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A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958
Using archival materials from all three nations, this first comparative study of French and Italian relations with the United States during the early Cold War shows that French and Italian ambitions of status, or prestige, crucially affected the formation of the Western Alliance. While attention to outside appearances had a long historic tradition for both European nations, the notion was compounded by their humiliation in World War II and their consequent fear of further demotion. Only by promoting an American hegemony over Europe could France and Italy aspire respectively to attain continental leadership and equality with the other great European powers. For its part, Washington carefully calibrated concessions of mere status with the more substantial issues of international roles.
A recent trend in both U.S. and European historiography of the Cold War has emphasized the role that America's allies had in shaping the post-World War II international system. Combining diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural insights, and reassessing the main events from post-war reconstruction to the Middle Eastern crises of the late 1950s, Brogi reaches two major that the United States helped the two allies to recover enough self-esteem to cope with their own decline; and that both the French and the Italian leaders, with constant pressure from Washington, progressively adapted to a notion of prestige no longer based solely on nationalism, but also on their capacity to promote, or even master, continental integration. With this focus on image, Brogi finally suggests a background to today's changing patterns of international relations, as civilizational values become increasingly important at the expense of more familiar indices of economic and military power.
A recent trend in both U.S. and European historiography of the Cold War has emphasized the role that America's allies had in shaping the post-World War II international system. Combining diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural insights, and reassessing the main events from post-war reconstruction to the Middle Eastern crises of the late 1950s, Brogi reaches two major that the United States helped the two allies to recover enough self-esteem to cope with their own decline; and that both the French and the Italian leaders, with constant pressure from Washington, progressively adapted to a notion of prestige no longer based solely on nationalism, but also on their capacity to promote, or even master, continental integration. With this focus on image, Brogi finally suggests a background to today's changing patterns of international relations, as civilizational values become increasingly important at the expense of more familiar indices of economic and military power.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published October 30, 2001
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March 21, 2022
World War II left France and Italy devastated economically with a shattering blow to their prestige and reputation. France suffered an early defeat and occupation, while Italy served as the junior Axis partner to Nazi Germany. During the early Cold War, both nations worked to recover their status in a Europe under American hegemony. Yale Historian Allessandro Brogi argues in his book, A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958, that the concern for prestige impacted how both interacted with the United States and shaped their policies. The desire to restore national self-esteem became a central component in the actions of both nations. The primary argument the author sets forth is that both countries sought prestige and status through a return to importance on the European, and world stage and both used prestige in their relationship with the United States. Brogi sees the French desire for grandeur and the Italian aspiration to maintain their bella figura (nice appearance) as affecting their foreign policies.(p.2)The author deals with both nations and structures his work around chronological and topical concerns. Each chapter looks at the use of prestige by both France and Italy, dealing with the use of prestige separately and comparing how both utilized status to achieve their goals. The comparison offers an outlook on prestige that an examination of one country might obscure.
Brogi utilizes a large range of published and unpublished sources from American, French, and Italian archives. Brogi argues against many historians who see the concern for prestige as merely “a matter of appearance” and a “display of rhetoric” spun for the domestic population with little impact on security or foreign relationships. (p.1) Brogi challenges this view by contending that appearance and substance remained linked together for France and Italy even after the war. He also believes that an examination of both countries “reveals patterns and characteristics of their foreign policies that have remained hidden in separate treatments of the two countries.” (p.1) Hans Morgenthau defines prestige as a function of power; therefore, prestige policies of weak postwar nations like France and Italy were counterproductive and foolish.(p.4) International Relations theory proponents such as Morgenthau concentrate mostly on the superpowers. While Brogi sees value in their applications, he believes that the French and Italian concern with status was far from counterproductive. In response, Brogi points to the accomplishments of France and Italy utilizing policies of prestige which provided some crucial goals and impacted the Western alliance. Although Brogi takes a different direction than the International Relations theorists, he sees value in their work. John Spanier suggests that a nation with a “reputation for power” reduces its risk of challenge and that reputation "nation's prestige may outlast its power."(p.5) Brogi also links his thesis of prestige to A. F. K. Organski, who proposes that "a reputation for power confers power, whether or not it is justified" and Joseph Nye’s idea of “soft power,” which uses “attraction rather than coercion,” to achieve goals.(p.5) Brogi links his central theme of prestige to these scholars, demonstrating that both France and Italy lacked the needed hard power to achieve their goals after World War II. Both nations used their past status in Europe and the world to enable them to claim a place of honor on the world stage.
Brogi admits that neither France nor Italy achieved their ultimate goals with the tool of prestige. France desired a place alongside the U.S. and Britain as a triumvirate within Europe and the world. This was a desire France continued to push within NATO, which fell on deaf ears as the United States pointed out that a triumvirate would be harmful to the "developing intimacy among all the members of NATO."(p.247) But Brogi maintains that France attained actual accomplishments despite her weak postwar position. Using their prestige, the French won concessions from the United States and “managed to delay the resurgence of a powerful Germany until they were sure that they could play the leading role in European integration.” (p.262) Before his resignation in 1946, General Charles de Gaulle utilized his position and the past prestige of France to win concessions from the Allies, such as an occupation zone in Germany and one of the five permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. Even the weak governments of the Fourth Republic managed to win a place on the steering committee of NATO.
But prestige proved to be a hindrance when France attempted to hold onto its empire. France believed that their influence as a world power depended on maintaining their colonies. Even Italy desired a U.N. trusteeship over their former colony, Libya but renounced imperialism as they sought a more significant role in the Mediterranean. France, however, remained committed to its vision of an imperial power. (p.262) A vision tied to their concern over their prestige. This prestige blinded them to the fact that imperialism was at an end. Their involvement in the Suez crisis also emphasized their lesser status before America.
The goal of Italy to achieve a place among the Western allies was a much more challenging climb owing to their role as an Axis power. But Marshall Pietro Badoglio managed to change the status of Italy from enemy to co-belligerent after the collapse of Mussolini and the surrender of Italy. After the war, the U.S. recognized the Italian contribution and encouraged the British and Soviets to include Italy in the United Nations. (p.37) In 1949, Italy was a founding member of NATO. While Italy lacked the worldwide ambition of France, she looked to fill a role as a mediator in the Mediterranean and towards the Arab Nations. During a crisis in Lebanon, the Eisenhower administration became receptive to an Italian role and received Prime Minister Fanfani with enthusiasm. Italy had previously allowed American troops to use Italy as a staging ground for their Lebanese operation, and his encouragement for the West to normalize relations with Arab nations to prevent Soviet incursion in the Middle East met with some agreement. (p.241)
But France and Italy failed to change their status within the pecking order of the Western alliance. France failed to break into the special relationship between the USA and Britain during the Fourth Republic or when de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The USA desired a more stable and independent France and preferred a strong de Gaulle instead of the unstable Fourth Republic. Both the French and the Italians recognized the hegemony of the United States in Europe. Eventually, both nations found that a close relationship with the U.S. encouraged their self-esteem despite their subservience to America. With the protection of the United States, France and Italy possessed the flexibility to pursue their goal to regain a status as a European power and, in the case of France a world power. Brogi believes this study is valuable in a world with only America as the sole super power. Other nations such as India, Russia, and China share a similar desire for status, prestige, and inclusion in international decisions. (p.271) While events changed since the writing of this volume, the desire for status and recognition remains true among most nations. An evaluation regarding matters of honor and prestige such as provided by Brogi in international relationships are an appreciated addition.
Brogi utilizes a large range of published and unpublished sources from American, French, and Italian archives. Brogi argues against many historians who see the concern for prestige as merely “a matter of appearance” and a “display of rhetoric” spun for the domestic population with little impact on security or foreign relationships. (p.1) Brogi challenges this view by contending that appearance and substance remained linked together for France and Italy even after the war. He also believes that an examination of both countries “reveals patterns and characteristics of their foreign policies that have remained hidden in separate treatments of the two countries.” (p.1) Hans Morgenthau defines prestige as a function of power; therefore, prestige policies of weak postwar nations like France and Italy were counterproductive and foolish.(p.4) International Relations theory proponents such as Morgenthau concentrate mostly on the superpowers. While Brogi sees value in their applications, he believes that the French and Italian concern with status was far from counterproductive. In response, Brogi points to the accomplishments of France and Italy utilizing policies of prestige which provided some crucial goals and impacted the Western alliance. Although Brogi takes a different direction than the International Relations theorists, he sees value in their work. John Spanier suggests that a nation with a “reputation for power” reduces its risk of challenge and that reputation "nation's prestige may outlast its power."(p.5) Brogi also links his thesis of prestige to A. F. K. Organski, who proposes that "a reputation for power confers power, whether or not it is justified" and Joseph Nye’s idea of “soft power,” which uses “attraction rather than coercion,” to achieve goals.(p.5) Brogi links his central theme of prestige to these scholars, demonstrating that both France and Italy lacked the needed hard power to achieve their goals after World War II. Both nations used their past status in Europe and the world to enable them to claim a place of honor on the world stage.
Brogi admits that neither France nor Italy achieved their ultimate goals with the tool of prestige. France desired a place alongside the U.S. and Britain as a triumvirate within Europe and the world. This was a desire France continued to push within NATO, which fell on deaf ears as the United States pointed out that a triumvirate would be harmful to the "developing intimacy among all the members of NATO."(p.247) But Brogi maintains that France attained actual accomplishments despite her weak postwar position. Using their prestige, the French won concessions from the United States and “managed to delay the resurgence of a powerful Germany until they were sure that they could play the leading role in European integration.” (p.262) Before his resignation in 1946, General Charles de Gaulle utilized his position and the past prestige of France to win concessions from the Allies, such as an occupation zone in Germany and one of the five permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. Even the weak governments of the Fourth Republic managed to win a place on the steering committee of NATO.
But prestige proved to be a hindrance when France attempted to hold onto its empire. France believed that their influence as a world power depended on maintaining their colonies. Even Italy desired a U.N. trusteeship over their former colony, Libya but renounced imperialism as they sought a more significant role in the Mediterranean. France, however, remained committed to its vision of an imperial power. (p.262) A vision tied to their concern over their prestige. This prestige blinded them to the fact that imperialism was at an end. Their involvement in the Suez crisis also emphasized their lesser status before America.
The goal of Italy to achieve a place among the Western allies was a much more challenging climb owing to their role as an Axis power. But Marshall Pietro Badoglio managed to change the status of Italy from enemy to co-belligerent after the collapse of Mussolini and the surrender of Italy. After the war, the U.S. recognized the Italian contribution and encouraged the British and Soviets to include Italy in the United Nations. (p.37) In 1949, Italy was a founding member of NATO. While Italy lacked the worldwide ambition of France, she looked to fill a role as a mediator in the Mediterranean and towards the Arab Nations. During a crisis in Lebanon, the Eisenhower administration became receptive to an Italian role and received Prime Minister Fanfani with enthusiasm. Italy had previously allowed American troops to use Italy as a staging ground for their Lebanese operation, and his encouragement for the West to normalize relations with Arab nations to prevent Soviet incursion in the Middle East met with some agreement. (p.241)
But France and Italy failed to change their status within the pecking order of the Western alliance. France failed to break into the special relationship between the USA and Britain during the Fourth Republic or when de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The USA desired a more stable and independent France and preferred a strong de Gaulle instead of the unstable Fourth Republic. Both the French and the Italians recognized the hegemony of the United States in Europe. Eventually, both nations found that a close relationship with the U.S. encouraged their self-esteem despite their subservience to America. With the protection of the United States, France and Italy possessed the flexibility to pursue their goal to regain a status as a European power and, in the case of France a world power. Brogi believes this study is valuable in a world with only America as the sole super power. Other nations such as India, Russia, and China share a similar desire for status, prestige, and inclusion in international decisions. (p.271) While events changed since the writing of this volume, the desire for status and recognition remains true among most nations. An evaluation regarding matters of honor and prestige such as provided by Brogi in international relationships are an appreciated addition.
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