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Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally
One of the most powerful Islamic militant groups in Africa, Al-Shabaab exerts Taliban-like rule over millions in Somalia and poses a growing threat to stability in the Horn of Africa. Somalis risk retaliation or death if they oppose or fail to comply with Al-Shabaab-imposed restrictions on aspects of everyday life such as clothing, media, sports, interpersonal relations, and prayer. Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally recounts the rise, fall, and resurgence of this overlooked terrorist organization and provides an intimate understanding of its connections with Al-Qaeda. Drawing from interviews with former Al-Shabaab militants, including high-ranking officials, military commanders, police, and foot soldiers, authors Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph reveal the motivations of those who commit their lives to the group and its violent jihadist agenda. A wealth of sources including US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, letters taken from the Pakistani hideout of Osama bin Laden, case files from the prosecution of American Al-Shabaab members, emails from Hillary Clinton's tenure as secretary of state, and Al-Shabaab's own statements and recruiting videos inform Maruf and Joseph's investigation of the United States' campaign against Al-Shabaab and how the 2006 US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia gave the group the popular support it needed to radicalize ordinary citizens and become a powerful movement.
The audio book is narrated by Nicholas Smith. Produced by Speechki in 2021.
The audio book is narrated by Nicholas Smith. Produced by Speechki in 2021.
344 pages, ebook
First published November 1, 2018
43 people are currently reading
364 people want to read
About the author
Dan Joseph
4 booksDan Joseph is a Washington-based journalist and author. A proud alumnus of the Indiana University School of Journalism, Dan has been an editor in the central newsroom at the Voice of America in Washington for nearly 20 years.
He is the author or co-author of four books, including "Behind the Yoi," a biography of legendary Pittsburgh Steelers broadcaster Myron Cope published in September 2024.
Dan is also a baseball historian and discovered the radio clip of Lou Gehrig saying that yes, Babe Ruth DID hit a "called shot" home run in the 1932 World Series. Look for the clip on YouTube.
He is the author or co-author of four books, including "Behind the Yoi," a biography of legendary Pittsburgh Steelers broadcaster Myron Cope published in September 2024.
Dan is also a baseball historian and discovered the radio clip of Lou Gehrig saying that yes, Babe Ruth DID hit a "called shot" home run in the 1932 World Series. Look for the clip on YouTube.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
March 6, 2019
Astonishing book. The Somali civil war and U.S. intervention in that country have been largely opaque to the public. This book, based largely on interviews with al-Shabab and Somali government officials, as well as classified U.S. cables, does an incredible job of pulling the curtain back on this conflict and Somalia's tragic descent into chaos over the past two decades. I did not appreciate how deeply al-Shabab was intertwined with al Qaeda from the beginning, unlike other AQ franchises that they have a more arms-length relationship with. In fact al Qaeda's origins are deeply rooted in East Africa. This was the region that suffered the first major attacks from the group in the 1990s, which struck Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Shabab's founding cadres were personally tied to al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and returned to Somalia with a clear mission. This was not merely a relationship of distant moral support.
In its behavior, al-Shabab is much closer to Islamic State than to more nationally-focused Islamist groups like the Afghan Taliban. The level of their brutality and uncompromising attitude is also much closer to ISIS than to other groups that might be reconciled or negotiated with. This book contains stunning revelations that are hard to find anywhere else in the English-language press. I was also not expecting a book published by a university press to be so grippingly written. This is a page-turner and an absolute must-read for those interested in the post-9/11 wars and the global jihadist movement.
In its behavior, al-Shabab is much closer to Islamic State than to more nationally-focused Islamist groups like the Afghan Taliban. The level of their brutality and uncompromising attitude is also much closer to ISIS than to other groups that might be reconciled or negotiated with. This book contains stunning revelations that are hard to find anywhere else in the English-language press. I was also not expecting a book published by a university press to be so grippingly written. This is a page-turner and an absolute must-read for those interested in the post-9/11 wars and the global jihadist movement.
February 15, 2020
What a great book.
As a Somali i absolutely hate Alshabaab and all terrorist organizations who kill innocent people, and have no strategy whatsoever, i hope in the future the Somali government will get it's shit together and defeat those maniacs.
Special thanks to HARUN MARUF and DAN JOSEPH for putting in the time and effort to reveal the history and evolution of this retarded terrorist cartel.
As a Somali i absolutely hate Alshabaab and all terrorist organizations who kill innocent people, and have no strategy whatsoever, i hope in the future the Somali government will get it's shit together and defeat those maniacs.
Special thanks to HARUN MARUF and DAN JOSEPH for putting in the time and effort to reveal the history and evolution of this retarded terrorist cartel.
December 1, 2018
Interesting book that reveals all the insides and details about the formation of and developments in Al-Shaabab linked very well the political and economical trends in the region and globally.
Written in a story-telling manner that makes for easy and entertaining reading while at the same time updates the reader on the ways of al-shaabab
Written in a story-telling manner that makes for easy and entertaining reading while at the same time updates the reader on the ways of al-shaabab
December 22, 2023
“Violence can only be concealed by a lie, and the lie can only be maintained by violence. Any man who has once proclaimed violence as his method is inevitably forced to take the lie as his principle.” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
“It is puzzling how a people who have so much in common—a religion, a language, an ethnicity, and cultural traditions dating back hundreds of years—can still find a way to divide themselves.” Harun Maruf on Somalia
This excellent book highlights Al-Shabaab’s evolution from its formation as a radical faction within the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union to the bitter street fighting that wracked Mogadishu in 2009 and 2010 when it threatened the survival of Somalia’s frail federal government propped up by the international community with African troops and US/EU funds. The book also sheds light on some aspects of Somali politics and international relations (e.g. Somalia’s complicated relationship with its neighbours, especially Ethiopia and Kenya) and Somali culture (e.g. clan rivalries, corruption).
I read this book out of curiosity to see how a relatively peaceful country with virtually no experience with hard-line Islamic law of the kind promoted by Al-Qaeda or the Wahhabism found in nearby Saudi Arabia could (1) collapse so spectacularly and (2) become such a fertile ground for terrorist groups.
In the 1960s, Somalia’s star was shining bright. Before independence, the UN mandate gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in political education and self-government, which was not the case for many other African countries/regions. Somalia’s democracy took a big step forward when the incumbent president who lost the 1967 election, relinquished his post to the victor. It was the first time an African head of state had voluntarily given up power to a democratically elected successor. The President’s seat was in Villa Somalia, an Art Deco palace in Mogadishu, the Somali capital which was once a jewel known as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. This, frankly, is mind-blowing for someone like me who’s only known Somalia as a failed state famous for terrorism, piracy and female genital mutilation and Mogadishu as the lawless place depicted in Black Hawk Down.
The star started waning when general Mohamed Siad Barre took power in 1969. Through a combination of bad governance (which led to an economic decline and growth of tribal politics), social oppression (abuses by armed forces, genocide), and disastrous foreign policy (e.g. the unsuccessful Ogaden war against Ethiopia), Barre’s government collapsed in 1991, plunging the county into a multi-front civil war which created the proper conditions for extreme organizations to form and flourish. “No single group had enough strength to seize control. Further attempts to form a new government failed. The north broke away completely, declaring itself the independent republic of Somaliland. And most other parts of the country suddenly had no official administration, no one formally in charge.”
In 1994 the United States adopted a hands-off policy toward Somalia after withdrawing its troops. The United Nations removed its peacekeepers the following year when it became clear they were doing nothing to stabilize the country. Neither the United States nor any other country sent diplomats to Somalia because there was no real government for them to deal with.
Left to fend for themselves, clan elders and businessmen created Islamic courts in Mogadishu in the mid-1990s trying to re-establish at least partial order amid Somalia’s anarchy and violence. Judges in the courts used interpretations of Islamic law to handle everything from property disputes to divorce cases to restitution claims for murders (in the latter case, often ordering the payment of “blood money” to the family of the victim). Over time, the clan-based courts gained influence and power and set up security forces to reduce crime. In 2000, they banded together as the Islamic Courts Union, or ICU, to better coordinate and mediate cross-clan affairs. In the absence of a working law enforcement or justice system in Somalia, the courts filled an important role.
As the ICU gained influence, its security forces became a powerful militia which started to successfully eliminate the various clan-affiliated militias led by [US-backed] warlords which controlled Mogadishu. Because most of the ICU fighters were in their teens and twenties, generally younger than the warlords and former army soldiers who opposed them, the population began calling them “the youth,” or more specifically, the Arabic form of the words—Al-Shabaab.
Al-Shabaab and the ICU wrested control of Mogadishu in June 2006, a victory that stoked fears in neighbouring Ethiopia of spill over jihadi violence. At the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government or TFG (a weak interim government backed by the international community), Ethiopia, a majority-Christian nation, sent troops to Somalia in December 2006 and ousted the ICU from Mogadishu with little resistance.
The occupation was responsible for transforming Al-Shabaab from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country. Basically, the Ethiopian occupation gave Al-Shabaab the popular support it needed to implement its radical agenda. Said Harun Maruf: “it helped that Al-Shabaab was essentially the only insurgent group still standing. The ICU had shattered and scattered, and no purely nationalistic militias seemed to emerge. If a young Somali wanted to fight the Ethiopians, Al-Shabaab was his number-one option.”
With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, Al-Shabaab began to swallow up big sections of southern and central Somalia and imposed its own harsh brand of Islamic law on the populace. By mid-2009, Al-Shabaab controlled about 80% of Somalia south of the Puntland region. The remainder was ruled not by the government but by the militia group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a or local clans. At least three million Somalis were living under Islamist extremist rule. Pro-government forces held onto the big prize, Mogadishu, but even there Shabaab forces were making incremental advances and forcing the government into an enclave that grew smaller and smaller.
The chapter dealing with the siege of Mogadishu / Villa Somalia is incredibly gripping, reading like a thriller. As Al-Shabaab gets within shooting range of Villa Somalia, even getting from one meeting to another becomes very dangerous for cabinet members as they are targeted by snipers. Holding on to the presidential compound and a few main roads leading to the airport, the only thing standing between Al-Shabaab militants and the frail transitional government was a ragtag bunch of pro-government forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping troops which had a limited government protection mandate requiring non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. However, “the AMISOM troops, drew motivation from their belief that no one would attempt to rescue them should they lose the battle.”
At this point in the book, I was wondering why Uganda and Burundi would put their soldiers’ lives in danger in order to rescue an incompetent, corrupt government in Somalia. Allowing for my digression, I’ll leave the answer in the capable hands of the author: “The African Union, using money supplied by the United States or the European Union, was to pay each soldier in AMISOM a gross salary of $750 per month. But instead of paying the soldiers directly, the AU transferred money for the wages to the governments of Uganda and Burundi. In Burundi’s case, the government deducted a $100 tax from each soldier’s paycheck. The cable didn’t spell it out, but basic math suggests that the tax gave Burundi, which had two thousand soldiers in Somalia at the time, an extra $200,000 per month to use or distribute as it saw fit—significant money in East African terms. Burundi also benefited by letting the United States pay for its soldiers’ uniforms, including armoured vests. The result was a stronger, battle-tested army, built primarily on other countries’ cash.”
Eventually, TFG and AMISOM forces took advantage of their superior firepower and turned the tide of the battle for Mogadishu in their favour. Outgunned, Al-Shabaab eventually retreated from the capital. As AMISOM troops got reinforcements from other countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, Al-Shabaab started quickly losing territory. “With no chance to win a conventional battle, Al-Shabaab leaders had fallen back again on the strategy used by outgunned armies since the beginning of time—guerrilla warfare.” Although the group has been weakened by territorial losses and the deaths of many leaders, “it has sustained a high pace of attacks in Somalia and Kenya and retains the resources, manpower, influence, and operational capabilities to pose a real threat to the region, especially Kenya. This is mainly because of the ranks of Al-Shabaab’s virtually unknown ‘middle management’ were so numerous and ideologically committed that the group was able to replace assassinated leaders with ease.”
How can Somalia and the international community get rid of Al-Shabaab? There is no simple answer to that question. Al-Shabaab is not only a terrorist group, but also a military organization, an insurgency, and a cultural movement as its addresses a number of issues and grievances that no one else is addressing. “Al-Shabaab finds ways to exploit the vacuum left by the state, tapping into a deep reservoir of grievances. It has become the main alternative to the government and will not be defeated by military means alone."
Al-Shabaab positions itself as an alternative to the intractable corruption and disorder that plagues Somali politics. A good example is the way in which government soldiers are paid: “in a report, UN monitors said Somali military officials had withdrawn almost $6.7 million from the country’s central bank over a ten-month period to pay back salary to soldiers—but that only $3.5 million of the money could be accounted for. Some units hadn’t been paid in over a year.”
Al-Shabaab was not created and does not exist in a vacuum – it is a product of Somali society and survives with support from (albeit a small part of) various subclans. The group will continue to be influential for as long as Somali governments “distinguish themselves only through robbery and ineptitude”.
2023 update
The mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was due to end in December 2021. However, the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) and Somali government decided that on 1 April, AMISOM will be replaced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The new mission will operate until the end of 2024, after which all responsibilities will be handed to the Somali Security Forces. ATMIS’ capacity of around 18 000 troops, 1 000 police and 70 civilians mirrors its predecessor, as does much of its mandate.
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continues to conduct sporadic deadly terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya and has joined the Tigray War, providing assistance to the Tigray People's Liberation Front against Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Useful info before reading the book: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/al-shaba...
“It is puzzling how a people who have so much in common—a religion, a language, an ethnicity, and cultural traditions dating back hundreds of years—can still find a way to divide themselves.” Harun Maruf on Somalia
This excellent book highlights Al-Shabaab’s evolution from its formation as a radical faction within the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union to the bitter street fighting that wracked Mogadishu in 2009 and 2010 when it threatened the survival of Somalia’s frail federal government propped up by the international community with African troops and US/EU funds. The book also sheds light on some aspects of Somali politics and international relations (e.g. Somalia’s complicated relationship with its neighbours, especially Ethiopia and Kenya) and Somali culture (e.g. clan rivalries, corruption).
I read this book out of curiosity to see how a relatively peaceful country with virtually no experience with hard-line Islamic law of the kind promoted by Al-Qaeda or the Wahhabism found in nearby Saudi Arabia could (1) collapse so spectacularly and (2) become such a fertile ground for terrorist groups.
In the 1960s, Somalia’s star was shining bright. Before independence, the UN mandate gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in political education and self-government, which was not the case for many other African countries/regions. Somalia’s democracy took a big step forward when the incumbent president who lost the 1967 election, relinquished his post to the victor. It was the first time an African head of state had voluntarily given up power to a democratically elected successor. The President’s seat was in Villa Somalia, an Art Deco palace in Mogadishu, the Somali capital which was once a jewel known as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. This, frankly, is mind-blowing for someone like me who’s only known Somalia as a failed state famous for terrorism, piracy and female genital mutilation and Mogadishu as the lawless place depicted in Black Hawk Down.
The star started waning when general Mohamed Siad Barre took power in 1969. Through a combination of bad governance (which led to an economic decline and growth of tribal politics), social oppression (abuses by armed forces, genocide), and disastrous foreign policy (e.g. the unsuccessful Ogaden war against Ethiopia), Barre’s government collapsed in 1991, plunging the county into a multi-front civil war which created the proper conditions for extreme organizations to form and flourish. “No single group had enough strength to seize control. Further attempts to form a new government failed. The north broke away completely, declaring itself the independent republic of Somaliland. And most other parts of the country suddenly had no official administration, no one formally in charge.”
In 1994 the United States adopted a hands-off policy toward Somalia after withdrawing its troops. The United Nations removed its peacekeepers the following year when it became clear they were doing nothing to stabilize the country. Neither the United States nor any other country sent diplomats to Somalia because there was no real government for them to deal with.
Left to fend for themselves, clan elders and businessmen created Islamic courts in Mogadishu in the mid-1990s trying to re-establish at least partial order amid Somalia’s anarchy and violence. Judges in the courts used interpretations of Islamic law to handle everything from property disputes to divorce cases to restitution claims for murders (in the latter case, often ordering the payment of “blood money” to the family of the victim). Over time, the clan-based courts gained influence and power and set up security forces to reduce crime. In 2000, they banded together as the Islamic Courts Union, or ICU, to better coordinate and mediate cross-clan affairs. In the absence of a working law enforcement or justice system in Somalia, the courts filled an important role.
As the ICU gained influence, its security forces became a powerful militia which started to successfully eliminate the various clan-affiliated militias led by [US-backed] warlords which controlled Mogadishu. Because most of the ICU fighters were in their teens and twenties, generally younger than the warlords and former army soldiers who opposed them, the population began calling them “the youth,” or more specifically, the Arabic form of the words—Al-Shabaab.
Al-Shabaab and the ICU wrested control of Mogadishu in June 2006, a victory that stoked fears in neighbouring Ethiopia of spill over jihadi violence. At the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government or TFG (a weak interim government backed by the international community), Ethiopia, a majority-Christian nation, sent troops to Somalia in December 2006 and ousted the ICU from Mogadishu with little resistance.
The occupation was responsible for transforming Al-Shabaab from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country. Basically, the Ethiopian occupation gave Al-Shabaab the popular support it needed to implement its radical agenda. Said Harun Maruf: “it helped that Al-Shabaab was essentially the only insurgent group still standing. The ICU had shattered and scattered, and no purely nationalistic militias seemed to emerge. If a young Somali wanted to fight the Ethiopians, Al-Shabaab was his number-one option.”
With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, Al-Shabaab began to swallow up big sections of southern and central Somalia and imposed its own harsh brand of Islamic law on the populace. By mid-2009, Al-Shabaab controlled about 80% of Somalia south of the Puntland region. The remainder was ruled not by the government but by the militia group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a or local clans. At least three million Somalis were living under Islamist extremist rule. Pro-government forces held onto the big prize, Mogadishu, but even there Shabaab forces were making incremental advances and forcing the government into an enclave that grew smaller and smaller.
The chapter dealing with the siege of Mogadishu / Villa Somalia is incredibly gripping, reading like a thriller. As Al-Shabaab gets within shooting range of Villa Somalia, even getting from one meeting to another becomes very dangerous for cabinet members as they are targeted by snipers. Holding on to the presidential compound and a few main roads leading to the airport, the only thing standing between Al-Shabaab militants and the frail transitional government was a ragtag bunch of pro-government forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping troops which had a limited government protection mandate requiring non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. However, “the AMISOM troops, drew motivation from their belief that no one would attempt to rescue them should they lose the battle.”
At this point in the book, I was wondering why Uganda and Burundi would put their soldiers’ lives in danger in order to rescue an incompetent, corrupt government in Somalia. Allowing for my digression, I’ll leave the answer in the capable hands of the author: “The African Union, using money supplied by the United States or the European Union, was to pay each soldier in AMISOM a gross salary of $750 per month. But instead of paying the soldiers directly, the AU transferred money for the wages to the governments of Uganda and Burundi. In Burundi’s case, the government deducted a $100 tax from each soldier’s paycheck. The cable didn’t spell it out, but basic math suggests that the tax gave Burundi, which had two thousand soldiers in Somalia at the time, an extra $200,000 per month to use or distribute as it saw fit—significant money in East African terms. Burundi also benefited by letting the United States pay for its soldiers’ uniforms, including armoured vests. The result was a stronger, battle-tested army, built primarily on other countries’ cash.”
Eventually, TFG and AMISOM forces took advantage of their superior firepower and turned the tide of the battle for Mogadishu in their favour. Outgunned, Al-Shabaab eventually retreated from the capital. As AMISOM troops got reinforcements from other countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, Al-Shabaab started quickly losing territory. “With no chance to win a conventional battle, Al-Shabaab leaders had fallen back again on the strategy used by outgunned armies since the beginning of time—guerrilla warfare.” Although the group has been weakened by territorial losses and the deaths of many leaders, “it has sustained a high pace of attacks in Somalia and Kenya and retains the resources, manpower, influence, and operational capabilities to pose a real threat to the region, especially Kenya. This is mainly because of the ranks of Al-Shabaab’s virtually unknown ‘middle management’ were so numerous and ideologically committed that the group was able to replace assassinated leaders with ease.”
How can Somalia and the international community get rid of Al-Shabaab? There is no simple answer to that question. Al-Shabaab is not only a terrorist group, but also a military organization, an insurgency, and a cultural movement as its addresses a number of issues and grievances that no one else is addressing. “Al-Shabaab finds ways to exploit the vacuum left by the state, tapping into a deep reservoir of grievances. It has become the main alternative to the government and will not be defeated by military means alone."
Al-Shabaab positions itself as an alternative to the intractable corruption and disorder that plagues Somali politics. A good example is the way in which government soldiers are paid: “in a report, UN monitors said Somali military officials had withdrawn almost $6.7 million from the country’s central bank over a ten-month period to pay back salary to soldiers—but that only $3.5 million of the money could be accounted for. Some units hadn’t been paid in over a year.”
Al-Shabaab was not created and does not exist in a vacuum – it is a product of Somali society and survives with support from (albeit a small part of) various subclans. The group will continue to be influential for as long as Somali governments “distinguish themselves only through robbery and ineptitude”.
2023 update
The mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was due to end in December 2021. However, the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) and Somali government decided that on 1 April, AMISOM will be replaced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The new mission will operate until the end of 2024, after which all responsibilities will be handed to the Somali Security Forces. ATMIS’ capacity of around 18 000 troops, 1 000 police and 70 civilians mirrors its predecessor, as does much of its mandate.
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continues to conduct sporadic deadly terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya and has joined the Tigray War, providing assistance to the Tigray People's Liberation Front against Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Useful info before reading the book: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/al-shaba...
June 22, 2024
Cutubka " CIA, the warlords, and Ethiopia " waxan ka helay xog aad muhim u ah oo ka jawaabaty waydiimmo badan oo aan ka qabay ururka al-shabaab.
Soo galidii Itoobiyaan ka ee soomaaliya iyo sida ay u shidaalisay ururka Al-shabaab.
Soomaaliya iyo Itoobiya waxay soo wada mareen dagaalo ku salaysnaa dhul soo dhicitaan oo ay soomaliya ku dagaalamaysay, soomaaliddu xabashiga waxa ka aaminsanyeen cadawgooda koobaad e dawaladaha jaarka, marka laga yimaad dagaalada, waxa lagu kala duwan yahay diimaha iyo dhaqannada labada shacab, intaas oo dhami qof kasta oo somaali ah oo koonfur joogay waqtigii ay ciidamada Itoobiyaanku muqdisho soo galeen, fursada kali ah ee cawagaas iska dhicin karayay waxay ahayed in uu ku biiro ururka Al-shabaab oo dagaal jawaabtoodu ahaayeen marka laga imaado arimaha ah in dalka lagu dhaqo diin. Fariinta kali ahayad ee ay adeegsanyeen waxay ahay " dalkiinna iyo dhulkiinna kaalaya ka xorraysta gaalka xabashiga ah" .
Sidda qumanayad in ay siyaasiyiintii u hormoodka u cabdilahi yusuf AHN in ay ciidamadda ay dalka la soo galeen ay kaso qortaan dalalka aynna soomalidda wadaagin xuduud iyo taariikh toonna sida; nijeeriya, ama koodifaar. Taasi waxay u yeeli lahayad waji kale dhalinnyaraddi ugu biiraysay Itoobiyaan nacayabka ama u arakaysay in Itoobiyaanku dalka occupation ku samayanayaan.
Soo galidii Itoobiyaan ka ee soomaaliya iyo sida ay u shidaalisay ururka Al-shabaab.
Soomaaliya iyo Itoobiya waxay soo wada mareen dagaalo ku salaysnaa dhul soo dhicitaan oo ay soomaliya ku dagaalamaysay, soomaaliddu xabashiga waxa ka aaminsanyeen cadawgooda koobaad e dawaladaha jaarka, marka laga yimaad dagaalada, waxa lagu kala duwan yahay diimaha iyo dhaqannada labada shacab, intaas oo dhami qof kasta oo somaali ah oo koonfur joogay waqtigii ay ciidamada Itoobiyaanku muqdisho soo galeen, fursada kali ah ee cawagaas iska dhicin karayay waxay ahayed in uu ku biiro ururka Al-shabaab oo dagaal jawaabtoodu ahaayeen marka laga imaado arimaha ah in dalka lagu dhaqo diin. Fariinta kali ahayad ee ay adeegsanyeen waxay ahay " dalkiinna iyo dhulkiinna kaalaya ka xorraysta gaalka xabashiga ah" .
Sidda qumanayad in ay siyaasiyiintii u hormoodka u cabdilahi yusuf AHN in ay ciidamadda ay dalka la soo galeen ay kaso qortaan dalalka aynna soomalidda wadaagin xuduud iyo taariikh toonna sida; nijeeriya, ama koodifaar. Taasi waxay u yeeli lahayad waji kale dhalinnyaraddi ugu biiraysay Itoobiyaan nacayabka ama u arakaysay in Itoobiyaanku dalka occupation ku samayanayaan.
Read
December 29, 2018Great book
December 31, 2019
Interesting information on the rise of violent extremism in Somalia. Of personal interest as I’ll be moving there this summer.
I don’t know I would recommend this to someone who is not already familiar with the region or history though. I feel like it presupposes a good grasp of East African history and geography, both from the colonial period and modern day.
The narrative ends in 2018, which is disappointing as there have been significant developments since then, but that’s not the book’s fault.
The most interesting parts for me was reading events that were taking place right next door while I was in Djibouti and personally knowing a number of the American actors.
I don’t know I would recommend this to someone who is not already familiar with the region or history though. I feel like it presupposes a good grasp of East African history and geography, both from the colonial period and modern day.
The narrative ends in 2018, which is disappointing as there have been significant developments since then, but that’s not the book’s fault.
The most interesting parts for me was reading events that were taking place right next door while I was in Djibouti and personally knowing a number of the American actors.
March 24, 2020
This is a great book for anyone interested in some of the recent history of the Horn of Africa and the complex problem of terrorism in the region. It is very well researched and left me with a better understanding of what led to the current state of affairs in the region.
September 5, 2022
I’ve been reading bits and pieces here & there for a while but finally committed to fully finishing it this weekend. I don’t really feel comfortable giving positive ratings to a man who built his career off of a nation’s instability. Maruf is the quintessential crisis entrepreneur and profits off the misery of his own people.
Nonetheless, the book was fairly interesting but didn’t have any new information for anyone who has already followed the situation over the past few years or so. Of course there was new tidbits scattered across the book but overall the book touched on how AS formed and evolved over the years. On top of that the book had a couple of inaccuracies that was hard to look over.
Nonetheless, the book was fairly interesting but didn’t have any new information for anyone who has already followed the situation over the past few years or so. Of course there was new tidbits scattered across the book but overall the book touched on how AS formed and evolved over the years. On top of that the book had a couple of inaccuracies that was hard to look over.
November 5, 2023
Buug muhiim ah, waxa uu diiradda saarayaa burburkii ka hore illaa 2018 wakhtiga buuga soo baxay. wuxuu taabanaysaa inteennii ku noleed koonfurta somaliya, dibna u xasuusinayaa waayihii adkaa. kadib bixitaankii siyaad barre, dalka waxa bur buray wax kasta oo isku hayay, waagaas illaa haddana weli dhibaatooyin waawayn oo haysta hormarka iyo degenaanshaha ayaa na haysta oo weli nagu ah caqabado, waxaana rajeenayaa in caqabadahaas aan ka gudbno, oo casharna inoo noqdaan waxii aan soo marnay.
November 27, 2019
Great work from the most respected Somali journalist of his age Harun Maruf and his co-author, without question this book provides a remarkable look inside the Al-shabaab during period of 2006 - 2017. This is a must read book.
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May 24, 2020perfect book.
August 7, 2020
Page turner. If you like military type subjects and reading about 4th generation type conflicts, this book is good stuff. You'll come away with a better understanding of Somalia as well.
July 30, 2023
Great book full of real stories, some of them I witnessed between 2007 and 2010. Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph did an exceptional overview of the History of Alshabab.
January 11, 2025
This was really good - an easy read and a good primer for anyone unfamiliar with al-Shabaab’s roots
September 1, 2020
This book is one of the few books written on the Al Shabab,a terrorist organization operating in Somalia and parts of Kenya.The authors have really done a good job in writing the history of the organization.However,for a reference perspective,this book can be cited as one of the most accurate and authentic source of information on Al Shabab and its 'leaders'.The bonus is that the book has a chapter totally dedicated to future of Somalia which is something the FSG of Somalia needs to memorise and implement.
Finally,as there were times,while reading the book,I found the writing more like a newspaper article than a text used in book(which in my opinion is the only flaw of the book),I am going with 4 out of 5.
Please read this book if you are interested in the unrest in the Horn of Africa.
Finally,as there were times,while reading the book,I found the writing more like a newspaper article than a text used in book(which in my opinion is the only flaw of the book),I am going with 4 out of 5.
Please read this book if you are interested in the unrest in the Horn of Africa.
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