The Franco-Prussian War

by Michael Eliot Howard, Bertrand Taithe (Foreword)

In 1870 the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck ordered the Prussian Army to invade France, inciting one of the most dramatic conflicts in European history. It transformed not only the states-system of the European continent but the whole climate of European moral and political thought. The overwhelming triumph of German military might, evoking general admiration and imitation, introduced an era of power politics, which was to reach its disastrous climax in 1914.

Genres: History, Military History, France, Germany, War, Nonfiction, Military Fiction

547 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1961

About the author

Sir Michael Eliot Howard was an English military historian, formerly Chichele Professor of the History of War, Honorary Fellow of All Souls College, Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford, Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, and founder of the Department of War Studies, King's College London.

In 1958, he co-founded the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

In 2013, Howard was described in the Financial Times as "Britain's greatest living historian". The Guardian described him as "Britain's foremost expert on conflict".

Reviews

[Manray9 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael Howard's The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 is a prize-winning account of the background and conduct of the war that changed Europe and set the course for the twentieth century. The weak Napoleon III, enfeebled by ill health, foolishly went to war to bolster his failing regime, revive his declining popularity, and secure the future of the Bonaparte dynasty. His generals, arrogant and eager for glory, but as ill-informed, unprepared, and shortsighted as he, urged him on. It was among history's greatest miscalculations. To Napoleon III and the French generals, the war would be won by national élan, rather than by such mundane and inglorious considerations as wise strategic thinking, tactical training, dependable communications, solid operational planning, and reliable logistics support. War had changed – and the changes were wrought by the Prussian general staff. The French did not recognize the new reality.

Howard emphasizes the staggering incompetence of the French government and its military leaders during the Second Empire. French military thought remained fixed in the era of the great Napoleon, but had been influenced by decades of small unit actions in Algeria and Mexico. Modern scientific and managerial practices were neglected. The most glaring example of France's outdated methods was mobilization. The German system of reserve force manning and training was vastly superior to the half-hearted efforts of the French. Imperial generals were paralyzed by political considerations which led them to view creation of a strong and well-trained reserve as an effort “to prepare an army for insurrection against the Government and society.” The efficient German mobilization contrasted with widespread confusion and delay on the French side. Within 18 days of the declaration, the Germans mobilized 1,183,000 men and placed 380,000 troops in the forward zone. In France affairs were much different. Many French units reached the front either late or with inadequate supplies. By the 23rd day of mobilization, only about half of French reservists had reached their regiments, and many of these lacked the most essential items of uniform and equipment. The rest, if they had left their depots at all, were marooned en route by railway delays and spent their days sleeping, drinking, begging, and plundering army stores.

Prussia has been successful in organizing its army around a professional core augmented by conscription and a trained reserve, the Landwehr. This system, along with von Moltke's expert General Staff and his special Lines of Communications Department, enabled the Germans (at this time still just the North German Confederation, not a united Germany) to bring a huge host into the field -- armed, uniformed, fed, and properly supplied. Bismarck, for his part, saw war with France as an opportunity to bring the South German states into union with the North German Confederation and build a German Empire under the hegemony of Prussia. The Germans had superiority of numbers, since, true to Bismarck’s hopes, the South German states of Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg honored their treaty commitments to Prussia and joined the fight against France. French anti-Prussian diplomacy failed as completely as did French arms.

The fighting in the fields and around the fortresses of France was sanguinary. Despite the German advantages in numbers, supply, and organization, the French possessed two weapons much in advance of their adversaries -- the chassepot rifle and the mitrailleuse gun. The French infantry rifles exceeded German shoulder weapons in range and accuracy, but the superiority of German artillery often led to French forces being cut to pieces before the infantry could exploit the advantage of their rifles. The Germans respected and feared the mitrailleuse (often called an early machine gun, but really a volley gun using 25 separate barrels firing 13mm rounds. A sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute was common). It was the best proto-machine gun of the pre-Maxim days, but French tactical doctrine for its employment was faulty. They insisted on placing the guns in battery, usually sited in the open (a la Napoleon I), and at extreme range. The German artillery could easily suppress the fire of the French mitrailleuse. Neither the chassepot nor mitrailleuse could compensate for the French army's many shortcomings.

The French use of cavalry en masse was a disaster. Cavalry officers envisioned the reincarnation of Marshal Ney. The charges of full squadrons and regiments of cuirassiers and chasseurs à cheval ended in slaughter. The days of massed cavalry attacking infantry were over. Infantry armed with breech-loading rifles and behind fieldworks carpeted the land with dead cavalrymen and their mounts. The French had to learn the hard way. Cavalry retained an important place in screening the flanks of an army, conducting reconnaissance and gathering intelligence. In these roles, not viewed by the French as glorious, they failed. French military decision-making was characterized by poor intelligence and the lack of even elementary reconnaissance. Much of the blame resided with misuse of their significant resources in cavalry.

Every battlefield of the war was dominated by German artillery. They fielded 30% more guns than the French. The Krupp steel breech-loading artillery pieces out-ranged and exceeded in caliber their bronze muzzle-loading counterparts. German artillery in almost every case suppressed French gunfire and made mincemeat of infantry assaults. In 1867 the Imperial government had requested 13 million francs to modernize the artillery. The funding was refused and Frenchmen on the battlefields in 1870 and 1871 suffered for the parsimony.

I was unfamiliar with the military operations in the interior following the surrenders at Sedan and Metz and the investment of Paris. Howard devoted considerable space to the actions in the east near Dijon and Belfort, in the center at Orléans and LeMans, and in the northwest around Rouen and St. Quentin. In addition, the activities of numerous francs-tireurs, especially in the east and northeast, characterized the guerre à outrance. As the French resorted to partisan activities, the Germans responded with barbaric reprisals against the civilian population. The transition of the struggle from an "affair of professional armies fighting in the interest of a balance of power" into "a savage war of peoples" poisoned relations for decades into the future. As Howard explained: "If the Germans were unappeased by victory, the French were still unconvinced of defeat.” What began on the French border in July of 1870 didn't end until Germany lay devasted in May of 1945. Then two new powers took center stage in Europe.

Michael Howard's The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 is an exceptional example of the writing of history. His clear straightforward prose and mastery of the subject matter are obvious. The book is chock full of detailed notes from both German and French sources, and although my lack of German language proficiency was a slight hindrance, the book was a masterpiece nonetheless. Howard earned Five Stars from me.

[Ray · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Franco Prussian war was the appetizer for the rather more serious set to's in the first half of the 20C. It pitted the glory that was Imperial France against the rising power of the North German Confederation, led by Prussia.

Prussia's army was battle hardened, confident after recent victories over Denmark and Austria, and led by the best generals in Europe. It had also mastered the art of using railways to concentrate force to achieve victory through local superiority of numbers.

France was complacent, long used to being the Daddy in Western Europe.

In a series of stunning victories, the Germans demoralised and destroyed the French armies and surrounded the French capital, Paris. Superior artillery, flexibility in battle and decisive and incisive leadership made the difference. In contrast the French were poorly led, and morale plummetted once the initial battles were lost.

The decisive victory led to the creation of the German Empire under the Prussian King. Alsace and Lorraine were brought back into Germany and France was made to pay a stiff indemnity. A new Europe, led by Germany at its centre, was in prospect. But France would not forget this humiliation and the very moment of triumph created the conditions for the disasters that befell Germany in WW1 and WW2

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael Howard's history of the Franco-Prussian War has long been regarded as a classic of military history, and after reading it it's easy to see why. His book is a incisive recounting of the combatants and the operations they undertook over the course of the ten-month-long conflict. In the process he identifies the elements that defined the conflict, showing how just ill-prepared the French were for the war they faced, how poorly suited the French generals were for the type of war they were in, and how precarious Prussia's victory was after their ostensibly decisive victory in the battle of Sedan. While Geoffrey Wawro's The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 serves as a better introduction to the subject thanks to its broader coverage of the context of events, nobody interested in understanding the events of the war can afford to skip Howard's perceptive and enduring examination of it.

[Jane Griffiths · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was the war which, though short, shaped twentieth century Europe, and whose influence is still felt in this century. I was interested in finding out more because I live in Alsace, and this book really did it for me. I read it on Kindle, but would like it in hard copy because of the maps. His style is very readable, and he keeps to the facts. Interesting on every page.

[Mark Singer · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent example of how military history should be written. Howard uses straight-forward narrations and excellent maps to tell his story. I did not know much about the Franco-Prussian War outside of summations in history textbooks before now, and would recommend this book to anyone interested in European and military history.

What seemed retrospect like a sure Prussian victory is explained as a combination of lack of planning, poor leadership and incompetence of the French and the willingness of Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the Prussian General Staff, to take advantage of said mistakes. Despite declaring war on Prussia, France managed to squander any of its initial advantages. Howard also discusses the political implications, which unified Germany under Prussian leadership.

[Tomlikeslife · Rating 3 out of 5]

I learned a lot about the Franco-Prussian War but I wish the author realized not everyone can read three languages (English, German and French) or that the folks who may be read his book doesn't have a strong grasp of 19th century European history and wouldn't understand statements about past events.

[Josh · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an incredible example of how people used to write history. Howard writes very well about the various campaigns involved in a sprawling war that had multiple phases, saw several different French governments, and explains very clearly what happened and why. He's good at explaining campaigns that happened simultaneously, explaining how they interacted yet keeping each thread distinct and clear. To a 21st Century reader, there's a lot of oddities compared to the way popular histories are written - most obvious is leaving passages of French and German untranslated in both the text and the footnotes. The other things I noted were an overdependence on the generals and highest ranking politicians with very little bottom-up analysis, even in places where it would be appropriate to consult soldiers' or citizens' diaries, etc. Howard frequently asserts the that the morale of an army played a huge part in determining outcomes of marches and attacks, yet he's very happy to rely on generals' observations rather than troops in the ranks.

The last bit I found odd was the extent to which Howard expected this book to only be about the War and I wish there was more context - he tells us certain generals were appointed for their reputations but doesn't explain how they earned those reputations beyond a vague mention of Senegal or Africa - what did Bourbaki do there to earn that reputation? We aren't told. Similarly, he refuses entirely to write about the Commune beyond how it impacted Favre and Bismarck's peace negotiations, or anything beyond the treaty. For what it is, the writing is great and the explanations presented make a lot of sense in explaining the outcomes. But it left me reliant on Google Lens' translation abilities and without the context I really wanted.

[Lauren Albert · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read more than a hundred pages and then gave up. It was too much military history for me and my eyes started to glaze over. It was well done so I gave it a good rating but military history is just not for me.

[Windsor · Rating 3 out of 5]

Had a hard time giving this book 4 stars. Not to take anything away from it: it's a well written summary of the war, but that's kind of where it ends. I guess I should have expected that, reading the title. The author claims that although France and Germany are fighting fifty years after the Napoleonic era, they still have, in some ways, to learn the lessons from that war. The French are very offensive at the start, until they aren't and immediately dig in and wait. The author begs the question: if the French were more active, would they have stalled the Germans? They might have even won, even in a time where officer corps talent is dwindling. All in all, a very well written military history of the war, but that's about it.

[Hans · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you want to read one book to learn more about the Franco-Prussian war, this is the title to get.

It covers the war from start to finish and covers all aspects of the conflict. Only issue that I have with the book is the lack of good maps. Yes, there are some maps inside, but they only show the areas where the fighting took place. There are only 1-2 maps that show the military units, but in order to follow the strategic situation and the maneuvers, you will have to look elsewhere. And since the positions of the armies does play a large role, the lack of maps makes it sometimes hard to follow along or grasp the military situation.

Otherwise this is a really good and well written book on the conflict.

[Enrico]

the foolishness of this war, and the french arrogance
and lack of preparedness is explained. an astounding story.

[Smoothfin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great scholarly work! The description of the lead-up, battle, and aftermath, and the consequences, of Sedan is truly a standout in the book. Meticulous research, excellent footnotes, expansive bibliography, and a clear and concise writing style present the reader with a wealth of knowledge about the political landscape leading up to the war, development of the crisis, and then, in rigorous detail, the war itself and the aftermath and how it affected France and Germany in the coming years and decades. Best book I've read on this conflict.

[Monty Milne · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not only a superb piece of history writing, but a beautifully crafted work of literature in itself. The narrative kept me turning the pages with excitement, and left me keen to find out more - as every good history book should. Although I read this many years ago (and lent my copy to someone who never returned it, alas) I still have vivid and pleasurable memories of reading it. (I also have vivid and pleasurable memories of the author, for we lived on the same staircase when I was a callow undergraduate at Oxford in the 1980's - he was charm personified, and often had me up for gin in his exquisitely furnished rooms).

[Heather Turcich · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall an engrossing and well written history of the conflict. At times the flow suffered a little from how the author chose to move between multiple simultaneous events but overall decent. As the author mentions in the short afterword, there was perhaps room for more detail if there'd been time to research some more of the primary sources. However, the work doesn't really suffer from that omission.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great overview of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. It covers the prewar conditions of Europe, the causes of the war, the political turmoil on both sides, and a blow-by-blow look at the fighting itself. Each campaign is covered separately, with logistics and staff work receiving as much attention as operations and tactics. While this was a bit of a hard read at points, I came away with a good understanding of the war itself and its consequences on Europe.

[Jeff Greason · Rating 4 out of 5]

The war itself is handled as a thoroughly competent military history. The lessons for a wider audience lay in the first half, where training, planning, resources, and leadership set the stage for the conduct of the war to follow

[Bobby24 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good, very heavy in places especially several battles which i skim read due to a lack of good maps which makes it impossible to follow but for the serious student of history very informative.

Bottom line is France took an absolute pasting.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sort of the classic, standard history of the war in English. I have no quibble with his conclusions. (The Germans were better organized, The French bit off more than they could chew).

[Alex Jutte · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not as nearly as good as Geoffrey Wawro's book.

[Craig MacKinnon · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Franco-Prussian war took place in 1870-1871, and is both the last of the wars featuring the traditional Imperial powers (France, England, Spain) and the first of the modern 20th century wars featuring the new Imperial powers (Germany, Japan, the US). There is also a direct linear relationship from this war to WWI (and thence to WWII). Because of this linear relationship, and because it was the only war between major European powers between the years of 1815 and 1914, more books have been written about it than any other war in history, relative to its length (a scant half-year). Few of these books are still in print. This one, however, is available, and is a good summary of the war. Michael Howard takes us through the 60 years of peace from the end of the Napoleonic wars, commenting on the reforms in equipment, tactics, and strategy of both the French and Prussian armies after their last clash at Waterloo. Then follows the meat of the narrative, the war itself. We are taken through the battles and campaign in some detail, starting with the important initial Prussian victories at Sedan and Metz that sent most of the regular French army into captivity. This is followed by the siege of Paris and the running countryside battles between the regular Prussian soldiers and the barely-trained French scratch armies and Francs-tireurs (guerillas). Along with the action, there is some insightful analysis. Howard convincingly argues that in both terms of manpower and equipment, the two armies cancelled each other out (the superiority of the Prussian artillery should have been cancelled by the superiority of the quick-firing French rifles). Thus, the Prussian victory mostly arose from superior staff work and organisation, for which he credits Moltke and Bismark and blames Napolean III and his staff. Also interesting was the debate on tactics that took place in both armies, for instance, the effectiveness of bombarding civilian populations as opposed to military targets only (and Howard gives us further analysis in light of the World Wars). The book is liberally sprinkled with footnotes and is well documented. Many of the footnotes are added as proof by direct quotes from original sources, and are thus in the language of the combatants. A knowledge of French and German is not required, as Howard gives you the gist in the main text, so the narrative runs along smoothly. Unfortunately, the narrative tends to be dry and the maps are small and occasionally difficult to read, hence the 4-star rating.

[Jim Bogue · Rating 5 out of 5]

Howard provides a masterful overview of the war between Napoleon III’s France (in war to become Republican France) and the coalescing power of Prussian dominated Germany. He gives background on each side’s military buildup and then walks the reader through the beginning of the war. He sees France as wandering poorly prepared into a war that Napoleon III was too ill to lead.
After explaining how Napoleon was defeated and forced to surrender his army and himself (but not the country, which in any event quickly overthrew the remains of his government), Howard follows the fates of the various remaining or newly formed French armies and the soon besieged Paris. His studied explanations of the battles include topography and the malign effects of wintry weather. He assesses the abilities of the various leaders, both military and civil.
He particularly praises the preparation and quick reactions of von Moltke on the German side and the inspirational leadership of Gambetta for the French. Bismarck’s willingness to accept at least some compromise makes peace quicker.
The is a superbly written and comprehensive study of the war, a model for the writing of military history.

[David Abernethy · Rating 3 out of 5]

This single-volume book on the Franco-Prussian War asks the reader to read 458 pages of fairly small print font, excluding the bibliography and index. Although appropriately critical of French preparation and decision-making, it is written from the French point of view, as evidenced by the title of Chapter III, "The first disasters". The maps do not contain army positions or movements, unusual for a book about a war. Missing is a timeline, which would clearly show that the responsibility for the war lay wholly on France: first to mobilize, first to declare war, and first to cross the enemy's frontier. Readers would have benefited from more editorial pruning of details. The drawbacks are balanced, however, by the author's sobering observation: nations get the governments and generals they deserve. Voters should meditate on the truth of this statement!

[Gregory · Rating 3 out of 5]

A solid, if somewhat dated, account of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. I wished it would've had better maps showing troop deployments and movements. Also some photographs would have added to a better understanding. Author has a good sense of satire and humor and points out the numerous errors and mistakes on both sides. The French seemed to be fatalistic and largely incompetent. The Prussians struggled with a long supply line and internal divisions. Prussian commander Helmuth von Moltke continuously overestimated the abilities and daring of the French commanders. This is mostly a military account. Not much on politics, German unification, or the Paris Commune.

[Terry Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book by the late, Sir Michael Howard is a classic. Originally published in 1961, it was reissued in 2001 and again in 2021. The Forward has been updated.
I first read this book years ago - during my Master's program. It is a classic and is the clearest historical look at how war is an extension of policy/politics by other means.

This review does not cover the tactical or operational aspects of the war; it does not discuss the technology, the rifles, the timetables or tactics. It is a review of the macro lessons learned of the major political and military strategic elements - lessons relevant still today and can be seen in the Russian – Ukraine conflict and are timeless lessons relevant today and for the future.

The Franco-Prussian war neatly captures the epoch shift in politics, international relations and war-making. The German wars of unification and the Franco-Prussian war changed the immediate balance of political power in Europe and it was recognized would ultimately change the economic power – both are intrinsic to National Security. The peace treaty that followed would be subject of contention for the next 75 years as Alsatians changed national identities – multiple times, the hatred and results of this war planted seeds that would manifest themselves thru 1945.

The author analyzed this conflict with forensic thoroughness and with a perspective of the military tactical and strategic, and the social, political and economic aspects that led up to the war, and during the war. This book also “demystifies” the genius of von Moltke the Elder and accounts for the poor decision making of both belligerents.

This book consists of 11 Chapters and is based on mostly primary French and German archives and sources.

The Review -

Chapter 10 provides a very in-depth account of the political, social and economic results – the details of the political and military interactions across all the actors provides exquisite context in how and why decisions were made, assumed, misinterpreted and ignored; or where failure and caution are perceived as malignancy – both political and military – and where actions are then dictated, not by reason or necessity but from the political pressure of a political minority group. Thus, the rhetoric from all sides incites and inflames to the point of riots and where groups and influencers suggest and infer physical violence an anyone opposed, or critical of decisions / governmental actions.

The political duplicity to achieve political ends is a hallmark of this war and should be the primary case study for students of Clausewitz.
During and after the siege of Paris – Clausewitz – political tenets associated with military operations - has no influence on von Moltke. The Crown Prince questions the political implications of the military strategy during and after the siege of Paris (circa Jan 9, 1871 at a staff diner), and von Moltke brushes off the question with indifference and firmness. The social and political implications of what occurs after the siege would have left no hope for post war negotiations.
Insurgent actions – Franc-tireurs. The intensity of the devolution of insurgent actions would undermine the discipline of units and commanders resulting in a savagery of actions- reaction-counteraction. Each side claimed to be fighting for the preservation of civilization itself from barbarism. This intensity and hatred would manifest and linger for 3 generations and beyond.
There is military value of an accumulation and succession of small nuisance, onerous actions, – either by insurgents or the regular army. Especially across multiple sectors and domains where a theater commanders’ resources are limited and unable to move resources back and forth across the theater – the proverbial “death by a thousand cuts’”

Siege warfare (area denial) is total warfare – it may be isolated geographically but the outcomes and results go far and wide beyond the geographical boundaries – hatred and the seeds of ones ideology are grown.
From the start, the French misunderstood German political and military intentions. They correctly guessed correct military dispositions and deployments; however this would not make up for a commanders insubordination (Steinmetz) and the Quartermasters/Logistics planners inability to plan and organize military logistical and transportation demands – which was directly linked to local, provincial and departmental political structure.

Strategic and operational failure fueled the opinions that failure was malignancy. and this inflexibility to recognize the true nature of the situation created massive public and political chaos.
The questions around failure then revolved around “morality.”

How does one separate the morality of an individual from the morality of the state? When does one decide what moral thresholds become redlines where one continues or capitulates?

Unable to avoid defeat, the political delegations hardened in attitude, press attacks intensified and multiplied, calls to reorder the government councils, and the government issued decrees “to help in the political education of the people.”

In order to understand the last 150 plus years of European history, The wars of German Unification and the Franco-Prussian War are it. I highly suggest this book and would propose to the reader to keep Clausewitz in mind while studying this history – war is an extension of policy/politics by other means. Pay close attention to the political aspects of this narrative.

[Paul LaFontaine · Rating 5 out of 5]

An account of the Franco-Prussian war that leans into the detail of the military campaigns in a way that is accessible, and authoritative. The writing is crisp, details laid out clearly and the insights useful. This was written when Military History still existed, and its a refreshing read.

I spend a bit of time studying this period and Howard's books is my fact check source. When I read another book I will refer back to Howard's balance presentation of the same action. Tremendously valuable.

Highly recommend.

[Larry · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent military history, well written and in great detail. The maps are, as with many other military histories, my only issue. While maps are included and they're reasonably detailed, many locations in the text are not indicated nor are unit movements and positions always easily divined. Still worth a read, since this war created the circumstances and patterns followed for the two great wars of the 20th century.

[Christopher Moore · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very concise history of the Franco-Prussian War, a war that needs more attention in order to understand the First World War better.

[Jbondandrews · Rating 4 out of 5]

My first book on the Franco-Prussian War. Almost a non-starter.

[A · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read at work, really to get a solider background on the Paris commune of 1871. Straightforward narrative account of the war ... up until the treaty (and not touching on the subsequent Commune).

[MARK LAING · Rating 3 out of 5]

Erudite, dry, and...dry. Reads like an official military history in many ways. I would have preferred more color, more "history" than simply a military-type campaign summary. I was looking also for a section on the uprising and Paris commune but, alas, Howard purposely did not include this aspect which I felt was a shame. There are also large passages in French with NO translations - this must be from the era (written around 1960) when every self-respecting reader had a good understanding of French but it does make for some blanks while reading.