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The Women Are Up to Something: How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics
The story of four remarkable women who shaped the intellectual history of the 20th century: Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch.
On the cusp of the Second World War, four women went to Oxford to begin their studies: a fiercely brilliant Catholic convert; a daughter of privilege longing to escape her stifling upbringing; an ardent Communist and aspiring novelist with a list of would-be lovers as long as her arm; and a quiet, messy lover of newts and mice who would become a great public intellectual of our time. They became lifelong friends. At the time, only a handful of women had ever made lives in philosophy. But when Oxford's men were drafted in the war, everything changed.
As Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch labored to make a place for themselves in a male-dominated world, as they made friendships and families, and as they drifted toward and away from each other, they never stopped insisting that some lives are better than others. They argued that courage and discernment and justice--and love--are the heart of a good life.
This book presents the first sustained engagement with these women's contributions: with the critique and the alternative they framed. Drawing on a cluster of recently opened archives and extensive correspondence and interviews with those who knew them best, Benjamin Lipscomb traces the lives and ideas of four friends who gave us a better way to think about ethics, and ourselves.
On the cusp of the Second World War, four women went to Oxford to begin their studies: a fiercely brilliant Catholic convert; a daughter of privilege longing to escape her stifling upbringing; an ardent Communist and aspiring novelist with a list of would-be lovers as long as her arm; and a quiet, messy lover of newts and mice who would become a great public intellectual of our time. They became lifelong friends. At the time, only a handful of women had ever made lives in philosophy. But when Oxford's men were drafted in the war, everything changed.
As Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch labored to make a place for themselves in a male-dominated world, as they made friendships and families, and as they drifted toward and away from each other, they never stopped insisting that some lives are better than others. They argued that courage and discernment and justice--and love--are the heart of a good life.
This book presents the first sustained engagement with these women's contributions: with the critique and the alternative they framed. Drawing on a cluster of recently opened archives and extensive correspondence and interviews with those who knew them best, Benjamin Lipscomb traces the lives and ideas of four friends who gave us a better way to think about ethics, and ourselves.
326 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2021
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December 27, 2021
This is an outstanding book!
This is a joint biography of four women philosophers who met each other and became friends, started their careers, and developed into prominence out of the environment of Oxford University around the time of WW2. Just starting with this sentence masks the variety among these four in their career paths, topics of professional interest, ways of pursuing philosophy, other areas of professional activity and success, such as fiction writing or journalism, and personal lives.
These women lived complex lives and affected academia and the world of letters in different way. Yes, timing makes a difference and that these careers unfolded at Oxford when they did is critical. The stories would have been different had they occurred either earlier or later than they did. Being at the right place at the right time made a difference for them. I had come across Elizabeth Anscombe and Phillippa Foot before, but a long time ago. I knew much less about Mary Midgley or Iris Murdoch.
The author, Professor Benjamin Lipscomb, links these four careers together in the context of how we think seriously about ethics or more broadly moral philosophy, as they were taught at Oxford at the time. The premise of the book is that the prevailing view of ethics at the time did not grant it stature as a serious topic for philosophical analysis. Ethical treatments reflected more the approval or disapproval of the speaker and did not concern objective factual situations that could be the subject of rigorous analysis. Ethics might concern issues of consistency for people who have made choices but ethical problems were not out there in the world. The starting point for the story in the book comes when one of the four (Foot) became aware of newly released news real footage of the recently liberated Nazi concentration camps at Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen and concluded that they had to be dealt with as evil not just as relativistic opinions. That was an effective way to motivate the book from the start.
By the way, philosophy is hard and to engage with particular arguments it is important to read the papers involved and think through the details. To his credit, Lipscomb does not do this but provides the general trajectories of some of the basic arguments. For those who are interested, there are ample citations to the key articles and their responses. In addition, these sorts of debates take place in different forums and even different types of publications. It is common for important papers to be presented to an audience, which engages in a back-and-forth with the speaker. Such a debate is often as important as the paper is at the time. Sometimes ideas develop in seminars through discussions with grad students or in collaboration with a thesis advisor. It is hard to convey such an intellectual environment but Lipscomb does a good job. Sometimes related ideas are developed in larger monographs, policy papers, or even novels, and Lipscomb is effective here too. This is a rich book with a well told story.
The book has other layers as well. The personal and family lives of these women were important and the story is a detailed about handling work and family conflicts and how each of the women handled their situations. The book is also about Oxford and how the university changed over the course of WW2. That is an interesting story on its own terms. There is also a lot on the increasing role of new media in the spreading of ideas – in this case the strategic use of BBC broadcasts. The title of the book itself refers to the reception of Harry Truman given complaints about the use of the atomic bomb and its justifications according to more traditional laws of war – a fairly modern problem of the role of intellectuals in the “public” sphere.
This is an outstanding book and well worth reading. On the surface, it brings to mind Louis Menand’s 2001 book “The Metaphysical Club”, another four person intellectual biography. The intellectual context of “The Women are Up to Something” is as rich or richer than Menand’s book and the personal interactions among the four principal subjects are much more involved and occur over a much longer period. It is an impressive work.
This is a joint biography of four women philosophers who met each other and became friends, started their careers, and developed into prominence out of the environment of Oxford University around the time of WW2. Just starting with this sentence masks the variety among these four in their career paths, topics of professional interest, ways of pursuing philosophy, other areas of professional activity and success, such as fiction writing or journalism, and personal lives.
These women lived complex lives and affected academia and the world of letters in different way. Yes, timing makes a difference and that these careers unfolded at Oxford when they did is critical. The stories would have been different had they occurred either earlier or later than they did. Being at the right place at the right time made a difference for them. I had come across Elizabeth Anscombe and Phillippa Foot before, but a long time ago. I knew much less about Mary Midgley or Iris Murdoch.
The author, Professor Benjamin Lipscomb, links these four careers together in the context of how we think seriously about ethics or more broadly moral philosophy, as they were taught at Oxford at the time. The premise of the book is that the prevailing view of ethics at the time did not grant it stature as a serious topic for philosophical analysis. Ethical treatments reflected more the approval or disapproval of the speaker and did not concern objective factual situations that could be the subject of rigorous analysis. Ethics might concern issues of consistency for people who have made choices but ethical problems were not out there in the world. The starting point for the story in the book comes when one of the four (Foot) became aware of newly released news real footage of the recently liberated Nazi concentration camps at Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen and concluded that they had to be dealt with as evil not just as relativistic opinions. That was an effective way to motivate the book from the start.
By the way, philosophy is hard and to engage with particular arguments it is important to read the papers involved and think through the details. To his credit, Lipscomb does not do this but provides the general trajectories of some of the basic arguments. For those who are interested, there are ample citations to the key articles and their responses. In addition, these sorts of debates take place in different forums and even different types of publications. It is common for important papers to be presented to an audience, which engages in a back-and-forth with the speaker. Such a debate is often as important as the paper is at the time. Sometimes ideas develop in seminars through discussions with grad students or in collaboration with a thesis advisor. It is hard to convey such an intellectual environment but Lipscomb does a good job. Sometimes related ideas are developed in larger monographs, policy papers, or even novels, and Lipscomb is effective here too. This is a rich book with a well told story.
The book has other layers as well. The personal and family lives of these women were important and the story is a detailed about handling work and family conflicts and how each of the women handled their situations. The book is also about Oxford and how the university changed over the course of WW2. That is an interesting story on its own terms. There is also a lot on the increasing role of new media in the spreading of ideas – in this case the strategic use of BBC broadcasts. The title of the book itself refers to the reception of Harry Truman given complaints about the use of the atomic bomb and its justifications according to more traditional laws of war – a fairly modern problem of the role of intellectuals in the “public” sphere.
This is an outstanding book and well worth reading. On the surface, it brings to mind Louis Menand’s 2001 book “The Metaphysical Club”, another four person intellectual biography. The intellectual context of “The Women are Up to Something” is as rich or richer than Menand’s book and the personal interactions among the four principal subjects are much more involved and occur over a much longer period. It is an impressive work.
August 12, 2024
The Anti-Existentialist Café?
In the vein of The Metaphysical Club or At the Existentialist Café this book works both as a biography of a group of four women at Oxford and a history and analysis of the contributions they made to the field of ethical philosophy. I would have preferred less biography and more philosophy, but I still found it a very worthwhile read.
After WWI the philosophy department at Oxford was beholden to the tenets of logical positivism—the theory that facts and values belonged to entirely separate realms—that it was philosophically invalid to start with a series of premises that state what “is” true, and arrive at a conclusion that states what one “ought” to do. By this way of thinking, values represent mere preferences, and moral judgments only reflect one’s personal feelings or acculturation. The field of philosophy thus would have nothing to contribute in the area of morals. It had painted itself into a corner and risked becoming irrelevant. After all, what is the point of philosophizing if it is useless for helping to decide between right and wrong?
After the revelation of the horrors of the Holocaust, these four Oxford philosophers began to question the reigning orthodoxy. Believing that we truly can regard some heinous acts as actually wrong—rather than simply unconventional or distasteful—they worked to establish a basis for ethical philosophy. They first began to ask questions about “rudeness.” This seemed to provide a curious link between description and proscription. Over time, developments in ethology (the study of animal behavior) suggested a possible link between biology and ethics and stimulated further inquiry in examining how certain behaviors promote flourishing while others are harmful. Could this line of thinking be used to suggest the validity of particular “ought” statements? Further advancements were made interrogating late Wittgensteinian thought and the writings of Aquinas, and over time the dominance of logical positivism crumbled.
One item I found noteworthy is Lipscomb’s idea of “the Dawkins Sublime.” We properly refer to something as sublime if it evokes feelings of awe, of fear and trembling, a sense of our own smallness compared to something immense. It differs from something that is merely beautiful. Think of a majestic mountain or a massive waterfall. This strange sensation we get is somehow pleasurable, explaining why people go to such great lengths to achieve these kinds of experiences. For those who deny the existence of God, or reject the idea of any meaning underlying the universe, and therefore accept a purely materialist philosophy (a “billiard-ball world”), the idea of standing alone against a cold and uncaring universe, staring into the void, can elicit similar feelings of awe. Indeed, rather than causing feelings of despair, this intellectual stance may instead mirror the sublime, and has the added perk of allowing adherents to think of themselves as courageous. This is “the Dawkins Sublime.” When certain atheists denigrate the views of theists as simply a psychological salve and cosmic wish-fulfillment, they should consider that they too may be deriving some psychological solace from their own philosophical posturing.
Scott wrote a great review:
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
In the vein of The Metaphysical Club or At the Existentialist Café this book works both as a biography of a group of four women at Oxford and a history and analysis of the contributions they made to the field of ethical philosophy. I would have preferred less biography and more philosophy, but I still found it a very worthwhile read.
After WWI the philosophy department at Oxford was beholden to the tenets of logical positivism—the theory that facts and values belonged to entirely separate realms—that it was philosophically invalid to start with a series of premises that state what “is” true, and arrive at a conclusion that states what one “ought” to do. By this way of thinking, values represent mere preferences, and moral judgments only reflect one’s personal feelings or acculturation. The field of philosophy thus would have nothing to contribute in the area of morals. It had painted itself into a corner and risked becoming irrelevant. After all, what is the point of philosophizing if it is useless for helping to decide between right and wrong?
After the revelation of the horrors of the Holocaust, these four Oxford philosophers began to question the reigning orthodoxy. Believing that we truly can regard some heinous acts as actually wrong—rather than simply unconventional or distasteful—they worked to establish a basis for ethical philosophy. They first began to ask questions about “rudeness.” This seemed to provide a curious link between description and proscription. Over time, developments in ethology (the study of animal behavior) suggested a possible link between biology and ethics and stimulated further inquiry in examining how certain behaviors promote flourishing while others are harmful. Could this line of thinking be used to suggest the validity of particular “ought” statements? Further advancements were made interrogating late Wittgensteinian thought and the writings of Aquinas, and over time the dominance of logical positivism crumbled.
One item I found noteworthy is Lipscomb’s idea of “the Dawkins Sublime.” We properly refer to something as sublime if it evokes feelings of awe, of fear and trembling, a sense of our own smallness compared to something immense. It differs from something that is merely beautiful. Think of a majestic mountain or a massive waterfall. This strange sensation we get is somehow pleasurable, explaining why people go to such great lengths to achieve these kinds of experiences. For those who deny the existence of God, or reject the idea of any meaning underlying the universe, and therefore accept a purely materialist philosophy (a “billiard-ball world”), the idea of standing alone against a cold and uncaring universe, staring into the void, can elicit similar feelings of awe. Indeed, rather than causing feelings of despair, this intellectual stance may instead mirror the sublime, and has the added perk of allowing adherents to think of themselves as courageous. This is “the Dawkins Sublime.” When certain atheists denigrate the views of theists as simply a psychological salve and cosmic wish-fulfillment, they should consider that they too may be deriving some psychological solace from their own philosophical posturing.
Scott wrote a great review:
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
January 9, 2022
This is a fine book. It provides a sort of narrative that ties these 4 lives to the evolution of meta-ethics over about 3 decades. It is written in an accessible fashion, and draws on interviews and archival research done by the author in interesting ways. I plan to use it as a background text in my upcoming seminar on Aristotle's Ethics and Contemporary Virtue Theory.
It also provided an opportunity for me to think back over memories from my philosophical life. I was a grad student at UCLA 1976-1983 and took or went to several seminars by Foot. My dissertation was on Moral Realism, chaired by Warren Quinn, though Foot was not involved. My early publications were on supervenience, and I got helpful comments/criticisms from Hare. I only met Anscombe once, but had to deal with her when publishing a collection of Wittgenstein's work--Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951. I needed her permission but couldn't get her to respond to me. I finally called her on the phone and got her to agree, and she then sent me a scrawled note of permission. My introduction to Murdoch was actually through John McDowell, who visited UCLA in 1977--I took his seminar on Greek Moral Psychology (a preview of his paper "Virtue and Reason") and he included readings from Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good. (Foot did not attend the course.) I was interested to see the comment from Foot that the department at UCLA was "the right sort" (p. 235). She certainly was close to Rogers Albritton and Quinn (both of whom were on my dissertation committee). But she was friendly with lots of folks in the department.
The only figure I had no connection to was Mary Midgley, though I was glad to learn about her work connecting human with animal nature, and tying that in with ethics. It reminded me a lot of the work of Marjorie Grene, whom I did know pretty well, though Marjorie did not tie her work to ethics. But she was also a woman of that era (1909-2008) who spent a good chunk of her time raising a family and getting relatively little recognition...well, apart from The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene.
It also provided an opportunity for me to think back over memories from my philosophical life. I was a grad student at UCLA 1976-1983 and took or went to several seminars by Foot. My dissertation was on Moral Realism, chaired by Warren Quinn, though Foot was not involved. My early publications were on supervenience, and I got helpful comments/criticisms from Hare. I only met Anscombe once, but had to deal with her when publishing a collection of Wittgenstein's work--Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951. I needed her permission but couldn't get her to respond to me. I finally called her on the phone and got her to agree, and she then sent me a scrawled note of permission. My introduction to Murdoch was actually through John McDowell, who visited UCLA in 1977--I took his seminar on Greek Moral Psychology (a preview of his paper "Virtue and Reason") and he included readings from Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good. (Foot did not attend the course.) I was interested to see the comment from Foot that the department at UCLA was "the right sort" (p. 235). She certainly was close to Rogers Albritton and Quinn (both of whom were on my dissertation committee). But she was friendly with lots of folks in the department.
The only figure I had no connection to was Mary Midgley, though I was glad to learn about her work connecting human with animal nature, and tying that in with ethics. It reminded me a lot of the work of Marjorie Grene, whom I did know pretty well, though Marjorie did not tie her work to ethics. But she was also a woman of that era (1909-2008) who spent a good chunk of her time raising a family and getting relatively little recognition...well, apart from The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene.
August 3, 2022
I finished reading this up at the cottage and thoroughly enjoyed it as a summer read. The friendship between these four women was as remarkable as each individual person was. I've long appreciated Murdoch, Foot, and Anscombe, but now even more so, and with the added interest in Mary Midgley. This book does an excellent job at paying attention to the nuances of friendship, it frames the setting well, with a clear understanding of the cultural and philosophical context of 20th century Britain. It's very well written. If anything, it's made me want to dive into the work of each woman. I inherited my late aunt's collection of Iris Murdoch's novels, which I plan to work through. I'm very thankful I read this book.
June 23, 2025
what a pleasure to experience this book!
January 28, 2023
if you like this review, i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com
20718: whether this is actually feministlit or philosophy-feminist I do not know, certainly the authors addressed are women and it is historically not distant, though the topics these women worked on were not specifically 'feminist'. this is very good group biography, with individual biographies leading to interactions in mid-century Oxford. this sort of philosophy is not familiar to me: linguistic, analytic, anglophone in general, though it does intrigue that perhaps I should read more of the Wittgenstein. his later work sounds interesting...
Mary Midgley is the one I have read and enjoyed most. the brief early contrast of the 'physics/billiard ball' picture that seems to have captured many if not all anglophone philosophers, and the more 'biological /interactive' picture she follows seems much more fruitful. She also points out the 'Dawkins sublime' idea of brave humans confronting valueless universe etc. I also liked iris Murdoch's interpretation of Sartre as romantic realist and his equal sublime...
When Dawkins says the universe is essentially cold, meaningless, valueless... but of course neither he nor anyone else can live that way- is this not indication there IS meaning and value? At least to the extent of living any way?
20718: whether this is actually feministlit or philosophy-feminist I do not know, certainly the authors addressed are women and it is historically not distant, though the topics these women worked on were not specifically 'feminist'. this is very good group biography, with individual biographies leading to interactions in mid-century Oxford. this sort of philosophy is not familiar to me: linguistic, analytic, anglophone in general, though it does intrigue that perhaps I should read more of the Wittgenstein. his later work sounds interesting...
Mary Midgley is the one I have read and enjoyed most. the brief early contrast of the 'physics/billiard ball' picture that seems to have captured many if not all anglophone philosophers, and the more 'biological /interactive' picture she follows seems much more fruitful. She also points out the 'Dawkins sublime' idea of brave humans confronting valueless universe etc. I also liked iris Murdoch's interpretation of Sartre as romantic realist and his equal sublime...
When Dawkins says the universe is essentially cold, meaningless, valueless... but of course neither he nor anyone else can live that way- is this not indication there IS meaning and value? At least to the extent of living any way?
March 12, 2024
This is a book about ethics and philosophy, yes, but it is also a story about female friendship, the post-WWII social and academic culture of the Oxbridge world, and women in academia. I loved it, and I came to admire the four women not only for their intellectual rigor, but for the way they supported each other and stood their ground against the prevailing philosophic arguments of their day.
The author does a great job of laying the groundwork for the book, not all at once at the top, but throughout, so it never feels overwhelming. Post World War II philosophy was defined by prescriptive ideas of ethics which posited that there is no objective morality that can be applied universally, but rather, each person subscribes to their own set of morals, and right and wrong is defined by how consistently that set of morals is followed. Therefore, what morality means for one cannot necessarily be applied to another, etc. The four women of this book found this deeply unsatisfying for making sense of the evil of the war. By such argument, what the Nazis did could not be called wrong, and this is the idea that the four philosophers wrestled against.
Much of the book is dedicated to the philosophy of Anscombe, Foot, Midgely, and Murdoch, but what I found equally compelling was the story of their friendship. One woman was a devout Christian, one a committed atheist. More than one ardently supported contraception and at least one was fiercely opposed. One woman was the mother of seven children; one was unable to bear any. Even so, their friendship persisted.
I was reading this book at the same time I read The Abolition of Man, and found so much overlap in the way that all five thinkers made sense of the intellectual environment of a time period they all shared. One of the women in Lipscomb's book even debated Lewis at Oxford, which was a fun cameo. I ended up listening to this book twice, mostly because it felt a bit like it was stretching my brain and also because it was a delight to spend time with such massive minds.
The author does a great job of laying the groundwork for the book, not all at once at the top, but throughout, so it never feels overwhelming. Post World War II philosophy was defined by prescriptive ideas of ethics which posited that there is no objective morality that can be applied universally, but rather, each person subscribes to their own set of morals, and right and wrong is defined by how consistently that set of morals is followed. Therefore, what morality means for one cannot necessarily be applied to another, etc. The four women of this book found this deeply unsatisfying for making sense of the evil of the war. By such argument, what the Nazis did could not be called wrong, and this is the idea that the four philosophers wrestled against.
Much of the book is dedicated to the philosophy of Anscombe, Foot, Midgely, and Murdoch, but what I found equally compelling was the story of their friendship. One woman was a devout Christian, one a committed atheist. More than one ardently supported contraception and at least one was fiercely opposed. One woman was the mother of seven children; one was unable to bear any. Even so, their friendship persisted.
I was reading this book at the same time I read The Abolition of Man, and found so much overlap in the way that all five thinkers made sense of the intellectual environment of a time period they all shared. One of the women in Lipscomb's book even debated Lewis at Oxford, which was a fun cameo. I ended up listening to this book twice, mostly because it felt a bit like it was stretching my brain and also because it was a delight to spend time with such massive minds.
April 6, 2024
I thoroughly enjoyed this book and loved the story of these women’s lives - how they intersected through friendship and diverged through different interests and experiences.
I thought it was so fascinating that these women came to Oxford and flourished as many of the male students were absent due to WWII, and it makes me wonder (once again) about the differences between what men and women need to succeed (whether due to nature or nurture), and how they might do that together, not in the absence or at the expense of one or the other.
I gained an appreciation for the work of moral philosophy and so much respect for what Anscombe, Midgley, Murdoch, and Foot contributed to the field.
I thought it was so fascinating that these women came to Oxford and flourished as many of the male students were absent due to WWII, and it makes me wonder (once again) about the differences between what men and women need to succeed (whether due to nature or nurture), and how they might do that together, not in the absence or at the expense of one or the other.
I gained an appreciation for the work of moral philosophy and so much respect for what Anscombe, Midgley, Murdoch, and Foot contributed to the field.
January 29, 2024
I read this shortly after I read the other book published around the same time on the same topic - Metaphysical Animals. And I definitely liked this one more. The storytelling was more engaging, the account of the philosophical issues clearer and more accurate, and the narrative less distorted by axe-grinding. A great book about some brilliant and still sadly under appreciated philosophers.
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December 30, 2021[Skip I want to ADDRESS THIS voice] MY REVIEW: http://farefwd.com/index.php/2021/12/...
July 2, 2022
4.5
“What came of it all? The world never halts, waiting for philosophers’ theories…The four friends shone a new, old light on the human landscape. They let us see ourselves differently, and better.”
What were the women up to? Nothing less than revolutionizing the Oxford-style, male-dominated field of philosophy. They were also forming friendships, having love affairs, causing some controversies, trying to secure jobs & make a buck. Though (I’m going 1st name basis) Elizabeth, Philippa, Iris & Mary came from quite different backgrounds & had very different personalities, they were united by their commitment to rich philosophical discussions & truth seeking.
WWII largely cleared most male students out of Oxford for a while, which meant the women had more space, more time with tutors & could start to develop the thinking that would mature later on. The WWII era led many men to develop & embrace theories of a value-free universe where values such as right & wrong are mere projections (think Existentialism, Emotivism). Many of the most vocal & admired male philosophers were “committed to a metaphysical picture on which the things the Nazis did were not objectively wrong. And that was the thought that [these four women] were determined to resist.”
Resist they did! Images from the death camps or face-to-face experience with war’s victims – the realities of people’s lives – further led them to believe that “there are moral truths, grounded in the distinctive nature of our species.” Individually, together & with some guiding lights (Wittgenstein, for one) they developed their arguments against what they saw as faddish thinking, against a philosophical tribalism that was “antithetical to truth-seeking.” It was ups & downs as far as progress, but they persisted, each in her own way, sometimes on diverging paths.
Besides providing a portrait of the four women, this book works as a really good philosophy primer. To understand any of these women’s lives & their work, you have to have a grasp of the philosophy they were contending with. This book very coherently explains the mid-20th century British & Continental philosophy that was so influential it still holds sway over people today. He also explains the problems with this thinking & the women’s responses to it very clearly.
It’s a great book, constructed so well in how it goes back & forth in time to explain each woman’s philosophical journey & the dynamics of their friendships.
“What came of it all? The world never halts, waiting for philosophers’ theories…The four friends shone a new, old light on the human landscape. They let us see ourselves differently, and better.”
What were the women up to? Nothing less than revolutionizing the Oxford-style, male-dominated field of philosophy. They were also forming friendships, having love affairs, causing some controversies, trying to secure jobs & make a buck. Though (I’m going 1st name basis) Elizabeth, Philippa, Iris & Mary came from quite different backgrounds & had very different personalities, they were united by their commitment to rich philosophical discussions & truth seeking.
WWII largely cleared most male students out of Oxford for a while, which meant the women had more space, more time with tutors & could start to develop the thinking that would mature later on. The WWII era led many men to develop & embrace theories of a value-free universe where values such as right & wrong are mere projections (think Existentialism, Emotivism). Many of the most vocal & admired male philosophers were “committed to a metaphysical picture on which the things the Nazis did were not objectively wrong. And that was the thought that [these four women] were determined to resist.”
Resist they did! Images from the death camps or face-to-face experience with war’s victims – the realities of people’s lives – further led them to believe that “there are moral truths, grounded in the distinctive nature of our species.” Individually, together & with some guiding lights (Wittgenstein, for one) they developed their arguments against what they saw as faddish thinking, against a philosophical tribalism that was “antithetical to truth-seeking.” It was ups & downs as far as progress, but they persisted, each in her own way, sometimes on diverging paths.
Besides providing a portrait of the four women, this book works as a really good philosophy primer. To understand any of these women’s lives & their work, you have to have a grasp of the philosophy they were contending with. This book very coherently explains the mid-20th century British & Continental philosophy that was so influential it still holds sway over people today. He also explains the problems with this thinking & the women’s responses to it very clearly.
It’s a great book, constructed so well in how it goes back & forth in time to explain each woman’s philosophical journey & the dynamics of their friendships.
August 12, 2023
This book was great fun to read. The headline is that four brilliant philosopher friends saved 20th-century philosophy from logical positivism. It’s a wonderful celebration of exceptionally intelligent women who changed and refashioned their philosophical landscape. In this world, science is said to offer meaning, even though science effectively renders all moral talk meaningless. This universe is devoid of value. Anscombe, Foot, Midgely, and Murdoch, struggle with how this conception ultimately nullifies the horrors of WWII (not to mention how it simply fails to map onto reality) and posit their own way of revivifying moral talk.
There are many good things to say about this book. Lipscomb’s accessible and clear framing of the 20th-century moral philosophy milieu is of particular note. It is the story that ought to have been told already, one that properly honors Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch. It is also the story of how friendship, the deep and abiding love one soul has for another, can be the site of profound and beautiful invention and discovery. For me, friendship is one of God’s greatest gifts to humans. So much is possible in and because of friendship. In its own way, this book is a testament to that fact.
Two brief criticisms: Lipscomb’s account is excellent, although I think he is mainly inattentive to Murdoch’s philosophy of literature. While she was probably the least philosophically talented of the four (a point Lipscomb regularly mentions), Murdoch, just as much as the other three, saw the “picture” behind Hare and Ayers’ philosophy and its inadequacies. Indeed, her understanding of literature is basically a repudiation of the fact/value dichotomy. And her literature is a powerful amalgam of thinkers like Plato, Augustine, Nietzche, and Sartre. I would argue that Murdoch, by way of Simone Weil’s notion of attention, gives a more robust account of how literature can change one’s “picture” of the world than her friends. Lipscomb talks a bit about Murdoch’s philosophy towards the end of the book, though it is relegated to a few pages. Lastly, while Lipscomb rightly notes that each of these four philosophers reinvigorated virtue ethics, he does not substantially tease out the critical ways in which they are different.
“We are, to a large degree, who our most significant friends and relations have made us . . . While the sun smiles on us, we collaborate with friends and see what we can do together” (274, 276).
There are many good things to say about this book. Lipscomb’s accessible and clear framing of the 20th-century moral philosophy milieu is of particular note. It is the story that ought to have been told already, one that properly honors Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch. It is also the story of how friendship, the deep and abiding love one soul has for another, can be the site of profound and beautiful invention and discovery. For me, friendship is one of God’s greatest gifts to humans. So much is possible in and because of friendship. In its own way, this book is a testament to that fact.
Two brief criticisms: Lipscomb’s account is excellent, although I think he is mainly inattentive to Murdoch’s philosophy of literature. While she was probably the least philosophically talented of the four (a point Lipscomb regularly mentions), Murdoch, just as much as the other three, saw the “picture” behind Hare and Ayers’ philosophy and its inadequacies. Indeed, her understanding of literature is basically a repudiation of the fact/value dichotomy. And her literature is a powerful amalgam of thinkers like Plato, Augustine, Nietzche, and Sartre. I would argue that Murdoch, by way of Simone Weil’s notion of attention, gives a more robust account of how literature can change one’s “picture” of the world than her friends. Lipscomb talks a bit about Murdoch’s philosophy towards the end of the book, though it is relegated to a few pages. Lastly, while Lipscomb rightly notes that each of these four philosophers reinvigorated virtue ethics, he does not substantially tease out the critical ways in which they are different.
“We are, to a large degree, who our most significant friends and relations have made us . . . While the sun smiles on us, we collaborate with friends and see what we can do together” (274, 276).
August 25, 2023
A fascinating book! I was fully engaged throughout listening to it. The author does a good job, I think, of balancing the philosophical and the biographical. And the philosophical is handled well: I am familiar with Foot and Anscombe’s work and I don’t think there were any egregious errors or missteps. Moreover, I think a reader not as familiar would be able to get a handle on the ideas as discussed here.
While I knew that Foot and Anscombe were associates, I had no idea the depth and intimacy of the relationships between the four women on which the book focuses: Philippa Foot, G.E.M. Anscombe, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. That these women were not only at Oxford around the same time, but were friends and intellectual interlocuters sort of blew my mind. A convergence of brilliance and ability like one rarely sees. The author details their friendships, but also the ways in which they intellectually influenced each other.
I am most familiar with Foot, having read much of work of the years. I have read little of Anscombe outside of the few works in moral philosophy she wrote. I was familiar with Murdoch, though never really read any of her work. And Midgley, I was only vaguely aware of the name. However, after reading this work, I ordered Midgley’s Beast and Man and hope to get to it sooner rather than later. She sounds like she pulls together many of the insights of Foot and the others in some promising ways.
I was also fascinated by the intellectual life of Oxford at this time. First, the depth of the education these women received is amazing – I am so jealous! What it took to get into Oxford and then proceed through successfully sounds incredibly challenging but also rewarding. Second, the seriousness with which intellectual life was treated came through and also makes me jealous!
These thinkers and their ideas should be more front and center in the philosophical world. They still are on the margins, but their insights continue to inspire and influence.
While I knew that Foot and Anscombe were associates, I had no idea the depth and intimacy of the relationships between the four women on which the book focuses: Philippa Foot, G.E.M. Anscombe, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. That these women were not only at Oxford around the same time, but were friends and intellectual interlocuters sort of blew my mind. A convergence of brilliance and ability like one rarely sees. The author details their friendships, but also the ways in which they intellectually influenced each other.
I am most familiar with Foot, having read much of work of the years. I have read little of Anscombe outside of the few works in moral philosophy she wrote. I was familiar with Murdoch, though never really read any of her work. And Midgley, I was only vaguely aware of the name. However, after reading this work, I ordered Midgley’s Beast and Man and hope to get to it sooner rather than later. She sounds like she pulls together many of the insights of Foot and the others in some promising ways.
I was also fascinated by the intellectual life of Oxford at this time. First, the depth of the education these women received is amazing – I am so jealous! What it took to get into Oxford and then proceed through successfully sounds incredibly challenging but also rewarding. Second, the seriousness with which intellectual life was treated came through and also makes me jealous!
These thinkers and their ideas should be more front and center in the philosophical world. They still are on the margins, but their insights continue to inspire and influence.
February 18, 2022
Funny until I just went to write this review I thought the author was female. I very much enjoyed learning more about these remarkable women. I was most familiar with and have been a longtime fan of Murdoch but found new fascinating details about her. The four women were very different. Enjoyed learning how they all came independently in her own way to rebel against the received wisdom of the time that moral philosophy was an oxymoron and any philosophical investigation should maintain a strict delineation between what can be factually stated and the moral realm that is based on mere "opinion". WWII dramatically changed how some, including these four, looked at what it was possible to say unequivocally about morality, philosophy and the way a human must behave without resorting to the cold rationalism previously used to imply that all morality was subject to personal opinion and behaving morally simply meant that one was consistent in being true to her own belief system, whatever that might entail. That became for them in different ways unacceptable and to be argued against in ways their unique gifts were used to address.
December 26, 2021
An engrossing account of the relationships between four women, trained as philosophers at Oxford during WWII, who not only paved the way for women in philosophy generally but more specifically developed arguments to reject the philosophical consensus of mid-twentieth century England.
July 8, 2024
For someone who knows next to nothing about philosophy or ethics, this book was super approachable and informative!!
I picked up the book because the title caught my eye (who doesn’t love scheming women??) and do not regret it one bit
This has definitely made me want to read more philosophy
I picked up the book because the title caught my eye (who doesn’t love scheming women??) and do not regret it one bit
This has definitely made me want to read more philosophy
February 17, 2025
This is a must read book about an important development in modern moral philosophy, as well as about the impact of four incredible women on the culture and climate of the 20th century, not just in the UK but throughout the western world. Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch were pioneers in the revival of virtue ethics, a far better way of thinking and doing ethics compared to anything from Kant (included) until now. The author is a bit light on the philosophy, and some of his comments and perspectives are a bit too heavily influenced by his own Christian faith (not shared by three members of the quartet), but he manages nonetheless to convey enough of the substance of these women’s thought to engage the reader. And we get an informative window not only into their private lives and personal struggles, but also in how difficult it was for a woman to have an academic career (or even just receive a university education) during the early and middle parts of the 20th century. Things have thankfully improved significantly since, though they are not yet where they should be. Still, don’t lose sight of the fact that the most important message of the work of Foot et al. is that Aristotle, the Stoics, and other ancient Greco-Romans got quite a bit right about ethics, and that we would all be well served by following (and, of course, improving on) their advice.
March 7, 2022
Absolutely delightful. Not only does this give an easily-accessible overview of the relevant philosophy, but it's immensely readable as a biography. The insights into each of the four women's lives feel intimate and honest--never contrived--and the book is peppered with anecdotes that make me wish I'd known them.
I'm feeling inspired to go out and read some of the writings of these four myself.
I'm feeling inspired to go out and read some of the writings of these four myself.
January 19, 2022
Benjamin Lipscomb has written the story of how 4 young women scholars became influential in philosophy studies at Oxford and later known throughout the world for their work. Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch were contemporaries and eventually friends studying and later teaching at Oxford. When WWII's draft emptied the university of men, the 4 women became prominent. The men returning at war's end found the women had established themselves as thinkers of note. Over the years they continued to shoulder their way among such highly regarded philosophers as Donald MacKinnon, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and R. M. Hare. Lipscomb's book is a critical biography of the four. Their work receives as much attention as the details and anecdotes filling their lives. Some of it's dense, and much of it was hard for me to follow. But Lipscomb's analysis is for the general reader and always interesting. Of the 4 I'd read only Foot and Murdoch, so Anscombe and Midgley are happy new acquaintances. These are brief, intertwined biographies showing lives refined in the hot forge of Oxford high philosophic thought while they earned their places among the men. I was surprised to learn Murdoch was considered the weakest of them, even having her work rejected at times. But Lipscomb tells us that all 4 doubted the value of their work at times. It seems to be the nature of the discipline.
February 1, 2023
In the years between the two World Wars, women won the opportunity to obtain degrees and enter the professions. The early pioneers, nevertheless, operated under the domineering pressure of a male establishment that did not seriously respect their contributions. Lipscombe argues that the departure of so many men to fight the Second World War created a brief space in which, in particular, four women studying philosophy at Oxford were able to develop quite independent views on the dominant moral philosophy of that time and put together both a devastating critique and the basis for a very different alternative.
The consensus in Oxford was that moral philosophy is entirely meaningless and without rational grounding. This was stated most clearly in “that most surprising thing, a philosophical best seller” written with all the insouciance (and over-simplification) of youth by A.J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic. However, its advocates did come to recognise that it made nonsense of much, very serious and seemingly very rational discussion that nevertheless did take place on moral questions. This defect was addressed after WW2 by Hare, with the proposal that moral statements are actually prescriptions, oughts, and that such prescriptions have logical implications which can, indeed, be the subject of reasoned discussion. In this way Oxford retained into the Fifties its picture of a value free and indifferent universe in which we must each have the courage and integrity (logical consistency) to live by arbitrary principles that we devise or choose out of a preference, an emotion, that cannot be grounded in any necessity.
Iris Murdoch gained some independent perspective by directly encountering Sartre and the French existentialists at the end of the war, and she was struck among other things by the similarity of Sartre’s picture of morality with that of Ayer and the Logical Positivists. Ultimately, we stand before the abyss of a dangerous and uncaring universe; we must exercise our freedom to choose the values we will live by, and the courage to keep to them in an authentic manner. She pointed out the surprising similarity of this picture to the great heroes of Romanticism: Werther, Manfred, and others. She posed a range of very severe challenges to this picture of morality. Firstly, it is not the objective, totally value free philosophical perspective it purports to be. Instead, it is exactly the type of manly, heroic stand that would appeal to the products of war or, indeed, the type of privately funded, boarding school education so many of its advocates shared. She found this an arrogant, “snobbish” and excessively masculine posture. It was also deeply unsatisfying, failing to clearly distinguish between good and evil as encountered, very pointedly, in the Nazi concentration camps.
Elizabeth Anscombe took these ideas further and directly challenged Hare at Oxford in a contest that she certainly did win. She observed that nothing in Oxford’s moral philosophy ruled out or rule in the intentional murder of civilians: indeed, none of the moral theories she reviewed ruled out anything at all. She demonstrated that the claim by positivists that the language of morals cannot be properly rational is simply false. She observed the inconsistency of philosophers like Hare using the language of principles, duty or obligations. In the absence of any authority of lawgiver – in which she believed but they mostly did not – they were claiming to be deeply serious when in reality they had no grounding whatever, no criteria by which to select or defend their principles. Finally she advocated that moral philosophy – whether for believers or atheists – required a different language, one with secure criteria to permit rational choices and debates, and she advocated devising one, not simplistically on the basis of Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues and vices, but his biologist’s concern for the traits we need to live flourishing human lives.
Anscombe’s independence was partly achieved through her Catholicism (specifically her passion for Aquinas) and her decision to study under Wittgenstein at Cambridge. She influenced Phillipa Foot to follow both strands of thinking in developing her own response to Ayer and Hare (as well as Nietzsche). Two 1957 papers (“Moral Arguments” and “Moral Beliefs”) turned her into Hare’s foremost opponent. She demonstrated that there are plenty of factual criteria that underpin evaluative statements, and that value statements can be reduced to absurdity if their factual basis is disregarded. She used the refrain “just try” to nail down her argument: “Just try to talk about ethics while leaving behind considerations of what makes human lives go well or badly.”
Anscombe and Foot remained inside the world of academic philosophy. Murdoch jumped ship to write novels. Mary Midgely (nee Scrutton) had a break of several decades to raise children before developing, at Newcastle University, the type of moral philosophy her three associates had advocated but never constructed. It was essential to Midgely that she made a deep study of field research by Lorenz, Tinbergen and others into animal behaviour – ethology – before drawing out their implication that if, as Darwin demonstrated, humans and animals are directly related, then our desires and emotions should not be incomprehensibly different from those of other animals. Midgely strong objected to simplistic, determinist accounts of human nature, including those of A.O. Wilson or – in The Selfish Gene - Richard Dawkins, which she traced back to the Social Darwinism of the past, and described as “biological Thatcherism.” She took from Lorenz a much richer and more complex understanding of instinct, in which for many animals the strong urge to act in given ways is mediated and often transformed by experience and social learning. While humans often show powerful attractions to strange and at times seemingly unnatural objectives, they are always concerned under the surface with more basic, instinctive needs. The upshot, though far more developed than the earlier work of Murdoch, Anscombe or Foot, was nevertheless the type of “biologically informed” ethics and morality that was first proposed by Aristotle, in which there is not just room, but a necessity to maintain the tightest connection of facts with values.
Lipscombe points to these women having a legacy in “value ethics”, which is not necessarily what they wanted, and in ethical naturalism, which has a place in current debate. However, he regards Constructivism as one of the foremost schools of contemporary ethics, an adaptation of Kant’s moral thought first articulated by John Rawls and argued in the work of his student, Christine Korsgaard; this is a survival of the deterministic, billiard-ball universe in which value does not exist unless we put it there, a slightly updated version of the theories of Ayer and Hare and the Romantic – if misplaced - heroism of Sartre.
It’s impressive that women have made such an important contribution to a philosophy dominated by men but it seems we have not yet arrived at the point where masculine philosophy can admit it is wrong, if this is pointed out by women.
Midgely judged that the dearth of men at Oxford during the war had atmospheric effects. Drawing on her immersion in animal-behaviour studies, Midgely remarked, “any situation where a lot of men are competing to form a dominance hierarchy, will produce cock-fights. But …these fights … interfere with philosophical work.” If there are people who like this sort of thing better than conversations where people try to understand and improve one another’s thoughts, Midgely suggested they set up “Departments of Cognitive Poker.” [p271]
The consensus in Oxford was that moral philosophy is entirely meaningless and without rational grounding. This was stated most clearly in “that most surprising thing, a philosophical best seller” written with all the insouciance (and over-simplification) of youth by A.J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic. However, its advocates did come to recognise that it made nonsense of much, very serious and seemingly very rational discussion that nevertheless did take place on moral questions. This defect was addressed after WW2 by Hare, with the proposal that moral statements are actually prescriptions, oughts, and that such prescriptions have logical implications which can, indeed, be the subject of reasoned discussion. In this way Oxford retained into the Fifties its picture of a value free and indifferent universe in which we must each have the courage and integrity (logical consistency) to live by arbitrary principles that we devise or choose out of a preference, an emotion, that cannot be grounded in any necessity.
Iris Murdoch gained some independent perspective by directly encountering Sartre and the French existentialists at the end of the war, and she was struck among other things by the similarity of Sartre’s picture of morality with that of Ayer and the Logical Positivists. Ultimately, we stand before the abyss of a dangerous and uncaring universe; we must exercise our freedom to choose the values we will live by, and the courage to keep to them in an authentic manner. She pointed out the surprising similarity of this picture to the great heroes of Romanticism: Werther, Manfred, and others. She posed a range of very severe challenges to this picture of morality. Firstly, it is not the objective, totally value free philosophical perspective it purports to be. Instead, it is exactly the type of manly, heroic stand that would appeal to the products of war or, indeed, the type of privately funded, boarding school education so many of its advocates shared. She found this an arrogant, “snobbish” and excessively masculine posture. It was also deeply unsatisfying, failing to clearly distinguish between good and evil as encountered, very pointedly, in the Nazi concentration camps.
Elizabeth Anscombe took these ideas further and directly challenged Hare at Oxford in a contest that she certainly did win. She observed that nothing in Oxford’s moral philosophy ruled out or rule in the intentional murder of civilians: indeed, none of the moral theories she reviewed ruled out anything at all. She demonstrated that the claim by positivists that the language of morals cannot be properly rational is simply false. She observed the inconsistency of philosophers like Hare using the language of principles, duty or obligations. In the absence of any authority of lawgiver – in which she believed but they mostly did not – they were claiming to be deeply serious when in reality they had no grounding whatever, no criteria by which to select or defend their principles. Finally she advocated that moral philosophy – whether for believers or atheists – required a different language, one with secure criteria to permit rational choices and debates, and she advocated devising one, not simplistically on the basis of Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues and vices, but his biologist’s concern for the traits we need to live flourishing human lives.
Anscombe’s independence was partly achieved through her Catholicism (specifically her passion for Aquinas) and her decision to study under Wittgenstein at Cambridge. She influenced Phillipa Foot to follow both strands of thinking in developing her own response to Ayer and Hare (as well as Nietzsche). Two 1957 papers (“Moral Arguments” and “Moral Beliefs”) turned her into Hare’s foremost opponent. She demonstrated that there are plenty of factual criteria that underpin evaluative statements, and that value statements can be reduced to absurdity if their factual basis is disregarded. She used the refrain “just try” to nail down her argument: “Just try to talk about ethics while leaving behind considerations of what makes human lives go well or badly.”
Anscombe and Foot remained inside the world of academic philosophy. Murdoch jumped ship to write novels. Mary Midgely (nee Scrutton) had a break of several decades to raise children before developing, at Newcastle University, the type of moral philosophy her three associates had advocated but never constructed. It was essential to Midgely that she made a deep study of field research by Lorenz, Tinbergen and others into animal behaviour – ethology – before drawing out their implication that if, as Darwin demonstrated, humans and animals are directly related, then our desires and emotions should not be incomprehensibly different from those of other animals. Midgely strong objected to simplistic, determinist accounts of human nature, including those of A.O. Wilson or – in The Selfish Gene - Richard Dawkins, which she traced back to the Social Darwinism of the past, and described as “biological Thatcherism.” She took from Lorenz a much richer and more complex understanding of instinct, in which for many animals the strong urge to act in given ways is mediated and often transformed by experience and social learning. While humans often show powerful attractions to strange and at times seemingly unnatural objectives, they are always concerned under the surface with more basic, instinctive needs. The upshot, though far more developed than the earlier work of Murdoch, Anscombe or Foot, was nevertheless the type of “biologically informed” ethics and morality that was first proposed by Aristotle, in which there is not just room, but a necessity to maintain the tightest connection of facts with values.
Lipscombe points to these women having a legacy in “value ethics”, which is not necessarily what they wanted, and in ethical naturalism, which has a place in current debate. However, he regards Constructivism as one of the foremost schools of contemporary ethics, an adaptation of Kant’s moral thought first articulated by John Rawls and argued in the work of his student, Christine Korsgaard; this is a survival of the deterministic, billiard-ball universe in which value does not exist unless we put it there, a slightly updated version of the theories of Ayer and Hare and the Romantic – if misplaced - heroism of Sartre.
It’s impressive that women have made such an important contribution to a philosophy dominated by men but it seems we have not yet arrived at the point where masculine philosophy can admit it is wrong, if this is pointed out by women.
Midgely judged that the dearth of men at Oxford during the war had atmospheric effects. Drawing on her immersion in animal-behaviour studies, Midgely remarked, “any situation where a lot of men are competing to form a dominance hierarchy, will produce cock-fights. But …these fights … interfere with philosophical work.” If there are people who like this sort of thing better than conversations where people try to understand and improve one another’s thoughts, Midgely suggested they set up “Departments of Cognitive Poker.” [p271]
April 11, 2023
This book is a fascinating exploration of the lives and works of four influential women philosophers. The book provides a detailed and engaging account of the lives and works of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. It highlights their unique perspectives on morality, religion, and the human condition, which have shaped contemporary ethical thinking in profound ways.
What sets this book apart is its celebration of women who have been overlooked or undervalued in the male-dominated field of philosophy. The author, expertly weaves together their individual stories, revealing their distinct personalities, backgrounds, and influences, and how they each challenged and changed the philosophical landscape in their own ways. The book provides a valuable contribution to the study of philosophy and feminism, and sheds light on the often-overlooked contributions of women in the field. However, it is somewhat repetitive. The author tends to reiterate the same points multiple times throughout the book. Some are overly long and could benefit from more concise editing.
The book is heavily focused on the lives and personalities of the four philosophers, rather than their actual philosophical ideas. While the personal details are interesting, I would have preferred a deeper exploration of their philosophical contributions and ideas.
Overall, this is an informative book that sheds light on the contributions of four intriguing influential women philosophers. I would have preferred a deeper exploration of the philosophical ideas presented by these thinkers.
Quote:
"Philosophy is not done in a vacuum, nor are its practitioners immune to the social and cultural forces that shape their lives. The lives of Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch were as fascinating and complex as their philosophical contributions. Understanding their lives and the challenges they faced as women in a male-dominated field can deepen our appreciation of their work and inspire us to continue their legacy."
What sets this book apart is its celebration of women who have been overlooked or undervalued in the male-dominated field of philosophy. The author, expertly weaves together their individual stories, revealing their distinct personalities, backgrounds, and influences, and how they each challenged and changed the philosophical landscape in their own ways. The book provides a valuable contribution to the study of philosophy and feminism, and sheds light on the often-overlooked contributions of women in the field. However, it is somewhat repetitive. The author tends to reiterate the same points multiple times throughout the book. Some are overly long and could benefit from more concise editing.
The book is heavily focused on the lives and personalities of the four philosophers, rather than their actual philosophical ideas. While the personal details are interesting, I would have preferred a deeper exploration of their philosophical contributions and ideas.
Overall, this is an informative book that sheds light on the contributions of four intriguing influential women philosophers. I would have preferred a deeper exploration of the philosophical ideas presented by these thinkers.
Quote:
"Philosophy is not done in a vacuum, nor are its practitioners immune to the social and cultural forces that shape their lives. The lives of Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch were as fascinating and complex as their philosophical contributions. Understanding their lives and the challenges they faced as women in a male-dominated field can deepen our appreciation of their work and inspire us to continue their legacy."
March 26, 2025
To read this book, the reader must be acquainted with at the very least a base level understanding of philosophy and popular philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato, Nietzsche,Kant, ect. I feel I would have benefitted from a deeper understanding of these philosophers as the four women’s perspectives are shaped by many of them.
This book is academic to be sure, not exactly a beach read. I had to look up numerous words I had never encountered before and write in the margins the theses as they developed. I have to say, I did get lost at times in the airy, vague language of the philosophy lectures the women attended at Oxford but I enjoyed the stories of the four women and how their perspectives changed as a result of these lectures and discussions.
The four women, reeling after seeing the horrific images out of WW2 German Concentration Camps, grappled with a way to explain how the actions of these soldiers and political leaders were not just wrong in a legal sense, but objectively and morally wrong.
This is the primary thesis of this book: that philosophy should, and must be able to make judgements about what is right and wrong- in other words, ethics. Be prepared to work your brain around this: can value judgements (ie. murder is wrong) be considered factual? If so, how and why so? The ideal reader likely is interested In these types of discussions.
This book is academic to be sure, not exactly a beach read. I had to look up numerous words I had never encountered before and write in the margins the theses as they developed. I have to say, I did get lost at times in the airy, vague language of the philosophy lectures the women attended at Oxford but I enjoyed the stories of the four women and how their perspectives changed as a result of these lectures and discussions.
The four women, reeling after seeing the horrific images out of WW2 German Concentration Camps, grappled with a way to explain how the actions of these soldiers and political leaders were not just wrong in a legal sense, but objectively and morally wrong.
This is the primary thesis of this book: that philosophy should, and must be able to make judgements about what is right and wrong- in other words, ethics. Be prepared to work your brain around this: can value judgements (ie. murder is wrong) be considered factual? If so, how and why so? The ideal reader likely is interested In these types of discussions.
November 17, 2024
surprisingly 3.5/5 rounded
as someone who hasn’t an ounce of philosophy knowledge beyond the trolley problem, i’m sure much of the philosophy went over my head, but what i did manage to understand i very much enjoyed.
it is a testament to Lipscomb’s skill as a writer and storyteller that i now feel a new found appreciation for philosophy and see how widespread its influence and how integral to our society it is… even if its practical application seems initially obscured. (so sorry to sarah gregory for ever doubting u.)
it took me an extremely long time to read this and 100% of my focus, but i’m glad i persisted. i loved that the book presented a full bodied picture of their lives and once i finally parsed out who was who, i was thoroughly hooked on finding out their contributions to philosophy and how their lives ultimately unfolded. super genius women thriving in the mid 1900s is so impressive.
-1 bc i think Lipscomb did not emphasize strongly enough exactly how their connection to eachother as a foursome warranted this book… it seems they got lunch that one time and yapped about “rudeness” but beyond that only existed together as individual friends and acquaintances.
as someone who hasn’t an ounce of philosophy knowledge beyond the trolley problem, i’m sure much of the philosophy went over my head, but what i did manage to understand i very much enjoyed.
it is a testament to Lipscomb’s skill as a writer and storyteller that i now feel a new found appreciation for philosophy and see how widespread its influence and how integral to our society it is… even if its practical application seems initially obscured. (so sorry to sarah gregory for ever doubting u.)
it took me an extremely long time to read this and 100% of my focus, but i’m glad i persisted. i loved that the book presented a full bodied picture of their lives and once i finally parsed out who was who, i was thoroughly hooked on finding out their contributions to philosophy and how their lives ultimately unfolded. super genius women thriving in the mid 1900s is so impressive.
-1 bc i think Lipscomb did not emphasize strongly enough exactly how their connection to eachother as a foursome warranted this book… it seems they got lunch that one time and yapped about “rudeness” but beyond that only existed together as individual friends and acquaintances.
September 18, 2023
Loved this. I am obsessed with friendships between intellectuals who shaped the culture and thought of their day, and this engaging book satisfyingly shows the deep humanity and unique brilliance of four connected women who helped shaped post-WWII thought (philosophical and otherwise) in the UK and the US.
Read
August 16, 2022unfortunately titled
December 23, 2022
A fascinating story.
June 17, 2024
Wonderful book
February 5, 2025
pewnie gdyby nie presja czasu przez egzamin, na który musiałam to przeczytać, to podobałaby mi się bardziej
February 5, 2025
truly heartbreaking to know it takes a war for women to be heard in the world we live in
December 29, 2021
Hovering on this - maybe three and a half?
Displaying 1 - 30 of 77 reviews