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Stalingrad: City on Fire
"A fresh look at what is perhaps the most famous battle of the Russo-German War from the Soviet perspective." --The NYMAS Review
Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet victory that turned the tide of the Second World War. Yet our knowledge and understanding continues to evolve, and this engrossing account by Alexey Isaev brings together previously unpublished Russian archive material--strategic directives and orders, after-action reports, and official records of all kinds--with the vivid recollections of soldiers who were there, on the front lines, reconstructing what happened in extraordinary new detail.
The evidence leads him to question common assumptions about the conduct of the battle--about the use of tanks and mechanized forces, for instance, and the combat capability and tenacity of the defeated and surrounded German Sixth Army in the last weeks before it surrendered. His gripping narrative carries the reader through the course of the entire battle from the first small-scale encounters on the approaches to Stalingrad in July 1942, through the intense continuous fighting through the city, to the encirclement, the beating back of the relieving force, and the capitulation of the Sixth Army in February 1943.
Military historian Alexey Isaev's latest book, with maps and illustrations included, is an important contribution to the literature on this decisive battle. It offers a thought-provoking revised view of events for readers already familiar with the story, and a fascinating introduction for those coming to it for the first time.
Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet victory that turned the tide of the Second World War. Yet our knowledge and understanding continues to evolve, and this engrossing account by Alexey Isaev brings together previously unpublished Russian archive material--strategic directives and orders, after-action reports, and official records of all kinds--with the vivid recollections of soldiers who were there, on the front lines, reconstructing what happened in extraordinary new detail.
The evidence leads him to question common assumptions about the conduct of the battle--about the use of tanks and mechanized forces, for instance, and the combat capability and tenacity of the defeated and surrounded German Sixth Army in the last weeks before it surrendered. His gripping narrative carries the reader through the course of the entire battle from the first small-scale encounters on the approaches to Stalingrad in July 1942, through the intense continuous fighting through the city, to the encirclement, the beating back of the relieving force, and the capitulation of the Sixth Army in February 1943.
Military historian Alexey Isaev's latest book, with maps and illustrations included, is an important contribution to the literature on this decisive battle. It offers a thought-provoking revised view of events for readers already familiar with the story, and a fascinating introduction for those coming to it for the first time.
336 pages, ebook
Published February 19, 2020
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 30, 2023
The dramatic story of The Battle of Stalingrad has been told and retold countless times. It would seem that there is an insatiable appetite to read about what most military historians would consider to be a major turning point in the 1941- 45 war on the Eastern Front. One can see why – it’s an endlessly fascinating tale of hubris, drama and pathos. On the face of it the established narrative would appear to be pretty much accepted. Hitler’s obsession with a city that bore the name of his nemesis led to an over commitment of men and arms which the Wehrmacht could ill afford to lose. Ferocious resistance in the city and an over-reliance on weaker allies out on the Steppe paved the way for a monumental German defeat delivered through the Red Army’s Operation Uranus. Isaev offers an alternative perspective however – one that is grounded in a forensic examination of Russian primary source material.
This book is divided into three sections. The first deals with the large-scale tank battles which took place in the Great Bend of the Don during the summer of 1942. The second section entitled The Verdun of the Steppes covers the three major assaults on the city by the German Sixth Army and the struggle for the factory district. The final part covers the encirclement battle and the eventual destruction of Paulus’s command. The author dates the start of the Battle of Stalingrad at the 16th July – a month or so earlier than many other writers. In doing so he is able to show how, even at this early stage, the Stavka was making decisions that would have a major influence on the later conduct of the battle for the city. The author examines all aspects of the battle including the role of the NKVD and the effect of the decision not to evacuate the civilian population. He is particularly strong on the role of the artillery, providing insight into the relative capabilities of the two sides.
Interestingly, the author does not buy-into the idea that the Romanian and Italian troops facing the Soviet counter-offensive in November 1942 lacked the competency to put up an effective defence. Rather, he cites Paulus’s decision to commit the 24th Panzer Division to the attack on the factory district 14th – 19th October as a major error and a crucial turning point. This redeployment stripped the defenders of the ‘land bridge’ of a much needed mobile reserve. He also argues thatallowing the Red Army to retain the Don bridgeheads at Serafimovitch and Kletskaya was a mistake and that Operation Uranus would have proved less viable had the German High Command signed-off on a Romanian plan to eliminate them.
In 2008 when this book was first published in Russia it was released under the title ‘Stalingrad: There is no land beyond the Volga for us’ and interestingly the title was changed twice more before it came to be translated into English in this latest edition. The original title speaks to the mindset of those who fought in the Red army at the time and it’s a bit of a shame that the English translation doesn’t make for an easily marketable tag line. The third iteration of the title was ‘Unknown Stalingrad: How to distort history’ and one could say that this alludes to the key strength of the book. There is an irony in this though - the author gained his history degree at the Historical Research Institute of the Federal Security Service and currently works for the Russian Ministry of Defence. Some of his peers might say that Isaev is biased towards the official state view. However, this work does appear to an impartial and authoritative account - undistorted by sentiment, conjecture or revisionism. Isaev’s careful analysis of war diaries, memoirs and diaries reveal a more nuanced story than the one you will find in the current English language historiography and, in the opinion of this reviewer, it’s a much more interesting one.
This book is divided into three sections. The first deals with the large-scale tank battles which took place in the Great Bend of the Don during the summer of 1942. The second section entitled The Verdun of the Steppes covers the three major assaults on the city by the German Sixth Army and the struggle for the factory district. The final part covers the encirclement battle and the eventual destruction of Paulus’s command. The author dates the start of the Battle of Stalingrad at the 16th July – a month or so earlier than many other writers. In doing so he is able to show how, even at this early stage, the Stavka was making decisions that would have a major influence on the later conduct of the battle for the city. The author examines all aspects of the battle including the role of the NKVD and the effect of the decision not to evacuate the civilian population. He is particularly strong on the role of the artillery, providing insight into the relative capabilities of the two sides.
Interestingly, the author does not buy-into the idea that the Romanian and Italian troops facing the Soviet counter-offensive in November 1942 lacked the competency to put up an effective defence. Rather, he cites Paulus’s decision to commit the 24th Panzer Division to the attack on the factory district 14th – 19th October as a major error and a crucial turning point. This redeployment stripped the defenders of the ‘land bridge’ of a much needed mobile reserve. He also argues thatallowing the Red Army to retain the Don bridgeheads at Serafimovitch and Kletskaya was a mistake and that Operation Uranus would have proved less viable had the German High Command signed-off on a Romanian plan to eliminate them.
In 2008 when this book was first published in Russia it was released under the title ‘Stalingrad: There is no land beyond the Volga for us’ and interestingly the title was changed twice more before it came to be translated into English in this latest edition. The original title speaks to the mindset of those who fought in the Red army at the time and it’s a bit of a shame that the English translation doesn’t make for an easily marketable tag line. The third iteration of the title was ‘Unknown Stalingrad: How to distort history’ and one could say that this alludes to the key strength of the book. There is an irony in this though - the author gained his history degree at the Historical Research Institute of the Federal Security Service and currently works for the Russian Ministry of Defence. Some of his peers might say that Isaev is biased towards the official state view. However, this work does appear to an impartial and authoritative account - undistorted by sentiment, conjecture or revisionism. Isaev’s careful analysis of war diaries, memoirs and diaries reveal a more nuanced story than the one you will find in the current English language historiography and, in the opinion of this reviewer, it’s a much more interesting one.
March 21, 2024
Author looks at the battle for Stalingrad from Soviet side and focuses on what Red army was doing. And why and why it often failed to do what it wanted to. It's a fresh perspective as existing works tends to focus on German side. While Glantz's recent work strikes a good balance of both sides this book is much shorter and as such more accessible. Sadly due to war in Ukraine Soviet perspective will again be sidelined with whatever comes from Russia being (rightly or not) be dismissed as propaganda and foreign historians having their access to archives restricted.
Having said that the book is not exactly easy and simple read. It's detailed and tries to get "the big picture" so it's dry. It's not a story, like Beevor's, it's a study and that brings certain writing style. In places the sentence structure feels off with Russian sentence structure being carried over into English. It's not common or particularly bad, though.
Author also covers in good detail battles that led to fight for city proper, namely initial stages of Operation Blau and points out that Germans were in fact close to capturing the city from the march. Sadly he doesn't take a further step back and takes a look at even bigger picture to link these initial German successes to failure of Soviet 1942 Kharkov offensive. But I guess space constraints prevented that? Similarly there is more that usual focus on series of soviet counter offensives in September near Stalingrad itself, aimed at breaking to 62nd Army, so called Kotluban series of offensives. Author covers them in good detail and explains why they failed, assigning blame to Red Army where warranted (which is often). In similar vein he gives proper focus to planning of Operation Uranus and why it was planned the way it was. Interestingly more famous anecdotes, like Pavlov's House and Zaitsev are merely footnotes.
Soviet armoured doctrine is given a proper examination and rebirth or tank corps and armies is covered well. Author is quick to point the issue Red army still had beyond inexperience. The continued use of obsolete T-70 tank, mixing T-34 and KV tanks. The erosion of the edge these tanks had over Germans previous years but were now increasingly vulnerable to new 75mm PaK 40 anti tank gun.
The biggest issue that makes book harder to read is the fact that maps are assembled in the middle of book and grouped together, rather than individual maps being in relevant chapters. Frequent flipping back and forth breaks the flow of reading. Similarly there is a strange way of presenting date in tables for armoured strength of German divisions. As there are more columns than rows tables get broken in two as it doesn't fit on a page. It would be much more clearer to switch columns and rows, even if that would make them different than other tables showing different strengths and losses. combined with above mentioned issues with translations it seems like editor didn't do a proper job.
Another issues worth raising is the coverage of Romanian forces. Author admits that Uranus was planned the way it was to strike at weaker Romanian forces yet their performance in actual offensive is covered very briefly. Author admits the continued to fight until 25. November and they were tougher nut to crack than expected, but not much detail is given. Similarly in covering Operation Winter Storm (German attempt to open a corridor to encircled 6th Army) Soviet offensive against Italian forces that tore a large gap in German defenses is not mentioned at all. Again, space constraints?
Overall this is an interesting book that provides a fresh perspective on the battle. It's not an easy read so maybe not the best choice for casual reader and some previous knowledge of the battle and wider picture doesn't hurt.
Having said that the book is not exactly easy and simple read. It's detailed and tries to get "the big picture" so it's dry. It's not a story, like Beevor's, it's a study and that brings certain writing style. In places the sentence structure feels off with Russian sentence structure being carried over into English. It's not common or particularly bad, though.
Author also covers in good detail battles that led to fight for city proper, namely initial stages of Operation Blau and points out that Germans were in fact close to capturing the city from the march. Sadly he doesn't take a further step back and takes a look at even bigger picture to link these initial German successes to failure of Soviet 1942 Kharkov offensive. But I guess space constraints prevented that? Similarly there is more that usual focus on series of soviet counter offensives in September near Stalingrad itself, aimed at breaking to 62nd Army, so called Kotluban series of offensives. Author covers them in good detail and explains why they failed, assigning blame to Red Army where warranted (which is often). In similar vein he gives proper focus to planning of Operation Uranus and why it was planned the way it was. Interestingly more famous anecdotes, like Pavlov's House and Zaitsev are merely footnotes.
Soviet armoured doctrine is given a proper examination and rebirth or tank corps and armies is covered well. Author is quick to point the issue Red army still had beyond inexperience. The continued use of obsolete T-70 tank, mixing T-34 and KV tanks. The erosion of the edge these tanks had over Germans previous years but were now increasingly vulnerable to new 75mm PaK 40 anti tank gun.
The biggest issue that makes book harder to read is the fact that maps are assembled in the middle of book and grouped together, rather than individual maps being in relevant chapters. Frequent flipping back and forth breaks the flow of reading. Similarly there is a strange way of presenting date in tables for armoured strength of German divisions. As there are more columns than rows tables get broken in two as it doesn't fit on a page. It would be much more clearer to switch columns and rows, even if that would make them different than other tables showing different strengths and losses. combined with above mentioned issues with translations it seems like editor didn't do a proper job.
Another issues worth raising is the coverage of Romanian forces. Author admits that Uranus was planned the way it was to strike at weaker Romanian forces yet their performance in actual offensive is covered very briefly. Author admits the continued to fight until 25. November and they were tougher nut to crack than expected, but not much detail is given. Similarly in covering Operation Winter Storm (German attempt to open a corridor to encircled 6th Army) Soviet offensive against Italian forces that tore a large gap in German defenses is not mentioned at all. Again, space constraints?
Overall this is an interesting book that provides a fresh perspective on the battle. It's not an easy read so maybe not the best choice for casual reader and some previous knowledge of the battle and wider picture doesn't hurt.
March 23, 2024
a highly detailed catalog of troop movements and tactical analysis with new insight. I read this mainly for the conclusions within but that really only consisted 15 percent of the text. I skim read most of the book. for 3 euros this was well worth the read for a new Russian perspective on the key issues of the battle.
January 9, 2022
Good book overall on the subject. But the author gets bogged down each regiment and unit moving here and there, at the expense of a good narrative. It gets to be a slog. Anthony Beevor's book on Stalingrad was much better.
PHIL Kuhn
PHIL Kuhn
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews