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Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation
The first systematic look at the different strategies that states employ in their pursuit of nuclear weapons
Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics.
Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies―hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program.
As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.
Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics.
Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies―hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program.
As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.
400 pages, Hardcover
Published January 11, 2022
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
March 24, 2025
This book does not just chronicle the proliferation of nuclear-armed states, it is an academic text that provides a novel way of thinking about the subject as a whole. Narang establishes his Proliferation Strategy Theory as an alternative to older, more robust approaches to international relations, and he is quite opinionated that it is superior to these. It is easy to see why considering how cohesive the model is. Specifically, he promotes PST as an alternative to both the realist and technological determinist camps of international studies. Previous literature only broke nuclear proliferation down into either states that sprinted towards armament, or nuclear latent states with no weapons capabilities. Narang describes the latter as "hedgers", and differentiates between three types: technical hedgers, who only have capabilities for nuclear energy production, but could potentially mobilize for weapons development (Argentina, Brazil, etc.); insurance hedgers, who likewise have the resources for nuclear weapons but are protected by an umbrella of deterrence from an allied great power that otherwise prevents proliferations (Germany, Japan, etc.); and hard hedgers, who have nuclear resources that could be mobilized extremely quickly for weapons production, because of a potential outside security threat (Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina, Brazil, Iran, etc.). Each form of hedging in this list is predicated by the previous one, with hard hedging being the closest to actual nuclear proliferation.
Narang then narrows the definition of countries who sprinted to their weapons development, arguing that this is only possible for nations with sufficient conventional capabilities to prevent foreign interference. This was the case with the great powers (P5) whose proliferation occurred prior to the NPT (as well as India, who sprinted following a long period of hedging). Narang instead provides a form of proliferation analogous to insurance hedging with the sheltered pursuers, who only developed nuclear weapons following sufficient security guarantees from larger states. The United States sheltered both Israel and Pakistan's weapons programs in order to maintain the security of its interests in the Middle East, while China permitted North Korea to develop their program to create a strong buffer between the PRC and South Korea. Finally, there are the hiders, who seek indigenous weapons programs in spite of the NPT, with any public knowledge of these surely warranting international sanctions or even armed intervention. Only South Africa was able to successfully develop nuclear weapons in complete hiding (before dismantling the program, as the failing apartheid government did not want the rising ANC, representing the millions of people who had long discriminated against under apartheid, to have access to nuclear weapons). Previous attempts at describing proliferation efforts have long had difficulties squaring away South Africa with the other nuclear states, especially since they are also the only country to have given up their nukes. Narang solves this by expanding his analysis of hiders to include the many states who failed in their hiding efforts, such as Iraq, Taiwan, Syria, and Libya. Iraq's case is quite interesting, as Saddam very much did want to have a nuclear weapons program even immediately prior to his ousting. But their hiding efforts were simply too lacking and inept as a result of being shut off from foreign help and having to go through great pains to avoid international scrutiny. US intelligence leading up to the Iraq War had indeed discovered vast complexes for weapons development, but these simply had not produced anything substantially fissile, making the war effort bunk.
Narang not only outlines how PST explains each of history's nuclear pursuers, he also wants it to be used in efforts to dissuade future proliferation. In the case of Iran, the Obama-era Iranian nuclear deal well-demonstrated a nation shifting from hiding to hard hedging as described by PST, solely as a result of diplomatic pressure and promises of sanction relief. While Trump greatly confounded the effort by retreating from the deal, Iran remains committed to hard hedging as opposed to proliferation. Narang views this as evidence that PST is worthwhile for approaching non-proliferation, especially as great foreign policy issues, such as the war in Ukraine or failing American security guarantees in Europe (the book was written prior to both of these), have made nuclear weapons seem more desirable to some.
4.44/5 stars
Narang then narrows the definition of countries who sprinted to their weapons development, arguing that this is only possible for nations with sufficient conventional capabilities to prevent foreign interference. This was the case with the great powers (P5) whose proliferation occurred prior to the NPT (as well as India, who sprinted following a long period of hedging). Narang instead provides a form of proliferation analogous to insurance hedging with the sheltered pursuers, who only developed nuclear weapons following sufficient security guarantees from larger states. The United States sheltered both Israel and Pakistan's weapons programs in order to maintain the security of its interests in the Middle East, while China permitted North Korea to develop their program to create a strong buffer between the PRC and South Korea. Finally, there are the hiders, who seek indigenous weapons programs in spite of the NPT, with any public knowledge of these surely warranting international sanctions or even armed intervention. Only South Africa was able to successfully develop nuclear weapons in complete hiding (before dismantling the program, as the failing apartheid government did not want the rising ANC, representing the millions of people who had long discriminated against under apartheid, to have access to nuclear weapons). Previous attempts at describing proliferation efforts have long had difficulties squaring away South Africa with the other nuclear states, especially since they are also the only country to have given up their nukes. Narang solves this by expanding his analysis of hiders to include the many states who failed in their hiding efforts, such as Iraq, Taiwan, Syria, and Libya. Iraq's case is quite interesting, as Saddam very much did want to have a nuclear weapons program even immediately prior to his ousting. But their hiding efforts were simply too lacking and inept as a result of being shut off from foreign help and having to go through great pains to avoid international scrutiny. US intelligence leading up to the Iraq War had indeed discovered vast complexes for weapons development, but these simply had not produced anything substantially fissile, making the war effort bunk.
Narang not only outlines how PST explains each of history's nuclear pursuers, he also wants it to be used in efforts to dissuade future proliferation. In the case of Iran, the Obama-era Iranian nuclear deal well-demonstrated a nation shifting from hiding to hard hedging as described by PST, solely as a result of diplomatic pressure and promises of sanction relief. While Trump greatly confounded the effort by retreating from the deal, Iran remains committed to hard hedging as opposed to proliferation. Narang views this as evidence that PST is worthwhile for approaching non-proliferation, especially as great foreign policy issues, such as the war in Ukraine or failing American security guarantees in Europe (the book was written prior to both of these), have made nuclear weapons seem more desirable to some.
4.44/5 stars
September 26, 2024
a massive achievement and a clear structure in understanding why do states do what they do for the bomb 💣
March 30, 2023
Haiku review:
Honors course reading.
Relations between countries.
Bombs create a mess.
Honors course reading.
Relations between countries.
Bombs create a mess.
August 1, 2022
Dr. Narang lays out his system for categorizing nuclear proliferation strategies in the same manner he laid out his system for understanding different nuclear postures in Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. While the previous book is certainly not necessary this text he does make several references to the different postures described in his previous work.
What you are getting here is a system by which to predict the pathway to a bomb a given nation would take in pursuit of nuclear weapons. Dr. Narang dispels the myth that every nation simply sprints for a bomb, and argues that the speed at which nations can conduct weapons development is a function of it's technical, political, security, and geopolitcal position. This book is not about how nations build bombs, if you're interested in that subject I'd point you to The Making of the Atomic Bomb. This book explains how nations tip toe up to or cross over the line of building a nuclear weapon from a decision making standpoint. Dr. Narang has a goal of understanding the various needs and wants of nuclear proliferators in order to better inform arms control and non proliferation efforts.
What you are getting here is a system by which to predict the pathway to a bomb a given nation would take in pursuit of nuclear weapons. Dr. Narang dispels the myth that every nation simply sprints for a bomb, and argues that the speed at which nations can conduct weapons development is a function of it's technical, political, security, and geopolitcal position. This book is not about how nations build bombs, if you're interested in that subject I'd point you to The Making of the Atomic Bomb. This book explains how nations tip toe up to or cross over the line of building a nuclear weapon from a decision making standpoint. Dr. Narang has a goal of understanding the various needs and wants of nuclear proliferators in order to better inform arms control and non proliferation efforts.
August 26, 2023
Narang had eloquently placed the five strategies that a nuclear-arsenal seeking country might use. However, he decided to go through these strategy in detail and examine them in the beginning which gave the following chapters a bore read due to the fact that everything was given beforehand.
July 21, 2024
Intellectually coherent and structured well. A good if somewhat dry resource on how states pursue nuclear weapons.
July 5, 2025
Buku yang sangat komprehensif membahas mengapa suatu negara mau dan bisa mengakuisisi bom nuklir, meskipun banyak kata-kata teknis tapi secara keseluruhan isi buku sangat bernas
August 23, 2025
Fantastically educational. It has permanently shaped how I think about nuclear proliferation
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews