In Ordering Violence, Paul Staniland advances a broad approach to armed politics—bringing together governments, insurgents, militias, and armed political parties in a shared framework—to argue that governments' perception of the ideological threats posed by armed groups drive their responses and interactions.
Staniland combines a unique new dataset of state-group armed orders in India, Pakistan, Burma/Myanmar, and Sri Lanka with detailed case studies from the region to explore when and how this model of threat perception provides insight into patterns of repression, collusion, and mutual neglect across nearly seven decades. Instead of straightforwardly responding to the material or organizational power of armed groups, Staniland finds, regimes assess how a group's politics align with their own ideological projects.
Explaining, for example, why governments often use extreme repression against weak groups even while working with or tolerating more powerful armed actors, Ordering Violence provides a comprehensive overview of South Asia's complex armed politics, embedded within an analytical framework that can also speak broadly beyond the subcontinent.
An interesting theoretical account of the ways in which armed groups participate in national politics. The case studies from Southeast Asia are really detailed - and can be a bit overwhelming in that detail for a non-area specialist. However, the application of different kinds of methods to explore an issue that is understudied in the civil war literature is really good. The last chapter includes some good ideas for future directions for research.
The bottom line is that armed groups are much more common in politics than we often account for - and the range of ways in which they matter in politics is broad. Not all armed groups are in conflict with the government. Some are allied, some have truces, etc. It's good for thinking about the way the world really works.