in a clever way? After reading this patiently I feel that I have been awarded. The authors took a shrewd bet that the authors would find much to interest them in this small snapshot of time. I believe he won that bet.

The story of the in-between days is told in a systematic multi-layered way. A panorama of the war is covered from the decision makers on both sides, to the increasingly worried German Commanders on the Eastern Front to the evermore fearful Jews of Europe. At the top level Churchill is at first hopeful for US support to the Allied Cause shortly after hearing of Pearl Harbour, however his mood soon turns to concern over the threat of the US Lend Lease Aid programme being reduced to help the US rearm. It is grimly fascinating to watch the slow-motion checking of the German Offensive into the Soviet Union. As the Soviet counterattack builds up, the way the events are presented allows the reader to observe the sense of creeping alarm that seeps up from the soldier level up to the command level. Meanwhile, the earlier massacres and transportations of the Jews of Eastern and increasingly Western Europe are grimly recounted.

Why did Hitler declare war on the USA? He was ultimately an insane fanatic who believed that the US Government was in the hands of “World Jewry” and held the Jews of Europe effectively responsible for US policy. In Hitler’s view, which had an element of truth in this case, he felt the US Government was already effectively at war with Nazi Germany. The US Government’s huge military aid donations to the Allies through Lend-Lease and Roosevelt’s “shoot to kill” order to sink German U-Boats within a huge exclusion zone in the Atlantic supported his argument. Hitler wasn’t completely blind to the US’s economic, industrial and military potential, but acted out early on a vague instinct of acting before it was too late. In many ways it was a more reckless gamble than the Japanese Empire’s attack on Pearl Harbour, which may have been more effective had the US Aircraft Carriers may not been elsewhere at the time.

What I found most engaging and frankly very scary was the uncanny connections between US politics in the early 1940s and with it in the current day. The biggest opposition bloc to the US joining the war against the Axis was the fiercely isolationist America First Committee, led by famous Aviator and infamously antisemitic Charles Lindbergh. Predictably their cause was sunk by Japan and Germany’s actions. But chillingly, and tellingly, much like their ideological forefathers they claimed even in defeat that they were right in principle. As a Brit I also found it amusing about how the American First Committee criticised “scheming” by the British Empire but were fiercely protective about the America’s own colonial possessions such as the Philippines at the time. Another real world parallel that was chilling was how the main Axis Powers; Germany, Japan and Italy saw themselves. Their propaganda presented them as the “have nots” who wanted a more “fair share” of global spoils. The authors described them as claiming they wanted a more multi-polar world rather than one than that dominated by the British Empire and the US. I could not help thinking about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 calling for something similar, only for the reality to be much grimmer.

Overall, while this book wasn’t necessarily always an easy read it was one that rewarded patience and perseverance. Despite some frankly superficially judgemental reviews, I think the format chosen by the authors was a bold decision which was a shrewd long term bet (not unlike Roosevelt giving Lend Lease to the Allies while the US was officially neutral). There were also some fascinating historical anecdotes such as Churchill, in desperation, offering Irish leader Eamon De Valera Irish unity in exchange for Eire declaring war on Germany. He refused. There was a lot of attention paid to concerns about Lend Lease, which fuelled the Soviet counterattack and kept the UK fed and armed. Both the Soviet and UK leadership lived in fear that the US would use the Japanese surprise attack to tun the aid tap off with perilous consequences to follow. The day-by-day narrative gave off a more visceral feel of these anxieties that I feel wouldn’t have been as tangible if this was simply an essay on Hitler’s single (worst for him) decision.

This was a meticulously written and confident snapshot of an episode of the Second World War which is all too often taken for granted.

[Rick · Rating 2 out of 5]

I was disappointed with this book. It claims to make the case that whether America would be at war with Germany as well as Japan was in doubt until Hitler declared war on America 4 days after Pearl Harbor. We get a blow-by-blow account of what happened in those 4 days in Berlin, London, Washington. But when we see the details, it turns out that no one really had much doubt that one way or another Germany and America were going to be at war. It wasn't 100% certain, but it was nearly so. Also, the book includes a pointless and irrelevant series of passages about the progress of a train of Jewish civilians being taken to a concentration camp. It is a poignant story, but has nothing to do with the thesis of the book.

[Austin · Rating 4 out of 5]

World War II was a cataclysmic event that reshaped and redefined the world in the 20th century. The United States found itself at the center of the global stage when it was "suddenly and deliberately attacked" by the Japanese Empire on December 7, 1941. However, it was not on that "date which will live in infamy" that the country found itself wrangled into fighting the entire Axis powers--that was not imminent. It was Hitler's sudden declaration of war on the United States four days later on December 11, 1941, that transformed the conflagration into a worldwide war. How do we make sense of the decision to bring the heavy-hitting United States in as an enemy of the Reich? Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was a calculated (or miscalculated) move, as the authors argue, to bring victory to the Third Reich.

I truly enjoyed this book and couldn't put it down--I literally got yelled at by my wife, BookedInWisco, that I was reading while at the dinner table. It’s about 400 pages long and covers a week’s worth of events–December 6 through 12 of 1941. Each chapter covers an individual day in the timeframe mentioned. On each day we learn of events occurring across the globe in important places like Berlin, London, Washington, Honolulu, Tokyo, and Moscow, to name a few. We learn of the Reich’s stalled Eastern Front campaign against the Soviets and the scramble to solidify the Axis powers in preparation for war against the United States; Churchill’s government wanting more war materiel through the American Lend-Lease program to fight Fascism at home and in Northern Africa; the Roosevelt administration trying to stay out of armed conflict while also supplying the Allies; Finally, Tokyo covertly moving its navy into position to strike at Pearl Harbor while also giving the illusion of peace through useless negotiations with American Diplomats. This is such a nail-biting account of events playing out–only because the authors show a slight change of events/choices in those tense days could have changed history as we know it.

I think the authors dispelled a lot of myths or maybe misunderstood the history of the events that happened at the end of 1941. First of all, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did not drag the United States into the war ravaging Europe. Roosevelt knew Hitler was the core of the “Axis of Evil”, but he also knew he couldn’t declare war on Germany without provocation–Congress nor the American opinion was ready for war. Even after Pearl Harbor was attacked, there was no declaration of war nor broad public backing to enter the European conflict. Hitler, too, only made strategic moves and seized moments to his advantage or as a means to victory. He made sure not to “not provoke the United States more than absolutely necessary” at first. He finally resorted to declaring war as a preemptive measure–as he saw war with America as inevitable. He sought to seize that moment of American vulnerability and military weakness in order to edge out his enemies, who were receiving help from America up until a brief stall after December 7, before facing full American might. Only now can we look back and see his military/ideological move as a strategic error–as the authors suggest.

Overall, this book totally rocks. I loved it. I do have to say that the final statement in the book sort of threw me for a loop as to what the authors were arguing–with a wide range of sources as proof, by the way. They slipped in their subjective analysis that the Axis powers would have lost the war regardless of the Japanese choice to attack Pearl Harbor or Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United States. How could they close on that after showing us just how consequential Hitler’s declaration was on December 11, 1941.

[Sam · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a book that never seemed to end, but having said that, Brendan Simms provides a huge wealth of information regarding events leading up to WW II, and even covers some of the post war events dealing with Harry Truman. He uses a multi-faceted approach to the story, discussing events occurring in the U. S., Britain, Germany, and Japan, and, for extra measure, discusses aspects of the Holocaust and how that was a definitive part of Hitler's plan to keep the U. S. out of the war. I always thought Hitler made two fatal mistakes, in 1941, that cost him an eventual European victory: One, attacking his, then, ally, the Soviet Union, and second, unilaterally declaring war on the U. S. His discussion details how the U. S. and Germany were in a "sort of" undeclared war, in the Atlantic, for at least a year prior to 1941, with Lend-Lease aid going from America to both Britain and Russia; Hitler, meanwhile stewing about it and keeping his U-Boat commanders at bay from torpedoing ships carrying American aid. As this was going on, Hitler ramped up his genocidal activities against Europe's Jews, accusing the Worldwide Jewish conspiracy against Germany for its problems; he then decided to essentially hold Europe's Jews hostage against the U. S. going to war against Germany. Feeling that the U. S. would not declare war on Germany, with millions of Jews under his thumb, Hitler decided to play a waiting game, hoping that eventually Roosevelt (FDR) would declare war on him. Obviously Hitler was not a good student of American civics, oblivious to the fact (or ignoring it) that U. S. presidents cannot declare war...only Congress has that power. FDR, meanwhile was also in a quandry, wanting to increase help to the British and Russians, but most of this nation was still isolationists. Then, sadly, a miracle occurred...December 7, 1941. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the U. S. into World War II as an active belligerent, but only partially. The U. S. was officially active, in WW II, but only in the Pacific. Hitler wanted to honor his part of the tri-partite pact, with Italy and Japan, but the pact was only if one of the three (Germany, too) was attacked, not the attacker. Simply put, four days after Pearl Harbor, Hitler had finally had enough of FDR, and he declared war on the U. S., formerly putting the U. S. into the conflict in both Europe and the Pacific. The book kinda carries on; in other words, he probably could have quit after Hitler's declaration of war, on the U. S., but he keeps it going for about another 75 pages or so. But, please don't read that in the wrong way...it's great information, and the book contains great information. I thought I had most of the answers as to how we got into the war, but reading Simms's book, I was wrong and learned a lot. If you're a World War II buff, this is really a good book, just about 530 pages of good book. I strongly recommend it.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book focuses on the diplomatic and political events between 7 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, and 11 December, when Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the USA. There is some attention given to the events prior to December 7, and there is an appendix that briefly describes the course of the rest of the war. But this mainly is a detailed study of the events of those few days.

The narrow scope brings with it some limitations. It is not just the time window. The authors give most of their attention to the actions of politicians and diplomats. They describe the circuit of messages between Tokyo, Berlin, Rome, Moscow, Washington DC, and London in great detail, with occasional forays to other capitals. It gives good insight in how diplomacy worked, or did not work, during this crucial week. It even has some comedy value. The spectacle of Mussolini giving a brief speech just because he wanted (despite prior agreements) to send his declaration of war a few minutes before Hitler's, is characteristic for the nature of the Axis collaboration.

But in doing so, they skip rather lightly over the parallel development of industrial and strategic thinking. By doing so, they probably make history look more malleable than it was, and give themselves more leeway for "what-ifs" than they rightly deserve. For example, there is mention of Wedemeyer's "Victory Program" and its leaking to the press in July 1941, but there is no deeper discussion of how US war plans developed during 1940 and 1941, including military coordination with Britain, and matured into Rainbow Five. The Lease-Lend act plays a central part in this book, but there is no discussion of the growing industrial collaboration, such as the large orders France and Britain placed with US industry, or the British decision to hand over the design of the cavity magnetron in September 1940. The future allies were more entangled before December 11 than Simms and Laderman allow for.

The chronological sequence is carefully retraced and wisely includes events elsewhere, such as the Soviet counter-offensive before Moscow and the fatal deportation of European Jews to camps and ghettos in the east. This is a well researched book, with extensive endnotes, but the authors are perhaps a bit over-confident in bringing some aspects of the story without admitting that they are controversial, especially when it comes to the timing of Hitler's decision to murder the European Jews.

There are no surprising new discoveries here, so it doesn't contribute a lot of new insights to our understanding of the course of WWII. But it is informative.

[Michael Brown · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just about every history textbook, related autobiography or study of the outbreak of WWII leading to the US entry always says we were surprised in the Pacific but knew it was coming and that we jumped into the war in Europe wholeheartedly. This book breaks down the time just prior to 12/7/1941 to 12/11/1941 into a sometimes very boring tale of politics but also lots of important material reported for the first time in my studies of the era. Yes we knew Japan was an enemy. But our racial profile of them precluded any great difficulty in defeating them if forced into a war. Most of the administration knew we would have to fight Germany. But strong conservative and anti-interventionist groups meant that we needed to be attacked to get the support of the country. Like the appeasement group in England, the anti-war groups in the US saw no threat. They saw no possible way that a war in Europe and China hurt us. We sold to everyone with money to buy. We had two big oceans protecting us that enemies would need to cross. Plus former hero Lindbergh supported the Nazis. The short term King of England supported the Nazis. Thousands of American Bund members supported the Nazis. So how bad were these Europeans? This hour by hour, day by day reconstruction tells us how things were on the line. Events shifted back and forth. All parties knew what was coming yet feared to be the first in line to act. Or wanted to move quickly yet knew that once begun, nothing would be the same again.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a fun read but not the book I thought it would be. I expected an analysis of the reasons Hitler chose to declare war on the U.S. What I received instead was a very well researched and engagingly presented hour-by-hour global tour through the events of Dec. 6-12, 1941.

The narrative strategy-- one chapter per day, frequent cuts from one nation to another to capture events in chronological order-- has its merits but by the third or fourth day becomes a bit repetitive. Dec. 9: British *still* worried that Lend Lease aid will be diverted to the Pacific theater. On the other hand, Profs. Sims and Laderman are telling a really good story.

The story they're not telling, however, is why Hitler decided to bring a still recalcitrant after Pearl Harbor U.S. into the European war. Their interpretation-- Hitler thought the Japanese strike gave him a window of opportunity to build a geopolitical bloc sufficiently strong to withstand American industrial might-- takes up maybe 2% of the book, and hardly the best reasoned part.

Similarly, I find unconvincing the assertion that Hitler intended merely to hold West European Jews, as opposed to their Polish and Soviet brethren, hostage to Roosevelt's behavior. The lack of supporting evidence in an otherwise well-footnoted work grounded in the latest scholarship is telling.

Even so, a good and well-researched read. Worth the time. 4 stars.

[David Wurster · Rating 2 out of 5]

Fair or not, I found myself annoyed and critical as I read this book. The main content of the book covers less than a week in December 1941 between the attack at Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war against the United States by Hitler on December 7th. The portion of the book is in chronological order, hour by hour in excruciating detail. The last chapter covers the rest of the war at breakneck speed; the Normandy campaign is covered in one sentence.
I did learn some things. The strength of the anti-interventionalists in America is covered well. The divergent attitudes and self-interest of the leaders on all sides was reported in a nuanced way. Still, I found enough fault in the presentation that I looked forward to finishing the book and going on to something more enjoyable. A few specific grievances include:
1. There were no maps at all in spite of the text discussing geographical events throughout.
2. The list of acronyms gave answers in German without a translation.
3. The strict chronological organization did not appeal to me.

Obviously, a great deal of research went into this book. I think a good editor might have greatly improved the appeal of the book by insisting on a reorganization early in its development.

[Jeff Francis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brendan Simms’s and Charlie Laderman’s “Hitler’s American Gamble: Pearl Harbor and Germany’s March to Global War” posits that the several days following Pearl Harbor were massively formative to what came after.

Not exactly a radical declaration, but HAG sets itself apart by claiming that those days were not defined so much by Japan vs. the U.S., but by Germany vs. the U.S.

“It had been a momentous day, and arguably the most important twenty-four hours in history,” the authors write in “Thursday, Dec. 11, 1941” (Love them weekdays in the chapter titles!). This mostly refers to Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S., which the authors persuade was not a foregone conclusion, and could’ve gone other ways. Yes, if you’re one of those alternate-scenario War types, there's some stimulating s--t within.

As a World War II book, “Hitler’s American Gamble” is a strange mix: there are parts on Pearl Harbor, the Holocaust, military history, naval warfare, etc. But it mostly focuses on behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvering (a naked Winston Churchill flashing Franklin Roosevelt is funny).

So, agree with the hypothesis or don’t. Even though “Hitler’s American Gamble” doesn’t especially break new ground, it is a worthwhile read.