5/5. This book is helping me think differently about militarized drug policing strategies, racism, institutional corruption, and the US-Mexico relationship. While products, drug violence, and protection rackets have shifted over time, the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking have only strengthened. This reality, skillfully traced by the author, highlights the limits of state power and the consequences of its weaponization.
“Grand corruption,” beginning in 1970s w PJF. “These new racketeers no longer hailed from the region they controlled; they had no links with the communities they extorted. So they stole more, they distributed less, and they became increasingly casual about the use of violence” (8).
In 1990s, dawn of “state capture.” “Increased drug profits and declining state power have upended the old protection rackets. In many regions of Mexico, the traffickers still pay the authorities. But now the traffickers are in charge; they control the protection rackets and decide the rules of the game” (8-9).
Nowadays there are plenty of other underlying causes for Mexico’s spiraling murder rate—the explosion of other forms of crime, the expansion of Mexico’s own retail drug market, the ongoing smuggling of guns from the United States, and the almost complete collapse of the country’s judiciary. Yet these two causes, which have marked the history of the Mexican drug trade, remain important today. Struggles over the control of drug protection rackets still generate conflicts among diverse state institutions and their allied traffickers. Aggressive antidrug policing still produces state-backed murders and divides drug-trafficking networks against one another. Violence, then, is not so much in the DNA of trading in narcotics as in the DNA of prohibiting the trade (12).
Such cases demonstrated the arbitrary lines between formal medicine and drug dealing. Medicine was just filling out the right forms, going through the right channels, and prescribing relief to the rich. Drug dealing was giving out a slightly weaker version of the product but to a poorer clientele and while cutting a couple of bureaucratic corners. Though the crackdown on narcotics was—even in its earliest days—portrayed as a struggle between good and evil, the difference between medicine and dealing was not really one of ethics or morality, but rather of attitudes to class and the state (39-40).
“And the Mexican authorities always preferred to take down a foreign operation rather than a domestic one. Doing so was good politics. It made the drug trade look like a pernicious import rather than something firmly entrenched (85).
Salazar; “Marxist theory of marijuana.” “Reefer madness” as a social construct, like private property, to keep proletariat down (101). Believed that solution to systemic drug crises was not judicial or medical, but economic.
He achieved state-run morphine distribution clinics, but “World War II and then the Cold War forced Mexico into closer and closer alignment with the United States. Drug policy followed in lock step” (110).
“Cacique:” “any rural boss whose charisma, wealth, and contacts made him the de facto leader of a community” (120).
Alemán — rebranded governing rev party to PRI. “the two C’s — corruption and coercion” designed his rule (149).
Secret police headed by Carlos Serrano: Ministry of Federal Security (DFS), “the coercive branch of the new state” and “one of Latin America’s first Cold War police forces.” Targeted leftists, and used to facilitate elite drug trade (152).
“Great Campaign” => “It was drug campaign as military invasion” (159).
“Public humiliation [by media following Cadillac Bust] pushed Mexico to stifle federal-level corruption and clamp down on the narcotics business.” Also let to winding down of DFS involvement in drug trade, at least temporarily. Counterrevolution started by Alemán needed US support; compromise was ceding control of narcotics policy abroad (160-162).
“Drug panics, however, had little to do with reality. In the United States — as in Mexico — panics had much more to do with how perceive the racial and social profile of the trade. In this case, Americans feared black and Mexican-American dealers hawking narcotics to their white, suburban kids” (164).
In Mexico, “[p]ersecution pushed what had started as a relatively open commerce toward organized crime” (165).
Narcoaristocracy (172) => alliances bonded by marriage
Narcoliteratura (173) => genre of fiction in Mexico following drug trafficking
Yet the masculine world of the drug business can be overplayed. It attracted most of the headlines and fed into both U.S. and Mexican visions of the narcotics business as inherently violent (180).
“Yet, in reality, such collusion was not simply a matter of money or corruption. It was embedded in the process of drug war policing. To get arrests, you needed informants. To get informants you essentially had to back one group against another. And when rivalries didn’t exist, you needed to create them. Divide and conquer. What looked like intercostal struggles were often just extensions of drug policing. It was the drug war’s dirty little secret. It was covered up by the traffickers, who didn’t want to reveal themselves as snitches. And it was covered up by the authorities, who didn’t want to unmask themselves as the authors of so much of the resulting bloodshed” (392-393).
After 2012… despite government tactics, the flow of drugs northward continued unabated. Incentives remained high; the demand for opiates in particular boomed. And traffickers adapted to the shifting U.S. market, moving smoothly from marijuana to heroin to the synthetic opiate fentanyl. For American addicts, it was as if the drug war never happened. Now it is cheaper and easier to get high than ever before (397).