Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present

by Donald Stoker, Paul Heitsch (Narrator)

*Running Time => 11hrs. and 3mins.*

How can you achieve victory in war if you don't have a clear idea of your political objectives and a vision of what victory means?

In this provocative challenge to U.S. policy and strategy, Donald Stoker argues that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war, particularly limited wars. He reveals how ideas on limited war and war in general evolved against the backdrop of American conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. These ideas, he shows, were flawed and have undermined America's ability to understand, wage, and win its wars, and to secure peace afterwards. America's leaders have too often taken the nation to war without understanding what they want or valuing victory, leading to the "forever wars" of today.

'WHY AMERICA LOSES WARS' dismantles seventy years of misguided thinking and lays the foundations for a new approach to the wars of tomorrow.


©2019 Donald Stoker (P)2021 Tantor

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military History, Military Fiction, War, Audiobook, Politics

Audible Audio

First published August 29, 2019

About the author

Donald J. Stoker is an American military historian. He earned a bachelor's degree (1989) and a Master's of Arts (1990) from Valdosta State University.
He is Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College's program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California."

Reviews

[Charles]

Military, diplomatic, and political history.

My autographed dead tree copy was a modest 335 pages. It had a 2022 copyright. The book included footnotes, a bibliography, and an index.

Donald Stoker is a military and diplomatic American military historian with expertise in military theory and grand strategy. He has written more than ten scholarly books on military and diplomatic history. This was the first book I’ve read by him.

This is an advanced-level, work. It’s strongly recommended that readers have some background knowledge of US military, diplomatic and political history before tackling it. Familiarity with Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern geography is also helpful.

I have a long-held interest in military history. This was an assigned reading for a certification I’m chasing. One of the least satisfying parts of that gig has been not reading entire books. You're forced to “Gut” them, and move on. Gutting includes reading the: Introduction, Conclusion, scanning the Bibliography, augering into the Index to find the tastiest bits satisfying the assignment, from which you pluck out, and then discard the ravaged, but still meaty carcass. Keeping pace with the schedule is most important. At the moment, the US is involved in what appears to be yet another Forever War. I found this book to be so topical that I read it cover-to-cover at great expense to my time budget.

The book was helpful in understanding American political and military leadership styles and decision-making, critical to understanding the organizational behavior of American Administrations and the (then) current Joint Chiefs of Staff, their primary military advisor.

Stoker identifies two primary reasons for modern American military failure. These losses range from the Fall of Saigon (1975) to the Fall of Kabul (2021). (Note: this book was published in the early Biden administration.) These occur no matter which political party occupies the White House and are irrespective of how good America's intentions may be. He also analyzes American victories during the period, such as the Liberation of Kuwait (1991), as counterexamples.

The first failure is that the American presidents typically don't exercise sound strategic thinking and judgment. Why presidents and administrations have failed to exercise sound strategic thinking is a worrisome question. Since Vietnam, the eleven American presidents, including Lyndon B. Johnson, have been either career politicians or businessmen and have never served in the military at field grade or above, which is part of the problem. What they do is exercise political judgment, or more recently, "go with their gut". At best, this is politically strategic within American politics, and to a greater or lesser extent militarily strategic.

The second is the twin failures of not having a full understanding and deep knowledge of the circumstances and situation in which military force was to be used. Too often, the nation moves in haste, in a "Ready, Fire, Aim" paradigm.

Critically, the military has not been a consistently successful advisor to the political leadership, with the nation's and then the services' best interests at the forefront of their advice, for several reasons, including careerism. One key example of how it ought to work was Colin Powell's threatened resignation as Chairman of the JCS over disagreements regarding George W. Bush's war plans, particularly during the discussions about military action in Iraq in 2004. He had reservations about the war and warned that it could be costly, indicating his concerns about the administration's approach to military intervention.

The result of the two major failures is that political and military leaders often lack, or have only a vague grasp of, the political objective in war. As a result, they fail to understand the usage of force. Typically, they fail to commit necessary forces for a victory, to the point that victory itself is devalued and can be misunderstood. In some cases, commitment of forces went ahead, with the suspicion that victory wasn’t possible. In addition to war plans, there must be a plan to end the war and secure peace. Rarely is this done, and when it is, it's incomplete in covering all the alternatives, such as defeat.

Stoker is a bit of a language lawyer in his analysis of "conflict" and "objectives". His approach is very Clausewitz-ian, in the importance he puts on definitions. That felt rather antique at points. In addition, fewer examples could have been given, given the repetition of mistakes.

The most important quote in the book is Stoker’s contention that American national security apparatchiks “fail to realize that diplomacy is diplomacy, war is war, and that all wars should be analyzed beginning with the political objective being sought”.

Recommended for folks interested in org behavior, the modern US military, and US diplomatic and political history.

[Scott Holstad]

Excellent, excellent book that I just finished reading through twice before rating or commenting on it. The author, Dr. Donald Stoker, is not someone I've had the pleasure to meet, although I know many of his associates, but I'm very familiar with his credentials, which are impeccable and I've recommended this book, and Dr Stoker's observations, relentlessly for quite some time, especially this week, the week of the Afghan evacuation debacle. As I've been writing in many forums, in response to many comments by outraged or enraged individuals determined to blame one president or one this or that, quit with the mudslinging! 20 years. Longest war in US AND Afghan history. Two different political parties, two administrations each. There's no one person to blame -- that's simply naive and using such a disaster for a political hatchet job. I've repeated cited this book as well as Dr Harlan Ullman's similar "Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every War It Starts" to people wanting to throw mud everywhere but themselves, ie us. I actually responded to the esteemed Admiral James Stavridis on LinkedIn yesterday -- whom I admire tremendously -- when he wrote "There are many reasons for the failures of the Afghan army, but one is certainly that we, the US military, did not train the right kind of army. We need to own that failure and learn from our mistakes."

My response was this: "Admiral, I agree, just as I typically do with most of your assessments. But I have to ask Why? Why did we fail to train the “right” kind of army? (I think there were many more variables than merely that.) Haven’t we seen this before? One whopper that comes to mind is the ARVN. Other more recent ones could possibly be included. I agree we have to learn from our mistakes, but haven’t we had sufficient chances at that by now? I still get ticked at how we supported France financially & materially in their effort to recolonize Indochina until the administration decided to terminate that at Dien Bien Phu — which should have given us fantastic opportunities at Lessons Learned, only for the US to simply essentially replace them & make many of the very same mistakes that doomed the French. Obviously it’s not that simple but character space is limited. After observing the French debacle & experiencing our own (& I’m trying to leave political blame games out & merely focus on what & how transpired for both & how to correct that), after knowing general staff in following years dedicated to doctrine change, it seems to me we’re not particularly good at learning from our mistakes. I’m sure you know Donald Stoker. Maybe he has some points?"

I doubt Stoker saw that or will see this but I would like to think his analysis & scholarship have paid off in & to some degree & I've appreciated his scholarship enough to have earned a PR bonus! ;) Honestly, quite a few readers on his LI site & my own agreed and I think this book may be tough for some people to swallow, but sometimes the truth hurts. As I told someone else, resort to any excuses you want, but I can't think of a single administration that hasn't suffered some sort of "failure" going all the way back through JFK & I'm sure we could get technical & keep analyzing, but I think that big picture assessment should be sufficient, because frankly isn't it enough? I had a discussion with a retired Marine officer today about this & I stated "When you have to withdraw, lick your wounds, conduct post-engagement analyses to 'learn' what went wrong & it’s now seemed to become as predictable as politicians dying to shed (American) blood in an open-ended, ill defined conflict -REPEATEDLY- I’d like to hope someone smarter than me has noticed that’s become the norm. Saying each time that “We have to learn from our mistakes” only to keep repeating them is proof you haven’t learned." He wholeheartedly agreed. And I suspect he's smarter than me.

Look folks, my family has fought, bled & died in service to America. I'm a (actually true, as in not seditious traitor) patriot. But there's nothing unpatriotic about asking tough questions, admitting to repeated failures & freaking actually DOING something to fix them rather than rinse, wash, repeat every 20 years. It makes us look stupid, & it IS stupid. For those who can handle the pain, this book should be damned required reading for all. Most highly recommended!

[Sophie Rice]

Genuinely a great book that anyone interested in International Affairs, politics, civil-military relations, or anything else should read. Presents great analysis of a wide array of conflicts with engaging insights and a large element of background research that contributes to the point Stoker is trying to make.

[Gary Klein]

I am not sure that I walk away from this book understanding "Why America Loses Wars," but it does make a lot of very interesting points and questions. A few examples follow-
1. Have nations stopped declaring war because modern international agreements might result in the first nation to declare a war the aggressor, with all of the associated legal and moral implications?
2. Are all wars attritional. Attrition has gained a bad reputation as something we want to avoid, but is that possible?
3. The Cold War seems to have encouraged nations to seek "limited war" to prevent escalation towards the use of nuclear weapons.
4. In seeking to achieve #3, have we confused means for ends? We ask what forces or how many forces we want to send before clearly spelling out the national objectives and ends we wish to achieve in the war.

[Andrew Carr]

War, in Stoker's Clausewitzian eyes, is fundamentally about its political objectives - this is what establishes the goal of the war - be it unlimited (the goal is removing the other political regime) or limited (everything else) - as well as the way it occurs on the ground, its passion, scope and ultimately who is likely to triumph.

With this framework in hand he sets about clearing the brush that has gathered around US thinking about war. Stoker is both right and righteous in this effort, seeking to rip and burn his way through official and scholarly sources as he attempts to clear out and clean up American strategic though.

The first two chapters are likely to be widely discussed and distributed, and a common reading in military colleges and strategic studies programs for years to come. It is passionate and articulate. Stoker rightly criticises western civilian leaders for paying too little attention to learning about war, and thus wasting vast amounts of lives and resources for aimless purposes.

One of the clever moves of this book is that it takes the Korean war as a central focus. This war is both more easily understood given the key documents are available, it is also emotionally remote. As such, it can be dissected in a way that is still difficult for Iraq and Afghanistan. Stoker of course covers those campaigns, as well as Vietnam, but the choice of focus gives the book a freshness compared to the bulging shelves complaining about US failures since 2001.

The brush-clearing bogs down somewhat in the final 1/3rd of the book as Stoker turns to how wars end, where he offers more history and an analysis which is much more circumspect - sometimes this approach is right, sometimes that, it depends'. This is fine as it goes, though somewhat goes against the grain of the books earlier approach and snarling rhetoric.

At times Stoker seems to take too much glee in demeaning others in his profession. He either misunderstands Carl Everett Dolman's critique of the idea of victory, and while I enjoyed seeing him wield an axe against the erratic value of Thomas Schelling's work, he could have done more to seriously engage with his ideas such as around signalling.

Overall though, this is one of the best books on clear strategic thinking released in recent years. It should be read and debated widely. It gets the fundamental things right, and that is about as much as you can ask.

[Kerney Perlik]

Thought provoking, scholarly read. Loses the thread on the America-focused argument, and seems to reiterate the same points over and over, which are really just commentary on not understanding strategy or crafting clear objectives in war. Long book for a few novel nuggets, but a good review of American experience in war termination and negotiation overall.

[Joseph Spuckler]

Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present by Donald Stoker is an examination of war theory and the practice of the United States in a period where the United States did not have a single declared war. Stoker was a Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College’s program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California for 18 years. He currently is a Visiting Fellow and Fulbright Visiting Professor of International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Austria.

Why America Loses Wars is a scholarly look at war and peace. Stoker draws heavily from Clausewitz to form his thesis and uses recent history to support his thinking. Kissinger would agree with America's most significant reason for losing wars -- lack of long term strategy. Machiavelli would also give the nod to not finishing the conflict correctly. America, by far, has the largest, strongest, best-equipped military in the history of the world (despite what national leaders say). We lost in Vietnam, effectively lost in Korea, have been to Iraq three times, and Afghanistan without a decisive victory. With that being said, in the first Iraq War, Colin Powell was heavily criticized by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney for not developing a military plan for Iraq. Powell said he could not produce a plan until he had a clear political objective for the military action. That is probably one of the most important demands of a military leader in recent history -- a clear objective for the military operation. Compared to the second Bush and his war on global terrorism, his father was much more decisive in setting a goal. The younger Bush's war on global terrorism as an objective has been compared to "war on an abstract noun." It may sound good, but it is not a tangible objective. 

War in America has taken a turn. No recent president wants to admit being at war and that started with Truman and the Korean Conflict. Truman committed troops without a declaration of war; in fact, World War II was the last declaration of war issued by the United States. Now, if the war is popular congress usually goes ahead and funds the conflict, until it becomes unpopular. At that time, the military is forced to curtail its activities, and a quagmire develops. An actual declaration of war would help in several ways. First, it would require congressional approval which may not be expedient, but it would question and examine the goals of the conflict. Secondly, the president would need to present a clear objective to Congress rather than rally the American people to a cause. Consider: With proper thought, would America drop a winning conflict in Afghanistan to start a new war in Iraq? With proper thought and planning, would America have been able to achieve its goals in Afghanistan in less than seventeen years?

Stoker examines limited warfare and what the term means and what popular opinion makes it out to be. We are not a nation that is afraid of going to war; in fact, it seems we are too ready to go to war, just not finish it. War has become much like our infrastructure. We love to build great works; we don't like to maintain them.  A critically important book combining theory and recent American military actions.

[Harry Rothmann]

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book. The author has - in my view as a soldier, military strategist and educator with 30 years experience - convincingly described the reasons our civilian and military leaders have been unable to bring our wars and conflicts after WWII to a successful close. In doing so, Dr. Stoker’s analysis of the use of principles for effective strategic formulation using military theory and history are right on in disclosing how US leaders have been so ineffective in their military strategic planning and execution. Moreover, and most startling, the author has very effectively emphasized that in many cases American civilian and military leaders have lost sight of or are sadly unaware of the principles of sound military strategic theory and formulation. This book needs to receive wide spread recognition at the highest levels of the US military and its educational institutions, as well as by those in government service.

[Maynard Handley]

This could be interesting, except for the tiny fact that the author seems unaware of the existence of nuclear weapons!
It seems to me there's a much more plausible story here than the one sketched out by the author:

- Korea starts, and the US has no idea how the USSR will handle nuclear weapons, and so that constrains everything they do. Yes, they have to fight with one hand behind their back, and have to push for much less than total victory because of the nuclear weapons issue.

- Vietnam starts, and same thing. You and I and the author may think that the domino theory was nonsense, but this was a US that had recently gone through (yet another) Berlin Crisis and then the Cuban Missiles crisis. If, in that context, you actually believe the domino theory, then, again, why would you not believe that an ally of the USSR can not be pushed too hard because nukes.

- After Vietnam. We have Serbia, which makes a big deal about being Friend of Russia, and occurs in the context of a Soviet Union that has just imploded, and, once again, who knows quite how the Russians will react to having an ally pushed too hard? Especially after the loss of Eastern Europe and general humiliation.

- Then we get Iraq 1, which has a specific objective that is NOT regime change (for what appear to be good reasons at the time) and which is won "easily" and without requiring any sort of deep worrying about the cost of victory, blah blah.

- And then we get Afghanistan and Iraq 2. And by that stage the previous set of experiences have basically created a mental clusterfck of impossible proportions:
+ The US (for what each seemed very good reasons) no longer posses a mindset of "the only goal is total victory" (even in a case where this is kinda feasible in the sense that there's no terrifying ally that might be pushed too hard)
+ BUT what does victory achieve in either place? OK, destroy the Taliban as Government. Mission Accomplished. Then what? All the complaining about "the politicians don't know what they want" is, in a sense, true, but what does the author (or the generals) want? Is it feasible to kill every Taliban and Taliban-wannabe, and foreign Taliban sympathizer?
Yes, given this fact, treating the war as a *war* was dumb from the start (and plenty of people said so) but that's a different complaint from "the government wouldn't allow us to really fight".
+ AND there's the fact that the US insisted on lying its way into the Iraq2 war, and, regardless of whether you think getting rid of Hussein was a good idea, the way that war was justified proved a poisoned chalice that could not be ignored. Just as Russia is learning, the rest of the world doesn't much like countries that start wars, regardless of the excuses; and that soon became apparent to the US. At which point, what? They have the same problem as Afghanistan of "whom exactly do I have to kill to get control of this place", plus the additional hurdle that every single non-combatant death or destruction is immediately added to the list of "evil stuff the US DELIBERATELY chose to do because they chose this war".

So, bottom line, this is a kinda amazing book, in that it goes on and on and on, yet never actually deals with the real issues. Yes, I'm sure it sucks, as a military professional, that the US has been so constrained since 1945. But you deal with that by understanding why, and considering the implications (perhaps either walk away from certain situations, or apply non-military pressure?), not by throwing a hissy fit against the US politicians.

[Bob]

Apparently the answer to the title is quite simple: the leaders are idiots, they did not thoroughly consider planning, executing or ending these wars. Well, it took a lot of text to produce that conclusion. Regarding the text, perhaps some of the extensive notes could have been included directly in the text. Not everyone is familiar with the hidden details of war, particularly the lead up and aftermath, since the media doesn't pay much attention to those areas. Plenty of details of wars from the distant past were mentioned as well, generally not with sufficient context to connect the idea being presented. The author made a number of definitive statements without logical support. There were several typos, the ones most glaring were with dates, like Biden announcing in 2021 that the Afghan war would end in 2011, when I suspect the end would have been 2021. Still, many interesting ideas on the nature of war, and significantly, how they might begin and end. Probably my most important complaint is what he calls either limited or unlimited political aims. Unlimited being the annihilation of the enemy. I figure that there are many countries in the world, so getting rid of just one is still a limited political goal. Unlimited would be getting rid of all (other) countries, or perhaps getting rid of human civilization.

[Scott Martin]

(Audiobook) Strange to think that America, or anyone for that matter would fight a war, but it fight to win. Yet, since World War II, there is an argument that perhaps America does just that. Enter Stoker and his work discussing that concept. A big factor is that when America has gotten into conflicts as of late, they have not managed to have a concerted plan for winning, lacking the clear answer to the question “What is victory?”

Using classic and modern strategic writings, Stoker sets up his arguments attacking the mindset of fighting without a clear, definitive purpose. Politicians and military commanders are guilty of lacking the endgame. Some could argue it is the old complaint “why are we fighting if we aren’t going to win?”, but even then, they have a point.

Agree or disagree, this book is worth the read, especially after the recent debacles in Afghanistan. War should be engaged in only if there is a clear political and military objective that doesn’t involve political appearances. It is more complex than that, but it is a start.

[Randal]

The title is a bit misleading because it’s not only about America’s wars but about the concept of “limited war” – defining it, exploring its implications, and theorizing about its prosecution and termination.

I found the writing a little too disorganized, and the author jumped around all over the place.

The author does present a strong case that it is the failure to first consider the POLITICAL objective that is at the heart of most defeats, especially those of major powers, in limited war.

The US does seem uniquely predisposed to making this mistake: either failing to clarify the political objective of its so-called limited wars, or choosing to change the political objective without reevaluating the military ways and means to reach it.

It’s interesting that this book came out in 2018, and you can see the reality of its theory in the absolute disaster of the Biden Admin’s surrender and defeat in Afghanistan.

[Holly]

If you are affiliated with the military - either as a service member or a government civilian - you are likely familiar with the concepts that Stoker provides regarding America and its approach to conflict. In that case, this book is not going to offer you anything you likely don't already know. However, if this is a new area for you, then I think that the book can be quite insightful.

The primary takeaways:
1. America loses wars because there is no clear political objective to the conflict.
2. If there is an objective, it hasn't prioritized the importance of (i.e., what level of resources - human and financial- it is willing to use to) achieving that objective.
3. America does not do a good job of assessing its adversary's objective and what resources they are willing to use to achieve that objective.

In military parlance, what are the ends, ways, and means?
Ends - objectives
Ways - diplomatic, military, economic, etc. options
Means - resources to achieve the objective

[xiaobao]

1 Time wasting. The book can be finished in one sentence, “US leaders lack political aims for wars”. Then no answer for what political aims should be, solely blame leaders for the lack.
2 How to define ‘political aims’? In fact, one only blame no when not agree with the aims or results. The author keeps complaining no insistent offensives in every post-war US war.
3 Who prefers stalemates if he has a choice to win? The problem is always about capabilities. “Not insistent determinations” are simply due to military failures, make your leaders withdraw.
4 The bigger picture refers to the failure of US cohesion, then failures in military mobilities. It’s damn shallow to blame leaders’ personalities for politics, so does the author’s propaganda label democratic states or not.

[Patricia Roberts-Miller]

The argument is really provocative, the citations are very useful, and the examples plentiful. Perhaps because it's used as a textbook, it's also very repetitive. (It may be that the author felt obliged to repeat, for instance, narratives about Korea because professors might just assign one chapter?)

[Isabelle]

I really loved this book. It tells it as it is and is so true. It’s right on, though I’d also add that it should be expanded upon, maybe a book two? There are so many reasons America loses wars but man this is a great book with a great start on why.

[منير الحاج]

اريد ان اقراء اولا

[Frank A.]

Stoker lays out another way that US policymakers could view waging war.

[Grahambo]

Rambling and illogical.