The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985

by John King Fairbank

Examines the transformation of Imperial China to Communist China, discusses the social and cultural changes that have occurred, and looks at modern economic development in China.

Genres: History, China, Nonfiction, Politics, Asia, World History

396 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1986

About the author

John King Fairbank (1907 – 1991) was an American historian of China and United States-China relations. He taught at Harvard University from 1936 until his retirement in 1977. He is credited with building the field of China studies in the United States after World War II with his organizational ability, his mentorship of students, support of fellow scholars, and formulation of basic concepts to be tested.
The Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard is named after him.

Reviews

[Tim Chamberlain · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book presents a masterful, introductory overview (or a neat refresher) of modern Chinese political history. A good primer or quick reference work for anyone studying the history and political transmutations of modern China at degree level, written by a very distinguished historian of the subject then nearing the end of a long career, it serves as a kind of personal scholarly distillation of the greater depth and detail which can be found in the Cambridge History of China series (Vols 10-13), of which Fairbank was editor (which ultimately will be of greater use to students as they go on to sharpen their focus on this period), and to which he points the reader in lieu of providing more traditional endnotes. Fairbank's prose is occasionally leavened by some personal and chatty asides, which may not chime well with all readers (and which may not always be readily comprehensible to non-Americans); as can also be said for his idiosyncratic romanisation of certain Chinese names - e.g. "Deng Hsiao-p'ing" - halfway between Wade-Giles and Pinyin. In certain places the book does show its age somewhat, but it certainly still bears reading alongside similar, more up-to-date works (e.g. - by historians, such as Julia Lovell, Robert Bickers, William T. Rowe, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, et al) which will in time, from certain perspectives, probably supersede it; not least, as Fairbank himself notes, because: "Each generation's historians have the task of presenting the past's relevance to our present concerns." As such, this book will undoubtedly become an interesting window on how China was perceived and so will still retain its historiographical relevance for quite some time yet.

[John Meyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

“By suggesting that our understanding was completely wrong, in fact stupid and not well based, I do not mean to claim that we may be smarter and better informed today, but I hope so” (311).

I've been sitting on this book for two months now, and I think I'm finally ready to sit up and figure out where I stand regarding this book. Fairbank was an ambitious, brilliant, and very well-read historian of China. He also shows great cultural sensitivity in reading Chinese history as a Westerner, taking a grand historian’s caution in making all his assertions. In his brilliance, I believe his mind often leapt from one idea to the next with little regard for internal organization, making it often difficult to follow to his train of thought within a particular chapter. I managed to keep up only by acts of extreme marginalia. The disorganization of his work may be discouraging, but if you too are the kind of reader who does not shy away from such annotation, then I give you my wholehearted recommendation of this book, because it really is exceptional.

To read this book, it helps to understand the broad strokes of Chinese history from 1800 to 1985. I wish I had spent some time reviewing before reading this book with at least a skim of Wikipedia’s History of China article. But I did know the broad strokes, which helped ground me as I read. I recommend readers review a bit before embarking on a read of Fairbank's book.

Fairbank's overarching idea—as evinced by the title of his book—is that the last 200 years of Chinese history can be described as a "great revolution," that the late Qing period witnessed a number of significant, wide-ranging transformations which continued during the revolution at the turn of the century and during the subsequent Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governments. He writes: "China has undergone not only political, social, and economic revolution but indeed a transformation of the entire culture” (42). So "great revolution" certainly seems an appropriate term for the period!

This great revolution is divided, in Fairbank's view, into four phases.

(1) "First, in early nineteenth-century China tension grows up between new growth and old institutions . . ." (2) "Second, the impact of the ancient combination of domestic disorders and foreign troubles leads to a late nineteenth-century condominium between conservative dynastic government and foreign treaty-port privilege." (3) "Third . . . movements for reform and for revolution begin to compete and interact. The competition is between modernization of material-intellectual life and the more slowly developing social change of values and institutions. . . ." (4) "Fourth, a seesaw develops between these efforts. The three revolutionary conflicts of 1911–1913, 1923–1928, and 1946–49 see interaction between the forces of material change and cultural change, between technology and values. The contest has still been under way in the People's Republic . . ." (45)

He splits the book into four parts, roughly corresponding with the four phases above: (1) Late Imperial China: Growth and Change, 1800–1895; (2) The Transformation of the Late Imperial Order, 1895–1911; (3) The Era of the First Chinese Republic, 1912–1949; and (4) The Chinese People's Republic, 1949–1985. To try and restate Fairbank’s central narrative: the Qing government was gradually eroded by social troubles and collusion between itself and foreign powers. Han Chinese began griping about the stagnation and backwardness of the Qing, introducing a reform movement that would lead to three tumultuous periods of internal conflict. The CCP would emerge victorious, establishing the People’s Republic of China while inaugurating an era of renewed industrial and cultural transformation.

The first part of the book is notable for its compelling and thorough examination of the Qing Dynasty in the throes of its decline. During this same period (1800–1895), European imperialists swallowed four-fifths of the world and achieved huge economic, industrial, and scientific advancements. Fairbank posits that China was prevented from achieving a similar revolution because of an enormous cultural “inertia,” an inertia that arose from China's relatively landlocked geography and immense population. In other words, Qing society stagnated because it had no reason to change. Machines were not invented because there was plenty of manpower. Slaves, workers, women, and other marginalized peoples in Qing lands could not demand rights because there was nothing to destabilize the extant patriarchal society.

Adding to the inertia of Qing society were the frequent rebellions of the nineteenth century—such as the White Lotus and Taiping Rebellions—and the increasing influence of the West. Some Qing officials worked to modernize the country, but the inertia was too great to make significant advancements, as seen in the life work of Li Hung-chang, whose story Fairbank recounts. By 1895, Han Chinese nationalist sentiment—outrage over compounding Qing failures to both push out Westerners and answer their pleas—had grown to the boiling point. The stage was set for a new China.

The second part of the book recounts the trials of the reform movement, the Boxer Rising, and finally the Republican Revolution. Fairbank writes that “the crisis and humiliation” at the hands of Westerners in the nineteenth century “led to the inescapable conclusion that China must make great changes. Something in China was fundamentally wrong” (131). The main desires of the Han reformists were to end state corruption, end the examination system in favor of more modern schooling, and industrialize (and therefore revitalize) the economy. The reformists arrived at their position out of the humiliation but also from a grounding in a Westernized education. Many of them were taught by Protestant or Catholic missions in China or completed their official studies by going to the Westernized universities in Japan.

In 1898, the reformers miraculously overthrew the Dowager Empress before being thrown out in turn. The reforms were too extreme for their time, and the Qing was able to harness Chinese conservatism and xenophobia to first overthrow the reformists, then to declare that all Westerners would be purged. The bloodbath that followed was extreme. The corrupt Qing government very quickly turned its back on the common people who had joined them by aligning themselves with the Western powers.

Han nationalists simmered. K’ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao—all fascinating historical figures—kept the reform movement alive during this brief repressive period, each in their own ways. But when the Qing government finally crumpled in 1911, it was the New Army branch of the reform movement, led by Yuan Shih-k’ai, that was best placed to take advantage of the situation, and Yuan was soon made president of the newborn republic.

The third part of the book does an amazing job at explaining the tumult between the rise of Yuan Shih-k’ai’s government in 1911 and the defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Fairbank believes the nationalist government was doomed from the beginning because of problems that would persist throughout the twentieth century: (a) most Chinese officials thought widespread suffrage was stupid, (b) strong central, authoritarian leadership felt necessary (and probably was), and (c) officials felt that democratic disagreement and compromise would harm a successful reform movement, stymying a democratic spirit.

With Yuan’s death in 1916, China collapsed into warlord states. In this same period (about 1916 to 1928), the KMT and CCP began building themselves up for a Nationalist Revolution. Both movements were stimulated by the influx of ideas from the Western-protected treaty ports, a trend that Fairbank terms the “New Culture” or “Sino-liberalism.” Huge boons came out of Sino-liberalism, such as the reform of Chinese writing and the beginnings of mass education and literacy by Hu Shih, Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Yen Yang-ch'u, and T’ao Hsing-chih, all of whom were spectacular figures whose life stories I found very moving. By the end of the 1920s, however, these liberals were increasingly turning to Marxism for answers to China’s problems.

The KMT—with a Soviet-style organization and support from the USSR—reunited China. But in reuniting China, the KMT did not inaugurate the social reforms which had given it life. Fairbank believes it was overwhelmed by the tasks of social, cultural, and economic revolution that it faced and forced to direct all its attention to the threat of Japanese militarism. Moreover, it had absorbed all of the corrupt warlords into its organization rather than overthrowing them and so was plagued by corruption.

Under the direction of KMT General Chiang Kai-shek, the CCP was nearly wiped out. At this point in China’s history, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai rose from the shadows of the CCP ranks, particularly during the Long March of 1934. For almost a decade, Mao had been arguing that the CCP should base itself on China’s peasantry rather than its proletariat. With the rebuilding of the CCP, Mao got what he wanted. Through a combination of his Sinicized Marxism (AKA Maoism or Mao Tse-tung Thought), organizational structure, party discipline and indoctrination/thought-reform (an absolutely chilling aspect of the CCP, by the way), and peasant mobilization through land reform, the CCP shot up in power. The main thrust of CCP policy can be summed up like this:

“the party must go among the people to discover their grievances and needs, which could then be formulated by the party and explained to the masses as their own best interest. This from-the-masses to-the-masses concept was indeed a sort of democracy suited to Chinese tradition” (247)

The CCP won over the common people like this. Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, their party membership expanded into the stratosphere. The continued incompetence of the KMT, during WWII and especially in its aftermath, completely alienated most Chinese. Despite American backing and huge territorial control, the KMT utterly failed to repress the CCP. The remaining KMT party in Taiwan was thoroughly reformed by American aid and the Sino-liberalism movement. It was now time for CCP to put Mao Tse-tung Thought to test, this time over the whole of China.

The fourth part of the book breaks down CCP policy in China from 1949 to 1985, focusing especially on three periods: (1) the Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958–1960, (2) the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) of 1966–1976, and (3) Deng Hsiao-p'ing’s altered course. Immediately after the civil war with the KMT, the CCP consolidated its power and achieving moderate successes on almost all imaginable fronts. Its most spectacular achievement was its rapidity to collectivize agriculture—by 1956, Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives (APCs) existed all over China. Things took a turn for the worse, however, in the late 1950s. The “Hundred Flowers” protests of 1957 demonstrated residual intellectual and Sino-liberal discontent with CCP policy, driving a wedge between the government and a crucial segment of the population for further reform.

Then came the GLF. Fairbank called the GLF the worst man-made catastrophe of all-time, with a resulting 20–30 million deaths. Mao believed that his tried-and-tested method of mass mobilization was the best way forward, and so abandoned the thus-far systematic economic development in favor of entrusting the passionate local leadership across China with surpassing agricultural and industrial aims. This approach, however, made the GLF very difficult to rein in until its horrors and excesses became widely known. Trust in the government (and within the government) was fatally undermined).

The GLF did not teach Mao anything, apparently, as he once again placed his trust in mass mobilization tactics by launching the GPCR, which have been widely called China’s “Ten Lost Years” (316). The GPCR unfolded like this: First, Mao rebuilt his place within the CCP via an internal faction which wholeheartedly supported him. Second, Mao and his Red Guards hosted six major rallies, announcing a general denunciation of intellectuals as “rightists” and rampaging to destroy the “Four Olds” (ideas, culture, customs, habits). Third, Mao’s faction lost control over the GPCR, Red Guard excesses growing out of control, ending only with their demobilization. Fourth, the mainline CCP reasserted control against Mao, though in doing so it became heavily militarized.

During the GPCR, development completely halted, foreign relations almost completely broke down, and trust in the government fell to even lower depths. Mao—finally broken by the failure of his GPCR—spent the last few years of his regime doing very little, allowing the CCP to reassert the model of systematic economic development which continued under Chou En-lai's chosen successor: Deng Hsiao-p'ing.

Deng abandoned Mao’s focus on class struggle in favor of the “Four Modernizations”: industry, agriculture, defense, and science and technology. With Mao’s unpredictability out of the way, the government’s operations and foreign relations stabilized significantly. Deng began an “open door” foreign policy in 1979 which boosted the economy and technology. Agricultural collectivization was replaced with the “contract system” or baogan system, where responsibility was put in the hands of 25-40 families, incentivizing them to increase productivity and avoiding the corruption of the previous system. These changes should not be thought of as a “capitalist-ization” of China, but rather as an inauguration of what Fairbank terms “bureaucratic socialism,” a series of improvements upon previous CCP systems. Through these and other reforms, Deng was eventually able to reestablish the CCP’s legitimacy.

In concluding the book, Fairbank notes how social and cultural revolutions continue to loom over China’s future. While some aspects of China remained the same over the 200 year period he examined—such as the huge population, unity through a central authority, the continuation of the Mandate of Heaven, and bureaucracy through a trained elite—many aspects of China have drastically changed—from small things like farming methods and elite activism to large things like urbanization, the opening up of village societies, material-technological modernization, and breakdown of social and cultural structures (though this last process is still heavily in-progress). I’ll end my review with some of Fairbank’s powerful final words:

”The path may be hard and stony with many twists and turns. For peasants to be catapulted into the modernity aspired to by the student elite can be a bruising experience. Between village and university, the gap is wide” (368).

[Théo Cantin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Très complet et intéressant

[Huma · Rating 1 out of 5]

What a fallacy to struggle through this book. It took me months and 2 false starts. The book was too dense and didn't present facts in a coherent, cogent manner, and I often found myself rereading pages I had already read just to get a grasp of what the author was trying to say. I do not recommend for an introductory exploration of Chinese history; it was not indepth enough to satisfy my thirst but not concise enough to even give me a grasp of the basic outline of Chinese history.

[Andrés · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good but sometimes too wry look at modern China. This is unapologetically a political history: it is full of names, dates, and places associated with "important people." It is not a social history. It consciously tries to see things from a Chinese perspective, thus debunking some Western and Chinese misapprehensions of Chinese history. However, Professor Fairbank's pinyin is frankly irritating.

[AC · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great book on the history and trajectory of modern China.

I should add that the author was quite old when he wrote this -- and so it took me awhile to get used to his voice... but once I did, I felt his treatment was masterful. His treatment of the Cultural Revolution in particular was magnificent.

[Mu-tien Chiou]

Excerpts from:
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/19/bo...

Fairbank stresses the ''historical continuity and distinctive culture'' of a China that is centered on itself and - until very recent times - apparently impervious to the waves of modernization that have broken against its shores from without.

[T]he prime mover of China's history [is] its own population ''implosion,'' which Mr. Fairbank associates with the country's self-centered culturalism, the close integration of polity and society, its economic stagnation, and even its major social pathologies (''sycophancy, cheating'')... as morality declined after the proliferation of population in the late 18th century.
...
The greatest continuum of all appears to be the political mode of imperial rule. To Mr. Fairbank, the years of revolution -1800-1985 - seem essentially to be no more than ''a dynastic cycle in operation.''

Other analogies are part of the ''macro-continuities'' that Mr. Fairbank detects throughout the course of Chinese history: the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1959 as an ''updated form'' of the rebuilding of the Grand Canal in the Ming dynasty, Mao Zedong ''as a monarch in succession to scores of emperors,'' and Deng Xiaoping as one of the ''second-great rulers who consolidated the work of dynastic founders -Emperor T'ai-tsung of the T'ang, Emperor T'ai-tsung of the Sung, Yung-lo of the Ming, K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing.''

This historical repetitiveness stems from ''the inertia of the highly developed and sophisticated Chinese culture.'' In that respect Mr. Fairbank's earlier works and ''The Great Chinese Revolution'' share identical assumptions about the prime ascendancy of native culture in Chinese history, shaping conquerors to Confucian rule and excluding alternative ideological choices coming from outside the Chinese world order.

Mr. Fairbank himself says of these analogies that ''a responsible scholar will see flaws in such comparisons, so what we obviously need is a bit of irresponsibility. Why not? Each generation learns that its final role is to be the doormat for the coming generation to step on. It is a worthy, indeed essential, function to perform.''

BY that yardstick, the philosopher John Dewey and Karl Marx fail to measure up to the cultural complexity of China. Mr. Fairbank writes: ''The two Western invasions of Chinese thought, liberal and Marxist, have been the highest stage of our Western intellectual imperialism. They have imposed upon China a saddle that doesn't really fit.'' China's revolution, then, is not the same as China's modernization - whether liberal or Marxist. The ''bureaucratic socialism'' that Mr. Fairbank describes emerging in China today draws upon the historical legacy of imperial rule in a society where the ''long past is ever-present in the environment, the language, the folklore and the practices of government, business and interpersonal relations.''

China's own revolution seems to remain caught in the grip of the past - a ''deja vu'', as he calls it, in the eyes of a historian who feels so keenly that ''We have been here before, sitting in judgment on a largely unknown country from a great distance.''

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is always interesting to hear from people after they have reached the summit of their careers and are semi-retired if not, completely retired. You get an unfiltered perspective that is not limited by any attempt to gain votes or get ahead in their careers. In this case, he had no need to increase his "clout" in his field anymore. Therefore, this offers a unique perspective as he mentions a few things that he would not have written earlier in his life.

Of course, this is not complete but it offers a few unique points worthy of consideration when one considers the topic.

The problems in China did not start overnight. Just like any empire in the history of the world, a breach or a loss was precipitated by internal problems. As Confucius says "Internal disorder, External disaster". The reason that he gives the date range for the Revolution in China is that he sees a similiar pattern in the Ching or Manchu Dyansty that we see in many great nations. That is, a ruling power that is unable to adapt and change with the times.

People again and again continue to look at China through a Western perspective. China is unique and will continue to go its own way in internal affairs. We cannot superimpose how we feel about this nation based on Western ideology. If we look at this nation through an American or Western prism we will contiue to make errors in judgement.

China has a long memory or wrongs that took place during this time. I cannot for the life of my understand why any nation thought it was a good idea to go to a foreign nation and wall off a part of the city and then prohibit the native people from going into that section. This was a humiliating period of time for the Chinese and they aim never to let it happen again.

Large role played but the Christian missionaries. I did not understand how involved the church was in China during this period of time. They had much direct and indirect influence in the country in part by stirring up public opinion back home. I think that one of the reasons the CCP destroys churches today is that it remains a symbols of national humiliation whether modern religions are privy to that or no.

The government has led and continues to lead all reforms. We cannot look at China as anything other than China. It is interesting to note that Chinese capitalism was engineered and managed by the government. Everything originated from the central administration and this changes the nature of the nation that embarks on capitalism in this form.

[John Harvard · Rating 5 out of 5]

John King Fairbank's book is an excellent narrative of the history of China. The author is an acclaimed Sinologist and was the authority on Chinese studies at Harvard University for over 40 years from 1933-1977. It is written for the layman who wishes to understand China and it’s people. The book recounts history in the best fashion; as a conversational narrative, with the author's perspective being sprinkled throughout the book. Examples of the author’s insights include statements like, “China managed to avoid the sufferings and humiliations brought by imperialism, but also did not receive the material benefits of colonialism that other countries experienced. Ironically, the three technical feats that molded European history were printing, compass, and gunpowder, and were all invented by the Chinese but made mainstream by the Europeans."

The book starts with a brief discussion about China in the middle ages and then quickly moves to the last 110 years of the Chin monarchy (1800-1911). From there it describes the rise of the Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) in 1911, the civil wars of the 1920-40s which led to the rise of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and finally, the reforms initiated by Deng Xiao-Ping.

In describing these seminal events in Chinese history, Fairbank also discusses the cultural and social reasons for their occurrence, giving readers a better understanding of the mindset of the public and how they have influenced modern day China and its one-man, one-party government structure.

In summary, this is a good read for anyone looking to gain a historical understanding of the history and culture that have led to modern day China with all its contradictions of a capitalist business society within a communist political system.

[Danny]

Really enjoyable, informative read. A little surprised at the reviews calling Fairbank’s narrative style too textbook-like and presentation too dense. Certainly there’s a lot of information he covers and certain points are expanded on more than others, but for such a far-reaching survey that particularly gets across the idea of an ongoing, grounded-in-history revolution not immediately perceptible to foreign eyes I think it did a good job. And I appreciated how subtly funny he could be at times!

[Jim S · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a frustrating book. The author clearly has a great amount of knowledge of China, the smarts to know there needs to be an opinion in delivery, and includes an era of Chinese history rarely documented in this overarching fashion.

However, the book reads like a ramble. Sentences are grouped into paragraphs at random, and chapters bleed into each other without any thematic borders. Supposedly there was an editor, Margaret Cheney, but you’d never know unless you checked the copyright page.

[Sarang Shaikh · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book entirely covers the scenic history of China and its revolutions time by time for the reader to understand how China has achieved its progress from being Imperial power to Democratic to a Communist-led country.

[Patrick · Rating 2 out of 5]

What a trip to read Fairbank’s 32-year-Old survey history of modern China intended for the layman audience. Especially when you couple it with some new PRC history published last year. Hah!

[Gary · Rating 3 out of 5]

Author is very informed and I learned more about China and its revolutions and leaders, but reads a little too much like a textbook.

[J · Rating 2 out of 5]

Stellenweise informativ, aber voller Orientalismus und transzedentalem Geschwafel

[Joshua · Rating 3 out of 5]

China has possibly the most bizarre, terribly tragic modern history of any country. The radical transformation in the last century has been littered with one disaster after another. The ignorance and arrogance of the leaders are clearly a major culprit, but one has to ask why such leaders (in particular, Mao Ze Dong) had such an influence? This question can only be answered by understanding the historical cultural context. John King Fairbank takes this challenge on in The Great Chinese Revolution.

As an amateur fan of Chinese history, I found much of the book dry. My favourite chapters were on the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution: Both awesome events that appear mysterious from the western perspective.

This is a very technical, in-depth analytical style of history. While comprehensive, it can get a little tedious for those not passionate about the details. I preferred the lectures “The Fall and Rise of China” as a more captivating overview of the same period.

Favorite Quote:
A sense of cultural superiority is inbred in the Chinese people. This of course has made it all the harder for them to suffer the humiliations of backwardness in modern times.

[Daniel Silveyra · Rating 5 out of 5]

Read this while travelling through China.

The book describes the history of how modern China was built from the ashes of the Ming dynasty, through the revolution, the years of Mao and the Cultural Revolution and the Deng Xiaoping era.

There is plenty of detail and historical evidence presented, so the treatment is (as far as I can tell) fairly nuanced. For this reason, it can be slow going and a little confusing - I recommend reading a higher-level overview of Chinese history before you tackle this volume (e.g. The Teaching Company's History of China series).

Fantastic chronicle of the cultural revolution. Made me think twice about buying those ironic Mao t-shirts.

[Arthur · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent survey of modern Chinese history.

Values a strong sense of structure and analysis over wordy narrative diversions, but also maintains a high level of 'readability' - a notoriously difficult balance to strike in history books.

Highly recommended to newcomers of modern Chinese history who want an introduction to what makes China 'tick' without having to slug through wordy paragraphs regarding what Mao's favourite colour was.

[Landis Duffett · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fairbank's analysis is always astute and challenging. This work, though--and he so much as admits it in the preface--takes great pains to maintain a detached mandarine emphasis on style (bemused, non-committal, even wry at times), not openly spurning substance, but not cultivating and caring for it either. The end result is much more a mood and a perspective than a body of knowledge, though a mood and a perspective that are rich, rewarding and highly cured, if not always nutritional.

[Noelan Brewington-janssen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Must read to understand modern China, changes to society, and the average chinese person's view of the chinese "rejuvenation". Should have a solid understanding of Chinese history during this period before reading this book.

[Jason Hebert · Rating 3 out of 5]

My feelings towards this book vacillated as I read it. It was a very thorough overview but at times was quite a difficult read. The detailed names and figures could become too list like but Fairbank did a good job presenting different influences that contributed to the revolution.

[Usman Chohan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a necessary step in a more profound understanding of the state of mind with which Chinese society has approached its challenges during the past 200 years.

[Roberto Ferrari · Rating 5 out of 5]

A Classic for every student of modern Chinese history, recommended in all history courses. Easy and nice to read. I liked it.