Written in his characteristically brisk and readable style, Operation Pedestal by Sir Max Hastings is an entertaining and worthwhile read for anyone who is afflicted with an insatiable interest in the Second World War. He effectively articulates the drama and jeopardy involved in the effort to resupply Malta, and the progress of the tanker Ohio in particular. For that reason, and due to my longstanding affection for his work, this book deserves its four stars. Nevertheless, it has significant flaws that warrant further discussion.
To me, the most glaring of these is what Sir Max presents as the rationale for the ongoing Allied interest in Malta and the significant effort expended in its relief. In a word, he sees the reasons as moral rather than strategic. As he explains, "Winston Churchill understood better than did most of his commanders that the moral issues at stake in the conduct of a war are quite as great as the material ones. No battle can be justly assessed by a mere profit-and-loss account of casualties, of tanks, aircraft, ships destroyed. Perception is also critical and often decisive. The British display of will, fighting the surviving vessels of Pedestal through to Malta despite repeated onslaughts and punitive losses, gave victory to the allied cause." So, the Allies relieved Malta and continued to hold it for the optics, and the only benefit was political.
This strikes me as inadequate and incomplete, failing to take account of Malta's strategic significance. Why does Sir Max give so little credence to these other aspects of its importance? The explanation can be found in the following: "Beyond the Straits of Gibraltar the island of Malta, less than sixty miles south of Sicily, was the only surviving British bastion in the central Mediterranean. It had been subjected to blockade and bombardment so relentless that the population and garrison were half starved; its usefulness as a naval and air base was almost extinguished. It was argued by some unsentimental allied officers that the island might best be surrendered to the enemy, who could then accept the burden of feeding its people. If the Russians pulled through, and when the full weight of American industrial might was committed, the issue of who held this Mediterranean pimple would become unimportant...Strip the global struggle to its essentials: between the June 1940 Nazi triumph in France and the allied landings in Normandy four years later, the British and American armies achieved little of importance against the Germans. The North African and Italian land campaigns were indispensable preliminaries to what came later for the Western allies, but remained marginal by comparison with the titanic clashes in the east, between the hosts of Hitler and Stalin."
While engagingly written, there is a contradiction here: how can the Mediterranean campaigns be simultaneously indispensable preliminaries and marginal? I would suggest that this reasoning reflects declinist presuppositions about the Allied conduct of the war more than it provides a fair and balanced assessment of the facts. What if, instead of characterising the Mediterranean as "achieving little of importance against the Germans," we look on it as the best place for the Allies to conduct a land campaign against Germany at this point in the war, for a reasonable cost in blood, and in a location relatively convenient for the Allies and inconvenient for the Axis? When the cost to Germany in men and materiel is taken into account, fighting in North Africa, Sicily and Italy seem like a much more sensible and justifiable strategic decision, and one that made a significant contribution to the Allies defeat of Nazi Germany. Malta itself was invaluable to the Allies thwarting the resupply of the German and Italian armies in North Africa, and if these campaigns are considered as I have above, rather than as a sideshow, then the strategic significance of relieving the island becomes obvious.
When it comes to the conduct of the Pedestal convoy itself, Sir Max's criticisms are much more valid. Even with the limitations in communication between ships, land and aircraft at this point in the war, the inability of the convoy to communicate effectively with itself or anyone else was shambolic: "A later Admiralty post-mortem concluded that, during the pre-planning for Pedestal, a liaison officer should have been flown home from Malta accompanied by a signals specialist to arrange procedures, wavelengths and suchlike, which would have prevented the chaos that prevailed on the ether. The ships never achieved communication with their would-be saviours in the sky." Incidents like Admiral Burroughs' inability to contact the majority of his ships after transferring to a destroyer, and the lack of air cover over Ohio because Air Vice-Marshal Park on Malta did not understand her significance, are shocking and reflect an inexcusable failure in command and control.
It's a shame that Sir Max didn't include more analysis, and the book ends rather abruptly, but I appreciate his decision to focus on the drama of the convoy itself and as such, he has produced a valuable and very enjoyable work of narrative history.