A potent fighting force that changed the course of the Civil War, the Army of the Cumberland was the North's second-most-powerful army, surpassed in size only by the Army of the Potomac. The Cumberland army engaged the enemy across five times more territory with one-third to one-half fewer men than the Army of the Potomac, and yet its achievements in the western theater rivaled those of the larger eastern army. In Days of Glory, Larry J. Daniel brings his analytic and descriptive skills to bear on the Cumberlanders as he explores the dynamics of discord, political infighting, and feeble leadership that stymied the army in achieving its full potential. Making extensive use of thousands of letters and diaries, Daniel creates an epic portrayal of the developing Cumberland army, from untrained volunteers to hardened soldiers united in their hatred of the Confederates.
Genealogy changed the focus of my Civil War reading. When I discovered that my great great grandfather fought in all the major engagements of the Army of the Cumberland I realized that I had neglected studying that army’s conflicts. It was second only to the Army of the Potomac in size, and for most of its existence was far more successful, yet amateur enthusiasts (like myself) tend to focus on the war in Virginia.
This is a serviceable history of the Union's second largest army. It covers the complete history of this fighting force, from its inception in Kentucky in 1861 until it was broken up by Sherman after serving as his workhorse in the Atlanta Campaign.
Days of Glory is a solid resource for those interested in the often neglected history of this important fighting force, but is far short of a thrilling read. The author lacks the narrative brilliance of Catton or Foote, and is much more of a "just the facts" style of writer. But it’s biggest flaw is a dearth of maps. The author goes into great detail describing troop movements and positions on battlefields, which proves to be nearly meaningless without maps to help the reader envision these details.
Despite its flaws, the book contains valuable information of one of the most important and consequential Union Armies of the war. Its victories at Perryville and Chattanooga were vital to the Union cause, as was its inclusion in Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign. Its officers included both the great General George Thomas (the war’s most neglected hero) and the brash, young Phil Sheridan who first distinguished himself here before Grant brought him east. While not nearly as studied as The Army of the Potomac, for a long time it was far more successful, and was crucial to winning the war. If you study the Civil War, you should read this book.
Well researched and detailed to a fault, Days of Glory certainly gives you a complete history of the often overlooked Army of the Cumberland.
It seems that the author, at times, is overly concerned with providing "balance" to the recent support given George Thomas by other writers (Buell's Warrior Generals in particular). However, it is clear that Daniel holds Thomas in nearly as high regard and seems a bit nit-picky on the subject at times.
Regardless of commander, the great sin of the Army of Cumberland according to it's critics during the war (among them Halleck, Grant and Sherman - a former commander of the army) was it's perceived slowness. For the most part the author leaves this assertion unchallenged or lends it some support. I've always found this a bit puzzling as it seems clear that strategic and logistical obstacles faced by this army were far greater than that of the Potomac in the east and Tennessee in the West. In the east, the close location of the two capitals kept the strategic geography compact. Additionally, dominance of the coastal waterways assured that the Army of the Potomac never faced the supply challenges of the Cumberland. In the west, once the forts were taken on the northern part of the Mississippi, Federal gunboats keep an assured line of communication open for Grant. The Cumberland had none of these advantages and had to deal with protecting a large amount of rail lines and bridges from the best cavalry commander in the war; Forrest.
While I would have enjoyed some expanded commentary on issues such as these (and the less defined military objectives as opposed to political objectives as compared to the other armies) what really kept this book from being more enjoyable was the paucity of maps. Daniel provides an excellent recounting of the movements of the army down the to brigade level. However, it is almost impossible to follow his narrative and relate it to the field because of the lack of maps. I had to reference a few other books for maps to follow along. There are no maps of any of the battles fought by the army.
So overall, it is worth the read but could have been a bit better.
This volume focuses on the origins, development, and maturation of the Army of the Cumberland. The author, Larry Daniel, notes that the maturing of the Army and its best commander, General George Thomas, went together. He observes (page xi): ". . .George Thomas emerges as the catalyst that gave the army its lethal edge, but he is a flawed character who does not mature until late 1863."
The roots of the Army came with General Robert Anderson (after his surrender of Fort Sumter) and General William T. Sherman. Neither did well.
Then, Don Carlos Buell arrived as head of this fighting force. He was typical of many generals of the era--slow and loath to be aggressive. His tour of duty came to an end after the battle at Perrysville.
Then came William Rosecrans, quite capable in many ways, but also excitable and eccentric. He was also not terribly aggressive, although when he moved, he could be brilliant (e.g., the Tullahoma Campaign and his flanking poor Braxton Bragg out of Chattanooga). He delivered a flawed victory (but a victory nonetheless) at Murfreesboro (or Stones River), at a time when the Union forces were doing poorly alsewhere. In the process, he earned Abraham Lincoln's gratitude.
After the debacle at Chickamauga and Rosecrans' dithering while under siege in Chattanooga, George Thomas took over. With Grant and his favorite lieutenant, Sherman, on the scene, Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland played a critical role, with their storming of Missionary Ridge.
Later, with Sherman commanding the forces in the West, Thomas continued to lead "his" army and was an important contributor in the movement of Union forces toward Atlanta. After Atlanta, of course, Sherman divided his forces and the Army of the Cumberland, in essence, no longer existed as an independent force.
This is a competently written and fairly thorough record of this Union fighting force. A good addition to one's Civil War library.
Larry Daniels is one of the best historians on the Civil War in the west, and his history of the Army of the Cumberland is well-researched and a pleasure to read. I most enjoyed the middle part of the book which describes the period of time the army was commanded by William S. Rosecrans. The final chapters on the Atlanta Campaign rely too heavily on Albert Castel's book on that topic and, consequently, are too biased against General William T. Sherman. However, Daniels does give General George Thomas his due credit. I do not believe Sherman has to be a mediocre commander in order for Thomas to be a good commander. If you are interested in the Civil War in the West, Days of Glory is a must-read!
The first modern history of the Army of the Ohio/Army of the Cumberland. If you're looking for detailed descriptions of their major battles, I suggest reading Peter Cozzens (No Better Place to Die, This Terrible Sound, The Shipwreck of their Hopes). But this is a good history of an army that has been neglected for too long. The Army of the Potomac had nothing on them when it came to politics impacting the army, rivalries & petty jealousies among their officers and bad blood between the army commanders and Grant, Sherman, Halleck & Stanton. The author differs in his opinion of George Thomas from many historians and other Civil War buffs. He sees Thomas as developing over the course of the war, superb on defense, often sluggish on offense. Yet Thomas made 5 suggestions for offensive actions to Sherman during the Atlanta campaign that were overruled by Sherman. The author doesn't think all of them were likely to have succeeded, but if some had, they could've changed the course of the campaign. And of course Thomas destroyed the Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Nashville. Unfortunately Thomas destroyed his private letters and he kept many of his opinions to himself so we don't know as much as we'd like to about why he did what he did or his side of disputes w/ Grant, Sherman, etc. The author thinks that Thomas displayed passive aggressive behavior at times.
One improvement would be to add more maps, especially for the Battle of Chickamauga. If you already read Peter Cozzens' books, you'll be better able to follow Daniels' battle descriptions.
In the tradition of "The Army of the Heartland," Daniel recounts the famous and infamous moments of the army. Soldiers are cited often and disputes between officers are gleefully recalled. Daniel could be called hyper-critical. More accurate is that he does not pointlessly defend generals. He has no dog in the fight. As such this is a refreshing read, inaccurate in places, but by turns entertaining and thoughtful. My only real gripe is that after Chattanooga the book gets a bit aimless. Daniel clearly did not relish writing or researching the army's difficult time under Sherman.
I picked this up originally intending to just read the portion pertaining to Chickamauga and Chattanooga (in preparation for a history presentation), but I enjoyed it enough to go ahead and read the rest as well.
This is a good, solid, focused look at the Army of the Ohio / Army of the Cumberland. I particularly appreciated the attention paid to the organization and logistics, and things happening between campaigns. Those things tend to fall through the cracks of other works.
One part that really stands out is Daniel's unusual opinion of George Thomas. At one point, Daniel refers to Thomas as the second best Union general of the war (presumably after Grant) which is much higher praise than is usually applied to him. This is despite Daniel's view that Thomas did not really hit his stride late until the latter half of the war and that he was frequently passive-aggressive when in disagreement with his superiors.