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Кто здесь власть? Граждане, государство и борьба за Россию
На чем базируется власть Путина — один из самых обсуждаемых вопросов последних двух десятилетий среди политологов, социологов, экономистов и журналистов. Книга политологов Сэма Грина и Грэма Робертсона — это попытка найти на него ответ не в теоретической плоскости, а в практической. Десятки интервью с обычными россиянами, изучение результатов соцопросов, наблюдение за различными группами в социальных сетях и анализ данных о составе и активности протестных групп — все эти методы не только помогли авторам понять, кто в действительности является сторонником Путина, но и сделать парадоксальный вывод: эта поддержка не так надежна, как принято считать, и в любой момент она может закончиться.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published June 11, 2019
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382 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
September 14, 2021
3.5 ☆
Given this argument by the two authors Greene and Robertson ("G&R"), the title seemed inaccurate. Putin v. the People was filled with many such nuanced qualifiers as the two political scientists explained the symbiotic realities of Russia's authoritarianism.
Putin has either been the Prime Minister or the President of Russia since 1999. G&R described a leader whose initial guiding principle had been don't excite the people and yet who also wanted to retain their support. The authors depicted Putin as possessing no clear fundamental ideology of his own but whose administration had tested various positions to identify one that would allow him to retain power.
In his early years, political stability was supported by a strengthening economy based upon rising values for Russian oil and gas exports. Putin was able to pursue economic reforms and a digitized economy while simultaneously claiming the lineage of tsars. Meanwhile behind the scenes, governing power was being consolidated.
Putin's bid for a third term as president tested Russia's constitution, and amidst a waning economy, domestic dissent gained momentum in 2012. Putin obviously prevailed. Popular opinion asserted that after its long history under tsars, Russia's cultural mindset was primed to accept an autocrat like Putin. G&R posited however that Putin's hold onto power resulted from a substantial change in the Kremlin's political strategy.
In other words, Putin and the Kremlin's new strategy entails a more focused propaganda campaign and a crack-down of dissenters with jail time. Alexei Navalny remains the strongest political threat to Putin and is currently recognized as a "prisoner of conscience" by Amnesty International. The Kremlin decided to create ideological wedges -
Initially, the Kremlin chose to focus upon religion and family values (ie. anti-LGBT). Later campaigns included the xenophobia directed at migrant workers and nationalism. By 2018, twenty of 22 television stations were conforming to the Kremlin's information policy and blocking opposition-minded news. The internet strategy included managing the okhraniteli, the "guardians" who were influential online.
But Putin had also received a gift of fate - the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula in 2014. A lot of this book covered Russia's takeover of Crimea - from how it had happened, how Russians felt about it, and how this benefited Putin's standing.
G&R had tracked online activity and conducted primary interviews. They had also tested common Russian citizens along the big 5 personality traits and found that the political outlooks were very different in Russia than what would have been expected in the West.
By the end, G&R argued that Putin's grasp of power is actually fragile especially with the current domestic stagnation. They also wouldn't rule out the possibility of a true democracy eventually emerging in Russia. Time will tell.
This was my second nonfiction about Putin this year and was another read with the Non Fiction Book Club. In terms of Putin's political longevity, G&R's argument differs from Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West, which had a different overall theme and its economic focus was more aligned with my reading interests.
Putin v. the People was very much a political examination and despite some interesting perspectives, the authors' presentation was too scattered and fragmented for my tastes. I had first listened to the audiobook which was a poor choice for me. The authors included a lot of names - of key actors, of social online sites, of political movements - and then abbreviated many. The sheer volume of unfamiliar names coupled with a non-chronological sequence bogged down my comprehension. Seeing everything in print was much better, especially as the hardcopy included a helpful 18-page list of dramatis personae.
Vladimir Putin is a popular man. He is also a dictator. That is not a contradiction.
Vladimir Putin's rule is not forced on an oppressed and unwilling public, but is jointly built -- co-constructed -- through a process of political struggle involving Putin, his opponents, and tens of millions of supporters.
Given this argument by the two authors Greene and Robertson ("G&R"), the title seemed inaccurate. Putin v. the People was filled with many such nuanced qualifiers as the two political scientists explained the symbiotic realities of Russia's authoritarianism.
Putin has either been the Prime Minister or the President of Russia since 1999. G&R described a leader whose initial guiding principle had been don't excite the people and yet who also wanted to retain their support. The authors depicted Putin as possessing no clear fundamental ideology of his own but whose administration had tested various positions to identify one that would allow him to retain power.
In his early years, political stability was supported by a strengthening economy based upon rising values for Russian oil and gas exports. Putin was able to pursue economic reforms and a digitized economy while simultaneously claiming the lineage of tsars. Meanwhile behind the scenes, governing power was being consolidated.
The state --directly or through proxies-- controlled all four of the parties in the State Duma, all of the governorships, and most of the television stations.
By the end of 2004, then, there were no longer any independent centers of power in Russia: television, the titans of industry, the political parties and regional leaders had all been brought to hell. All that remained outside of the Kremlin's direct control was the street.
But for all its autocracy, Putin's Russia was not particularly coercive. ... The murders of critical journalists, lawyers, and activists ... left little doubt that the state and its allies could kill, but it usually did not.
Putin's bid for a third term as president tested Russia's constitution, and amidst a waning economy, domestic dissent gained momentum in 2012. Putin obviously prevailed. Popular opinion asserted that after its long history under tsars, Russia's cultural mindset was primed to accept an autocrat like Putin. G&R posited however that Putin's hold onto power resulted from a substantial change in the Kremlin's political strategy.
The goal was to transform passive acceptance of Putin's rule into active participation in that rule, by using tried and tested political technologies to mobilize supporters and demonize opponents.
In other words, Putin and the Kremlin's new strategy entails a more focused propaganda campaign and a crack-down of dissenters with jail time. Alexei Navalny remains the strongest political threat to Putin and is currently recognized as a "prisoner of conscience" by Amnesty International. The Kremlin decided to create ideological wedges -
...to find issues that could "weaponize" an existing but dormant social consensus and mobilize that consensus against the opposition to the advantage of the regime.
... the whole point of wedge issues is to separate people, dividing them into unbridgeable camps, experiencing different realities in their different media spheres, and to firm up coalitions of a majority (whether silent or moral or what have you) against the minority.
Initially, the Kremlin chose to focus upon religion and family values (ie. anti-LGBT). Later campaigns included the xenophobia directed at migrant workers and nationalism. By 2018, twenty of 22 television stations were conforming to the Kremlin's information policy and blocking opposition-minded news. The internet strategy included managing the okhraniteli, the "guardians" who were influential online.
But Putin had also received a gift of fate - the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula in 2014. A lot of this book covered Russia's takeover of Crimea - from how it had happened, how Russians felt about it, and how this benefited Putin's standing.
... the Kremlin's decision to occupy first Crimea and then parts of the Donbas, and to plunge the region into an armed conflict that continues to this day, produced a groundswell of genuine support.
Charisma is a relationship between a leader and a set of followers. As a result, charismatic leaders often emerge in times of crisis because successful management of a crisis turns formerly ordinary politicians into charismatic leaders.
G&R had tracked online activity and conducted primary interviews. They had also tested common Russian citizens along the big 5 personality traits and found that the political outlooks were very different in Russia than what would have been expected in the West.
By the end, G&R argued that Putin's grasp of power is actually fragile especially with the current domestic stagnation. They also wouldn't rule out the possibility of a true democracy eventually emerging in Russia. Time will tell.
This was my second nonfiction about Putin this year and was another read with the Non Fiction Book Club. In terms of Putin's political longevity, G&R's argument differs from Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West, which had a different overall theme and its economic focus was more aligned with my reading interests.
Putin v. the People was very much a political examination and despite some interesting perspectives, the authors' presentation was too scattered and fragmented for my tastes. I had first listened to the audiobook which was a poor choice for me. The authors included a lot of names - of key actors, of social online sites, of political movements - and then abbreviated many. The sheer volume of unfamiliar names coupled with a non-chronological sequence bogged down my comprehension. Seeing everything in print was much better, especially as the hardcopy included a helpful 18-page list of dramatis personae.
August 15, 2021
Non-fiction. Sociological discussion of Russians and their politics. 4.5 stars.
Greene writes an excellent book that talks about the culture and attitudes of Russians. This is not a set of conspiracy theories, this is an attempt to understand why Russians have the government they do right now. There is a great effort to not impose US or Western ideas and suppositions and to really understand the populace as a sociologist or anthropologist would endeavor to understand any society.
Of course there are political issues: government controlled media, quashing of oppositional voices, jailing of oppositional leaders, corruption...none of that is ignored. Instead, this is an explanation of why it is allowed and rewarded.
My favorite part was Chapter 5 discussing the personality traits of individuals with leadership capabilities. It was very interesting to explore how 'conservatives' in US score high with conscientiousness while 'liberals' high with openness and the corresponding 'terms' for Europe have the corresponding traits. BUT in Russia, the supporters of Putin are less determined by openness or conscientiousness (like in the West) and are in fact more agreeable and essentially want to continue with the government they think everyone else wants them to want.
I also came to understand that the support for Putin is tied to national identity and the fact that [some/most?] Russians want to be seen in the world as strong and in power again. I can relate to this if I'm honest. I also want my country to be strong and in power because that increases my chances of success.
A little side note here...I really like idioms. Apparently there's a Russian saying, 'by the edge of her ear.' I like it.
I read this as a Buddy Read with the Non Fiction Book Club Aug 2021. We had a great discussion that you can see by going to the book's main page and scrolling to the bottom to "Discuss This Book" below the comments.
"We need to think not of Putin's Russia, but of Russia's Putin."
"As his second term wore on, Putin was facing a problem: Russia's constitution."
"Whatever direction the causation goes in, the whole point of wedge issues is to separate people, dividing them into unbridgeable camps, experiencing different realities in their different media spheres, and to firm up coalitions of a majority...against the minority."
"Oddly enough, it was the disconnect between what he was seeing on Russian state-controlled TV and what he was reading on independent Ukrainian websites that finally made him pick up and go to war."
"The only way to win the propaganda war...was to fight lies with bigger lies."
"One of the best analyses of the collapse of the USSR-an event that surprised almost everyone-was the product of modeling how rational people would behave if they worked in a bureaucracy where their bosses suddenly stopped monitoring their behavior."
collective effervescence: "Soccer fans know this well-the profound emotional arousal of watching a game live together, singing together, crying together and sharing symbols of a collective history creates lasting bonds that go well beyond any particular moment of any given match. Sociologists know about it too."
"Charisma is a relationship between a leader and a set of followers."
"...Russia-fairly obviously-is not the West."
"Getting along-and seeing the positive in any situation-takes work, and agreeable people are more likely than others to make that extra effort. As they make that effort, though, they're reading their social surroundings to determine what's expected-and what's expected is not necessarily nice."
"...Russian citizens know that the system is broken. That it is rigged. That it delivers them neither to prosperity nor security. And yet...they toe the party line."
Greene writes an excellent book that talks about the culture and attitudes of Russians. This is not a set of conspiracy theories, this is an attempt to understand why Russians have the government they do right now. There is a great effort to not impose US or Western ideas and suppositions and to really understand the populace as a sociologist or anthropologist would endeavor to understand any society.
Of course there are political issues: government controlled media, quashing of oppositional voices, jailing of oppositional leaders, corruption...none of that is ignored. Instead, this is an explanation of why it is allowed and rewarded.
My favorite part was Chapter 5 discussing the personality traits of individuals with leadership capabilities. It was very interesting to explore how 'conservatives' in US score high with conscientiousness while 'liberals' high with openness and the corresponding 'terms' for Europe have the corresponding traits. BUT in Russia, the supporters of Putin are less determined by openness or conscientiousness (like in the West) and are in fact more agreeable and essentially want to continue with the government they think everyone else wants them to want.
I also came to understand that the support for Putin is tied to national identity and the fact that [some/most?] Russians want to be seen in the world as strong and in power again. I can relate to this if I'm honest. I also want my country to be strong and in power because that increases my chances of success.
A little side note here...I really like idioms. Apparently there's a Russian saying, 'by the edge of her ear.' I like it.
I read this as a Buddy Read with the Non Fiction Book Club Aug 2021. We had a great discussion that you can see by going to the book's main page and scrolling to the bottom to "Discuss This Book" below the comments.
"We need to think not of Putin's Russia, but of Russia's Putin."
"As his second term wore on, Putin was facing a problem: Russia's constitution."
"Whatever direction the causation goes in, the whole point of wedge issues is to separate people, dividing them into unbridgeable camps, experiencing different realities in their different media spheres, and to firm up coalitions of a majority...against the minority."
"Oddly enough, it was the disconnect between what he was seeing on Russian state-controlled TV and what he was reading on independent Ukrainian websites that finally made him pick up and go to war."
"The only way to win the propaganda war...was to fight lies with bigger lies."
"One of the best analyses of the collapse of the USSR-an event that surprised almost everyone-was the product of modeling how rational people would behave if they worked in a bureaucracy where their bosses suddenly stopped monitoring their behavior."
collective effervescence: "Soccer fans know this well-the profound emotional arousal of watching a game live together, singing together, crying together and sharing symbols of a collective history creates lasting bonds that go well beyond any particular moment of any given match. Sociologists know about it too."
"Charisma is a relationship between a leader and a set of followers."
"...Russia-fairly obviously-is not the West."
"Getting along-and seeing the positive in any situation-takes work, and agreeable people are more likely than others to make that extra effort. As they make that effort, though, they're reading their social surroundings to determine what's expected-and what's expected is not necessarily nice."
"...Russian citizens know that the system is broken. That it is rigged. That it delivers them neither to prosperity nor security. And yet...they toe the party line."
March 26, 2024
4.5 ⭐
Aanrader als je meer wilt weten over wat de bevolking van Rusland van Poetin vind (positiever dan ik verwacht had) en waarom dat zo is. Interessante analyse van hoe bepaalde gebeurtenissen, zoals de annexatie van de Krim, leidde tot een meer goedkeuring en populariteit voor Poetin onder de Russische bevolking.
Aanrader als je meer wilt weten over wat de bevolking van Rusland van Poetin vind (positiever dan ik verwacht had) en waarom dat zo is. Interessante analyse van hoe bepaalde gebeurtenissen, zoals de annexatie van de Krim, leidde tot een meer goedkeuring en populariteit voor Poetin onder de Russische bevolking.
January 30, 2020
I enjoyed this book and found it informative. It was an interesting read and from a different perspective. It did breeze over a few things and completely ignored public outrage over the Kursk submarine disaster (which I found odd for a book that looked so closely at the relationship between the Russian populace and the Russian government - and Putin, in particular).
Another criticism is that the authors would go on tangents that I felt went on for too long and were unnecessary. There were also portions that felt a bit condescending, as they pointed out the glaringly obvious.
Another criticism is that the authors would go on tangents that I felt went on for too long and were unnecessary. There were also portions that felt a bit condescending, as they pointed out the glaringly obvious.
August 13, 2021
This is a political science / sociology non-fic that attempts to look on the current situation is Russia not from usual top-down approach (“Putin’s Russia” where a dictator guides and everyone follows or else) but bottom-up (where Putin tries to get support of the governed and fulfill their desires of e.g. ‘Russian greatness’ so they don’t mind a kleptocratic and abusive authorities). I read it as a buddy read for August 2021 at Non Fiction Book Club group.
The authors had a unique opportunity to measure how the occupation of Crimea affected popularity of Putin – in 2013 (before the grab, which happened in March 2014) they made a survey of Russians regarding their attitude toward the authorities and found what other similar surveys shown – a veining popularity of Putin, outrage about high level corruption, etc. However, when they surveyed again the same people after the occupation of Crimea, not only their increased but even high level corruption suddenly became less of an issue. The fact that after a ‘little victorious war’ there is a sort of “rallies around the flag” which is reasonably common. However, in the West it quickly stops because an opposition starts to show problems there or elsewhere, while in Russia it remains high, not at the least due to the media control.
The authors try to find why and first go after the idea of the pathbreaking French sociologist Émile Durkheim, who studied the religious rituals of Aboriginal groups in Australia, and found out that the key to making something sacred was togetherness: engaging with other people in the same unusual moment that transgressed the rules and tedium of everyday life. The euphoric feeling that this extraordinary togetherness causes—the same powerful emotional excitement that we get from being “in sync” with others, what Durkheim called “collective effervescence.”
Then they journey into studies was a system of five basic personality traits that was both stable and, more importantly, useful in predicting officer performance on the job. These traits were Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (OCEAN). They find out that [a] split into Openness-strong democrats and Conscientiousness-strong Republicans, or their analogs in other Western democracies isn’t present. What does distinguish Putin’s supporters is high scores on Agreeableness, even if it works in reverse way compared to the West, where Agreeableness e.g. means greater support/compassion to minorities, while in Russia they are ok to support anti-gay laws, etc. The authors assume that this means that Putin’s support might vein again, if his / authorities actions became less socially accepted.
Despite there are some issues with their depictions of Ukrainian situation, overall the book is well-researched and I agree with their underlaying point (which wasn’t written explicitly) – the majority of Russians perceive the West as plotting against them, and aggressive actions on the part of Russian authorities as ‘getting from the knees’ and that expansion is driven not by a madman on the top, but by a large share of supporters of the myth of Russia as the Third Rome
The authors had a unique opportunity to measure how the occupation of Crimea affected popularity of Putin – in 2013 (before the grab, which happened in March 2014) they made a survey of Russians regarding their attitude toward the authorities and found what other similar surveys shown – a veining popularity of Putin, outrage about high level corruption, etc. However, when they surveyed again the same people after the occupation of Crimea, not only their increased but even high level corruption suddenly became less of an issue. The fact that after a ‘little victorious war’ there is a sort of “rallies around the flag” which is reasonably common. However, in the West it quickly stops because an opposition starts to show problems there or elsewhere, while in Russia it remains high, not at the least due to the media control.
The authors try to find why and first go after the idea of the pathbreaking French sociologist Émile Durkheim, who studied the religious rituals of Aboriginal groups in Australia, and found out that the key to making something sacred was togetherness: engaging with other people in the same unusual moment that transgressed the rules and tedium of everyday life. The euphoric feeling that this extraordinary togetherness causes—the same powerful emotional excitement that we get from being “in sync” with others, what Durkheim called “collective effervescence.”
Then they journey into studies was a system of five basic personality traits that was both stable and, more importantly, useful in predicting officer performance on the job. These traits were Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (OCEAN). They find out that [a] split into Openness-strong democrats and Conscientiousness-strong Republicans, or their analogs in other Western democracies isn’t present. What does distinguish Putin’s supporters is high scores on Agreeableness, even if it works in reverse way compared to the West, where Agreeableness e.g. means greater support/compassion to minorities, while in Russia they are ok to support anti-gay laws, etc. The authors assume that this means that Putin’s support might vein again, if his / authorities actions became less socially accepted.
Despite there are some issues with their depictions of Ukrainian situation, overall the book is well-researched and I agree with their underlaying point (which wasn’t written explicitly) – the majority of Russians perceive the West as plotting against them, and aggressive actions on the part of Russian authorities as ‘getting from the knees’ and that expansion is driven not by a madman on the top, but by a large share of supporters of the myth of Russia as the Third Rome
October 27, 2023
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Новые порядки, новые игрушки,
Нам говорят о мире в телерадиоэфире,
Переплавляем ложки, кружки в пушки
И мир видали только из окна своей квартиры.
С одной стороны, мне хочется поставить этой книге высокую оценку, ибо любая книга, которая показывает истинное лицо путинской власти, заслуживает похвалы. Однако с другой, книга в очередной раз пересказывает череду всем известных событий на всём протяжении путинского правления. Мне кажется, что даже иностранцы выучили наизусть эти события, что происходили во время правления Путина, начиная с начала второй Чеченской войны и взрывов домов в Москве, захвата заложников в Норд-Осте, появления политика Навального и заканчивая войнами с Грузией и Украиной. Можно сказать, что книга в этом смысле похожа на книгу Михаила Зыгаря «Вся кремлевская рать: Краткая история современной России» с тем единственным отличием, что в этой книге есть вставки с «обычными людьми», чаще всего поддерживающие Путина. В принципе, наверно иностранцам такой подход будет чем-то даже интересным, ибо многие такие «простые люди» довольно искренни в своих мыслях по поводу «если не Путин, то кто?». Но тут есть один нюанс: этим людям не с чем сравнивать Путина. Они видят по телевизору только Путина и никого более. Это сознательная политика кремлёвской власти чтобы на фоне Путина все остальные смотрелись если не комично, то хотя бы несерьёзно. Именно поэтому Путин, никогда не участвовал ни в каких дебатах, ибо дебаты очень быстро показали всю обычность Путина (а возможно даже его нелепость). Поэтому включать в книгу размышления простых людей о Путине, не выглядит хорошей идей. В конце концов, всегда можно найти в стране группу людей поддерживающих самые безумные идеи (что мы и увидели в 2022). В книге мы встречаем несколько таких людей. Вот и получается, что книга является, с одной стороны, дайджестом по всем значимым событиям во время правления Путина, а с другой, интервью с простыми людьми по вопросу, почему они поддерживают Путина. И что автор книги этим хотел показать? Что все «простые люди» поддерживают Путина? Вряд ли. Даже среди «простых людей» его поддержка вовсе не 80%. Другими словами, намного лучше, если бы автор выбрал что-то одно - дайджест по путинскому правлению или мнение «простого народа» о Путине. Но получилось так, что автор нашёл несколько людей согласившихся с ним побеседовать и он от радости решил этих нескольких граждан представить в виде «российского народа поддерживающего своего вождя». На самом деле ситуация намного сложнее, ибо в каких-то социальных стратах Путина поддерживают больше, а в каких-то меньше. Особенно важен регион. Ну и, разумеется, в авторитарной стране спрашивать людей, почему они поддерживают диктатора, довольно бессмысленная затея. Интересно такие вопросы задавать обществу, у которого имеется выбор и, следовательно, выборы. В России с приходом Путина к власти это исчезло. Да и честно говоря, и до Путина выбор у российского народа был очень ограниченный. В итоге, книгу можно рассматривать наравне с вышеназванной книгой Зыгаря, но до серьёзного анализа ситуации в стране её очень и очень далеко.
И последнее. Эта книга очень сильно напоминает журналистскую работу. Наверно она изначально такой и была, но в итоге расширилась до целой книги.
Стоит ли читать книгу гражданам самой России? Ну, только в том случаи, если читатель всё ещё не понял, кто же такой Владимир Путин и почему он всё ещё у власти. Под конец 2022 для многих это уже перестало быть секретом.
On the one hand, I want to praise this book, because any book that shows the true face of Putin's power deserves praise. On the other hand, however, the book retells a series of well-known events throughout Putin's reign. It seems to me that even foreigners have learned by heart these events that took place during Putin's rule, starting with the beginning of the second Chechen war and the bombing of houses in Moscow, the hostage-taking in Nord-Ost, the emergence of the politician Navalny and ending with the wars with Georgia and Ukraine. One could say that the book, in this sense, is similar to Mikhail Zygar's book "All the Kremlin's Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin" with the only difference being that this book has inserts with "ordinary people" who most often support Putin. In principle, foreigners will probably find this approach interesting because many of these "ordinary people" are quite sincere in their thoughts about "if not Putin, who else?" But there is one nuance: these people have nothing to compare Putin with. They see only Putin on TV and no one else. It is a deliberate policy of the Kremlin authorities to make all the others look, if not comical, at least not serious against Putin. It is why Putin never participated in any debates, because the debates very quickly showed Putin's commonness (and perhaps even his ridiculousness). So including ordinary people's thoughts about Putin in the book doesn't seem like a good idea. After all, you can always find a group of people in the country who support the craziest ideas (as we saw in 2022). In the book, we meet several such people. So it turns out that the book is, on the one hand, a digest of all significant events during Putin's reign, and on the other hand, interviews with ordinary people on why they support Putin. And what did the author of the book want to show? That all "ordinary people" support Putin? Hardly. Even among "ordinary people," his support is not 80%. In other words, it would have been much better if the author had chosen one thing - a digest on Putin's rule or the opinion of "ordinary people" about Putin. But it turned out that the author found a few people who agreed to talk to him, and he happily decided to present these few citizens as "the Russian people supporting their leader." In fact, the situation is much more complicated because some social strata support Putin more and some less. The region is especially important. And, of course, in an authoritarian country, asking people why they support a dictator is a rather pointless exercise. It is interesting to ask such questions to a society that has a choice and, consequently, elections. In Russia, this has disappeared since Putin came to power. And to be honest, even before Putin, the Russian people had a very limited choice. As a result, the book can be considered on a par with the above-mentioned book by Zygar, but it is very far from being a serious analysis of the situation in the country.
One last thing. This book feels very much like a journalistic work. Perhaps it was originally a journalistic work, but, in the end, it expanded into a whole book.
Is the book worth reading for citizens of Russia itself? Well, only if the reader still doesn't understand who Vladimir Putin is and why he is still in power. By the end of 2022, this is no longer a secret for many people.
Новые порядки, новые игрушки,
Нам говорят о мире в телерадиоэфире,
Переплавляем ложки, кружки в пушки
И мир видали только из окна своей квартиры.
С одной стороны, мне хочется поставить этой книге высокую оценку, ибо любая книга, которая показывает истинное лицо путинской власти, заслуживает похвалы. Однако с другой, книга в очередной раз пересказывает череду всем известных событий на всём протяжении путинского правления. Мне кажется, что даже иностранцы выучили наизусть эти события, что происходили во время правления Путина, начиная с начала второй Чеченской войны и взрывов домов в Москве, захвата заложников в Норд-Осте, появления политика Навального и заканчивая войнами с Грузией и Украиной. Можно сказать, что книга в этом смысле похожа на книгу Михаила Зыгаря «Вся кремлевская рать: Краткая история современной России» с тем единственным отличием, что в этой книге есть вставки с «обычными людьми», чаще всего поддерживающие Путина. В принципе, наверно иностранцам такой подход будет чем-то даже интересным, ибо многие такие «простые люди» довольно искренни в своих мыслях по поводу «если не Путин, то кто?». Но тут есть один нюанс: этим людям не с чем сравнивать Путина. Они видят по телевизору только Путина и никого более. Это сознательная политика кремлёвской власти чтобы на фоне Путина все остальные смотрелись если не комично, то хотя бы несерьёзно. Именно поэтому Путин, никогда не участвовал ни в каких дебатах, ибо дебаты очень быстро показали всю обычность Путина (а возможно даже его нелепость). Поэтому включать в книгу размышления простых людей о Путине, не выглядит хорошей идей. В конце концов, всегда можно найти в стране группу людей поддерживающих самые безумные идеи (что мы и увидели в 2022). В книге мы встречаем несколько таких людей. Вот и получается, что книга является, с одной стороны, дайджестом по всем значимым событиям во время правления Путина, а с другой, интервью с простыми людьми по вопросу, почему они поддерживают Путина. И что автор книги этим хотел показать? Что все «простые люди» поддерживают Путина? Вряд ли. Даже среди «простых людей» его поддержка вовсе не 80%. Другими словами, намного лучше, если бы автор выбрал что-то одно - дайджест по путинскому правлению или мнение «простого народа» о Путине. Но получилось так, что автор нашёл несколько людей согласившихся с ним побеседовать и он от радости решил этих нескольких граждан представить в виде «российского народа поддерживающего своего вождя». На самом деле ситуация намного сложнее, ибо в каких-то социальных стратах Путина поддерживают больше, а в каких-то меньше. Особенно важен регион. Ну и, разумеется, в авторитарной стране спрашивать людей, почему они поддерживают диктатора, довольно бессмысленная затея. Интересно такие вопросы задавать обществу, у которого имеется выбор и, следовательно, выборы. В России с приходом Путина к власти это исчезло. Да и честно говоря, и до Путина выбор у российского народа был очень ограниченный. В итоге, книгу можно рассматривать наравне с вышеназванной книгой Зыгаря, но до серьёзного анализа ситуации в стране её очень и очень далеко.
И последнее. Эта книга очень сильно напоминает журналистскую работу. Наверно она изначально такой и была, но в итоге расширилась до целой книги.
Стоит ли читать книгу гражданам самой России? Ну, только в том случаи, если читатель всё ещё не понял, кто же такой Владимир Путин и почему он всё ещё у власти. Под конец 2022 для многих это уже перестало быть секретом.
On the one hand, I want to praise this book, because any book that shows the true face of Putin's power deserves praise. On the other hand, however, the book retells a series of well-known events throughout Putin's reign. It seems to me that even foreigners have learned by heart these events that took place during Putin's rule, starting with the beginning of the second Chechen war and the bombing of houses in Moscow, the hostage-taking in Nord-Ost, the emergence of the politician Navalny and ending with the wars with Georgia and Ukraine. One could say that the book, in this sense, is similar to Mikhail Zygar's book "All the Kremlin's Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin" with the only difference being that this book has inserts with "ordinary people" who most often support Putin. In principle, foreigners will probably find this approach interesting because many of these "ordinary people" are quite sincere in their thoughts about "if not Putin, who else?" But there is one nuance: these people have nothing to compare Putin with. They see only Putin on TV and no one else. It is a deliberate policy of the Kremlin authorities to make all the others look, if not comical, at least not serious against Putin. It is why Putin never participated in any debates, because the debates very quickly showed Putin's commonness (and perhaps even his ridiculousness). So including ordinary people's thoughts about Putin in the book doesn't seem like a good idea. After all, you can always find a group of people in the country who support the craziest ideas (as we saw in 2022). In the book, we meet several such people. So it turns out that the book is, on the one hand, a digest of all significant events during Putin's reign, and on the other hand, interviews with ordinary people on why they support Putin. And what did the author of the book want to show? That all "ordinary people" support Putin? Hardly. Even among "ordinary people," his support is not 80%. In other words, it would have been much better if the author had chosen one thing - a digest on Putin's rule or the opinion of "ordinary people" about Putin. But it turned out that the author found a few people who agreed to talk to him, and he happily decided to present these few citizens as "the Russian people supporting their leader." In fact, the situation is much more complicated because some social strata support Putin more and some less. The region is especially important. And, of course, in an authoritarian country, asking people why they support a dictator is a rather pointless exercise. It is interesting to ask such questions to a society that has a choice and, consequently, elections. In Russia, this has disappeared since Putin came to power. And to be honest, even before Putin, the Russian people had a very limited choice. As a result, the book can be considered on a par with the above-mentioned book by Zygar, but it is very far from being a serious analysis of the situation in the country.
One last thing. This book feels very much like a journalistic work. Perhaps it was originally a journalistic work, but, in the end, it expanded into a whole book.
Is the book worth reading for citizens of Russia itself? Well, only if the reader still doesn't understand who Vladimir Putin is and why he is still in power. By the end of 2022, this is no longer a secret for many people.
July 2, 2019
Great account about Putin and the Russian People.
Lots of data lots of polls lots of stories.
the main theme is the relationship of the Russian people with Putin and/or the DUMA (crazy printer).
Lots of data lots of polls lots of stories.
the main theme is the relationship of the Russian people with Putin and/or the DUMA (crazy printer).
July 4, 2023
Felt like it educated me ... perhaps a little sparse all the same.
May 15, 2024
A great and unique book that focuses on modern Russian politics and its relationship with the Russian people. It starts off with such a striking concept: Putin is a dictator and a popular man that cares about staying popular.
Besides the brief bio of Putin's early life, the whole second time as president was a really big deal in Russian politics and history.
Besides all the political problems in his administration in regards to terrorism and lacking economy, Putin has risen above all that by literally staying above politics and the party. A true populist. He also takes advantage of wedge issues that divide people. There was a whole chapter about this in regards to the band Puasy riot that had this controversial performance inside a church which got them in such trouble for years including some of them going to prison. In regards to the media, the book emphasizes how it is TV that really is the dominant force in how people get any of their information. Thereby how much putin used tv for their agenda.
The next chapter is all about getting the Russian support for the crimean invasion in 2014. The start of that whole debacle to this day remains in some mystery. It just unfolded with a blatantly obvious lie of "Polite civilians" that were heavily armed and equipped holding the area hostage. The polite civilians an idea created for the polite, Russian defending, moral normal men. While the Russian government denying they had nothing to do with it. I was deeply intrigued about the idea of Putin and the nationalists. Although often limited into nationalism, the Kremlin has distanced itself from the nationalists in Russia. An important split since the krushchev era. They've disagreed on Visa issues since which has stopped Putin from being a nationalist. There have been many attempts to steal mainstream nationalist voters by creating other parties set to take away seats in parliament. The issue of crimea has been a long held nationalist dream. Putin on the other hand finally addressed it with a long winded historic justification that tried to use every single angle. The nationalists loved it and they were a large part of the original recruits online. The media, as per usual has all sorts of ways to make Europe and the Ukraine become the enemy and create hatred for them in Russia. There is an important shift or split between Moscow and the nationalists as the Minsk agreements went on that the war was diminished but Ukraine was increasingly weakened. The nationalists completely ignored this online demonstrating a dilemma for Europe and Ukraine for a seemingly incapable conflict.
The next chapter focused on how Putin and the Kremlin used the conflict in crimea to gain popularity. The Kremlin predominantly uses foreign policy matters in their elections as opposed to t neglected economy. They also focus on a city at a time. Previously focusing their attention on the Sochi Olympics and then in crimea. Our crimea, became a popular slogan that represented this imaginary nostalgia. This is not to say that it wasn't a polarizing and controversial issue in Russia. But the official narrative on TV and then online, made it out to be a perfectly justified decision based off of mistake during the Soviet era, the Russia was correcting. It also focused on the large Russian speaking population in crimea, to unite, despite them identifying as ethnically Ukrainian. Most importantly it would, point or the risk and while of fascism, like in WW2. The Kremlin controlled media would turn on news on the Ukraine over almost anything, including kids tv shows. They also got rid of any "opposition" channels whatsoever. I'm amazed but somehow not surprised that political and economical scientists are so calculated that they use mathematics to estimate human behavior. To get to the bottom of it they have to understand rational decisions and emotional decisions. The emotional one being the one that actually outranks the former. The emotion that is generally associated with dictators is fear, which is somewhat true but not the primary one with Putin. There is the bizarre example of the worship of Stalin at the end of his life, after all atrocities for his acknowledged victory over fascism. It's just an example that believable narratives are what drive people's political emotions, not brainwashing or ignorance. At the center of this process with Putin is tv. The main source of all information for Russians. The issue in crimea made the Russian people dramatically shift and feel a sense of national pride, trust and hope. This is partly to do with three Russian military on the offensive for the first time in decades. It's mostly a sense of participation that they are united and part of a grand event. This isn't a new idea but Putin has been able to do it for a really long time. This comes with a burden to keep those that have jumped on the band wagon.
The next chapter delves incredibly deep into political psychology. This is truly interesting but it's quite hard for me to understand what the conclusion is beyond the obvious. It describes how difficult it is to actually have any sort of consensus on the Russian people's personality. Some studies managed to put people's personality vaguely into 5 or so different scales. The main one being Agreeability, (the are openes, extroversion, conscientious, neuroticism). Being on one side of these scales or another will definitely affect most parts of your life, including politics. People will be probably more swayed by policies that they Believe directly affect them or that they understand. But it's very hard to measure how much it's affected an individual so how a policy or idea is framed is much more important. This is of course done by the media which in Russia is mostly controlled by the Kremlin. Seems obvious. As mentioned before, Agreeability is the biggest determining Factor for Russian politics, with those that are more agreeable , voting for Putin. This may be surprising only because Russia works differently than the West. They are neither liberal nor a democracy. Politics is about the president and loyalty to the President is the same as loyalty to the state. In a context where citizens are asked to show loyalty to the state and their people, through political views, highly agreeable people are likely to feel internal pressure to accept the current government. Even people that aren't involved in politics or don't care about particular issues.
The next chapter focused on the opposition that also got significantly bigger and more united after the crimea incident. At the center for one reason or another is Alexi nivalni. He had one hell of a hard time even being remotely considered a threat as he was barred, charged, harassed in every possible way over and over again. He's since died since the writing of this book a few years later.
The book doesn't have the most enlightening and definitive conclusion as it seems difficult to change or to improve. In a long winded conclusion, ultimately even Democratic countries weren't always democratic and Russia doesn't have to stay the way it is forever either. Seems to stay the same for the near future.
Besides the brief bio of Putin's early life, the whole second time as president was a really big deal in Russian politics and history.
Besides all the political problems in his administration in regards to terrorism and lacking economy, Putin has risen above all that by literally staying above politics and the party. A true populist. He also takes advantage of wedge issues that divide people. There was a whole chapter about this in regards to the band Puasy riot that had this controversial performance inside a church which got them in such trouble for years including some of them going to prison. In regards to the media, the book emphasizes how it is TV that really is the dominant force in how people get any of their information. Thereby how much putin used tv for their agenda.
The next chapter is all about getting the Russian support for the crimean invasion in 2014. The start of that whole debacle to this day remains in some mystery. It just unfolded with a blatantly obvious lie of "Polite civilians" that were heavily armed and equipped holding the area hostage. The polite civilians an idea created for the polite, Russian defending, moral normal men. While the Russian government denying they had nothing to do with it. I was deeply intrigued about the idea of Putin and the nationalists. Although often limited into nationalism, the Kremlin has distanced itself from the nationalists in Russia. An important split since the krushchev era. They've disagreed on Visa issues since which has stopped Putin from being a nationalist. There have been many attempts to steal mainstream nationalist voters by creating other parties set to take away seats in parliament. The issue of crimea has been a long held nationalist dream. Putin on the other hand finally addressed it with a long winded historic justification that tried to use every single angle. The nationalists loved it and they were a large part of the original recruits online. The media, as per usual has all sorts of ways to make Europe and the Ukraine become the enemy and create hatred for them in Russia. There is an important shift or split between Moscow and the nationalists as the Minsk agreements went on that the war was diminished but Ukraine was increasingly weakened. The nationalists completely ignored this online demonstrating a dilemma for Europe and Ukraine for a seemingly incapable conflict.
The next chapter focused on how Putin and the Kremlin used the conflict in crimea to gain popularity. The Kremlin predominantly uses foreign policy matters in their elections as opposed to t neglected economy. They also focus on a city at a time. Previously focusing their attention on the Sochi Olympics and then in crimea. Our crimea, became a popular slogan that represented this imaginary nostalgia. This is not to say that it wasn't a polarizing and controversial issue in Russia. But the official narrative on TV and then online, made it out to be a perfectly justified decision based off of mistake during the Soviet era, the Russia was correcting. It also focused on the large Russian speaking population in crimea, to unite, despite them identifying as ethnically Ukrainian. Most importantly it would, point or the risk and while of fascism, like in WW2. The Kremlin controlled media would turn on news on the Ukraine over almost anything, including kids tv shows. They also got rid of any "opposition" channels whatsoever. I'm amazed but somehow not surprised that political and economical scientists are so calculated that they use mathematics to estimate human behavior. To get to the bottom of it they have to understand rational decisions and emotional decisions. The emotional one being the one that actually outranks the former. The emotion that is generally associated with dictators is fear, which is somewhat true but not the primary one with Putin. There is the bizarre example of the worship of Stalin at the end of his life, after all atrocities for his acknowledged victory over fascism. It's just an example that believable narratives are what drive people's political emotions, not brainwashing or ignorance. At the center of this process with Putin is tv. The main source of all information for Russians. The issue in crimea made the Russian people dramatically shift and feel a sense of national pride, trust and hope. This is partly to do with three Russian military on the offensive for the first time in decades. It's mostly a sense of participation that they are united and part of a grand event. This isn't a new idea but Putin has been able to do it for a really long time. This comes with a burden to keep those that have jumped on the band wagon.
The next chapter delves incredibly deep into political psychology. This is truly interesting but it's quite hard for me to understand what the conclusion is beyond the obvious. It describes how difficult it is to actually have any sort of consensus on the Russian people's personality. Some studies managed to put people's personality vaguely into 5 or so different scales. The main one being Agreeability, (the are openes, extroversion, conscientious, neuroticism). Being on one side of these scales or another will definitely affect most parts of your life, including politics. People will be probably more swayed by policies that they Believe directly affect them or that they understand. But it's very hard to measure how much it's affected an individual so how a policy or idea is framed is much more important. This is of course done by the media which in Russia is mostly controlled by the Kremlin. Seems obvious. As mentioned before, Agreeability is the biggest determining Factor for Russian politics, with those that are more agreeable , voting for Putin. This may be surprising only because Russia works differently than the West. They are neither liberal nor a democracy. Politics is about the president and loyalty to the President is the same as loyalty to the state. In a context where citizens are asked to show loyalty to the state and their people, through political views, highly agreeable people are likely to feel internal pressure to accept the current government. Even people that aren't involved in politics or don't care about particular issues.
The next chapter focused on the opposition that also got significantly bigger and more united after the crimea incident. At the center for one reason or another is Alexi nivalni. He had one hell of a hard time even being remotely considered a threat as he was barred, charged, harassed in every possible way over and over again. He's since died since the writing of this book a few years later.
The book doesn't have the most enlightening and definitive conclusion as it seems difficult to change or to improve. In a long winded conclusion, ultimately even Democratic countries weren't always democratic and Russia doesn't have to stay the way it is forever either. Seems to stay the same for the near future.
November 14, 2022
4.5 rounded down to 4
Written by Samuel A. Greene and Graeme B. Robertson, Putin v. The People is a great analysis of Putin's politics throughout his mandate, including when, in theory, he wasn't.
The research covers interviews with Russian citizens from different parts of the country in a wide variety of issues to measure the public opinion, which is a key element for Kremlin's decisions and politicis, thus, showing how Russian society from different spectrums feeds Putin's politics and viceversa. It's quite interesting how this symbiotic relationship has driven politics depending on the time of occurrence, but which in any case has allowed Putin's control over the media, "mysterious" deaths of opponents, and so on over a wide time span.
As an additional note, it's impressive how many of Kremlin's tactics have been used by some governments in Latin America; the paralells with the current government of Mexico are worrying, to say the least.
All the items covered in the book are supported by data, but it also specifies when the latter is not sufficient to reach a conclusion. In addition, the authors are always very clear on what the research does and does not demonstrate.
In short, Putin v. The People is a must read for anyone interested in Putin's politics and how he's been able to hold power for so long.
Written by Samuel A. Greene and Graeme B. Robertson, Putin v. The People is a great analysis of Putin's politics throughout his mandate, including when, in theory, he wasn't.
The research covers interviews with Russian citizens from different parts of the country in a wide variety of issues to measure the public opinion, which is a key element for Kremlin's decisions and politicis, thus, showing how Russian society from different spectrums feeds Putin's politics and viceversa. It's quite interesting how this symbiotic relationship has driven politics depending on the time of occurrence, but which in any case has allowed Putin's control over the media, "mysterious" deaths of opponents, and so on over a wide time span.
As an additional note, it's impressive how many of Kremlin's tactics have been used by some governments in Latin America; the paralells with the current government of Mexico are worrying, to say the least.
All the items covered in the book are supported by data, but it also specifies when the latter is not sufficient to reach a conclusion. In addition, the authors are always very clear on what the research does and does not demonstrate.
In short, Putin v. The People is a must read for anyone interested in Putin's politics and how he's been able to hold power for so long.
January 26, 2021
I knew next to nothing about Russian politics but feel much better informed after reading this book.
March 8, 2022
Some people support Putin because they like the way the country is moving. Many people are not thrilled with Putin, but toe the party line because it is the socially acceptable thing to do, because of the lack of a serious alternative.
Russian nationalism. Many Russians do not want to be part of European culture.
Putin does need popularity to an extent—and is highly popular.
State-run TV propaganda.
Russia is not doomed to autocracy.
“Our biggest enemy is the lack of belief that something can be changed.”
People will not push against the grain if they don’t think they will be on the winning side. They prefer to get in line and follow the masses. If it seems the masses will shift course, in a moment the masses will make that move.
Russian nationalism. Many Russians do not want to be part of European culture.
Putin does need popularity to an extent—and is highly popular.
State-run TV propaganda.
Russia is not doomed to autocracy.
“Our biggest enemy is the lack of belief that something can be changed.”
People will not push against the grain if they don’t think they will be on the winning side. They prefer to get in line and follow the masses. If it seems the masses will shift course, in a moment the masses will make that move.
May 23, 2022
Should be read in todays climate (specifically around these past few weeks, at the time of writing this review).
While the propaganda machine is big on both sides and it seems that the world will be returning to the Cold War era soon, its vital to take everthing being said and formulate an opinion based on many references.
That being said i think many overestimate the power of people and their desire to live their life "freely" to the point that they are willing to stand up to their goverment and return to peaceful times.
Propaganda and living the life under carefully chosen narratives is an effective brainwash system, despite all the "freedom" one might think they have.
While the propaganda machine is big on both sides and it seems that the world will be returning to the Cold War era soon, its vital to take everthing being said and formulate an opinion based on many references.
That being said i think many overestimate the power of people and their desire to live their life "freely" to the point that they are willing to stand up to their goverment and return to peaceful times.
Propaganda and living the life under carefully chosen narratives is an effective brainwash system, despite all the "freedom" one might think they have.
January 1, 2024
I should admit that I didn't learn anything new from the book. Perhaps for those who do not have basic knowledge about the Russian politics, this book will be a good source of information, but nothing more. I expected more, for example, about the deeper motivation of Russians to support putin. However, the emphasis is on describing the political events of Russia in the last decade. In addition, the book contains several factual inaccuracies, which are however of minor importance. One of the advantages of the book: a simple and accessible style of narration.
February 9, 2024
This was a really great book that ties in some fascinating anthropological and sociological work in a look at Russia more focused more on the people of Putin’s Russia than Putin himself. Really interesting perspective and full of fascinating fieldwork data.
March 20, 2024
Finishing this book, I realized that I don’t know anything more than before I read it. I thought I’d understand the Russians better after reading this book. But no, the whole book is about this, then that, and that and that too. I walked away not knowing Russians any better.
December 17, 2019
Good book encompassing how we should understand domestic support for Putin. Hopefully I can get a more thorough review published.
January 10, 2020
Just one sided looked at Putin and his government. Typical type of dark overview of Russia and its government. Nothing new.
September 18, 2021
Interesting, even if it was a bit soft in the research area.
January 15, 2022
An excellent, in-depth look at Russian politics and society informed by rich datasets.
May 18, 2023
Not Bad, i think you can sum.the whole book up in a nutshell ... Easy read which is good, you cant mistake any information.
January 23, 2024
3,5 this was interesting and insightful but I need to stop giving everything 4 and 5 stars
February 14, 2024
It's well written & correct based on my personal experience. But it didn't tell me anything I haven't already known. Hence 4 not 5.
July 9, 2025
Thoroughly enjoyed this. A cogently argued and original look at Russia. Needs a more recent update to incorporate changes post war
March 14, 2022
I think the author did a great job of making a political science/sociological approach towards Putin's popularity understandable to a regular audience. While there were some areas that I think could have been made stronger with different polling, this book in a great secondary read towards understanding that while Putin is authoritarian, he is also popular.
June 4, 2023
An insightful recap of Putin's consolidation of power. Greene includes a few interesting political theories and methods, providing a stronger theoretical and methodological basis than most Russia analysts do. An avid reader of Greene's weekly newsletter, I had expected this book to dive a bit deeper, however!
October 22, 2022
Fascinating read! Was nice to see references to their directly held research, rather than someone else's, that defined their thoughts in the book. I did find all the names and locations hard to differentiate or visualize, as that part of the world is not where I was raised.
March 13, 2023
Really enjoyed this as an westerner I am amazed at what is missed about putin's crackdown on liberty. A must read if you wish to understand the current ukraine war
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