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War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962
The circumstances attending the disastrous campaign that followed the Chinese invasion of India's Himalayan borders have never been clearly understood. Even today, some three decades after the ceasefire of November 1962, very little official information has been made available to the public or the press about that brief but traumatic episode.
The present memoir is therefore all the more welcome, not only because it comes from the pen of one who is an established writer and commentator on military affairs but also because, as Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters during that fateful period, he both witnessed and took part in the processes through which government policies were formulated and the decision taken to go to war against the Chinese, in circumstances that must have indicated inevitable catastrophe.
General Palit describes with refreshing candour the ad hoc nature of the decision-making apparatus at prime ministerial and cabinet levels, the lack of any semblance of coordinated staff analyses, the over-reach of government into the responsibilities of the military, and the quiescence of the latter in permitting it. He is uninhibited in recording facts as he saw them and the opinions he held at the time, though always careful to distinguish between that and hind-sight rationalization. While commenting on the actions of others the author is also frankly and disarmingly self-critical.
In an attempt to explain the historical causes for the almost total lack of inter-face between the government and the military, a leitmotiv that runs through the narrative, the author has made an interesting analysis of the ethos of the Indian Army as it has developed during the British-Indian period, an inheritance from the colonial past that remained unchanged despite forty-five years of independence. In a fascinating postscript the author demonstrates that this malfunctioning of the government's national security system continues to the present day.
The present memoir is therefore all the more welcome, not only because it comes from the pen of one who is an established writer and commentator on military affairs but also because, as Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters during that fateful period, he both witnessed and took part in the processes through which government policies were formulated and the decision taken to go to war against the Chinese, in circumstances that must have indicated inevitable catastrophe.
General Palit describes with refreshing candour the ad hoc nature of the decision-making apparatus at prime ministerial and cabinet levels, the lack of any semblance of coordinated staff analyses, the over-reach of government into the responsibilities of the military, and the quiescence of the latter in permitting it. He is uninhibited in recording facts as he saw them and the opinions he held at the time, though always careful to distinguish between that and hind-sight rationalization. While commenting on the actions of others the author is also frankly and disarmingly self-critical.
In an attempt to explain the historical causes for the almost total lack of inter-face between the government and the military, a leitmotiv that runs through the narrative, the author has made an interesting analysis of the ethos of the Indian Army as it has developed during the British-Indian period, an inheritance from the colonial past that remained unchanged despite forty-five years of independence. In a fascinating postscript the author demonstrates that this malfunctioning of the government's national security system continues to the present day.
450 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1991
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 14, 2021
The Sino-Indian war of 1962, what a topic. And what better time to revisit said topic when after nearly 70 years, both India and China are again at a tense border standoff, with the same places, same high altitude bitterly cold settings, albeit with nukes thrown into the mix for added spice. And who better to narrate what happened (at least from the Indian point of view) than the then Director of Military Operations of the Indian Army.
Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit has wrote a very readable account/memoir of the times, which gives us a peek into the thought processes and actions of the Indian Government and military. As DMO, he had access to the major actors, and as previous CO of the 7th Brigade, he was intimately familiar with the area where India suffered its worst reverses, the erstwhile NEFA.
While the book has been termed by various critics as being self exculpatory, the author's account for many things tallies with the accounts of others involved (at least the ones that I have read). Palit was frank in giving his opinion about the leaders of the Indian government/military of the time in the book, along with the various shortcomings he felt that could be addressed by both the Civilian Government and the Military of the time. Shortcomings if addressed appropriately at the time, would not have been hobbling the Indian politico-military relations to this day.
The frankness of the author is refreshing, especially when he has the courage to point out the flaws in the Forward Policy of the government, and the disconnect between the intelligence provided by the intelligence agencies and the analysis of the said intelligence by the government. One starts to suspect that that the same state of affairs still persists in New Delhi in the present day too.
Read this book if you like to be depressed (if you are an Indian), but informed nonetheless.
Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit has wrote a very readable account/memoir of the times, which gives us a peek into the thought processes and actions of the Indian Government and military. As DMO, he had access to the major actors, and as previous CO of the 7th Brigade, he was intimately familiar with the area where India suffered its worst reverses, the erstwhile NEFA.
While the book has been termed by various critics as being self exculpatory, the author's account for many things tallies with the accounts of others involved (at least the ones that I have read). Palit was frank in giving his opinion about the leaders of the Indian government/military of the time in the book, along with the various shortcomings he felt that could be addressed by both the Civilian Government and the Military of the time. Shortcomings if addressed appropriately at the time, would not have been hobbling the Indian politico-military relations to this day.
The frankness of the author is refreshing, especially when he has the courage to point out the flaws in the Forward Policy of the government, and the disconnect between the intelligence provided by the intelligence agencies and the analysis of the said intelligence by the government. One starts to suspect that that the same state of affairs still persists in New Delhi in the present day too.
Read this book if you like to be depressed (if you are an Indian), but informed nonetheless.
May 25, 2025
An excellent read, with an analysis of the personalities involved.
The issues identified in the book are pertinent, and unfortunately All of these still exist to this day, 60+ years later ; except maybe for equipment which seems to be in a much better position.
- ineffectual Higher leadership,
- difiident Senior officers,
- a lack of a National Defence Strategy,
- disconnect between the Government & the Services,
- abrogation of Defence of the nation by the bureaucracy officers
- poor national & defence intelligence capabilities
- officers mostly lacking strategic thinking & vision;
- all held together & buttressed only by the battlefield courage of the Army's younger officers & soldiers.
Though at times, it seems that the author assigns more importance to his role in matters than seems likely, but this is merely conjecture on my part.
To be clear, I immensely enjoyed reading the book & finished it in under 2 days, as the author has kept it mostly engaging; though he does go into long-winded asides, mostly into matters where he played a part.
But then as General Palit states, this is more in the firm of a personal memoir of the events of 1961 & 1962, with a short epilogue of 1965 & 1971.
The issues identified in the book are pertinent, and unfortunately All of these still exist to this day, 60+ years later ; except maybe for equipment which seems to be in a much better position.
- ineffectual Higher leadership,
- difiident Senior officers,
- a lack of a National Defence Strategy,
- disconnect between the Government & the Services,
- abrogation of Defence of the nation by the bureaucracy officers
- poor national & defence intelligence capabilities
- officers mostly lacking strategic thinking & vision;
- all held together & buttressed only by the battlefield courage of the Army's younger officers & soldiers.
Though at times, it seems that the author assigns more importance to his role in matters than seems likely, but this is merely conjecture on my part.
To be clear, I immensely enjoyed reading the book & finished it in under 2 days, as the author has kept it mostly engaging; though he does go into long-winded asides, mostly into matters where he played a part.
But then as General Palit states, this is more in the firm of a personal memoir of the events of 1961 & 1962, with a short epilogue of 1965 & 1971.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews