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State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century
Francis Fukuyama famously predicted "the end of history" with the ascendancy of liberal democracy and global capitalism. The topic of his latest book is, therefore, surprising: the building of new nation-states. The end of history was never an automatic procedure, Fukuyama argues, and the well-governed polity was always its necessary precondition. "Weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's most serious problems," he believes. He traces what we know―and more often don't know―about how to transfer functioning public institutions to developing countries in ways that will leave something of permanent benefit to the citizens of the countries concerned. These are important lessons, especially as the United States wrestles with its responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. Fukuyama begins State-Building with an account of the broad importance of "stateness." He rejects the notion that there can be a science of public administration, and discusses the causes of contemporary state weakness. He ends the book with a discussion of the consequences of weak states for international order, and the grounds on which the international community may legitimately intervene to prop them up.
160 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2004
102 people are currently reading
1337 people want to read
About the author
Francis Fukuyama
116 books2,220 followersYoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (born 27 October 1952) is an American philosopher, political economist, and author.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
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November 9, 2025
В „Строежът на държавата: управление и световен ред през XXI век“ Франсис Фукуяма разглежда защо изграждането на силни и ефективни институции е ключът към стабилността и развитието на държавите.
След успеха на „Краят на историята и последният човек“, Фукуяма се фокусира върху проблемите на държавния капацитет – способността на една държава да прилага закони, да поддържа ред и да предоставя обществени услуги. Той различава обхвата на държавната власт (в колко сфери се намесва) от силата ѝ (доколко ефективно го прави), като подчертава, че много страни страдат не от прекалено силни, а от слаби институции.
Фукуяма анализира неуспешните опити за изграждане на държави след външни интервенции (като в Ирак и Афганистан), разглежда примери от Азия и Латинска Америка и показва, че модернизацията без стабилна държавност води до хаос.
В крайна сметка книгата предлага прагматичен и реалистичен поглед върху международната политика и управлението: за да има демокрация и развитие, първо трябва да има ефективна държава, която работи в интерес на гражданите си.
След успеха на „Краят на историята и последният човек“, Фукуяма се фокусира върху проблемите на държавния капацитет – способността на една държава да прилага закони, да поддържа ред и да предоставя обществени услуги. Той различава обхвата на държавната власт (в колко сфери се намесва) от силата ѝ (доколко ефективно го прави), като подчертава, че много страни страдат не от прекалено силни, а от слаби институции.
Фукуяма анализира неуспешните опити за изграждане на държави след външни интервенции (като в Ирак и Афганистан), разглежда примери от Азия и Латинска Америка и показва, че модернизацията без стабилна държавност води до хаос.
В крайна сметка книгата предлага прагматичен и реалистичен поглед върху международната политика и управлението: за да има демокрация и развитие, първо трябва да има ефективна държава, която работи в интерес на гражданите си.
June 3, 2013
The first issue that I should address comes from the fact that that I have posted this book review on my “Steve’s View from Abroad” website. What has this to do with India? While a far cry from the failed states that are the primary focus of this book, India, nevertheless, is a state (or states, as it’s a federal system) that fails to function effectively in many realms. Anytime I speak about India, I almost always mention the lack of basic government services and the effect that this has daily life. Poor roads, poor drainage, poor sewers, poor water and air quality—I could go on (and did with some dinner partners just the other night). I believe that India will gain a measure sophistication and decent quality of life (which includes and transcends a mere increase in GDP) when Jaipur no longer has garbage strewn upon its streets; when the poor living in shanties have found decent housing; and when the middle class has initiated a “Progressive Era” for India to clean-up political corruption and to address its failing infrastructure. India is far from a world-class economy currently, but if it can reach a critical minimum of an engaged middle-class willing to fight the good political fight, it has a future. A lot of work—a lot—remains to be accomplished, but it can happen.
So issues of governance drew me to this work as one reason, but the other is the reputation of Fukuyama himself. Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, now much maligned, is a very interesting and instructive book. I read it many years ago to great benefit and delight. The benefit and delight came from understanding a train of political thought that I’d never grasped very well before. Plato, Hegel (via Kojeve), and Nietzsche were brought to life in a manner that I’d never before appreciated. The English tradition, with Locke, Bentham, Mill, etc. emphasizes rational, utilitarian man, homo economus. However, this older tradition, going back to Plato and Thucydides (although Plato wanted to crush all human instinct under reason), emphasizes thymos, our human demand for dignity and respect, the kinds of things that the English tradition, at least in economics, tended to downplay if not outright ignore. Fukuyama raised my understanding Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave, something that in a rush toward Marx, too much political theory ignored. For this education alone, Fukuyama’s book was very worthwhile.
The other part of The End of History and the Last Man concerns the growing trend toward liberal democracy in the world, and here’s where people have come down hard on Fukuyama, considering him a failed prophet. However, I don’t recall (sorry, my copy not here with me) that Fukuyama emphasized that we would all become happy, bourgeoisie democrats. What I believe that he did—and on which he has not been rebutted—is to establish that no political system is more appropriate for human affairs than liberal democracy. As a practice, liberal democracy has not swept the field, but as an ideal (non-utopian), who stands as a contender? No other system, I submit, and for this reason, Fukuyama deserves more praise than the easy derision he has received.
The criticism that The End of History and the Last Man has received hasn’t slowed Fukuyama, and he’s gained in prominence. I enjoyed his The Great Disruption and Trust, and well as a number of articles that he’s written. Meanwhile, the Panda (sometimes Hungry, sometimes Inscrutable), during her earlier visit India, was reading his most recent book, The Origins of Political Order (Part 1). She began it with some skepticism but concluded it with approval and assigned it to me to read (my copy awaits me in IC). Thus, when I saw this slender (179 p.) book, I took it up and read it in less than a day. It proved worthwhile, indeed.
Written in 2004 after the invasion of Iraq and our incursion (if that’s the right term) into Afghanistan, it reflects on these experiences as well as the long list of “failed-states” that grabbed world attention in the years following the collapse of the Communism. Put simply, states (governments) serve crucial functions and when they fail (no longer function effectively), people suffer and often die. Fukuyama initially details the function of states and how these functions can vary. For instance, the state in the U.S. is much more limited than European states in the provision of services and policies. Think healthcare, for instance. While thoughts can vary in this regard, a certain minimum number of functions need attention. In addition, Fukuyama devotes a chapter to public administration, which proves to me, again, not only his mastery of a great empirical body of knowledge, but his ability to draw out some of the fundamental theoretical and practical aspects of a topic like public administration.
Fukuyama discusses how public administration is an issue around the globe and identifies its unique problems. For instance, the agency problem, the scope of authority problem, and the motivation problem. Fukuyama criticizes the microeconomics approach to public administration and the institutional approach, at least to the extent that those approaches aren’t augmented by a sociological approach. Fukuyama notes that organizations, or more exactly, the individuals within them, are governed by group norms, personal relationships, leadership standards, and other non-economic motivations (without totally ignoring the economic issues). His example of the armed forces serves perfectly: men and women don’t fight and die for the great pay; they fight and die for each other. (By the way, this applies to terrorists as well. See Scott Atran’s work Talking with the Enemy.) Among our economics-envying social sciences, this may come as news. It shouldn’t, but at least in the current policy-making world, it does. (Economics, in the meanwhile, suffers from a perverse physics-envy.) Everyone should consider this from Fukuyama:
It has been a longstanding dream of the social sciences to turn the study of human behavior into a true science, moving from the mere description to formal models of causation with nontrivial predictive value, based on rigorous empirical observation. This project can be realized more readily in some spheres of human behavior than in others. Markets are susceptible to this kind of analysis, which is why economics emerged as the queen of the social sciences in the late twentieth century. But organizations constitute a complicated case. Individuals in the organizations look out for their narrow self-interests, and to the extent they do, the economist’s methodological individualism provides genuine insight. But to a much greater extent than in markets, norms and social ties affect individual choices in organizations. The effort to be more “scientific” than the underlying subject matter permits carries a real cost in blinding us to the real complexities of public administration as it is practiced in different societies. (123)
Agreed. Thus, theorists like Herbert Simon, James March, and Chester Barnard receive Fukuyama’s use and praise instead of more recent thinkers. In addition, I must note the fascinating account of Japanese public administration after WWII when American “experts” attempted to “fix it”. Amazing.
Finally, Fukuyama addresses the issue of sovereignty, one in which the U.S. (especially the Bush Administration) and other countries often parted ways. To his credit, Fukuyama mentions Robert Kagan, whom I believe has been a critic of Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. He cites Kagan’s appreciation of the differences between the U.S. and Europe on these issues.
All in all, a short but powerful book. Having now experienced ineffective or marginally effective states (I’ll throw in Cameroon as well), I have a new and greater appreciation of the mundane but crucial work of government.
So issues of governance drew me to this work as one reason, but the other is the reputation of Fukuyama himself. Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, now much maligned, is a very interesting and instructive book. I read it many years ago to great benefit and delight. The benefit and delight came from understanding a train of political thought that I’d never grasped very well before. Plato, Hegel (via Kojeve), and Nietzsche were brought to life in a manner that I’d never before appreciated. The English tradition, with Locke, Bentham, Mill, etc. emphasizes rational, utilitarian man, homo economus. However, this older tradition, going back to Plato and Thucydides (although Plato wanted to crush all human instinct under reason), emphasizes thymos, our human demand for dignity and respect, the kinds of things that the English tradition, at least in economics, tended to downplay if not outright ignore. Fukuyama raised my understanding Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave, something that in a rush toward Marx, too much political theory ignored. For this education alone, Fukuyama’s book was very worthwhile.
The other part of The End of History and the Last Man concerns the growing trend toward liberal democracy in the world, and here’s where people have come down hard on Fukuyama, considering him a failed prophet. However, I don’t recall (sorry, my copy not here with me) that Fukuyama emphasized that we would all become happy, bourgeoisie democrats. What I believe that he did—and on which he has not been rebutted—is to establish that no political system is more appropriate for human affairs than liberal democracy. As a practice, liberal democracy has not swept the field, but as an ideal (non-utopian), who stands as a contender? No other system, I submit, and for this reason, Fukuyama deserves more praise than the easy derision he has received.
The criticism that The End of History and the Last Man has received hasn’t slowed Fukuyama, and he’s gained in prominence. I enjoyed his The Great Disruption and Trust, and well as a number of articles that he’s written. Meanwhile, the Panda (sometimes Hungry, sometimes Inscrutable), during her earlier visit India, was reading his most recent book, The Origins of Political Order (Part 1). She began it with some skepticism but concluded it with approval and assigned it to me to read (my copy awaits me in IC). Thus, when I saw this slender (179 p.) book, I took it up and read it in less than a day. It proved worthwhile, indeed.
Written in 2004 after the invasion of Iraq and our incursion (if that’s the right term) into Afghanistan, it reflects on these experiences as well as the long list of “failed-states” that grabbed world attention in the years following the collapse of the Communism. Put simply, states (governments) serve crucial functions and when they fail (no longer function effectively), people suffer and often die. Fukuyama initially details the function of states and how these functions can vary. For instance, the state in the U.S. is much more limited than European states in the provision of services and policies. Think healthcare, for instance. While thoughts can vary in this regard, a certain minimum number of functions need attention. In addition, Fukuyama devotes a chapter to public administration, which proves to me, again, not only his mastery of a great empirical body of knowledge, but his ability to draw out some of the fundamental theoretical and practical aspects of a topic like public administration.
Fukuyama discusses how public administration is an issue around the globe and identifies its unique problems. For instance, the agency problem, the scope of authority problem, and the motivation problem. Fukuyama criticizes the microeconomics approach to public administration and the institutional approach, at least to the extent that those approaches aren’t augmented by a sociological approach. Fukuyama notes that organizations, or more exactly, the individuals within them, are governed by group norms, personal relationships, leadership standards, and other non-economic motivations (without totally ignoring the economic issues). His example of the armed forces serves perfectly: men and women don’t fight and die for the great pay; they fight and die for each other. (By the way, this applies to terrorists as well. See Scott Atran’s work Talking with the Enemy.) Among our economics-envying social sciences, this may come as news. It shouldn’t, but at least in the current policy-making world, it does. (Economics, in the meanwhile, suffers from a perverse physics-envy.) Everyone should consider this from Fukuyama:
It has been a longstanding dream of the social sciences to turn the study of human behavior into a true science, moving from the mere description to formal models of causation with nontrivial predictive value, based on rigorous empirical observation. This project can be realized more readily in some spheres of human behavior than in others. Markets are susceptible to this kind of analysis, which is why economics emerged as the queen of the social sciences in the late twentieth century. But organizations constitute a complicated case. Individuals in the organizations look out for their narrow self-interests, and to the extent they do, the economist’s methodological individualism provides genuine insight. But to a much greater extent than in markets, norms and social ties affect individual choices in organizations. The effort to be more “scientific” than the underlying subject matter permits carries a real cost in blinding us to the real complexities of public administration as it is practiced in different societies. (123)
Agreed. Thus, theorists like Herbert Simon, James March, and Chester Barnard receive Fukuyama’s use and praise instead of more recent thinkers. In addition, I must note the fascinating account of Japanese public administration after WWII when American “experts” attempted to “fix it”. Amazing.
Finally, Fukuyama addresses the issue of sovereignty, one in which the U.S. (especially the Bush Administration) and other countries often parted ways. To his credit, Fukuyama mentions Robert Kagan, whom I believe has been a critic of Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. He cites Kagan’s appreciation of the differences between the U.S. and Europe on these issues.
All in all, a short but powerful book. Having now experienced ineffective or marginally effective states (I’ll throw in Cameroon as well), I have a new and greater appreciation of the mundane but crucial work of government.
October 25, 2013
لي عليه ملاحظتين : الأولى هو أنه متشرب كلية بالليبرالية - بطبيعة الحال - ويبحث في كيفية تحقيقها على الوجه أفضل ، و هو إذاك يحاول أن يقيم تجارب التصدير السابقة إلى الدول النامية عبر الحروب أو المعونات أو الديون .. إلخ ، ويحاول أن يجيب عن الأسباب التي منعت تلك الدول من أن أن تتقمص النموذج أو تبني "الدولة القوية" كما يقول ..
أما الملاحظة الثانية فهي أنه يطرح فكرة هامة ويركز عليها ، مفادها أنه لا يكفي اقرار توجهات جديدة ناجحة نظرياً (كتحرير السوق مثلاً)، دون وجود مؤسسات قوية فعالة تضمن تنفيذ تلك السياسات والبرامج ، كالبنية الإدارية والتشريعية والقانونية ... إلخ ، وأنه من الممكن جداً في عدم وجود تلك المؤسسات أن يحدث أسوأ السيناريوهات ، فعوضاً عن أن يكون إصلاحاً و تقدماً ، يكون فاتحة خراب ودمار إذا لم تكن الظروف مواتية ومؤسسات الدولة قادرة .
و لعل الفكرة -مع بعض التحفظ- تفسر عديداً من الحالات في دول العالم النامي والتي حاولت استيراد تلك النماذج ، أو فرض عليها ذلك (العراق وافغانستان على وجه المثال)دون أن يكون ثمة نظرية "علمية" هنا يمكن تطبيقها بحذافيرها (وهي دعوى تأسيسية لدى الكاتب يسعى لإثباتها)و بالتالي دون أن تتم دراسة السياق المناسب في وضعية الدولة وجهازهاالمؤسساتي ، و من ثم السياقات الإجتماعية الخاصة و التي لا يمكن تعميمها.
و على كل حال فإن الكتاب يصنف ضمن كتب الوعي بالعصر ، و كاتبه يطرح أفكاراً ونماذج تفسيرية جديدة تستحق النظر بحق للمشغولين بحال الدول النامية وإقتصاداتها .
ولصاحبه طريقة جيدة في عرض أفكاره ، فهو يستخدم العدة المنهجية والمنطقية ويستشهد بالدراسات والأرقام و يحيل إلى المراجع ، دون أن يلجأ لتنميق الألفاظ .
كتاب جيد أنصح بقرائته :)
أما الملاحظة الثانية فهي أنه يطرح فكرة هامة ويركز عليها ، مفادها أنه لا يكفي اقرار توجهات جديدة ناجحة نظرياً (كتحرير السوق مثلاً)، دون وجود مؤسسات قوية فعالة تضمن تنفيذ تلك السياسات والبرامج ، كالبنية الإدارية والتشريعية والقانونية ... إلخ ، وأنه من الممكن جداً في عدم وجود تلك المؤسسات أن يحدث أسوأ السيناريوهات ، فعوضاً عن أن يكون إصلاحاً و تقدماً ، يكون فاتحة خراب ودمار إذا لم تكن الظروف مواتية ومؤسسات الدولة قادرة .
و لعل الفكرة -مع بعض التحفظ- تفسر عديداً من الحالات في دول العالم النامي والتي حاولت استيراد تلك النماذج ، أو فرض عليها ذلك (العراق وافغانستان على وجه المثال)دون أن يكون ثمة نظرية "علمية" هنا يمكن تطبيقها بحذافيرها (وهي دعوى تأسيسية لدى الكاتب يسعى لإثباتها)و بالتالي دون أن تتم دراسة السياق المناسب في وضعية الدولة وجهازهاالمؤسساتي ، و من ثم السياقات الإجتماعية الخاصة و التي لا يمكن تعميمها.
و على كل حال فإن الكتاب يصنف ضمن كتب الوعي بالعصر ، و كاتبه يطرح أفكاراً ونماذج تفسيرية جديدة تستحق النظر بحق للمشغولين بحال الدول النامية وإقتصاداتها .
ولصاحبه طريقة جيدة في عرض أفكاره ، فهو يستخدم العدة المنهجية والمنطقية ويستشهد بالدراسات والأرقام و يحيل إلى المراجع ، دون أن يلجأ لتنميق الألفاظ .
كتاب جيد أنصح بقرائته :)
October 7, 2014
لماذا أنصح الصوماليين بقرآءة كتاب كهذا، ولا سيما الفصلان الثاني والثالث؟
سيبدو لنا الكثير مما ورد في هذا الكتاب مألوفاً ، فآذاننا أشبعت بعبارات مثل: (بناء الدولة) (إعادة الإعمار) (تفويض الصلاحية) (المركزية واللا مركزية والفيدرالية) (السيادة) (المجتمع الدّولي) وغالباً ما تثير هذه الموضوعات نقاشات حادة ومحمومة، ونعود للتخوف ضمناً من تأثير سلبي على القبيلة والعشيرة ومصالحها "المقدسة" والواقع أن قرآءة كتاب كهذا سيغيّر من نظرتنا لهذه الكلمات ومفهومها. وسيلاحظ القارئ أن فوكوياما المغرق في الليبرالية حين يتحدث عن عدم نجاح أي من محاولات المجتمع الدّولي حلّ المشكلات الداخلية للدول الضعيفة (التي تعاني من مشكلة في بسط سلطاتها) بالقوة وبأفكار لا تولد من الدّاخل، وممارسة دور الوصي عليها، سيؤكد في جملة لاحقة أن هذا لا يعني أنّ المجتمع الدولي وتدخله ليس مصدر أزما، وهذه الدول تضر بالأمن الدولي من غير أن يمنحنا دليلاً على ملائكية أو خيرية هذه الرعاية الأممية التي حلت محل ما كان يعرف سابقاً ب (الانتداب) أيام عصبة الأمم.
سيبدو لنا الكثير مما ورد في هذا الكتاب مألوفاً ، فآذاننا أشبعت بعبارات مثل: (بناء الدولة) (إعادة الإعمار) (تفويض الصلاحية) (المركزية واللا مركزية والفيدرالية) (السيادة) (المجتمع الدّولي) وغالباً ما تثير هذه الموضوعات نقاشات حادة ومحمومة، ونعود للتخوف ضمناً من تأثير سلبي على القبيلة والعشيرة ومصالحها "المقدسة" والواقع أن قرآءة كتاب كهذا سيغيّر من نظرتنا لهذه الكلمات ومفهومها. وسيلاحظ القارئ أن فوكوياما المغرق في الليبرالية حين يتحدث عن عدم نجاح أي من محاولات المجتمع الدّولي حلّ المشكلات الداخلية للدول الضعيفة (التي تعاني من مشكلة في بسط سلطاتها) بالقوة وبأفكار لا تولد من الدّاخل، وممارسة دور الوصي عليها، سيؤكد في جملة لاحقة أن هذا لا يعني أنّ المجتمع الدولي وتدخله ليس مصدر أزما، وهذه الدول تضر بالأمن الدولي من غير أن يمنحنا دليلاً على ملائكية أو خيرية هذه الرعاية الأممية التي حلت محل ما كان يعرف سابقاً ب (الانتداب) أيام عصبة الأمم.
June 22, 2025
4.5
I'm a political scientist, so I enjoyed this analysis a lot. I think that it is very suitable for this period in which we live in, even though it was published 20 years ago. There were some really good points especially regarding the efficiency and power of public institutions. Of course, as with any analysis I found some points I disagreed with, however it energized me and I love reading different points of view, and especially when I can find both things I agree and disagree in the same text.
I'm a political scientist, so I enjoyed this analysis a lot. I think that it is very suitable for this period in which we live in, even though it was published 20 years ago. There were some really good points especially regarding the efficiency and power of public institutions. Of course, as with any analysis I found some points I disagreed with, however it energized me and I love reading different points of view, and especially when I can find both things I agree and disagree in the same text.
December 9, 2022
A rather short book on a very large topic. The basics is here with the function of states and why some states fail and various tines in history rendered different results while statebuilding. Still the book only touches the tip of the iceberg, there are many factors that were only mentioned and not dug deep into.
March 3, 2020
Fukuyama argues that the strength of a government and the scale of its public goods are the most important factors to evaluate when engaging in state-building. He levels fair criticism at the US for not building enough institutions of good governance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, etc. Fukuyama states that what dooms the US strategy of state-building is the desire to move too quickly. As a result, our interventions under Bush 43 failed because we weakened and dismantled forms of governance that were not replaced with anything viable. Even though he is writing this book in 2003-2004, I Fukuyama is prophetically writing about the issues the US would still encounter nearly 20 years in Afghanistan and approaching that in Iraq. Trillions spent on war and state-building but with nothing to show for it.
May 17, 2022
Kui raamatus on palju viiteid autori nime ja aastaarvuga ning kasutatakse ladinakeelset väljendit "et al", tekkis mul kerge kahtlus, et olen puhkusele lugemiseks kaasa haaranud tõsiteadusliku akadeemilise töö. Francis Fukuyama on tuntud kui ajaloo lõpu hüpoteesi püstitaja, mis on pärast avaldamist omajagu kriitikat saanud erinevate konfliktide valguses. Eriti praegune Venemaa rünnak Ukrainale.
See akadeemiline töö aga arutleb riigi olemuse üle. Räägib väheke 9/11 järgsetest Afganistani ja Iraagi operatsioonidest ning rahvusvahelistest operatsioonidest, mis üritasid eelneva jama asemel toimivat demokraatlikku riiki püsti panna. Alati ei ole kõige paremini välja kukkunud ja eks see aastal 2022 vaadates tundub veel keerulisem teema pärast Afganistanist väljumist. Kuid tegelikult ei ole see raamat konkreetsusest pakatav manual, vaid pigem üldine arutlus.
Ei teagi, mis teadusharu alla see arutlus kuulub, aga midagi reaalset ja mõõdetavat see mõistagi pole. Pigem vist politoloogia, millega mina olen kursis peamiselt Tujurikkuja dokumentaalide vahendusel. Ehk siis pigem mitte palju. Sain nüüd vist väheke rohkem teada ja jagan teiegagi mõnda lõiku.
Riikidel on hulk erisuguseid funktsioone, mis võimaldab riikidel kaitsta omandit ning pakkuda inimestele turvalisust, on ühtlasi ka vahend, mille abil riigid võivad konfiskeerida eraomandi ning rikkuda oma kodanike õigusi.
Max Weber (1946) defineeris riiki kui "inimühendust, mis omab legitiimset füüsilise jõu kasutamise monopoli antud territooriumil".
Järgides Aristotelesele omistatud mõtet "valitsemine seaduste, mitte inimeste poolt" loodi kaasaegne põhiseaduslik valitsus ja õigusriik kindla taotlusega piirata riigivõimu teostamisega kaasnevat omavoli. Ometi ei piisa tulemuslikuks riigivalitsemiseks ainuüksi õigusriigist; tõhus valitsus vajab otsustusvõimet, või nagu on kirjas föderalistide alusdokumentides: "energilist võimu teostajat".
Riigi funktsioonid
* Minimaalsed funktsioonid
** Avalike hüvede pakkumine
*** riigikaitse, seadused ja korrakaitse omandiõigused
*** makromajanduslik juhtimine
*** tervishoiu-teenused
** Võrdsuse edendamine
*** vaeste kaitse
* Vahefunktsioonid
** Välismõjudele reageerimine
*** haridus, keskkond
** Monopolide ohjamine
** Hariduse ebakohtade reguleerimine
*** kindlustus, finantsregulatsioon sotsiaalkindlustus
* Aktivistlikud funktsioonid
** Tööstuspoliitika
** Rikkuse ümberjaotamine
...
See akadeemiline töö aga arutleb riigi olemuse üle. Räägib väheke 9/11 järgsetest Afganistani ja Iraagi operatsioonidest ning rahvusvahelistest operatsioonidest, mis üritasid eelneva jama asemel toimivat demokraatlikku riiki püsti panna. Alati ei ole kõige paremini välja kukkunud ja eks see aastal 2022 vaadates tundub veel keerulisem teema pärast Afganistanist väljumist. Kuid tegelikult ei ole see raamat konkreetsusest pakatav manual, vaid pigem üldine arutlus.
Ei teagi, mis teadusharu alla see arutlus kuulub, aga midagi reaalset ja mõõdetavat see mõistagi pole. Pigem vist politoloogia, millega mina olen kursis peamiselt Tujurikkuja dokumentaalide vahendusel. Ehk siis pigem mitte palju. Sain nüüd vist väheke rohkem teada ja jagan teiegagi mõnda lõiku.
Riikidel on hulk erisuguseid funktsioone, mis võimaldab riikidel kaitsta omandit ning pakkuda inimestele turvalisust, on ühtlasi ka vahend, mille abil riigid võivad konfiskeerida eraomandi ning rikkuda oma kodanike õigusi.
Max Weber (1946) defineeris riiki kui "inimühendust, mis omab legitiimset füüsilise jõu kasutamise monopoli antud territooriumil".
Järgides Aristotelesele omistatud mõtet "valitsemine seaduste, mitte inimeste poolt" loodi kaasaegne põhiseaduslik valitsus ja õigusriik kindla taotlusega piirata riigivõimu teostamisega kaasnevat omavoli. Ometi ei piisa tulemuslikuks riigivalitsemiseks ainuüksi õigusriigist; tõhus valitsus vajab otsustusvõimet, või nagu on kirjas föderalistide alusdokumentides: "energilist võimu teostajat".
Riigi funktsioonid
* Minimaalsed funktsioonid
** Avalike hüvede pakkumine
*** riigikaitse, seadused ja korrakaitse omandiõigused
*** makromajanduslik juhtimine
*** tervishoiu-teenused
** Võrdsuse edendamine
*** vaeste kaitse
* Vahefunktsioonid
** Välismõjudele reageerimine
*** haridus, keskkond
** Monopolide ohjamine
** Hariduse ebakohtade reguleerimine
*** kindlustus, finantsregulatsioon sotsiaalkindlustus
* Aktivistlikud funktsioonid
** Tööstuspoliitika
** Rikkuse ümberjaotamine
...
Read
July 19, 2020عن الكاتب:
فرانسيس فوكوياما. فيلسوف، عالم اجتماع سياسيّ، وأستاذ جامعي أمريكي.
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عن الكتاب:
تنويه: العولمة، الليبرالية -التي تتنافى كثير من مبادئهما مع الدين الإسلامي العظيم- هي أهم سمات الكتاب.
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بناء الدولة.. ما هو؟ في جوهره هو خروج على الإجماع الاقتصادي والسياسي السائد.
ويعرفه فوكوياما على أنه: تقوية المؤسسات القائمة وبناء مؤسسات جديدة فاعلة، وقادرة على البقاء والاكتفاء الذاتي.
يتناول الكتاب مصطلح "الخصخصة" كمصطلح رئيسي فيه، وتعريفه:
"الخصخصة هي عملية تحويل كلي أو جزئي لملكية رأسمال الشركات العمومية إلى القطاع الخاص، عن طريق البيع المباشر أو بوساطة الأسواق المالية، ونقيضها هو التأميم." المصدر: الجزيرة نت.
وكما سيُفهم من التعمق في القراءة، هو الحلّ البديل المؤقت عند غياب دولة المؤسسات والقانون.
(لماذا تسعى الدول القوية اقتصادياً إلى نزع السيادة عن الدول الضعيفة ودول الصراعات؟)
سؤال مهم يخطر ببال كثيرين نجد إجابته في مقدمة الكتاب:
مفهوم الجواب من ص14:
الليبراليون الجدد يؤمنون بأن توفر أسلحة الدمار الشامل بأيدي هذه الدول أو بأيدي جماعات داخلها، يشكل تهديداً غير مسبوق في تاريخ العالم الغربي، [الليبرالي] مقتنع بأن هذا التهديد الإرهابي يبرر منطقياً وليبراليا اعتماد الغرب مبدأ الحرب الوقائية والاستبقائية؛ ويسعى الغرب لإيجاد نظام عالمي، يبيح للغرب حق الاستيلاء على حكم تلك الدول لأسباب "أمنية" أو "إنسانية".
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"يعتبر فوكوياما ضعف الإدارة العامة لب أزمة التنمية التي تعيشها الدول النامية، ويعتبر الشروط الظالمة التي يفرضها البنك الدولي نوعا من الحب القاسي الذي ثبت فشله."
تغيرت نظرتي للبنك الدولي بمجرد قراءة هذا الجزء، إذاً، لم يكن القصد من فكرة البنك الدولي تدمير اقتصاد الدول النامية، كان القصد عكسياً لكنه فشل، افتقر للحكمة، إن صحّ القول. وربما.. كان هذا هو القصد الأول خلف الستار؟ من يدري.. لكن في النهاية، الكتاب به اعتراف بفشل فكرة البنك الدولي. يُنظر ص19-21.
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قبل قراءتي للكتاب كنت أرى أن الدولة الضعيفة ليست سوى مشكلة تؤذي وترهق أفراد شعبها فقط، أو بشكل أوسع أفراد شعبها والشعوب القليلة المجاورة، ثم تبين لي أن الأمر أوسع وأشمل بكثير، ضعف دولة ما يؤثر على الغالبية العظمى من العالم، الفقر، المرض، العوز المناعي المكتسب، الإرهاب، المخدرات، الجهل.. وغير ذلك مما يمكن تصديره بقصد أو دونه إلى دول أخرى، هذا يشكل خطراً على ما هو أوسع وأبعد نطاقاً من تلك الدولة الضعيفة لوحدها...
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المصطلحات والأسلوب ليسا بالسهلين، تحتاج قراءة الكتاب لجهد وتركيز.
فرانسيس فوكوياما. فيلسوف، عالم اجتماع سياسيّ، وأستاذ جامعي أمريكي.
-
عن الكتاب:
تنويه: العولمة، الليبرالية -التي تتنافى كثير من مبادئهما مع الدين الإسلامي العظيم- هي أهم سمات الكتاب.
-
بناء الدولة.. ما هو؟ في جوهره هو خروج على الإجماع الاقتصادي والسياسي السائد.
ويعرفه فوكوياما على أنه: تقوية المؤسسات القائمة وبناء مؤسسات جديدة فاعلة، وقادرة على البقاء والاكتفاء الذاتي.
يتناول الكتاب مصطلح "الخصخصة" كمصطلح رئيسي فيه، وتعريفه:
"الخصخصة هي عملية تحويل كلي أو جزئي لملكية رأسمال الشركات العمومية إلى القطاع الخاص، عن طريق البيع المباشر أو بوساطة الأسواق المالية، ونقيضها هو التأميم." المصدر: الجزيرة نت.
وكما سيُفهم من التعمق في القراءة، هو الحلّ البديل المؤقت عند غياب دولة المؤسسات والقانون.
(لماذا تسعى الدول القوية اقتصادياً إلى نزع السيادة عن الدول الضعيفة ودول الصراعات؟)
سؤال مهم يخطر ببال كثيرين نجد إجابته في مقدمة الكتاب:
مفهوم الجواب من ص14:
الليبراليون الجدد يؤمنون بأن توفر أسلحة الدمار الشامل بأيدي هذه الدول أو بأيدي جماعات داخلها، يشكل تهديداً غير مسبوق في تاريخ العالم الغربي، [الليبرالي] مقتنع بأن هذا التهديد الإرهابي يبرر منطقياً وليبراليا اعتماد الغرب مبدأ الحرب الوقائية والاستبقائية؛ ويسعى الغرب لإيجاد نظام عالمي، يبيح للغرب حق الاستيلاء على حكم تلك الدول لأسباب "أمنية" أو "إنسانية".
-
"يعتبر فوكوياما ضعف الإدارة العامة لب أزمة التنمية التي تعيشها الدول النامية، ويعتبر الشروط الظالمة التي يفرضها البنك الدولي نوعا من الحب القاسي الذي ثبت فشله."
تغيرت نظرتي للبنك الدولي بمجرد قراءة هذا الجزء، إذاً، لم يكن القصد من فكرة البنك الدولي تدمير اقتصاد الدول النامية، كان القصد عكسياً لكنه فشل، افتقر للحكمة، إن صحّ القول. وربما.. كان هذا هو القصد الأول خلف الستار؟ من يدري.. لكن في النهاية، الكتاب به اعتراف بفشل فكرة البنك الدولي. يُنظر ص19-21.
-
قبل قراءتي للكتاب كنت أرى أن الدولة الضعيفة ليست سوى مشكلة تؤذي وترهق أفراد شعبها فقط، أو بشكل أوسع أفراد شعبها والشعوب القليلة المجاورة، ثم تبين لي أن الأمر أوسع وأشمل بكثير، ضعف دولة ما يؤثر على الغالبية العظمى من العالم، الفقر، المرض، العوز المناعي المكتسب، الإرهاب، المخدرات، الجهل.. وغير ذلك مما يمكن تصديره بقصد أو دونه إلى دول أخرى، هذا يشكل خطراً على ما هو أوسع وأبعد نطاقاً من تلك الدولة الضعيفة لوحدها...
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المصطلحات والأسلوب ليسا بالسهلين، تحتاج قراءة الكتاب لجهد وتركيز.
June 5, 2021
"Government is the problem"-, Ronald Regan famously said in his first inaugural address. A trend towards smaller states began, reversing the welfare state model that came following the end of the 2nd World War. This small state mantra got canonized as the "Washington Consensus". India also adopted this model in the early 90s giving up its nearly half century-long experiment with socialism.
Fukuyama reminds us that states, with their ability to provide order, security, law, and property rights made possible the rise of the modern world. So states cannot be dismissed as a problem. He distinguishes between two attributes of states: scope of state activity and capacity or strength of state institutions. Affluent countries have states that are limited in scope but with very strong institutions. On the other end of the spectrum are failed countries, which have states with very limited scope and also weak institutions. So state-building projects, such as undertaken by America in Iraq and Afghanistan, should seek to create states that are small yet powerful.
How can you build effective state institutions? The classic solution suggested by the discipline of Public Administration is to build clearly defined hierarchies with rules of conduct. Fukuyama argues that this is not enough. He makes a case for infusing public institutions with strong ethical norms and national ethos.
This is altogether a very insightful book. The downside is that at times it reads like a literature review.
Fukuyama reminds us that states, with their ability to provide order, security, law, and property rights made possible the rise of the modern world. So states cannot be dismissed as a problem. He distinguishes between two attributes of states: scope of state activity and capacity or strength of state institutions. Affluent countries have states that are limited in scope but with very strong institutions. On the other end of the spectrum are failed countries, which have states with very limited scope and also weak institutions. So state-building projects, such as undertaken by America in Iraq and Afghanistan, should seek to create states that are small yet powerful.
How can you build effective state institutions? The classic solution suggested by the discipline of Public Administration is to build clearly defined hierarchies with rules of conduct. Fukuyama argues that this is not enough. He makes a case for infusing public institutions with strong ethical norms and national ethos.
This is altogether a very insightful book. The downside is that at times it reads like a literature review.
August 9, 2013
فرانسيس فوكوياما، أول قرائتي ليه كانت بكتاب "نهاية التاريخ"
The End of History and the Last Man
و تقريبا أشهر كتبة ،و لأن عادة كتب العلوم السياسة دي بقراها بلغتها الأصلية عشان مشاكل الترجمة، معاني كتيير بتضيع في النص ،و القصد من الجملة و أو كلمات معينة، لكن للأسف ملقتش المرة دي الكتاب بلغته :/ :/ :/ فأضطريت اضطرارا على قراءته مترجم و أظن الترجمة دي ترجمة محترمة، مظنش كان فيه نقل غير صادق للكلمات أو الجمل و لكن نقلها زي ما هي كدا أظن يعني، من شوية جملة و كلمات في بعض المواضع تحس ان الانجليزي بتاعها أحسن :) :) ما علينا :)
:) كتاب حلو و بيتكلم عن بناء الدول، الفرق بين بين الدول و بناء الأمم في نبذه و تقريبا في كتاب تاني عن النقطة دي :) في حتت زي اليابان ، أفغانستان، البوسنة ، الاسباب لكدا- نظرة امبريالية كتيرة للموضوع من أمريكا و أوروبا - // المؤسسات الاقتصادية و البروقراطية و طرق لحل المشاكل و حاجات كتير :) كتاب يتقرا يعني للي بيحب يقرا في السياسة :)
مقتطفات + اسقاط على الوضع الحالي :)
The End of History and the Last Man
و تقريبا أشهر كتبة ،و لأن عادة كتب العلوم السياسة دي بقراها بلغتها الأصلية عشان مشاكل الترجمة، معاني كتيير بتضيع في النص ،و القصد من الجملة و أو كلمات معينة، لكن للأسف ملقتش المرة دي الكتاب بلغته :/ :/ :/ فأضطريت اضطرارا على قراءته مترجم و أظن الترجمة دي ترجمة محترمة، مظنش كان فيه نقل غير صادق للكلمات أو الجمل و لكن نقلها زي ما هي كدا أظن يعني، من شوية جملة و كلمات في بعض المواضع تحس ان الانجليزي بتاعها أحسن :) :) ما علينا :)
:) كتاب حلو و بيتكلم عن بناء الدول، الفرق بين بين الدول و بناء الأمم في نبذه و تقريبا في كتاب تاني عن النقطة دي :) في حتت زي اليابان ، أفغانستان، البوسنة ، الاسباب لكدا- نظرة امبريالية كتيرة للموضوع من أمريكا و أوروبا - // المؤسسات الاقتصادية و البروقراطية و طرق لحل المشاكل و حاجات كتير :) كتاب يتقرا يعني للي بيحب يقرا في السياسة :)
مقتطفات + اسقاط على الوضع الحالي :)
February 29, 2024
Dib u dhiska Dawaladnnimadda .
In badan waxaan moodi jiray in siyaasadd tahay waxa lagu gorfooyo fadhi-ku-dirirka oo ay tahay falaqayanta dhacdooyinka maalin la ah, balse argtidaydanni waxay is badashay markii dalka suudaan oo aan waxbarasho u joogay uu ka qaraxay dagaal sokeey e,
oo fursad ii siiyay inaan akhriyo buuga ( how civil wars start and how to stop it by Barbara Walter) kaa oo ii ibo-furay sababaha keena dagaal sokeey e iyo sida loogo hor tago, iyo ( the dictator's hand book by Bruce). Dalka suudaan waxaa aas-aas u ahaa khilaafka siyaasigga ah ee ka dhex qaraxay KALIGIITALIYENNIMO oo keentay dagaal sokeey e.
Markaan dib u raacay waxii aan goob-joog u ahaa iyo araggtiyaha aqoonyahanadda labaddan buug waxay ugu riixeen inaan si dhab ah u eego xaaladaydda shaqsiyadeed ee soomaalinnmo oo ah maxaad bur-buriyay dawaladdaadii? Maxay u soo kaban laadahay? Maxaa kaa dhigay dib -wareeeg ? Maxay dadkaagu u wada yihiin qoxoonnti? Maxay dadka soomaliyeed ee qurbaha aaday ugu baraaruggi laayihiin waydiimaha dadban ee la waydiinnayo ee ah; hormarka iyo Dawaladnnimadda casrigga ah ee ay la kulmeen, daah furnaanta, iyo adeeggyadda aasaasiggah ee loo fidinnayo.
Intaas oo dhammi waxay i soo haggeen buugga la yidhaah ( state-building governance and world order by fukuyama)
Fukuyama waxa uu qabaa in dawaladda dhiska tiir dheexaadkeeddu yahyahay; DASTUURKA oo ah kan isku hayan kara bulshooyinn ku kala duwan, Diin, dhaqan iyo ciriqi. Tusaale waxa ah INDIA.
Haddaba inagga soomaali ahaan Dawaladnnimadda inga bururtay ka dib sidee loo raacay dib u dhiskeedda? In badan waxaynnu hareer marnay qoddobka u muhiinsan oo ah waxa isku hayan kara bulshooyinka oo ah dastuurka, nasiib wanaag waxa aynu nahay hal qoomiyadd oo wadaagta; af, dhaqan, iyo diin. Lkn ayanu ku kala tagnno qabiilnnimmo.
Qabiilnnimmaddi ayaynnu aas-aas uga dhigannay Dawaladnnimaddii oo ayaynnu ku kala gaddisannahay mana shaqayannayso in la unnko dawaldd ka caagan waxa kastoo ku dhisan qaarbo -kiil taasinna hor u socod yeelan mayaso.
Maxaaddirooyin uu ka jeeddin jirray mid ka mid ah jaamacaddaha USA ayaa loo roggay buugggan. Dawaladd dhiska waxa uu u qabaybinnayaa saddex qaybood:
- waxyaabaha ay laa'yihiin dawaladdaha burburray.
- sababta keenta burburka.
-doorrka beesha caalamku leedahay dib u dhiska.
Ugu horrayan waxa uu kala saarayaa farqigga u dhaxeeya QARAN iyo dawaladd. Qarannka waxa uu ku qeexayaa in uu ku qottommo taariikh iyo dhaqan, halka uu dawaladda ku qeexay in ay bayas u tahay haa'ayaddo dawali ah; sida ciidamadda qalabka sidda, iyo dhamaan haa'ayaddaha dawalligga ah .
Dawaladdaha dumay ee bilaa fulinta ah waxa uu tusaale u soo qaadanayaa; xanuunnka AYDHISKA in ayana badanna dawalddaha qaaradda afrika ayana jirrin haa'ayaddo la tacaala xanuunka oo dawooyinnkii bulshaddu u baahnayad aan loo fulin oo dhimasho badan keentay. Sida uu u qeexay (Dawaladda waa haa'ayaddo fulinneed) wasaarradda caafimaaddka oo u xil-saarnnayad ilaallinta iyo ka hortagga xanuunnadda marka ay hawasheedda gabtto, waxa halkaas soo galayaa Dawaladd la'aan.
Dawaladd dhiska waxa uu muhiim u arkaa in ay jirtto dhul badeedd iyo cirr ay ka taliso dawaladdu oo u qayabinnayo labbo; Scope, and capacity. Dawaladdaha dumay waa kuwa aan la hayan labaddan midnna. Oo ah dhul ay ka taliyaan iyo awoodd ay ku ilaaliyaan. Aqoonyahanno kale waxay qabaan in awoodda la saarro dhaqaalaha marka laga hadalayo dib u dhiska dawaladdaha dumay, xage uu fukuyama uu muhiim u arrko in haa'ayaddo dawalligga ah la dhiso ma'daammo tahay unnugga laga unnko dawaladda.
Dib u dhiska dawaladdaha ay beesha caalamku ku leedahay marka uu ka hadalayo waxa uu leeyahay. " beesha caalammku waxay taqaan sida loo caawiyo balse ma taqaan sida loo fulliyo caawimaddaas".
In badan waxaan moodi jiray in siyaasadd tahay waxa lagu gorfooyo fadhi-ku-dirirka oo ay tahay falaqayanta dhacdooyinka maalin la ah, balse argtidaydanni waxay is badashay markii dalka suudaan oo aan waxbarasho u joogay uu ka qaraxay dagaal sokeey e,
oo fursad ii siiyay inaan akhriyo buuga ( how civil wars start and how to stop it by Barbara Walter) kaa oo ii ibo-furay sababaha keena dagaal sokeey e iyo sida loogo hor tago, iyo ( the dictator's hand book by Bruce). Dalka suudaan waxaa aas-aas u ahaa khilaafka siyaasigga ah ee ka dhex qaraxay KALIGIITALIYENNIMO oo keentay dagaal sokeey e.
Markaan dib u raacay waxii aan goob-joog u ahaa iyo araggtiyaha aqoonyahanadda labaddan buug waxay ugu riixeen inaan si dhab ah u eego xaaladaydda shaqsiyadeed ee soomaalinnmo oo ah maxaad bur-buriyay dawaladdaadii? Maxay u soo kaban laadahay? Maxaa kaa dhigay dib -wareeeg ? Maxay dadkaagu u wada yihiin qoxoonnti? Maxay dadka soomaliyeed ee qurbaha aaday ugu baraaruggi laayihiin waydiimaha dadban ee la waydiinnayo ee ah; hormarka iyo Dawaladnnimadda casrigga ah ee ay la kulmeen, daah furnaanta, iyo adeeggyadda aasaasiggah ee loo fidinnayo.
Intaas oo dhammi waxay i soo haggeen buugga la yidhaah ( state-building governance and world order by fukuyama)
Fukuyama waxa uu qabaa in dawaladda dhiska tiir dheexaadkeeddu yahyahay; DASTUURKA oo ah kan isku hayan kara bulshooyinn ku kala duwan, Diin, dhaqan iyo ciriqi. Tusaale waxa ah INDIA.
Haddaba inagga soomaali ahaan Dawaladnnimadda inga bururtay ka dib sidee loo raacay dib u dhiskeedda? In badan waxaynnu hareer marnay qoddobka u muhiinsan oo ah waxa isku hayan kara bulshooyinka oo ah dastuurka, nasiib wanaag waxa aynu nahay hal qoomiyadd oo wadaagta; af, dhaqan, iyo diin. Lkn ayanu ku kala tagnno qabiilnnimmo.
Qabiilnnimmaddi ayaynnu aas-aas uga dhigannay Dawaladnnimaddii oo ayaynnu ku kala gaddisannahay mana shaqayannayso in la unnko dawaldd ka caagan waxa kastoo ku dhisan qaarbo -kiil taasinna hor u socod yeelan mayaso.
Maxaaddirooyin uu ka jeeddin jirray mid ka mid ah jaamacaddaha USA ayaa loo roggay buugggan. Dawaladd dhiska waxa uu u qabaybinnayaa saddex qaybood:
- waxyaabaha ay laa'yihiin dawaladdaha burburray.
- sababta keenta burburka.
-doorrka beesha caalamku leedahay dib u dhiska.
Ugu horrayan waxa uu kala saarayaa farqigga u dhaxeeya QARAN iyo dawaladd. Qarannka waxa uu ku qeexayaa in uu ku qottommo taariikh iyo dhaqan, halka uu dawaladda ku qeexay in ay bayas u tahay haa'ayaddo dawali ah; sida ciidamadda qalabka sidda, iyo dhamaan haa'ayaddaha dawalligga ah .
Dawaladdaha dumay ee bilaa fulinta ah waxa uu tusaale u soo qaadanayaa; xanuunnka AYDHISKA in ayana badanna dawalddaha qaaradda afrika ayana jirrin haa'ayaddo la tacaala xanuunka oo dawooyinnkii bulshaddu u baahnayad aan loo fulin oo dhimasho badan keentay. Sida uu u qeexay (Dawaladda waa haa'ayaddo fulinneed) wasaarradda caafimaaddka oo u xil-saarnnayad ilaallinta iyo ka hortagga xanuunnadda marka ay hawasheedda gabtto, waxa halkaas soo galayaa Dawaladd la'aan.
Dawaladd dhiska waxa uu muhiim u arkaa in ay jirtto dhul badeedd iyo cirr ay ka taliso dawaladdu oo u qayabinnayo labbo; Scope, and capacity. Dawaladdaha dumay waa kuwa aan la hayan labaddan midnna. Oo ah dhul ay ka taliyaan iyo awoodd ay ku ilaaliyaan. Aqoonyahanno kale waxay qabaan in awoodda la saarro dhaqaalaha marka laga hadalayo dib u dhiska dawaladdaha dumay, xage uu fukuyama uu muhiim u arrko in haa'ayaddo dawalligga ah la dhiso ma'daammo tahay unnugga laga unnko dawaladda.
Dib u dhiska dawaladdaha ay beesha caalamku ku leedahay marka uu ka hadalayo waxa uu leeyahay. " beesha caalammku waxay taqaan sida loo caawiyo balse ma taqaan sida loo fulliyo caawimaddaas".
August 8, 2025
“State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century” by Francis Fukuyama is a brief analysis of the necessity and challenges presented by state-building and strengthening institutions in the developing world as a part of the modern security environment. Fukuyama argues that weak and failed states often arise from overbearing state responsibilities with limited state capacity to fulfill those responsibilities, suggesting that states should instead scale back the extent of their responsibilities to the basic functions (e.g., law enforcement, basic public services) that they can realistically fulfill with the limited state power that they possess. He plots countries on a series of multiple two-axis compasses to emphasize his distinction between the scope and strength of governments and the dangers that can arise when mismatches between the two arise. Beyond scaling back government commitments, Fukuyama explains that governments should build effective governance structures through inculcating norms and adapting internationally transplanted institutions to local contexts, a process that he acknowledges takes significant time and resources. However, Fukuyama stands firm in his belief that nation-building should be high on the agenda of the international security community and that development aid should be better targeted and patiently administered to give weakened and failed states a fighting chance at stabilizing and building the institutions needed to regain the security, prosperity, and dynamism needed to prevent emerging security threats.
January 6, 2022
Хэрвээ ном нь 2021 онд бичигдсэн байсан бол үнэхээр л энгийн ном байх байлаа. Ном дээр байгаа утга агууллага санаанууд Либерал бодлого капиталын илүү өргөн дэлгэрүүлсэн байдлаар буюу хувааж ашиглах, эргэлтэнд хурдан оруулах гэх мэт энгийн мэт болсон ойлголтуудтай өнөө үед мэдээж шүү дээ гэж бодогдохоор, гэвч 2004 онд бичигдсэн эл ном нь тухайн үед онцгой үзэл санааг хэн ч мэдээгүй байхад гаргаж ирсэн нь олны сайшаалыг хүртээх байсан биз. Тэр их олон санааны иш таталтуудыг хараад байхад зохиогч маань олон номыг уншиж нэг урсгалдаа чин үнэнчээр итгэн эргэцүүлэмж гэхээс илүү батламж болгон бичиж байгаа юм шиг санагдаж байна.
Төрийг төвхөнүүлэхийн тулд мөн түүнийг урт хугацаанд товхинуулахын тулд нийтийн хариуцлага нийтийн эрх ашиг тусгагдах хэрэгтэй. Мөн тодорхойлж хэлэхэд, нийтийн шаардлага юм. Нийтийн шаардлагыг институц буюу байгууллага, хамгийн сайн аргаар мөн, шаардлага болон бусад зүйлсийг тодорхойлон шийдвэрлэж байх нь одоогийн хамгийн сайн арга ажээ.
Сулхан төр нийтийн захиргааны хар нүх юм.
Байгууллагын удирдлагын хамгийн дээд эрх мэдлийг хамгийн мундагт нь гэхээс илүү тухайн асуудлаар хамгийн их мэдээлэлтэй хүнээр гаргуулж байх нь хамгийн зохистой шийдвэр юм. Мөчир бүрт гаргах ёстой шийдвэр бий, мөчир бүрт хамгийн их мэдээлэлтэй хүн бий. Тухайн тухайн шийдвэрээ гаргачихвал, хариуцлагыг сайжруулж төвлөрөлийг сааруулан, хяналтыг нэмдэг. Учир нь төлөөний хүн хувьдаа ашиг сонирхол бүхий зүйл хийхгүй.
Төлөөлөгчийн зардал Jensen Meckling 1976
Төлөөлөгчийг тогтоон барих, хүсээгүй зүйлийг нь хийлгэсний төлөөх, алдааг нь залруулах алдаа зэрэг нь ордог.
Зарим эрдэмтэд менежер нь зан төлвөөрөө удирдагддаг гэж үзсэн бол зарим эрдэмтэд хоёр туйлт харилцаа гэж үзсэн.
Нийгмийн ялгаатай секторуудыг хянах боломж ялгаатай
Өвөрмөц байдал Үйл ажиллагааны багтаамж их байхад хянах боомж их учир нь нийгмийн олон төлөөллийг ялгалгүй үйл ажиллагаа явуулдаг.
Өвөрмөц байдал болон үйл ажиллагааны хүрээнээс үр дүнг хянах хэцүү 75 ху
Сайн засаглал болон сайн лидерүүд нэг нэгнийгээ нөхөж чаддаг ч хоёулаа байх нь урт хугацааны шийдэл юм.
Байгууллагад сайн засаглал зан төлвийг бий болгож чадвал энэ нь нийт нийгэмд эерэг тусгал, систем болж хувирдаг.
"Хүний бус хуулийн засаглал" - Аристотель
Хуулиар удирдагчаар удирдуулан улсууд цэргийн командлал болон мөнгөний бодлогыг хуулиар нарийвчлан тогтоогоогүй байдаг учир эрх мэдлийн хоёр том үзүүр буруу хүний гарт орох нь аюул тарих тохиодол бий.
Аж үйлдвэр болон мэдлэг чадвартай түшмэд авлигад авталгүй байваас олигтой хөгжөөгүй хөрөнгийн зах зээлийг мэдээлэл дутуу байсан ч ав явьж чадсаар байх болно.
Харин буруу гарт орвол хөрөнгө оруулалтын эх үүсвэрийг ус төрийн дэмжлэгтэй бүлгүүд авч эсвэл анд нөхөд хамаатан саданруугаа хийдэг байна.
Байгууллагад харьяалагдаж байгаа хүн байгууллагаараа нийгмийг төсөөлдөг.
Байгууллагад бодлого хэвшсэн бол хүчтэй хяналтыг сулруулж болно.
Байгууллагын оройлогч нь хүн хоорондын оройлогчоос ялгаатай. Оройлогч нь эн тэргүүнд эрхэм зүйлийг хөхиүлэн дэмжигч байна.
Байгууллагын уламжлал хэлбэр хэм хэмжээ дээр тогтож байсан бол орчин үед урамшууллын хэлбэрлүү шилжжээ. Байгууллагадаа хүртэл хохирол учруулахгүй байх нь байгууллагын шилдэг ёс зүйн төлөөлөгч гэх мэт...
Тодорхой нэг удирдагчийг гаргаж ирж түүний нүүр царайгаар нийт институц улсын байр байдлыг илэрхийлэх нь орчин үеийн гадаад харилцааны тренд. Амархан зайлуулж болох том давуу талтай учраас...
Талууд хөдөлсөнөөр өөр өөрийгөө өөрийн гараар тодорхойлно.
Төрийг төвхөнүүлэхийн тулд мөн түүнийг урт хугацаанд товхинуулахын тулд нийтийн хариуцлага нийтийн эрх ашиг тусгагдах хэрэгтэй. Мөн тодорхойлж хэлэхэд, нийтийн шаардлага юм. Нийтийн шаардлагыг институц буюу байгууллага, хамгийн сайн аргаар мөн, шаардлага болон бусад зүйлсийг тодорхойлон шийдвэрлэж байх нь одоогийн хамгийн сайн арга ажээ.
Сулхан төр нийтийн захиргааны хар нүх юм.
Байгууллагын удирдлагын хамгийн дээд эрх мэдлийг хамгийн мундагт нь гэхээс илүү тухайн асуудлаар хамгийн их мэдээлэлтэй хүнээр гаргуулж байх нь хамгийн зохистой шийдвэр юм. Мөчир бүрт гаргах ёстой шийдвэр бий, мөчир бүрт хамгийн их мэдээлэлтэй хүн бий. Тухайн тухайн шийдвэрээ гаргачихвал, хариуцлагыг сайжруулж төвлөрөлийг сааруулан, хяналтыг нэмдэг. Учир нь төлөөний хүн хувьдаа ашиг сонирхол бүхий зүйл хийхгүй.
Төлөөлөгчийн зардал Jensen Meckling 1976
Төлөөлөгчийг тогтоон барих, хүсээгүй зүйлийг нь хийлгэсний төлөөх, алдааг нь залруулах алдаа зэрэг нь ордог.
Зарим эрдэмтэд менежер нь зан төлвөөрөө удирдагддаг гэж үзсэн бол зарим эрдэмтэд хоёр туйлт харилцаа гэж үзсэн.
Нийгмийн ялгаатай секторуудыг хянах боломж ялгаатай
Өвөрмөц байдал Үйл ажиллагааны багтаамж их байхад хянах боомж их учир нь нийгмийн олон төлөөллийг ялгалгүй үйл ажиллагаа явуулдаг.
Өвөрмөц байдал болон үйл ажиллагааны хүрээнээс үр дүнг хянах хэцүү 75 ху
Сайн засаглал болон сайн лидерүүд нэг нэгнийгээ нөхөж чаддаг ч хоёулаа байх нь урт хугацааны шийдэл юм.
Байгууллагад сайн засаглал зан төлвийг бий болгож чадвал энэ нь нийт нийгэмд эерэг тусгал, систем болж хувирдаг.
"Хүний бус хуулийн засаглал" - Аристотель
Хуулиар удирдагчаар удирдуулан улсууд цэргийн командлал болон мөнгөний бодлогыг хуулиар нарийвчлан тогтоогоогүй байдаг учир эрх мэдлийн хоёр том үзүүр буруу хүний гарт орох нь аюул тарих тохиодол бий.
Аж үйлдвэр болон мэдлэг чадвартай түшмэд авлигад авталгүй байваас олигтой хөгжөөгүй хөрөнгийн зах зээлийг мэдээлэл дутуу байсан ч ав явьж чадсаар байх болно.
Харин буруу гарт орвол хөрөнгө оруулалтын эх үүсвэрийг ус төрийн дэмжлэгтэй бүлгүүд авч эсвэл анд нөхөд хамаатан саданруугаа хийдэг байна.
Байгууллагад харьяалагдаж байгаа хүн байгууллагаараа нийгмийг төсөөлдөг.
Байгууллагад бодлого хэвшсэн бол хүчтэй хяналтыг сулруулж болно.
Байгууллагын оройлогч нь хүн хоорондын оройлогчоос ялгаатай. Оройлогч нь эн тэргүүнд эрхэм зүйлийг хөхиүлэн дэмжигч байна.
Байгууллагын уламжлал хэлбэр хэм хэмжээ дээр тогтож байсан бол орчин үед урамшууллын хэлбэрлүү шилжжээ. Байгууллагадаа хүртэл хохирол учруулахгүй байх нь байгууллагын шилдэг ёс зүйн төлөөлөгч гэх мэт...
Тодорхой нэг удирдагчийг гаргаж ирж түүний нүүр царайгаар нийт институц улсын байр байдлыг илэрхийлэх нь орчин үеийн гадаад харилцааны тренд. Амархан зайлуулж болох том давуу талтай учраас...
Талууд хөдөлсөнөөр өөр өөрийгөө өөрийн гараар тодорхойлно.
June 19, 2021
Key Lessons from “State Building”
1. Unclear Goals
2. Lack of Accountability
3. Badly allocated discretion
Unclear goals
The first problem that the public sector faces regarding its organization is vague goals. Organizations don’t always have delegate specific goals the right way. In theory, principals should delegate activities to subordinates which they should execute.
Nonetheless, in reality, organizations rarely function in this manner. Goals and tasks move all over the organizational chart.
Often, organizations give authority to people who are more functionally oriented, instead of hierarchically. These problems are rooted in the past, but no one has solved them yet.
Lack of Accountability
Public organizations do not use profit as a metric for their success.
They put attention to another variable: service outputs. These outputs differ in specificity and transaction volume. Specificity refers to the possibility to measure the output.
Transaction volume, on the other hand, shows the number of processed transactions. Some services, however straightforward they might be, are almost impossible to measure.
Badly Allocated Discretion
Often, organizations should delegate decision making and discretion. The more judgment the task requires, the more of them they should appoint. The problem is that delegating authority is risky.
In government and public organizations, delegating authority to federal officials may bring forth a patronage network. Furthermore, the need and acceptable rate of delegated discretion are different for different cultures. For all these reasons, there is no general rule about how much delegation is enough.
In the end, it all comes down to taking the right action in a specific situation.
1. Unclear Goals
2. Lack of Accountability
3. Badly allocated discretion
Unclear goals
The first problem that the public sector faces regarding its organization is vague goals. Organizations don’t always have delegate specific goals the right way. In theory, principals should delegate activities to subordinates which they should execute.
Nonetheless, in reality, organizations rarely function in this manner. Goals and tasks move all over the organizational chart.
Often, organizations give authority to people who are more functionally oriented, instead of hierarchically. These problems are rooted in the past, but no one has solved them yet.
Lack of Accountability
Public organizations do not use profit as a metric for their success.
They put attention to another variable: service outputs. These outputs differ in specificity and transaction volume. Specificity refers to the possibility to measure the output.
Transaction volume, on the other hand, shows the number of processed transactions. Some services, however straightforward they might be, are almost impossible to measure.
Badly Allocated Discretion
Often, organizations should delegate decision making and discretion. The more judgment the task requires, the more of them they should appoint. The problem is that delegating authority is risky.
In government and public organizations, delegating authority to federal officials may bring forth a patronage network. Furthermore, the need and acceptable rate of delegated discretion are different for different cultures. For all these reasons, there is no general rule about how much delegation is enough.
In the end, it all comes down to taking the right action in a specific situation.
February 8, 2011
Francis Fukuyama, in an important slender volume, sees nation building as the process of helping to ". . .create self-sustaining democratic political institutions and robust market-oriented economies. . . ." He draws a critical distinction between "nation building" and "state building." The former refers to ". . .creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation." The latter, in contrast, aims at ". . .creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the like." The two are not the same--but are interdependent one upon the other.
Fukuyama argues that the process must proceed in two stages: first, the country must be stabilized, with the provision of humanitarian assistance, rebuilding of infrastructure, disaster relief, and economic development. Only then, second, comes the building of self-sustaining political and economic institutions that can support competent democratic governance and economic growth. Thus, nation building involves stabilization of ties that bind a people together as well as supporting the construction of government institutions.
This is a real challenge and not one that can be done easily, without much effort and care. In short, eny effort at democratic nation building must be done with patience and making sure that prerequisites are in place before trying to introduce the full regalia of democracy.
Fukuyama argues that the process must proceed in two stages: first, the country must be stabilized, with the provision of humanitarian assistance, rebuilding of infrastructure, disaster relief, and economic development. Only then, second, comes the building of self-sustaining political and economic institutions that can support competent democratic governance and economic growth. Thus, nation building involves stabilization of ties that bind a people together as well as supporting the construction of government institutions.
This is a real challenge and not one that can be done easily, without much effort and care. In short, eny effort at democratic nation building must be done with patience and making sure that prerequisites are in place before trying to introduce the full regalia of democracy.
June 17, 2020
This book has three main parts.
The first lays out an analytical framework for understanding the multiple dimensions of “stateness”—that is, the functions, capabilities, and grounds for legitimacy of governments. This framework will explain why, in most developing countries, states are not too strong but rather too weak.
The second part looks at the causes of state weakness, particularly why there can be no science of public administration despite recent efforts by economists to establish one. This lack sharply limits the ability of outsiders to help countries strengthen their state capacity.
The final part discusses the international dimensions of state weakness: how instability is driven by state weakness, how weakness has eroded the principle of sovereignty in the international system, and how questions of democratic legitimacy on an international level have come to dominate disputes between the United States, Europe, and other developed countries in the international system.
The first lays out an analytical framework for understanding the multiple dimensions of “stateness”—that is, the functions, capabilities, and grounds for legitimacy of governments. This framework will explain why, in most developing countries, states are not too strong but rather too weak.
The second part looks at the causes of state weakness, particularly why there can be no science of public administration despite recent efforts by economists to establish one. This lack sharply limits the ability of outsiders to help countries strengthen their state capacity.
The final part discusses the international dimensions of state weakness: how instability is driven by state weakness, how weakness has eroded the principle of sovereignty in the international system, and how questions of democratic legitimacy on an international level have come to dominate disputes between the United States, Europe, and other developed countries in the international system.
May 14, 2016
The book is not bad at all, particularly to bring such a brief explanation on how to shape the art of state building, how can a state be failed or having a wrong turn to be weaken. Fukuyama underlines that weak states have posed threats to international order because they are the source of conflict and grave abuses of human rights. In the end of the book he strongly supports to turn back to sovereign-nation state by trying to understand how to make it solid and effective. Yet, bring back the security issue on the table shouldn't be the only answer. And there is still a big gap to operationalise the notion of soft power, though there are some windows to use it in order to reshape the notions if governance and world order in the 21 century.
December 29, 2016
I consider this book as a gift to the rulers, particular those who are leading developing countries, as a Libyan young man Im seeing tragically how domestic leaders are destroying everything without any sense of responsibility, despite we no longer believe on their intention to make our lives better. This book is a perfect guidance and illustrates some previous experiences for instance, Japanese experience after 19945, and other Eastern Asian countries. I sent this book to a friend who works in our parliament and he promised to give it to some pms and some ministers he closely in touch, and I hope from my deep it catches their attention and read it in intention to improve their performance. Finally I say Thanks Francis for this gift
June 3, 2016
Randomly picked up this gem from Dad's shelf. It's very intro-ey on its titular topic but got me intrigued on the historical and political aspect of state building (which is to say it presented the many failed attempts at interventions, mostly by the US). It feels a bit bashy against economists, which means this is the second book of the year I read that spends a lot of its pages on that.
Favorite quote:
"..reinventing a wheel that had been first rolled out over fifty years previously.
Such is the nature of progress in the social sciences."
Favorite quote:
"..reinventing a wheel that had been first rolled out over fifty years previously.
Such is the nature of progress in the social sciences."
February 1, 2014
أكره التنظير الاكاديمى بتلك الطريقة
كنت أظن أن فرانسيس سيحاول أن يعتدل ويبتعد عن نظرياته الخيالية بعد مالاقاه من مجابهة فى كتاب نهاية التاريخ ولكن مع الآسف
مازال يطيح بالنظريات دون أى اسانيد وكأنه يملك آلة استشراق للمستقبل
كنت أظن أن فرانسيس سيحاول أن يعتدل ويبتعد عن نظرياته الخيالية بعد مالاقاه من مجابهة فى كتاب نهاية التاريخ ولكن مع الآسف
مازال يطيح بالنظريات دون أى اسانيد وكأنه يملك آلة استشراق للمستقبل
July 12, 2016
كتاب مهم وعميق
October 22, 2019
Ez a könyv bizonyos tekintetben logikus folytatása A történelem végé-nek. Fukuyama abban azt állítja, hogy a társadalmak fejlődésének logikus végpontja a demokrácia, az Államépítés-ben pedig arra reflektál, hogy amennyiben ez így van, akkor miért csődölnek be rendszeresen azok az államok, amiket a nyugatiak (gyakran akaratuk ellenére) kirángatnak a maguk autoriter, elnyomó rezsimjeik alól, és megkísérelnek bennük valami demokráciaszerűséget felépíteni. Válaszában mindenekelőtt kifejti az állami intézmények működésének sajátosságait, majd a szervezetelméleti kutatások gazdag tárházára támaszkodva kifejti, milyen nehézségek árán lehet átültetni őket idegen talajba. Meg hogy miért sorvadnak ott el szinte kivétel nélkül. Fukuyamának erre természetesen több válasza is van, de a legtöbb aköré csoportosul, hogy az amerikai decentralizált föderalizmus merev alkalmazása a nem-demokratikus államokra lebontja azok már meglévő intézményeit. Így végső soron hatalmi űrt hoz létre, amiben könnyen megteremnek az olyan kártékony gyomok, mint a korrupció és a terrorizmus. (Csak hogy a mezőgazdasági hasonlatoknál maradjunk.) Kissé primitívre lefordítva a konklúziót: vannak országok, akik elég jók a demokráciához, és vannak, akik még nem elég jók.
Ez a kötet természetszerűen szűkebb keresztmetszetet vizsgál, mint A történelem vége, így nem is szól olyan széles olvasóközönséghez. Legnagyobb hibája mindazonáltal az, amit maga az író is leszögez már idejekorán: hogy nem lehet olyan általános javaslatokat tenni a kérdésben, amivel ezek a kínzó problémák egyértelműen feloldhatóak lennének. Ami az egyik közösség problémáira orvosság, az a másiknak méreg – ez nyilván nagyon igaz, de éppen ezért ez a könyv nem lehet több, mint az alapok lefektetése a nemzetépítés jövőbeli tudományához. Nem a Szent Grál, csak egy felhívás annak keresésére.
Amúgy meg kifejezetten aktuális olvasmány, nem pusztán a Közel-Kelet eseményei iránt érdeklődőknek, hanem annak is, akit érdekel az EU és az USA közötti súrlódás gyökerei, amelyek sajátos demokráciaértelmezéseikre vezethetőek vissza.
Ez a kötet természetszerűen szűkebb keresztmetszetet vizsgál, mint A történelem vége, így nem is szól olyan széles olvasóközönséghez. Legnagyobb hibája mindazonáltal az, amit maga az író is leszögez már idejekorán: hogy nem lehet olyan általános javaslatokat tenni a kérdésben, amivel ezek a kínzó problémák egyértelműen feloldhatóak lennének. Ami az egyik közösség problémáira orvosság, az a másiknak méreg – ez nyilván nagyon igaz, de éppen ezért ez a könyv nem lehet több, mint az alapok lefektetése a nemzetépítés jövőbeli tudományához. Nem a Szent Grál, csak egy felhívás annak keresésére.
Amúgy meg kifejezetten aktuális olvasmány, nem pusztán a Közel-Kelet eseményei iránt érdeklődőknek, hanem annak is, akit érdekel az EU és az USA közötti súrlódás gyökerei, amelyek sajátos demokráciaértelmezéseikre vezethetőek vissza.
December 3, 2023
- يتناول الكتاب مسألة بناء الدولة مع تركيز أوسع علي الجانب المؤسساتي اعتباراً بان مفهوم بناء الدولة عند المؤلف هو توسيع المؤسسات القائمة او إيجاد مؤسسات جديدة. ويُستهل الكتاب بمناقشة مفهومي قدرة الدولة ومداها وعلاقة ذلك بدور الدولة في الحياة العامة والذي يعد مقياسا/او محددا لقوة/مدى الدولة، ثم ينتقل تدريجيا للمسائل الفرعية المرتبطة بالأداء المؤسسي والإدارة العامة بما في ذلك جوانب القيادة والتنظيم وتقسيم العمل والتراتبية واللا مركزية وما إلى ذلك.
- في الجزء الأخير من الكتاب يناقش فوكوياما مسألة السيادة في المستقبل وعلاقتها بوضع الدولة داخليا وانعكاس ذلك علي التنمية من جهة وعلي المجتمع الدولي وتدخلاته من جهة أخرى ولعل في هذا الجزء أهمية لما تثيره من تساولات تدفع للبحث خاصة بعد التطورات اللاحقة في عالم اليوم.
- بغض النظر عن خلفية المؤلف الليبرالية والاراء الواردة في الكتاب والتي قد تثير حفيظة الكثير من المتخصصين كما فعلت غداة نشره، فإن الكتاب يعد مرجعا مهما للباحثين في مجال النظم السياسية والتنظيم الإداري.
- في الجزء الأخير من الكتاب يناقش فوكوياما مسألة السيادة في المستقبل وعلاقتها بوضع الدولة داخليا وانعكاس ذلك علي التنمية من جهة وعلي المجتمع الدولي وتدخلاته من جهة أخرى ولعل في هذا الجزء أهمية لما تثيره من تساولات تدفع للبحث خاصة بعد التطورات اللاحقة في عالم اليوم.
- بغض النظر عن خلفية المؤلف الليبرالية والاراء الواردة في الكتاب والتي قد تثير حفيظة الكثير من المتخصصين كما فعلت غداة نشره، فإن الكتاب يعد مرجعا مهما للباحثين في مجال النظم السياسية والتنظيم الإداري.
July 11, 2017
Actually I expected more especially that I keep hearing a lot about Fukuyama however I found this book to be average in quality. Not much new stuff from what I learned in political science and public administration classes. The exception is chapter 3, which offered excellent perspectives to the issue of weak states, interventions and international legitimacy and a differentiation to the US-EU approaches.
March 27, 2023
It was pretty good albeit brief book on various methods for improving state formation and which have worked in which contexts.
Though it falls short of the 21st century part as it doesn't address any of major high probability future crises. Better would have been to name it 1990's state formation, would have been more accurate.
Though it falls short of the 21st century part as it doesn't address any of major high probability future crises. Better would have been to name it 1990's state formation, would have been more accurate.
April 25, 2022
Almost feels like the author is trying to justify colonialism. And help make it more effective and successful.
The agent problem part is helpful.
Will try to read the other two big books by the author. Maybe will feel differently about this one after understanding the author’s framework better.
The agent problem part is helpful.
Will try to read the other two big books by the author. Maybe will feel differently about this one after understanding the author’s framework better.
May 12, 2022
在这本书里，比起理论的严谨和深度，福山更关注的其实是现实世界里的政策问题。所以它的优缺点，都源于这一点。
但无论如何，在民主制度和国家构建的复杂互动、对欧洲国家和美国在外交政策及其历史成因的差异性分析、对美国当代外交政策的辩护和反思上，福山依然在这本书里抛出了很多有见地的观察和思考。
至于弱国家的国家能力黑洞和外部援助这部分内容，则尤其适合跟保罗·科利尔的《战争、枪炮与选票》结合起来一起读。
但无论如何，在民主制度和国家构建的复杂互动、对欧洲国家和美国在外交政策及其历史成因的差异性分析、对美国当代外交政策的辩护和反思上，福山依然在这本书里抛出了很多有见地的观察和思考。
至于弱国家的国家能力黑洞和外部援助这部分内容，则尤其适合跟保罗·科利尔的《战争、枪炮与选票》结合起来一起读。
November 28, 2022
very interesting book
I am Somalia-American and political science major and MPA. I bought this book to help me understand nation building. I learned why these failed state keep failing. I travel and observe. I would to see these countries transform into peaceful states.
I am Somalia-American and political science major and MPA. I bought this book to help me understand nation building. I learned why these failed state keep failing. I travel and observe. I would to see these countries transform into peaceful states.
June 19, 2019
Читала в очень плохом переводе на русский, возможно в оригинале была бы оценка 5
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