It was partly traumatic to come back to the topic of Brexit after having been in Parliament during the Boris years. It was also difficult at the time to be able to try and level-headedly evaluate both positions given the enormous amount of information that was spewed out constantly from both sides of the debate; however this short book, written not long after the UK left the EU 'for real', provides a clear account of why the country had always been, due to our unique history and standing within Europe, the most likely of it's peers to leave the EU. This book can be read by those who have little knowledge of the history of Brexit, and can come away with a good summation of the thoughts of both Remainers and Leavers.
Brown's decision to forgo joining the Euro was fundamental to our ability to leave the EU (and helped in our ability to respond to the 08 Financial Crisis and Covid more nimbly than the Eurozone), which may put to rest any idea of other iterations of Brexit for other countries, given the effect this would have on citizen's savings should they have to switch out of the Euro (approximately a 10-15% reduction in people's savings should this take place), therefore politically untenable. Brexit has served as an inflection point to our direction as a country in this new multi-polar world: one towards ever worsening managed decline alongside the EU; or "reasserting democracy in the only form in which it flourishes or has ever flourished - within a nation state."
Passages that I found useful:
"Remain voters may, I suggest, be placed into four overlapping categories. First, Ideological Remainers. This small group (the aforementioned, 9 percent of Remain voters, about 1.4 million people) claim to be primarily motivated by an emotional commitment to the "European project" - 'the last of the Enlightenment grand narratives.' They support greater power being exercised by EU institutions, and some think of themselves primarily as 'Europeans'. For those sharing this sentiment (who seem from personal observation to include elderly as well as youthful idealists) the EU shares the same lineage as the League of Nations, the United Nations and even the Green movement. Whatever its shortcomings, they feel it somehow expresses 'peace on earth and goodwill to men'. It embodies European civilization in a traditional form - ancient Greece, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment - but shorn of its darker qualities. According to the philosopher John Gray, 'they think of themselves as embodiments of reason, facing down the ignorant passions of the unwashed rabble. But their rationalism is a vehicle for a dangerous myth, which the EU is a semi-sacred institution." They may regard British and English national identity as outdated or even dangerous, and sometimes hold vehemently negative views of Britain and England — a considerable portion of this group, simple arithmetic suggests, may well be Scottish, Welsh or Irish nationalists." Add to the mixture a strong dash of anti-Americanism and "post-colonial guilt". Such sentiments have a long pedigree, harking back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - in 1940 George Orwell mocked those who would feel more ashamed of standing to attention during "God Save the King" than of stealing from a poor box'."
"Did Remainers as a whole share any common assumptions? Did Leavers? For convinced Remainers, one is 'declinism': the belief that Britain is a much diminished and weak country, barely able to function economically or politically on its own. If for some this is a cause of alarm and regret, many Remainers appear to cling to it gleefully, presumably as a way of repudiating the nation state, or at least the British nation state. The corollary is a bien-pensant internationalism, whether as an ideal or merely as a convenience - ease of travel, and, for the better off, ownership of property in agreeable parts of the Continent. Such Europeanism (found in the richer parts of every EU country) can be costless: "not ... the acquisition of new obligations towards the less successful regions of Europe [but] the exit from former obligations towards the less successful regions of one's own nation!" The problems facing the EU seem to cast little shadow: whereas post-Brexit Britain is confidently declared to be in terminal decline, the EU is assumed to be marching towards fulfilment and the resolution of its problems. 'The fantasy that another Europe is on the horizon,' comments John Gray, 'allows them to evade the mortifying truth that the European project belongs in the past. Here, surely, is 'nostalgia' — the trait they ascribe to Leavers. "
"The conservative philosopher Roger Scruton prioritized culture, community and nation, 'a society held together by trust between strangers", the bedrock of tolerance, democracy and inclusivity. He regretted that many Remainers seemed animated by repudiation of home - the turning away from the inherited first person plural', and he argued that Britain always had been and remained part of true European culture. "' John Gray, also a philosopher, wrote mordant political commentaries, one of which identified the 'fellow-traveller' mentality attractive to intellectuals: "The ease with which fellow-travellers pass over the casualties of the regimes with which they identify is one of their defining traits... They are attracted by any large political experiment that seems to prefigure a new order of things." Richard Tuck, a left-wing historian of ideas, provided incisive analyses of the politics, as did the economist Graham Gudgin of the economics. Matthew Goodwin attempted to explain 'populism' rather than abusing voters. Chris Bickerton provided a critical inside analysis of the EU system, in which former nation states were reduced to dependent member states. Vernon Bogdanor, a leading constitutional expert, hoped that Brexit, a new beginning, might catalyse constitutional reform. Paul Collier, an economist who had voted Remain but accepted Leave, reflected on the growing importance of community and the need for an 'economics of belonging' through which post-Brexit policy must redress the inequalities created by the globalized metropolitan culture of individual rights and group privileges. Stephen Davies wrote a detailed political analysis, arguing that Brexit marked a fundamental realignment of political forces in Britain and Europe."
"Secessionism of the wealthy can be seen clearly in Catalonia, Flanders, northern Italy and London. Had the EU been economically successful, its peoples might perhaps have reconciled themselves to becoming denationalized Europeans under a technocracy with a systemic democratic deficit. After all, democracy is new and fragile in much of Europe, and is often tainted with failure and corruption. But the EU has not been successful, and it is now similarly tainted. Its defenders would perhaps argue that, without the EU, things would be worse - that we are 'better together'. Indeed, EU membership once buttressed democracy and the rule of law, as in Spain, Portugal and Greece, and in newly independent Eastern Europe. But now the biggest problems stem from the EU itself. It has created a political void between citizens and those who govern them: powers of decision have been removed from open electoral politics and placed in the shadowy realm of secret diplomacy. The EU has become a political black hole, sucking authority away from elected governments but being unable to wield that authority effectively. It faces a series of problems it cannot solve: migration, unemployment, the growing inequalities and dangers of the Eurozone system, and now the Ukraine crisis. Its response to the COVID pandemic, which seemed to many a make-or-break challenge, again underlined its divisions and limitations. Its ambition to play a superpower role falls embarrassingly, even dangerously, short. Russian aggression showed it as a follower, not a leader. Even people who accept many of these criticisms fall back as an ultimate argument on political gigantism: the EU is very big; and post-Brexit Britain is small. Versions of this argument are more than a century old."
"The idea of a united Europe as the embodiment and defender of a certain humane civilization, even as an 'empire', has attracted people for over 150 years - not so much a place as an idea. The ‘founding fathers' are seen by some as having engaged in ‘a heroic endeavour’ with its prime justification renunciation of chauvinism and war in favour of harmony, friendship and the defence of European exceptionalism. Beethoven's "Ode to Joy' is an inspiring prophecy: 'All men will be brothers .. ‘ The beguiling vision remains eternally just over the horizon. Brexit was felt by many in Europe and Britain to be a philistine act of destruction, like smashing a Greek statue or throwing acid over a Renaissance painting. But this Europe, as Tony Judt pointed out, was 'a Europe of the mind." As such, it enthused many intellectuals. But, despite huge and continuing efforts, it has not managed to become equally attractive as a Europe of realities, able to inspire the instinctive shared identity that any democratic system - or even an empire - requires to be successful. The only justification for being willing to cede authority to this faltering utopia would be if it did indeed have some overriding political and moral purpose as 'a Europe of citizens, peoples, democracy and destiny.' To be frank, to me this is what Milan Kundera called political kitsch, something the EU has been brilliant at creating. The reality is a rather cynical system in which some social groups, some interests, and some countries gain hugely, and others lose hugely."
"How might Brexit be remembered in Britain, as far as it is remembered at all? At least as an alteration in economic and political direction after nearly fifty years of hesitant commitment to European integration. At best, as the beginning of an effort to improve social cohesion, to shake up a tired system of government, and to reset an exhausted national strategy. At worst, as the acceleration of a long decline into relative poverty, global marginalization, and social and political dis-integration. This third possibility is the standard Remainer scenario, which some cling to with fierce passion. Which of these turns out to be true depends partly on the state of a suddenly unstable world, but, above all, on our collective decisions: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.' Though it sparked a culture war, Brexit was essentially political. Most Leave voters of all classes were determined to have a government that would pay attention to them. Though often dismissed as populism, having governments that pay attention is the aim and constant effort of democracy. Not all Leavers want the same things, but they do want that, as traditional Labour voters showed in December 2019 by backing a Conservative government. Many people across Europe also want more political control. Yanis Varoufakis, long a prominent advocate of a democratized EU, now thinks that we did the right thing, if for the wrong reason. Those of us who supported Leave thought it was for the right reason: to reassert democracy in the only form in which it flourishes or has ever flourished - within a nation state. Many who voted Remain accept this view."