Full Review Could not be Posted
I was motivated enough by the contents to comment upon 28 of the essays. Imagine my disappointment when I found that my full review could not be posted here due to a word count limit. I guess that just is the nature of life and experience, to be disappointing. From the 28 full reviews that I have written, I could only post a sample of 10.
See pp. 278 – 291 - The two essays on AI, ‘The Future of Moral Machines’ by Colin Allen (pp.278 – 283) and ‘Cambridge, Cabs and Copenhagen: My Route to Existential Risk’ by Huw Price (pp. 284 – 291). Both essays are very well done but my question is about the AI risk that went unmentioned and was only touched upon by Huw Price. I do not think there is much risk from AI dominating humanity in terms of smart machines and robots taking over the planet and enslaving the human race The risk comes from us in the form of augmented human beings. I look to the quest for the electric car as a model. The dream of the electric was never realized but the hybrid car, part gasoline engine, part electric motor and battery, is a reality. Perhaps the dream for full AI will never be realized but I think the hybrid human, part biological, part AI, with selected augmentation, will become a reality and will become a new super race of human beings. What are the social risks and cultural outcomes of an AI augmented human race existing side-by-side with purely biological human beings? I can imagine some dark and frightening scenarios based on nothing more than the most cursory review of human history. Unless the AI augmentation technology is made available to every living human being, and there is no reason to think it will, the future of humanity divided into an augmented super race and a biological under race is very plausible. I would have liked to have seen one of the very capable contributors to this book address this risk potential with more depth and rigor than I can devote to it in this simple review.
See pp. 309 – 314 for the essay by Andy Clark, ‘Do Thrifty Brains Make Better Minds?’ If this Kantian hypothesis is correct, and I think this likely, there are some unsettling implications not discussed in the essay. The idea from Kant is one of the imagination completing sense perceptions to form concepts of understanding. Basically put, the hypothesis is that our perceptions are completed, filled in so to speak, based on our expectations. That is, our expectations, built up from a long history of perceptions automatically complete the otherwise incomplete experience of immediate perception. If indeed our everyday and new perceptions are routinely competed and filled in by expectation built from our own history of perceptions and our imagination, what does this imply for such staples of human experience as eye witness testimony? If our expectations determine what we perceive, or as stated by the author “… to ’trump’ certain aspects of incoming sensory signals…” (p. 312), then “…perceiving, understanding and imagining in a single package. Now there’s a deal!” (p. 314), may not be such a great deal; at least not for one convicted on the strength of eyewitness testimony. Though this very unsettling implication is not discussed in the essay, the author does provide a wonderful quote apposite to the implication “…future perceptions will also be similarly sculpted – a royal recipe for tainted evidence and self-fulfilling negative prophecies.” (p. 313).
See pp. 317 – 321 for the essay by Benjamin Y. Fong, ‘Bursting the Neuro-utopian Bubble’. This is a very troubling essay, but not for the reasons the author presents. The author asks “What happens when health insurance companies get hold of this information?” (This information being neuro-brain mapping information analogues to human genome mapping) Fair enough, but may I also ask, what happens when government gets hold of this information? A government that no less may potentially manage both health insurance and health care? The author speaks about neuro scientists being naïve about the ‘corporate wolves’ with whom they run. The author accuses research scientists of willful ignorance regarding corporate influence. What about the author’s willful ignorance about the influence of government? If ‘neuromarketing’ is a risk (p. 319), what about neuro-governance? Where does the author suppose the massive research funding necessary for such groundbreaking and cutting-edge work will come? Most likely, from private enterprise or government, neither the abode of saints. One place it will not come from is those precious university endowment funds!
More troubling is the author’s causal fallacy in the confusion of correlation with cause or perhaps to even reverse cause and effect or to even confuse an accompanying event for a cause. Yes, there is a connection between schizophrenia and poverty. The author states on p. 320 that “…in the face of the known connection between poverty and schizophrenia” and suggests that research focus should turn toward changing socioeconomic conditions rather than to direct neuro and genetic research. Perhaps the causal chain works in reverse here and it is the unfortunate and tragic disorder of schizophrenia that is the cause of poverty? The author also states “…that low socioeconomic status at birth is associated with greater risk of developing schizophrenia,…” (p. 320). Assuming this is the case, it could instead very well be that people in low socioeconomic status, due to schizophrenia, with untreated or un-treatable schizophrenia, having children to whom the condition is passed, presents the ostensible but misleading finding that schizophrenia results from low socioeconomic status at birth when the arcane problem really is that untreated or even un-treatable schizophrenia is the cause of the low socioeconomic status at birth in the first place. In this case, the research focus and funding should most definitely be directed toward finding treatment options and a cure through neuro and genetic research rather than in attempting to reorder society at some fundamental level. As desirable as some of this reordering might indeed be, t is s very indirect way in which to treat the tragic conditions of mental illness. I agree with the author that the best scientific research is no substitute for the responsibly we bare for working toward a more just society, even if small and incremental progress is all we are capable.
See pp. 330 – 336, the essay by Eddy Nahmias, ‘Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?’ Excellent essay. However, it seems that a possible path to the compatibility of free will and determinism is overlooked. I agree in the main with the author, our efforts are better spent in explaining how free will works rather than in explaining it away (p. 332). The mistake is to cast the discussion of free will versus determinism in terms of a one-size fits all answer so to speak; of addressing the problem as a whole rather than in the parts as I believe it actually exists in the world. I believe the error is in thinking that the world, and the human experience of it, can be characterized as either deterministic or subject to free will. Even standard compatibility comprise solutions are fitted to explain and account for the entire human experience of existence and the world. It seems to me that the most obvious compromise is that each individual human being experiences different levels of free will and determinism and to a different degree and in changing proportions over the course of life. The only two fully, but admittedly most important, points in life that can be said to be fully deterministic (no free will possible) are birth and death. Think of this as a chart with free will plotted on the vertical axis (0% to 100%) and a person’s age plotted on the horizontal axis (0 – 85?). The only two points that can be plotted with certainty, at a level of 0% on the vertical axis, are those corresponding to the birth (first point) and death (last point) on the horizontal axis. Between these two points, one can imagine any number of, actually a great number of, curves that can be fitted to connect the two points that represent the course of any given person’s life. I am not claiming to know that shape of the curve connecting the two points, that is the very point, no two curves are likely to be the same, but I very much doubt that there is only one such curve that can be said to characterize the human experience as a whole. No two charts are likely to be identical. Each individual life is governed by different and changing levels and free will and determinism over the course of life. The capacity for free will is greatly determined by the first, the most important and fully deterministic causal antecedent - the circumstance, place, time and attributes of birth. The irresistible ethical implication here is that one born to privilege, wealth and opportunity will have a greater capacity for free will and thus has greater moral, ethical, social and yes, legal responsibility than one born into deprivation, poverty and limited opportunity. We do not have to give up on free will and with it moral, ethical and legal responsibility, but we must scale it better. In the interest of justice, we must be aware that free will and hard causal determinism do not reside in the same proportions or at equal levels for each individual. The author touches upon this when he explains free will as a matter of capacities with the understanding that these capacities are much more than being conscious of one’s appetites, desires and plans. The next move is to understand that each individual is born with a different set of causally determined capacities and the capacity to develop these capacities. Thus, I agree again with the author that we possess less free will then we like to suppose (p. 336). But if we are fully deterministic beings, then the evolution of consciousness must be taken to be some sort of evolutionary error and this does not seem to be correct. Oh yes, I have of course plotted one such chart for myself and I am not even sure if this one is correct, but it is the only one I can hope to know.
See pp 353 – 357, ‘Can Neuroscience Challenge Roe v. Wade’ by William Egginton. Is the author serious? My objection has nothing to do with the right to abortion. I am not opining on the ethics of abortion in this review. I am not writing from the perspective of someone who wants prohibit abortion or the use of RU-486. I just cannot believe that author is seriously referring to Descartes to refute the findings of neuroscience. I greatly admire the contribution and accomplishments of Descartes a great deal, but not in this case. The issue at stake is whether an unborn fetus can feel pain and if so, can this be established by neuroscience and if so, should this be the basis for curtailing the practice of abortion? That is, does pain sentience equal personhood? The author relies upon Descartes to establish that pain sentience does not equate to full-fledged personhood. So, what of it? Regardless of personhood, to knowingly cause pain to a being with sentience enough to feel that pain, whether human, animal or fetal is prima facia immoral and unethical. I do not pretend to know the answer to the question of fetal pain but any thoughtful being should be appalled at causing pain to another being sentient enough to feel such pain, mouse or man. Using the legal definition of personhood to avoid the ethical responsibility for causing pain is odious and appalling! Using a 17th century understanding of sentience and consciousness to refute the finding of 21st century natural and neuroscience science seems to me anachronistic at best, even bizarre. The author speaks of “…the hubris of scientific claims to knowledge that exceeds the boundaries of what the sciences in fact demonstrate” (p. 353). This is a fair enough point but what of the hubris in using the ideas from the 17th century to refute 21st century scientific research? Let us not forget that this vaunted philosophic tradtion inaugurated by Descaerts and his followers led to the belief that animals did not feel pain because they lacked ‘reflective’ consciousness. This paved the way for the appalling dissection of live animals, the nailing of live animals to planks for dissection and open experimentation and surgical procedures on live animals, the obvious distress and cries of the animals in pain being discounted as merely reactive, not reflective consciousness. This is the standard we are to use in determining the authenticity of fetal pain?
Interestingly, Sam Harris has devolved from neuroscientist (p. 330) to polemicist (p. 356). Does this author need to engage in pejorative ad hominem attacks to bolster his case? This to me is a sign of the weakness of his argument. In another odd statement, the author claims: “Science can no more decide that question [what counts for full-fledged personhood] than it can determine the existence or nonexistence of God.” (p. 356). Really? I thought that our basis for the doubt as to the existence of God and the conclusion in the outright impossibility as to the existence of God was precisely informed by our growing scientific understanding of nature. In any case, the notion of personhood in the context of this argument is a classic red hearing. The issue is the morality and ethics of pain knowingly caused by a being sentient enough to know that is causing pain to another being sentient enough to feel that pain. Even if it is true that pain can only be known by inference from personal experience and observed reactions, this changes nothing from an ethical perspective. This is the issue at stake here. Please, let’s allow science to progress and refine its findings before we dismiss these findings. Science has served humanity so well for so long, why do we now discount it in favor of a philosophic tradition emanating from the early modern period of Europe?
See pp. 497 – 502, ‘The Sacred and the Human’ by Anat Biletzki. On p. 497, the author quotes Ronald Dworkin “we almost all accept…that human life in all its forms is sacred.” At least the essential adverb modifier ‘almost’ was used because I am one of those who does not accept that human life in all its forms is sacred. This belief is as ubiquitous as it is false. It is as well, a very selfish view. Before I shock the readers of this review too much, please allow me explain further, but only in due course. First, part of why I think this to be the case follows on p. 497 where the author quotes R.H. Tawney “…every human being is of infinite importance…” This is unsound on logical grounds. How can a finite being be of infinite value? Further, (not Anat Biletzki’s view) “But to believe this it is necessary to believe in God.” Well, at least this much is correct. If a person can be believe in God, there is likely no limit to what person might believe, even that a finite being can be of infinite value. Both beliefs are equally absurd but do make very nice comfort beliefs with which many otherwise reasonable people indulge. I agree with author that religiously derived ethics are always suspect and even where beneficial, they are at risk.
My view, not likely too far from that of the author (p.489), is that our sacredness is independent of our individualism. This is why I cannot accept that all human life in all its forms is sacred. The sacredness is not contained in, and cannot be confined to, individual human beings, or any one individual person, any more than a finite being can be the container of infinite value. The sacredness of human life is in the relationships we cultivate and have with each other. It is the relationship nexus that is sacred. There is nothing sacred in our just being individual human beings. As discussed in the essay by Lisa Guenther (pp.531 – 534), the very structure of our humanity is relational with the support of others being crucial for a coherent experience of existence. The claim of which by any single person is scared is quite pretentious and selfish. It is not the fact of our individual humanity that makes us sacred, it is our relation to each other as human beings that is and makes us sacred. Human sacredness is the mutually supportive and thus beneficial relationships we form with each other and maintain overtime. This is not achieved through command, secular or sacred. It is achieved through our continued biological, social and cultural evolution. This is what commands us (to answer the author’s question) “to be available to the neediness, the suffering, the vulnerability of the other persons” as posited by Hilary Putnam - p. 500. Here is the true human miracle if one needs miracles. Individual human dignity does not turn the engine of human rights as stated by the author on p. 501. The principles of ethics are empathy and compassion which include the non-human realm of existence, the existential source of which is the authentic self and the phenomenology of empathy, the connections and bonds between sentient beings in our shared experience of existence. Perhaps here is here we finally arrive at the “…the starry night above me and moral law within me” as so pleasantly quoted from Kant by the author in closing on p. 502. Yes, I must admit that my position is also a metaethical one in that I am accepting at the outset of my comments that ethics is possible.
See pp. 503 - 508, ‘Confessions of an Ex-Moralist’ by Joel Marks. As the essay continues, we find the concepts of right and wrong exchanged for desirable and undesirable but the practical consequent is the same, only the language changes. There is no new metaethics here, only a change in syntax. The author posits the interesting hypothesis that in the absence of moral right and wrong, our desires would be the same because it is desire that drives human behavior, not ethics, not morality, not God, and not notions of right or wrong. The author faults himself for bad faith in believing in the absolute possibility of ethics, morals, good and evil, when he knew, but could not admit, the impossibility of each. The author states “Mother Teresa was acting as much from desire as the Marquis de Sade.’ (p. 506). The risk here is in conflating desires and rendering all desires to be of equal value. Also, this statement immediately strikes me as narrow and reductive. If we conflate all desires, how are we to decide upon desirable desires and understanding that not all desires are desirable? The author tells us that all justice becomes a matter of preference. The distinction of ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’ gives way to the distinction of desirable from undesirable. This amounts to nothing more than an alternative way of discussing right and wrong, good and evil