This book describes the history of (mostly American) Economics, and how Economists have come to be regarded as first class advisors, starting from a largely ignored position, sitting in the proverbial "basement" of policy institutions. It is a dense but very informative read, and sets the tone to understand decisions made by governments in clearer terms with regard to our own experience in the past, helping us understand political and economic motivations, and giving us ideas for how we can improve. It also helped me understand how economics as a human experience (across countries) is different from Economics which is typically understood as a bunch of theories. It left me more open minded in my own understanding of Economic Decision making by individuals and governments, and left me less anchored to the theories we use to understand these decisions, by exposing how these failed historically. The singular example that comes to mind is the Laffer curve, which suggests that after a point, reducing the tax rate increases overall tax revenues; this statement might be meaningless because that point might be too high to be of any practical relevance. Another example is the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, which time and again has been seen to not be ubiquitously true.
This is an extremely well researched piece of writing in my understanding; though one would do well to be conscious of the fact the author might have some of their own biases in writing the book.
To serve my own memory, I will lay down a brief chapterwise summary of ideas in this book in this review (which I also struggled to find anywhere else). I believe a more trained economist can improve upon my review.
1. Markets in Everything:
In this chapter, the author speaks to how economists laid the foundation for government institutions to trust the functioning of markets in every aspect of public decision making. The case in particular is that of ending the military conscription, which was spurred by such pushes from economists. Notably, for the first time, Economists tried to show that the costs of ending conscription (which would be largely incurred by having to offer more competitive wages for joining the army) would be largely offset by the gains from the otherwise lost economic activity that would be generated by men who chose to not join the army, precisely because they foresaw making more wealth in other ways. Thus was seeded the idea for a marketplace for recruiting even for the military, where in people would join only of their own volition. Of course, it is naive to say that this pivot in policy was solely economic. There were strong political factors and a general dissatisfaction among the public with regard to forced conscription. Making matters complicated was the fact that it was based on a lucky draw. Further, America's involvement in a foreign conflict was seen as very different from earlier situations, if not entirely unnecessary. However, there is no doubt that economists played an irreplacable role in pushing this shift in policy.
2. Friedman vs Keynes
This chapter describes the battle of ideologies that played out in the American Economy. On the one hand was Keynes, who suggested that fiscal policy had a large role to be played in enhancing economic welfare. On the other side was Friedman, who suggested that monetary control was the only thing that could affect economic welfare, and that giving out fiscal stimuli was the same as giving out cash to the public. But because the public at large was incentivised to spend money better since they had their own skin in the game, it would be more beneficial for government to dole out cash directly instead of fiscal stimuli - for one comparison, a suggestion is made that the government could pay people to dig ditches, in which they were to find money itself. The way this played out in the American experience is that since Keynes' ideology supposedly had one in a big way post the 1930s depression, it continued to have the upper hand for most of the next half century; but eventually, Friedman's legacy was stamped all over the world in terms of governments shifting to reduced fiscal involvement and more monetary intervention
3. One Nation - Under Employed
This chapter notices the end of the Keynesian era where there was a limit hit with respect to unemployment being solved at the cost of inflation. The American political system realised that fiscal stimulus was no longer cutting it, and that austerity was required in order to bring down inflation which had its own perils. What follows is a description of this austerity under the Reagan administration, and then even under the Clinton administration, who had explicitly sought at first to increase spending, but was mellowed down by his advisors.
4. Representation Without Taxation
This chapter describes the pivot towards a policy of reducing taxation in order to increase incentives for people to earn more, which would supposedly more than offset the losses due to a decrease in percentage taxed. In other words, the size of the pie taken would increase even though the fraction would reduce, because the entire pie itself would become much larger. Remarkably, this trend was observed not only in America, but also the remaining developed world such as Europe and Japan. This was most strongly supported by economists such as Mundell and Laffer. However, this came at its own cost. The trickle down effect of low corporate and income taxes did not ever kick in, and government did not reduce its spending as much as it reduced its revenue collection. This led to a surge in public debt, which was conveniently down played as cheap credit flowed in from first Japan, and then a decade or so later, from China. However, it did mean that post the decrease, governments did have to resort to austerity to bring public debt rates in control. However, tax rates have since not been higher than 40 percent in any part of the developed world; and since government spending has only boomed every since, the world has seen a shift to the norm of deficit financing.
5. In Corporations We Trust
This chapter describes the emergence of the Chicago School of Antitrust, or rather, Protrust, brewed by characters such as George Stiegler, Richard Posner and Richard Bork. This school radically altered antitrust regulation in favour of deregulations and not meddling with large corporations - in terms of blocking mergers or anticompetitive pricing. The bedrock of this shift was the newfound arguments in economics which characterised law as a manifestation of economics itself (Even historically, according to Posner). Bork and Stieglier gave economic arguments for the instability and infeasibility of large of cartels, sustained anti competitive or predatory pricing and the losses of large scale vertical mergers. It was argued that the erstwhile arguments against each of these were political rather than economic, and they needed replacement. While there was merit in the political reasons for the work of antitrust law in terms of not wanting to allow concentration of power and keeping bargaining power evenly balanced between corporations and wage earners, it would be unfair to say that these arguments are not sound Economics. However, what is also true is that there is not much evidence of loss to consumers due to lesser antitrust regulation, at least not directly. However, some of these counterfactuals are impossible to estimate, such as the drop in innovation due to the persistence of large conglomerates, and the effect on democratic conduct. In recent times, the law community has asked for a revisit and reconsideration of this policy due to various reasons, and examples of growing monopolies such as Amazon.
6. Freedom from Regulation
This chapter charts out the path of civil aviation and trucking the United States from being heavily regulated to being entirely deregulated. This led to falling prices for transportation and shipping, and much higher utilization. The experience was also felt in Europe, notably Britain and Ireland. However, while the US experience has been to replace heavy regulation with non regulation, the European experience has been to keep limited regulation in favour of preserving high levels of competition. The author concludes with the idea that while deregulation helps, absolute deregulation comes with its own problems, and in the specific cases of the airline industry and internet service providers, Europe is doing better than the US because of its predilection to actively maintaining competition. As a side point, we learn the etymology of the tile of the book, the term Economists's hour, which was introduced by Thomas McGraw in his book "Prophets of Regulation".
7. The Value of Life
In the spirit of cost benefit analysis of the previous chapter, the author continues down the line of where cost benefit analysis must find its ultimate gold standard - in the analysis of policy relating to human life. Placing a value on human life prior to the economists' hour was considered unethical. The first precedent in changing this mindset was the emergence of life insurance in Britain in the mid 19th century, where people started examining and pinning down the value of life. This was important from a policy perspective, because at present, the US government was passing law to protect human life without a consideration of the costs of such law, because human life was declared unquestionably paramount. It was the same line of argumentation which allowed unlimited military spending, as well as more benign restrictions such as the recall of potentially fatal armchairs and passing of law which protects cotton pickers from getting their lungs hurt by occupational hazards. The conclusion of the chapter is that overcoming opposition time and again, the valuation of life seeped into American policy making, which changed decision making to now happen more on economic than political grounds. What remained was a debate on specific numbers; and the value of life increased steadily starting at around 1 million dollars to near 10 million dollars with the Obama administration. This number was important; a higher value permitted higher regulation, as a general rule.
8. Money, Problems
This chapter describes the journey of international monetary policy from the Bretton Woods agreement post World War 2, where the US laid down fixed exchange rate between currencies, to the reversal of this agreement. Closely tied to this was the idea that the US would compensate any bearer of US dealers with a fixed amount of gold per dollar. This largely crippled the United States, because while its currency was pegged to the gold standard, other economies were freer in calibrating their currency. In particular, Japan and Germany made great use of this situation, by becoming huge exporters to the US. Their goods found a ready market in the US as they turned out to be cheaper than domestic American goods. While the exact monetary dynamic behind this has not been explained by the author, one can presume that this happened because these countries were able to artifically lower the prices on their exports by printing less money, thereby making their currency more valuable and increasing purchasing power for Americans. It was soon understood that this pegging of exchange rates was infeasible, and after a bunch of haggling between nations, the world eventually settled on truly floating exchange rates and removal of the pegging of the US dollar to the gold standard. This shift in paradigm gave great power to the US in the international economy - one reason for this was that the USD became the currency of the world. Countries would trade amongst each other on the basis of the USD. However, this floating of exchange rates has come with its share of problems - Japan and China were able to stealthily control their currencies, make their goods cheap in the US market and hoard large amounts of US dollars, simultaneously unfairly pushing their economies as well as gaining control of American assets. The author also describes the creation of the Euro; with its motivations lying in avoiding the problems of freely floating currencies posing transactions costs for trade within Europe. This was also an imperfect compromise, and countries which were economically weaker which agreed to adopt the Euro suffered.
9. Made in Chile
In this chapter, the author constrasts the Chilean and Taiwanese experiences of growth. While Chile maintained extreme free market policies which resulted in debilitating social and economic inequality in the country, Taiwan pursued a protectionist policy starting out, gradually liberalising its economy. It made impactful decisions of splitting land holdings between the actual tillers of the land, increasing equity as well as efficiency at the same time; while Chile in the name of free markets continued to be controlled by a handful of powerful decision makers.
10. Paper Fish
In the final chapter of the book, the author moves almost to the present. He describes the history of financial deregulation - where in secondary markets in derivates were left entirely de regulated. He points out how this has time and again led to systematic fraud - and contrasts arguments by stalwarts such as Greenspan who thought of this as the market punishing the idiots, vs the author's (among other economists') view of this as a systematic information asymmetry based market failure. He alludes to this leading to the financial crisis of 2008, which didn't change much in the name of deregulation. He gives the example of Iceland, which completely deregulated its financial services industry, culminating in severe fraud to the effect of about 70,000 USD per citizen. While Iceland punished its wrongdoers by sending them to prison, America did not.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the author describes the journey of policy making from being entirely political to moving its to burden economists, systematically. While the world benefitted from deregulation at large, it is also true that deregulation is not to be favoured at every time and in extreme. The author argues that the Economist's hour partly ended in 2008, based on the government's response (or lack thereof) to the crisis. However, this seems like a myopic conclusion, especially based on evidence from the book itself, where the author has shown how it has taken time to convince decision makers of economic arguments to devise better policy. There is a particular focus on how inequality has systematically risen in the developed world, especially in America, and how that is making its citizens worse off, and the economy suffer. Partial blame rests with the American social security net, especially in terms of healthcare, whereby pepole lead harder lives because basic welfare is not guaranteed.