Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias

by Stephen Biddle

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfareSince September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies.Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship.A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

Genres: Military Fiction, War, History, Nonfiction, Military History, Politics, Political Science

449 pages, Kindle Edition

First published April 6, 2021

Reviews

[Scott · Rating 2 out of 5]

Pocket histories of five minor wars between 1965 and 2008 masquerading as a model of non-state military behavior. The idea that institutional maturity and limited vs existential stakes of war heavily influence military behavior is intriguing. However, the five cherry picked examples give insufficient evidence for any useful conclusion. And, the frequently referenced appendix with its adhoc nonlinear formula and hand chosen constants is a parody of a proper regression analysis. Overall, the book repetitively insists that each of the five examples match the "predictions" of "the new theory". But, this repetition does result in detailed descriptions of particular aspects of each conflict (e.g. use of cover) which I found interesting. So, I give it two stars for assembling such complete compressed histories.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Academically rigorous and sound, Biddle posits a theory and framework of modern warfare—the outcomes of which demonstrate that what we think we know about non-state and irregular warfare relative to conventional war fighting, and the assumptions we tend to make therein, do not hold traction. Especially the glaring assumption that nonstate actors fight differently than conventional armies—which Biddle discovers is not true. Through a comparative lens of Fabian-like irregular warfare vs Napoleonic-style conventional warfare, Biddle uses a set number of variables in the comparison within five case studies: Lebanon Hezbollah, Iraq, Somalia, Vietcong and Croatia. Previous errors of scholarship and academic studies of warfare can benefit by Biddle’s work, and among other revelations are that all things being equal between warring factions, it is institutional maturity and wartime stakes, and not material technology and experience that tend toward winning outcomes.

[Frank Kelly · Rating 4 out of 5]

There has been considerable research and writing on the difference between nonstate vs. state warfare. And with it has come, as Stephen Biddle makes abundantly clear in this deep - and at times, dense - study of the subject. His research is voluminous, but he wisely breaks it down into several case studies: Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, Hezbollah's strategy and tactics versus Israel, the United Nations efforts in Somalia, which led to the famous "Black Hawk Down" incident. The modern actions saw the non-state actor employ tactics as if they were seasoned, big state actors - which led to the actual state actors suffering significantly more casualties and damage than anyone anticipated. Biddle offers a comprehensive, richly thought-out account of how warfare has changed dramatically over the years.

[Juan · Rating 3 out of 5]

In *Nonstate warfare*, Biddle wants to blow up the assumption that state and non-state armed groups – because of baseline differences in strength – fight in fundamentally different ways, with the former using conventional weapons and tactics and the latter using irregular, guerrilla tactics. He argues instead for thinking about armed actors (non-state *and* state) as falling along a *Fabian-Napoleonic* continuum.

The two poles of this continuum correspond to the classic distinction between conventional (Napoleonic) and guerrilla styles of warfare (the Fabian strategy, named for the Roman dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus). Biddle’s first innovation is to argue for a *continuum* as opposed to distinct types: all groups live along the continuum, none perfectly at one pole or the other. The second is to argue that the style of warfare is not totally a function of actor type: states can use Fabian strategies, and rebels can rely on Napoleonic ones. The examples Biddle provides of states relying on Fabian strategies are interesting and convincing, especially those from WW2, Soviet reliance on irregular partisans, German / Allied use of coercive bombing, etc.

The final contribution is to present a theory to predict where actors land on this continuum, based on the internal political makeup of the actor—their internal institutions and stakes in fighting. This part feels less interesting and less convincing. Less interesting because in the process his theory ends up generating predictions that are not so different from the conventional wisdom: that rebels use guerrilla tactics, and states mostly use conventional tactics, because of differences in relative strength. The upshot is (if Biddle is right) we now have a clearer sense of why relative strength varies, but not super different. Less convincing because the theory starts to feel a little overdetermined, generating too many buckets for groups to fall into.

As a last note, Biddle is clearly very smart and a great writer. You can tell he can nerd out about military tech and strategy. But the format of academic books is so dry, formulaic, here’s my DV, here are my IVs, here’s the scope condition, boring… This book would be so much better as a popular press book (which unfortunately are not taken as seriously).

[Eric Johnson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Admittedly, when I started this book, I felt that I had a grasp on the topic, and I felt that maybe I would know less, or gain little knowledge. After reading it, however, I was wrong. It's a long book that took a lot to get through, and I have to say that I learned the aspects of the five cases that were brought up. Overall, I learned some new things about the various conflicts, so I would say that I did learn some new things after finishing this book. I don't understand the Fabian and Napoleonic styles that well, and it may have been brought up, but I apparently either missed it, or read over it, or the author just has those styles and didn't go through it, and explain it further.

[Alexis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Argues that the military strategy of modern (post-1970s) non-state actors can be predicted based on a combination of material (numerical imbalance, technological sophistication) and political (institutionalization, stakes) variables. Proffers a functional way to calculate a non-state actor's likely place on the "Fabian to Napoleonic" spectrum. Case studies were repetitive, conclusion was persuasive, although arguments related to numerical imbalance were difficult to agree with given the paucity of information on the manpower available to most insurgencies.

[Jenn Hartlove · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book. It's been a while since I've dug into pure political science writing and I really appreciated how Biddle lays out the framework for his theory. I think this is timely scholarship, as we continue to grapple with how to characterize the nature of military conflict today. As Biddle posits, I agree that it's not quite so clearly defined and I second his call for a closer look at the conflict more broadly--to include both inter- *and* intra-state conflicts.

[Turgut · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic book! Really innovative.