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Wellington as Military Commander
Known affectionately as "Old Nosey," Wellington earned the highest reputation as a British military commander. He achieved victories despite impossible obstacles and had the undying loyalty of his men. In Wellington as Military Commander Michael Glover traces Wellington's triumphant career, from his early days in India through the Peninsular campaigns and his glorious defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. Glover's vivid narrative, with its unrivaled descriptions of the strategies, weapons, and formations of George III's army, draws upon personal accounts of both the men who served under Wellington and the great commander himself.
288 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1968
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About the author
Michael Glover
93 books7 followersMichael Glover served in the British army during the Second World War, after which he joined the British Council and became a professional author. He wrote many articles and books on Napoleonic and Victorian warfare.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 16, 2022
Good overview but tinder dry. Good on tactics, not so much on strategy. Maps are poor. The arguments are well-marshalled but might benefit from being in a more chronological narrative followed by an overview at the end, rather than splitting the actions into offensive, defensive & siege. This split probably affects the strategic assessment.
August 27, 2025
I'm a fan of this Military Commander series, one of the first books I ever read was Napoleon as Military Commander by James Marshall-Cornwall, though God knows I didn't understand it and have been meaning to re-read it, and also a fan of this author who has written extensively on the Peninsular War.
This work starts off conventionally, briefly going into the background of Wellington's military career and early experiences. His time in India and his participation in the Duke of York's disastrous campaign in the Netherlands, for example.
Glover repeats the traditional narrative that Wellington learned his logistical skills in India, though Huw Davies casts doubt on this in his more recent work, which focuses much more on India than does Glover here.
We learn that Wellington, like Napoleon, needed to be constantly present everywhere because operations not under his own direction tended to go awry. Wellington says he learned this from the old army legend David Dundas, who was the only general he could find during the 1794 campaign. He resolved that in any affair he commanded, he would always be present and accessible.
The core of the book is, unsurprisingly, concerned with the Peninsular War which is where Wellington spent the majority of his military career. We are given an overview of the whole war from the landing at the Mondego to Toulouse.
This part is a real delight because we get to see much of the operations from Wellington's own perspective, for example his frustration on not being able to march on Seville after the fall of Badajoz, and in particular I was impressed by the description of his strategy for Salamanca. That is, why he decided to attack Marmont instead of Soult, which reasoning is very convincing.
After the overview of the Peninsular War we are treated to two special chapters that examine Wellington as an offensive and a defensive commander.
I appreciated the chapter on the offensive, which used the case studies of Salamanca, Toulouse, and the Douro to demonstrate Wellington's style in this form of warfare.
Since I've been a lifelong devotee of Napoleon I had long assimilated the French view that Wellington was primarily a defensive and cautious general, so this was a particularly interesting chapter for me and showed that Salamanca, above all, was a true masterpiece and that Wellington was very capable on the offensive.
The chapter on the defensive uses Fuentes de Onoro and the Pyrenees. The latter battle Glover regards as Wellington's finest performance on the defensive. Wellington misread Soult's objective, thinking it to be San Sebastian when it was Pamplona, but nonetheless Wellington's dispositions accounted for this contingency and he was able to thwart the French marshal's strategy with the sound victory at Sorauren.
Perhaps the most exciting part of the book is, inevitably, the section on Waterloo. This almost mythical contest between Wellington and Napoleon has had so much written about it and has so many controversies and mysteries that it's unlikely anybody will be satisfied with any single account, but Glover does the job well.
Interestingly, he also notes that Soult advised Napoleon not to attack, and that Wellington believed Napoleon's strategy to be more clever than it was. He expected to be attacked in flank instead of frontally, and as John Strawson noted, he was disappointed that Napoleon was 'a mere pounder after all.'
Napoleon's options before Waterloo are well-explained, though perhaps not enough credit is given to the Prussians. Glover notes that Wellington anticipated the Prussians arriving at 1 PM, but for various reasons they did not arrive until 7 PM.
Still, due to Napoleon's mistakes and Wellington's skill, the Anglo-Dutch Army held until that time, and Glover quotes Wellington to the justifiable effect that had he not been there the British probably would have broken.
The final chapters examine the sieges of the Peninsular War, which have long been noted as a particular weak spot for the British. Then they examine the use of cavalry and artillery, which were enlightening insofar as Wellington did not rely on massed artillery as much as Napoleon did, and Spain was mostly bad cavalry country.
These chapters make it clear that Wellington was poorly served by subordinates, especially in cavalry, but that he had a knack in making the inefficient cumbrous machinery of the British Army work smoothly. It also contains a rare defense of Beresford at Albuera, though in my opinion an unconvincing one.
He says for example that the Spanish ought to have followed his orders, but this was the precisely the criticism Edwards made in his monograph on Albuera when he pointed out that he should have personally overseen that the Spanish did what he wanted, as Wellington would have done.
Surely Albuera was poorly fought and the soldiers were right when they saw Wellington and exclaimed that had he been with them they would have suffered far less.
The book ends on that note, that Wellington was an efficient commander who looked after his logistics, the well-being of his men, and took careful considered decisions that were calculated to result in the least amount of life.
For this reason he was often forced to be cautious, and to adopt strong defensive positions. This became something of his trademark and caused French historians to denigrate his offensive capabilities, as alluded to above, but Wellington was adept at seizing rare opportunities for inflicting powerful offensive blows.
Nonetheless, it is fitting that Waterloo was a masterpiece of the tactical defensive because Wellington has become associated with this, as Napoleon has become associated with the offensive.
Every entry in this series so far has been a joy to read and I've long admired Glover's style. It is hard to find fault with this book except perhaps in that it does not say much about the Spanish, and unlike many works on Wellington it is not hagiography. Glover notes that Wellington came close to defeat at Fuentes de Onoro, at Sorauren, and above all at Toulouse, so he was lucky as well as skilled.
It is well-worth examining Napoleon's legendary nemesis in this book.
This work starts off conventionally, briefly going into the background of Wellington's military career and early experiences. His time in India and his participation in the Duke of York's disastrous campaign in the Netherlands, for example.
Glover repeats the traditional narrative that Wellington learned his logistical skills in India, though Huw Davies casts doubt on this in his more recent work, which focuses much more on India than does Glover here.
We learn that Wellington, like Napoleon, needed to be constantly present everywhere because operations not under his own direction tended to go awry. Wellington says he learned this from the old army legend David Dundas, who was the only general he could find during the 1794 campaign. He resolved that in any affair he commanded, he would always be present and accessible.
The core of the book is, unsurprisingly, concerned with the Peninsular War which is where Wellington spent the majority of his military career. We are given an overview of the whole war from the landing at the Mondego to Toulouse.
This part is a real delight because we get to see much of the operations from Wellington's own perspective, for example his frustration on not being able to march on Seville after the fall of Badajoz, and in particular I was impressed by the description of his strategy for Salamanca. That is, why he decided to attack Marmont instead of Soult, which reasoning is very convincing.
After the overview of the Peninsular War we are treated to two special chapters that examine Wellington as an offensive and a defensive commander.
I appreciated the chapter on the offensive, which used the case studies of Salamanca, Toulouse, and the Douro to demonstrate Wellington's style in this form of warfare.
Since I've been a lifelong devotee of Napoleon I had long assimilated the French view that Wellington was primarily a defensive and cautious general, so this was a particularly interesting chapter for me and showed that Salamanca, above all, was a true masterpiece and that Wellington was very capable on the offensive.
The chapter on the defensive uses Fuentes de Onoro and the Pyrenees. The latter battle Glover regards as Wellington's finest performance on the defensive. Wellington misread Soult's objective, thinking it to be San Sebastian when it was Pamplona, but nonetheless Wellington's dispositions accounted for this contingency and he was able to thwart the French marshal's strategy with the sound victory at Sorauren.
Perhaps the most exciting part of the book is, inevitably, the section on Waterloo. This almost mythical contest between Wellington and Napoleon has had so much written about it and has so many controversies and mysteries that it's unlikely anybody will be satisfied with any single account, but Glover does the job well.
Interestingly, he also notes that Soult advised Napoleon not to attack, and that Wellington believed Napoleon's strategy to be more clever than it was. He expected to be attacked in flank instead of frontally, and as John Strawson noted, he was disappointed that Napoleon was 'a mere pounder after all.'
Napoleon's options before Waterloo are well-explained, though perhaps not enough credit is given to the Prussians. Glover notes that Wellington anticipated the Prussians arriving at 1 PM, but for various reasons they did not arrive until 7 PM.
Still, due to Napoleon's mistakes and Wellington's skill, the Anglo-Dutch Army held until that time, and Glover quotes Wellington to the justifiable effect that had he not been there the British probably would have broken.
The final chapters examine the sieges of the Peninsular War, which have long been noted as a particular weak spot for the British. Then they examine the use of cavalry and artillery, which were enlightening insofar as Wellington did not rely on massed artillery as much as Napoleon did, and Spain was mostly bad cavalry country.
These chapters make it clear that Wellington was poorly served by subordinates, especially in cavalry, but that he had a knack in making the inefficient cumbrous machinery of the British Army work smoothly. It also contains a rare defense of Beresford at Albuera, though in my opinion an unconvincing one.
He says for example that the Spanish ought to have followed his orders, but this was the precisely the criticism Edwards made in his monograph on Albuera when he pointed out that he should have personally overseen that the Spanish did what he wanted, as Wellington would have done.
Surely Albuera was poorly fought and the soldiers were right when they saw Wellington and exclaimed that had he been with them they would have suffered far less.
The book ends on that note, that Wellington was an efficient commander who looked after his logistics, the well-being of his men, and took careful considered decisions that were calculated to result in the least amount of life.
For this reason he was often forced to be cautious, and to adopt strong defensive positions. This became something of his trademark and caused French historians to denigrate his offensive capabilities, as alluded to above, but Wellington was adept at seizing rare opportunities for inflicting powerful offensive blows.
Nonetheless, it is fitting that Waterloo was a masterpiece of the tactical defensive because Wellington has become associated with this, as Napoleon has become associated with the offensive.
Every entry in this series so far has been a joy to read and I've long admired Glover's style. It is hard to find fault with this book except perhaps in that it does not say much about the Spanish, and unlike many works on Wellington it is not hagiography. Glover notes that Wellington came close to defeat at Fuentes de Onoro, at Sorauren, and above all at Toulouse, so he was lucky as well as skilled.
It is well-worth examining Napoleon's legendary nemesis in this book.
March 23, 2015
A good military biography of Wellington which, owing to a lack of large scale maps, is better on his tactics than his strategy.
November 6, 2021
It's very interesting, yet arduous to read. The beginning sketches the context of an eighteenth century army and the system for officers. It goes on to be a good succinct biogaphry of Wellesly/Wellington, but dwells a lot on numbers when describing the peninsular campaign.
June 17, 2021
There are a lot of facts here, using specific examples to support the argument
August 8, 2020
One of the best books on Wellington I have read. His feats in the Peninsula and subsequently are recounted with vivid flair with the accent on his tactical and strategic genius.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews