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The Lines of Torres Vedras: The Cornerstone of Wellington's Strategy in the Peninsular War 1809-12
This is the first book to examine in detail the role of one of the most important fortifications in military history, the Lines of Torres Vedras in the Peninsular War. In 1809 the French armies controlled almost every Spanish province and only Wellington's small force in Portugal stood between Napoleon and the conquest of Iberia. The French invaded Portugal but found their way blocked by the greatest range of field fortifications the world had ever seen—the Lines of Torres Vedras. Unable to penetrate the Lines, the French were driven back into Spain having suffered the heaviest defeat yet experienced by Napoleon's armies. From the security of the Lines, Wellington was then able to mount the offensive campaigns which ultimately brought him victory in the Peninsula. This is an account of the planning, construction, and occupation of the Lines and of the battles, sieges, and horrors of the French invasion. It is also a challenging new study of Wellington's strategy during the crucial years of the Peninsular War.
- GenresHistory
248 pages, Paperback
Published September 1, 2004
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 2, 2025
This was really a wonderful work, about a subject during the Peninsular War that deserves much more coverage and much more reflection and interpretation.
The book consists of chapters explaining the details and specifics of the lines, the fortifications built, the engineering projects and so forth. It has tables at the end listing the location of the all of the redoubts, their garrisons, the number of guns and so on, but it is much more than just a technical survey of the British fortifications. It places the lines in their proper context in relation to Wellington's strategy and the difficulties they imposed upon the French operations.
We see that while the idea was not exactly conceived ex nihilo, since early proposals to fortify the Lisbon Peninsula can be found among Portuguese and British officers (one of which even complained that Wellington did not acknowledge his contribution), Wellington's conception was nonetheless a mark of true genius.
Wellington alone among the senior British leadership had any faith in England's ability to hold Lisbon. The previous commander of the British in the Peninsula, Sir John Moore, said it could not be done. He was very far from alone in this, many respected professional soldiers thought that Lisbon could not be defended against a serious French attack.
But Wellington saw more clearly than they. He saw that the French would find it hard to concentrate large forces in the Peninsula anywhere, due to the poverty of the soil and the resistance of the populace. He shrewdly realized that the competition between the French soldiers and the native inhabitants would drive the latter to banditry to avoid starvation, a point that Charles Esdaile made in another work I reviewed.
Nonetheless, to reassure his superiors, Wellington established an evacuation point at St. Julian, whose fortifications still stand today, and indeed are even still used by NATO. These were never needed.
Wellington also feared a French occupation of Almada on the southern bank of the Tagus, which he believed could control the estuary if the French were able to drag guns up to it. It is remarkable that the French evidently never considered doing this.
In fact, the French campaign seems like an arrogant promenade. After the withdrawal of the French from Portugal in the failed attempts by Junot and Soult, Napoleon appointed Massena to command and he seems to have believed that it would be a walkover. Massena was less sanguine, and Grehan observes that he was both older and softer than the Massena whose heroics in the War of the Second Coalition are so worthy of admiration.
Half of the book is devoted to Massena's campaign, and here we glean some very useful lessons on the practical utility of the lines, and get to watch Wellington's strategy play out in real time.
First off, we learn Wellington not only possessed a unique vision to defend Portugal despite the doubts of his colleagues and compatriots, but was prescient enough to conceal their construction from the French.
Accordingly, Massena took his time reducing Ciudad Rodrigo, the gateway to northern Portugal. Wellington's genius shines again due to his fixity of purpose. He must have faced enormous pressure to march to the relief of his Spanish allies, but this he resolutely refused to do. It must have taken enormous moral courage and one is reminded of Napoleon's decision to abandon the siege of Mantua. In war one must forfeit the secondary objectives for the primary, and this is perhaps its most difficult aspect. One must identify which are which, and hold to the decisive issue at stake.
Wellington let Ciudad Rodrigo fall in order to save Lisbon and win the war. After Massena took the fortress we learn that he crossed into Portugal to enjoy some good luck with the explosion of a powder magazine at Almeida, which fell to the French much earlier than Wellington had hoped.
We then learn that, inexplicably, Massena took a very poor route through Portugal based on old maps despite the fact that Junot and Soult's engineers had drawn much better maps only a year or two previously. Some of the officers who had been with them were even present, and yet Massena was deceived as to the best routes.
Unfortunately for him, this route led to the ridge at Bussaco. Massena seriously underestimated Wellington's strength, and his tactical skill, and made a clumsy assault on what he though was Wellington's flank but was actually his center. The French received a bloody repulse at Bussaco, but Wellington withdrew south towards the lines anyway.
This is perhaps the most interesting part of the narrative, for Grehan argues that Wellington had no need to withdraw from Bussaco as the position could only have been turned on the left by way of the Caramulo Pass.
Grehan observes that Wellington sent very meager forces to defend this pass, when he might easily have blocked it indefinitely with his ample reserves. Grehan suggests that, perhaps, Wellington allowed himself to be outflanked so that he could retreat to the lines.
Grehan suggests this because if Wellington had stopped Massena at Bussaco the lines would have been pointless, and perhaps Wellington, to justify the expense and the labor, withdrew. He also suggests that perhaps Wellington chose to stand at Bussaco to encourage his men and inspire confidence in the event of the French assaulting the lines.
He needed have worried. When Massena arrived before the lines he undertook a thorough reconnaissance and decided that an attack was impossible. Yet, as one British officer quoted said, he should have tried anyway.
As it happened Massena stood several weeks before the lines, hoping for strong reinforcements. It seems he may also have hoped for Soult to take Badajoz and threaten Lisbon from the south, a contingency that Wellington greatly feared.
But the French here, as everywhere else in the Peninsula, failed to coordinate as the marshals due to jealousy or avarice could not cooperate in anything. In the event Massena had already retreated back to Spain before Badajoz fell.
The real brilliance of Wellington's strategy is revealed in this campaign. Massena could neither assault the lines nor maintain himself in front of them. Grehan argues that Napoleon hoped that the British would withdraw without being compelled to, that perhaps the British Government would force Wellington to do it.
These were obviously vain hopes. Despite achieving prodigies in feeding his men, Massena's army withered away in inactivity until he decided that this limbo existence was pointless and he could not take Lisbon.
Grehan argues that had Wellington not kept the lines secret, Massena might have masked both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida to make a mad dash for Lisbon, which would have been a titanic battle. But by the time he realized what the British had done it was too late. His leisurely parade taking two fortresses and scrambling along poor roads had allowed Wellington the time he needed.
A brief account is made of Wellington's capture of Almeida, the gallant and furious attempt by Massena to relieve it at Fuentes de Onoro, and the final expulsion of the French from Portugal. This was the crowning success of Wellington's strategic conception.
The end of the work provides us with a wonderful synopsis of Wellington's strategy in the Peninsula overall, which was opportunistic and patient. He could never challenge French general superiority so he had to await chances where he could achieve local predominance.
His chance arrived when Napoleon withdrew men for the invasion of Russia, and though Grehan doesn't say, also because of Suchet's conquest of Valencia which drew the French away from the Portuguese border.
After detecting this movement, and the corresponding diminution of the French in the northwest of Spain, Wellington struck to retake Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington's maneuvers against a greatly superior opponent are a masterclass in the annals of war, but that goes beyond the scope of the present work.
The author sums up by arguing that Wellington might have kept his position at Bussaco and spared the Portuguese further rapine and robbery, and briefly mentions the destruction wrought by the French on the unhappy country. He seems to believe that Wellington was callously indifferent to this.
I am not sure that he was, not anymore than he was indifferent to the passionate defense of Ciudad Rodrigo by the old Spanish General Harrasti. The point was that he could not sacrifice his strategy for them. The tragedy was that he could not save everybody, but as he himself said, if the Portuguese followed his plan the French would be sent packing forever. And he was vindicated by the results.
For anyone wishing to learn more about the defensive lines in front of Lisbon in a technical respect, this is a great reference work. But it also provides a fantastic strategic survey of how they were incorporated into Wellington's successes in Portugal, and how the French ultimately ran into their high-water mark before them despite the enormity of their numerical superiority in Spain.
Wellington's vision was triumphantly justified when, as he predicted, Massena was only able to bring sixty or seventy thousand men into Portugal, and these were too few to assault the lines, but yet too many to survive in the countryside outside of them. AS Grehan notes in his final pages, it is a strong display of using defenses and logistics to negate an enemy's superiority and is almost a counter argument to the Napoleonic emphasis on the offensive in every circumstance. I thoroughly enjoyed this book.
The book consists of chapters explaining the details and specifics of the lines, the fortifications built, the engineering projects and so forth. It has tables at the end listing the location of the all of the redoubts, their garrisons, the number of guns and so on, but it is much more than just a technical survey of the British fortifications. It places the lines in their proper context in relation to Wellington's strategy and the difficulties they imposed upon the French operations.
We see that while the idea was not exactly conceived ex nihilo, since early proposals to fortify the Lisbon Peninsula can be found among Portuguese and British officers (one of which even complained that Wellington did not acknowledge his contribution), Wellington's conception was nonetheless a mark of true genius.
Wellington alone among the senior British leadership had any faith in England's ability to hold Lisbon. The previous commander of the British in the Peninsula, Sir John Moore, said it could not be done. He was very far from alone in this, many respected professional soldiers thought that Lisbon could not be defended against a serious French attack.
But Wellington saw more clearly than they. He saw that the French would find it hard to concentrate large forces in the Peninsula anywhere, due to the poverty of the soil and the resistance of the populace. He shrewdly realized that the competition between the French soldiers and the native inhabitants would drive the latter to banditry to avoid starvation, a point that Charles Esdaile made in another work I reviewed.
Nonetheless, to reassure his superiors, Wellington established an evacuation point at St. Julian, whose fortifications still stand today, and indeed are even still used by NATO. These were never needed.
Wellington also feared a French occupation of Almada on the southern bank of the Tagus, which he believed could control the estuary if the French were able to drag guns up to it. It is remarkable that the French evidently never considered doing this.
In fact, the French campaign seems like an arrogant promenade. After the withdrawal of the French from Portugal in the failed attempts by Junot and Soult, Napoleon appointed Massena to command and he seems to have believed that it would be a walkover. Massena was less sanguine, and Grehan observes that he was both older and softer than the Massena whose heroics in the War of the Second Coalition are so worthy of admiration.
Half of the book is devoted to Massena's campaign, and here we glean some very useful lessons on the practical utility of the lines, and get to watch Wellington's strategy play out in real time.
First off, we learn Wellington not only possessed a unique vision to defend Portugal despite the doubts of his colleagues and compatriots, but was prescient enough to conceal their construction from the French.
Accordingly, Massena took his time reducing Ciudad Rodrigo, the gateway to northern Portugal. Wellington's genius shines again due to his fixity of purpose. He must have faced enormous pressure to march to the relief of his Spanish allies, but this he resolutely refused to do. It must have taken enormous moral courage and one is reminded of Napoleon's decision to abandon the siege of Mantua. In war one must forfeit the secondary objectives for the primary, and this is perhaps its most difficult aspect. One must identify which are which, and hold to the decisive issue at stake.
Wellington let Ciudad Rodrigo fall in order to save Lisbon and win the war. After Massena took the fortress we learn that he crossed into Portugal to enjoy some good luck with the explosion of a powder magazine at Almeida, which fell to the French much earlier than Wellington had hoped.
We then learn that, inexplicably, Massena took a very poor route through Portugal based on old maps despite the fact that Junot and Soult's engineers had drawn much better maps only a year or two previously. Some of the officers who had been with them were even present, and yet Massena was deceived as to the best routes.
Unfortunately for him, this route led to the ridge at Bussaco. Massena seriously underestimated Wellington's strength, and his tactical skill, and made a clumsy assault on what he though was Wellington's flank but was actually his center. The French received a bloody repulse at Bussaco, but Wellington withdrew south towards the lines anyway.
This is perhaps the most interesting part of the narrative, for Grehan argues that Wellington had no need to withdraw from Bussaco as the position could only have been turned on the left by way of the Caramulo Pass.
Grehan observes that Wellington sent very meager forces to defend this pass, when he might easily have blocked it indefinitely with his ample reserves. Grehan suggests that, perhaps, Wellington allowed himself to be outflanked so that he could retreat to the lines.
Grehan suggests this because if Wellington had stopped Massena at Bussaco the lines would have been pointless, and perhaps Wellington, to justify the expense and the labor, withdrew. He also suggests that perhaps Wellington chose to stand at Bussaco to encourage his men and inspire confidence in the event of the French assaulting the lines.
He needed have worried. When Massena arrived before the lines he undertook a thorough reconnaissance and decided that an attack was impossible. Yet, as one British officer quoted said, he should have tried anyway.
As it happened Massena stood several weeks before the lines, hoping for strong reinforcements. It seems he may also have hoped for Soult to take Badajoz and threaten Lisbon from the south, a contingency that Wellington greatly feared.
But the French here, as everywhere else in the Peninsula, failed to coordinate as the marshals due to jealousy or avarice could not cooperate in anything. In the event Massena had already retreated back to Spain before Badajoz fell.
The real brilliance of Wellington's strategy is revealed in this campaign. Massena could neither assault the lines nor maintain himself in front of them. Grehan argues that Napoleon hoped that the British would withdraw without being compelled to, that perhaps the British Government would force Wellington to do it.
These were obviously vain hopes. Despite achieving prodigies in feeding his men, Massena's army withered away in inactivity until he decided that this limbo existence was pointless and he could not take Lisbon.
Grehan argues that had Wellington not kept the lines secret, Massena might have masked both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida to make a mad dash for Lisbon, which would have been a titanic battle. But by the time he realized what the British had done it was too late. His leisurely parade taking two fortresses and scrambling along poor roads had allowed Wellington the time he needed.
A brief account is made of Wellington's capture of Almeida, the gallant and furious attempt by Massena to relieve it at Fuentes de Onoro, and the final expulsion of the French from Portugal. This was the crowning success of Wellington's strategic conception.
The end of the work provides us with a wonderful synopsis of Wellington's strategy in the Peninsula overall, which was opportunistic and patient. He could never challenge French general superiority so he had to await chances where he could achieve local predominance.
His chance arrived when Napoleon withdrew men for the invasion of Russia, and though Grehan doesn't say, also because of Suchet's conquest of Valencia which drew the French away from the Portuguese border.
After detecting this movement, and the corresponding diminution of the French in the northwest of Spain, Wellington struck to retake Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington's maneuvers against a greatly superior opponent are a masterclass in the annals of war, but that goes beyond the scope of the present work.
The author sums up by arguing that Wellington might have kept his position at Bussaco and spared the Portuguese further rapine and robbery, and briefly mentions the destruction wrought by the French on the unhappy country. He seems to believe that Wellington was callously indifferent to this.
I am not sure that he was, not anymore than he was indifferent to the passionate defense of Ciudad Rodrigo by the old Spanish General Harrasti. The point was that he could not sacrifice his strategy for them. The tragedy was that he could not save everybody, but as he himself said, if the Portuguese followed his plan the French would be sent packing forever. And he was vindicated by the results.
For anyone wishing to learn more about the defensive lines in front of Lisbon in a technical respect, this is a great reference work. But it also provides a fantastic strategic survey of how they were incorporated into Wellington's successes in Portugal, and how the French ultimately ran into their high-water mark before them despite the enormity of their numerical superiority in Spain.
Wellington's vision was triumphantly justified when, as he predicted, Massena was only able to bring sixty or seventy thousand men into Portugal, and these were too few to assault the lines, but yet too many to survive in the countryside outside of them. AS Grehan notes in his final pages, it is a strong display of using defenses and logistics to negate an enemy's superiority and is almost a counter argument to the Napoleonic emphasis on the offensive in every circumstance. I thoroughly enjoyed this book.
October 1, 2017
Great book about Wellington’s defensive lines in Portugal during the Peninsular War. It not only gave details if how and where they were built, but also of the military position leading up to the British army’s retreat into Portugal and the five month stand off between Wellington and Massena’s armies, including good explanations of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida along with a description of the battle of Busaco and its importance to what came later. Like a lot of military histories there could have been more maps and diagrams as there was obviously a lot of text saying General so-and-so’s Division moved to such and such a village to meet up with or attack another General. I found it difficult sometimes to keep up with who was where and for what strategic reason, but overall a good reference work that helped explain the importance of Wellington’s strategy in dealing with the French’s invasion of Portugal in 1810.
The final chapter was of particular interest as the author put forward and explained different theories of Wellington’s tactics and whether or not the French invasion and subsequent destruction of great sways of Portugal could have been avoided.
The final chapter was of particular interest as the author put forward and explained different theories of Wellington’s tactics and whether or not the French invasion and subsequent destruction of great sways of Portugal could have been avoided.
August 13, 2018
Its only a short book but perhaps predictably most of the content is yet another unnecessary retelling of the whole Peninsular war as per the dates on the title. Who is going to read a book on this topic that doesn't already have some basic background? There is some good information actually about the Lines of Torres Vedras but perhaps only 30 pages worth. This is a technical topic really and there needed to be much more in the way of data, maps, plans, diagrams. There also was considerable scope for detailed study of the experience of troops and civilians on both sides of the actual lines but no more coverage than a general history tells. Overall it is a reasonable book but disappointing in its offering
April 14, 2016
This book is about one of the cornerstones of Wellington's fight in the Peninsula, the Lines of Torres Vedras. Built at a cost of 200,000 pounds, these three formidable lines of redoubts near Lisbon were meant to stymie any attempt to take the city by the French, and force an evacuation by the British Army.
Detailed information on the lines themselves, the Battle of Bussaco and interesting conjectures make this an important book to read about the Peninsula.
Detailed information on the lines themselves, the Battle of Bussaco and interesting conjectures make this an important book to read about the Peninsula.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews