What do you think?
Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress
Other books have documented pork barrel projects in different policy areas, but none has examined the process of using pork to buy votes for broad public policy. This book reveals how Congressional leaders and the President give pork barrel projects to Congressional members' districts to buy their votes for broad-based national legislation. It does so through interviews with key actors--who provide the basis for a rich narrative of the process of passing the bills as well as statistical analysis.
280 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2004
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
April 27, 2026
Through examining specific cases within both the House of Representatives and the Senate, Evans describes how specific provisions added to bills to win over votes affects the United State’s legislative process as a whole. Bills and their writers have several goals, one of them of course being purely making good policy. However, from a Mayhewian perspective, congress’ members' proximate goal is always re-election, leading to the constant pulling for distributive benefits in order to win over a member’s district and claim credit. It may seem that pork barrel benefits may overshadow the true intention of bills, or come at the cost of general goods for the whole country, but Evans states that “pork may be a lubricant for the legislative machine, but it is not the main product.” (Evans, p. 21)
Pork is relevant to congressional elections as the benefits a member can bring back home. If you are a party leader who has the means to dole out the pork, you can ensure that a representative in a contentious seat has enough benefits going home to protect his election chances, and in turn you build a coalition of members indebted to each other. Evans outlines the game theory behind who can trade pork for votes and how they do it efficiently, as well as giving perspective on how it may not be a huge flaw in the system like its fat, sloppy nickname invokes in one's mind when they hear the term ‘pork.’
At first thought, one would assume pork is something you use to buy a vote from someone truly on the fence about the vote, but really, the true benefits of both the givers and receivers of pork is being a member of a voting coalition. You will not be left out on the distributive benefits if you were going to vote in favor of a bill anyway, all you have to do is let it known what you want. The fact of the matter is that pork gets things done.
Previous literature on the subject speaks on bills that are for pork’s sake alone. Greasing the Wheels instead focuses on looking into how distributive benefits are tacked onto general interest legislation to buy votes. Evans argues her point throughout the book by looking at these sweeping general interest bills and describing who passes out the benefits to get their bills passed. Ultimately her thesis is strongly backed up with the data she provides.
Greasing the Wheels gives context to what is Pork and distributive benefits in its first two chapters before diving into specific case studies. This is a major strength of the book, as Evans tells and then shows, arming readers with crucial context instead of just throwing you into the workings of the Public Works and Transit committee’s “Big Four,” which would sound more like a crime syndicate than a legislative body if the author didn’t give the perspective of herself, Arthur, and Mayhew from the start. Her use of NAFTA and the Highway Bill of 1987 and 1991 as the bills she researches also aides understanding, as you see how a sweeping general interest legislation can be the perfect vessel for sometimes hundreds of localized demo projects. In the case of NAFTA, our understanding of the electoral system grows as you see the particularized benefits given to districts most affected by Mexican trade, and how specific districts and votes are targeted by bill writers. Similarly with the Interstate bills, you can see how the need to buy votes does sometimes compromise the original intent of the policy, with Chairman Howard sacrificing his cherished 55 MPH speed limit to capture votes of rural and western House members.
The fact that policy sometimes gets cut for the sake of policy reads like truly all things can be sacrificed to the one sole and true end; re-election. If even legislators of James Howard’s stature and position must cut things he is truly passionate about, then there are no other goals it seems besides the one we all heard from Mayhew. However, it is true that other real policy came from the Highway Bill’s, and that wouldn’t have happened without concessions. In some ways, distributive benefits are a physical monument to compromise and its importance to getting literally anything done in the House.
Evans writes about distributive benefits used in many contexts, given to people on your side, fence sitters, and members of the opposing party. One interesting way that pork can affect elections is by giving it out to those whose seats have been deemed unsafe. If you were a representative of a district, and your main goal is re-election, then you will certainly vote for a bill that gives you a demonstration project. For the price of one vote, you can have a number of benefits for your district that you can tell your constituents you fought for.
This free flowing of projects means that pork impacts elections greatly by changing exactly what a representative has to do while maintaining their seat and gaining status in D.C. Go along with these bills, receive these projects in return, all while information sharing with your fellow members, allowing you all to credit claim for things you may not have had to do as much work as your voters may believe. This allows you to focus your time on concentrated benefits for your district, while still acknowledging national issues without putting in extra effort on collective benefit bills
In the broader scope of things, the book and especially chapters three, four, and five illustrate the power of negotiation and compromise. It gives us a deeper understanding of what it takes to work within this system and how everyone from freshman to long standing committee heads are engaged in a tug of war, pulling for their own collective and distributive goals. When it is played the right way, more often than not, the game doesn’t end with either side down in the mud, but with both coming away with something that furthers their career goals.
Evans makes clear that she chooses to refer to pork barrel benefits as buying votes, not to say that members are being bribed, but to say “it is a coalition building technique that transcends the ability to reach across party lines in a search of allies.” She "conceives of vote buying as a more precisely targeted and therefore a more effective strategy that can be used to pass many types of legislation”(p.21).
Much is said about how congress often finds itself in a gridlock in modern times. As the nation and politicians become more and more partisan over time, it would be interesting to see if using distributive benefits could become a way for a minority party leader to reach across the aisle and pick up votes. The same way Evans sees pork as a tool to get things done, maybe the tool could be repurposed into a way to depolarize congress. It has happened in the past, but it was a less polarized and less nationalized time.
Could a repeat of the NAFTA situation happen again in the future? It seems now that if a congress member jumped over to the other party to vote for a bill written by the opposition, perhaps the backlash both at home and across the nation would be too great to be worth whatever project they would receive in return. As it stands now, it is hard to imagine a bill the size of NAFTA being written by a president of one party, then being picked up by the next president of the opposite party. If Trump were to revive a piece of Biden legislation, you would think Democrats would oppose it instantaneously. Maybe there could be a price paid to get just enough of them to pass the bill, but it is tough to imagine.
One thing Evans fails to mention is exactly what the dollar cost amounts to. Once everyone has had their fill, are the people better off? The wheels have been greased, are the collective goods of a given bill worth the distributive ones? Evans' main argument is that pork is a necessity, and while she proves that it is how huge pieces of legislation are often passed, it is unclear if these bills are a net positive in the end. Haphazardly giving a road project in a district without properly studying its costs and effects on the area and just tacking it onto a bill for a vote seems like it could get dangerous, and as more and more voters realize their vote can get them something, it becomes less likely that any critical thinking is done when deciding that their distributive benefits make sense at all.
Besides the money cost, it is worth noting that pork makes members vote for things that they themselves do not believe in. NAFTA appeared dead, with several groups giving compelling arguments to why that was a good thing. Many of them, those most affected by NAFTA especially, flipped their votes when given special provisions, distributive goods put in to pass the collective good. Is a system where one district in Florida was promised that Mexican orange sales would be limited to buy his vote, and in return a worker in Michigan would lose his factory job because of this a fair or representative system at all? The fact that these seats are tied to geography and specific locations means that some votes are much easier to target and buy to win a majority. Farmers of a specific crop in one place as opposed to factory and union workers spread across the United States makes it so that the needs of the few end up being prioritized over the needs of more.
It is hard to imagine a legislative system without distributive benefits, for better or for worse. Evans makes a compelling case for seeing pork as a neutral or even good thing, despite its reputation amongst its political enemies and the media. It is easy to think that pork is just money being shadily passed around between politicians. In reality, it is a useful and powerful tool that can benefit congress members from freshman house members to senior senators. All it takes is a willingness to compromise and play the game.
Pork is relevant to congressional elections as the benefits a member can bring back home. If you are a party leader who has the means to dole out the pork, you can ensure that a representative in a contentious seat has enough benefits going home to protect his election chances, and in turn you build a coalition of members indebted to each other. Evans outlines the game theory behind who can trade pork for votes and how they do it efficiently, as well as giving perspective on how it may not be a huge flaw in the system like its fat, sloppy nickname invokes in one's mind when they hear the term ‘pork.’
At first thought, one would assume pork is something you use to buy a vote from someone truly on the fence about the vote, but really, the true benefits of both the givers and receivers of pork is being a member of a voting coalition. You will not be left out on the distributive benefits if you were going to vote in favor of a bill anyway, all you have to do is let it known what you want. The fact of the matter is that pork gets things done.
Previous literature on the subject speaks on bills that are for pork’s sake alone. Greasing the Wheels instead focuses on looking into how distributive benefits are tacked onto general interest legislation to buy votes. Evans argues her point throughout the book by looking at these sweeping general interest bills and describing who passes out the benefits to get their bills passed. Ultimately her thesis is strongly backed up with the data she provides.
Greasing the Wheels gives context to what is Pork and distributive benefits in its first two chapters before diving into specific case studies. This is a major strength of the book, as Evans tells and then shows, arming readers with crucial context instead of just throwing you into the workings of the Public Works and Transit committee’s “Big Four,” which would sound more like a crime syndicate than a legislative body if the author didn’t give the perspective of herself, Arthur, and Mayhew from the start. Her use of NAFTA and the Highway Bill of 1987 and 1991 as the bills she researches also aides understanding, as you see how a sweeping general interest legislation can be the perfect vessel for sometimes hundreds of localized demo projects. In the case of NAFTA, our understanding of the electoral system grows as you see the particularized benefits given to districts most affected by Mexican trade, and how specific districts and votes are targeted by bill writers. Similarly with the Interstate bills, you can see how the need to buy votes does sometimes compromise the original intent of the policy, with Chairman Howard sacrificing his cherished 55 MPH speed limit to capture votes of rural and western House members.
The fact that policy sometimes gets cut for the sake of policy reads like truly all things can be sacrificed to the one sole and true end; re-election. If even legislators of James Howard’s stature and position must cut things he is truly passionate about, then there are no other goals it seems besides the one we all heard from Mayhew. However, it is true that other real policy came from the Highway Bill’s, and that wouldn’t have happened without concessions. In some ways, distributive benefits are a physical monument to compromise and its importance to getting literally anything done in the House.
Evans writes about distributive benefits used in many contexts, given to people on your side, fence sitters, and members of the opposing party. One interesting way that pork can affect elections is by giving it out to those whose seats have been deemed unsafe. If you were a representative of a district, and your main goal is re-election, then you will certainly vote for a bill that gives you a demonstration project. For the price of one vote, you can have a number of benefits for your district that you can tell your constituents you fought for.
This free flowing of projects means that pork impacts elections greatly by changing exactly what a representative has to do while maintaining their seat and gaining status in D.C. Go along with these bills, receive these projects in return, all while information sharing with your fellow members, allowing you all to credit claim for things you may not have had to do as much work as your voters may believe. This allows you to focus your time on concentrated benefits for your district, while still acknowledging national issues without putting in extra effort on collective benefit bills
In the broader scope of things, the book and especially chapters three, four, and five illustrate the power of negotiation and compromise. It gives us a deeper understanding of what it takes to work within this system and how everyone from freshman to long standing committee heads are engaged in a tug of war, pulling for their own collective and distributive goals. When it is played the right way, more often than not, the game doesn’t end with either side down in the mud, but with both coming away with something that furthers their career goals.
Evans makes clear that she chooses to refer to pork barrel benefits as buying votes, not to say that members are being bribed, but to say “it is a coalition building technique that transcends the ability to reach across party lines in a search of allies.” She "conceives of vote buying as a more precisely targeted and therefore a more effective strategy that can be used to pass many types of legislation”(p.21).
Much is said about how congress often finds itself in a gridlock in modern times. As the nation and politicians become more and more partisan over time, it would be interesting to see if using distributive benefits could become a way for a minority party leader to reach across the aisle and pick up votes. The same way Evans sees pork as a tool to get things done, maybe the tool could be repurposed into a way to depolarize congress. It has happened in the past, but it was a less polarized and less nationalized time.
Could a repeat of the NAFTA situation happen again in the future? It seems now that if a congress member jumped over to the other party to vote for a bill written by the opposition, perhaps the backlash both at home and across the nation would be too great to be worth whatever project they would receive in return. As it stands now, it is hard to imagine a bill the size of NAFTA being written by a president of one party, then being picked up by the next president of the opposite party. If Trump were to revive a piece of Biden legislation, you would think Democrats would oppose it instantaneously. Maybe there could be a price paid to get just enough of them to pass the bill, but it is tough to imagine.
One thing Evans fails to mention is exactly what the dollar cost amounts to. Once everyone has had their fill, are the people better off? The wheels have been greased, are the collective goods of a given bill worth the distributive ones? Evans' main argument is that pork is a necessity, and while she proves that it is how huge pieces of legislation are often passed, it is unclear if these bills are a net positive in the end. Haphazardly giving a road project in a district without properly studying its costs and effects on the area and just tacking it onto a bill for a vote seems like it could get dangerous, and as more and more voters realize their vote can get them something, it becomes less likely that any critical thinking is done when deciding that their distributive benefits make sense at all.
Besides the money cost, it is worth noting that pork makes members vote for things that they themselves do not believe in. NAFTA appeared dead, with several groups giving compelling arguments to why that was a good thing. Many of them, those most affected by NAFTA especially, flipped their votes when given special provisions, distributive goods put in to pass the collective good. Is a system where one district in Florida was promised that Mexican orange sales would be limited to buy his vote, and in return a worker in Michigan would lose his factory job because of this a fair or representative system at all? The fact that these seats are tied to geography and specific locations means that some votes are much easier to target and buy to win a majority. Farmers of a specific crop in one place as opposed to factory and union workers spread across the United States makes it so that the needs of the few end up being prioritized over the needs of more.
It is hard to imagine a legislative system without distributive benefits, for better or for worse. Evans makes a compelling case for seeing pork as a neutral or even good thing, despite its reputation amongst its political enemies and the media. It is easy to think that pork is just money being shadily passed around between politicians. In reality, it is a useful and powerful tool that can benefit congress members from freshman house members to senior senators. All it takes is a willingness to compromise and play the game.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews