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444 pages, Paperback
First published August 11, 2020
DEUTSCH: Well, I see human history as a long period of virtually complete failure—failure, that is, to make any progress. Our species has existed for, depending on where you count it from, maybe a hundred thousand or two hundred thousand years. And for the vast majority of that time, people were alive, they were thinking, they were suffering, and they wanted things. But nothing ever improved. The improvements that did happen happened so slowly that archaeologists can’t distinguish between artifacts from eras separated by thousands of years. There was generation upon generation upon generation of suffering and stasis.
Then there was slow improvement, and then faster improvement. Then there were attempts to institutionalize a tradition of criticism, which I think is the key to rapid progress—that is, progress discernible in a human lifetime—and there was also error correction, so that regression was less likely. That happened several times and failed every time except once—in the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
What worries me is that the inheritors of that unique instance of sustained progress are only a small proportion of the population of the world today. It’s the culture, or civilization, that we call the West. Only the West has a tradition of institutionalized criticism. And this has made for various problems, including the problem of failed cultures that see their failure writ large by comparison with the West and therefore want to do something about it that doesn’t involve creativity. That’s very dangerous. And even in the West, what it takes to maintain our civilization is not widely known. As you've also said, the prevailing view among people in the West, including very educated people, is a picture of the relationship between knowledge and progress and civilization and values that’s wrong in dangerous ways. Although our cultural institutions have now preserved stability despite rapid change for hundreds of years, the knowledge of what it takes to keep civilization stable in the face of rapidly increasing knowledge is not widespread.
We're like people on a huge, well-designed submarine which has all
sorts of lifesaving devices built in, who don’t know they’re in a submarine. They think they’re in a motorboat, and they’re going to open all the hatches because they want a nicer view.
HARRIS: What a great analogy! The misconception that worries me most, frankly, is the fairly common notion that there’s no such thing as progress in any real sense, and there’s certainly no such thing as moral progress. Many people believe that you can’t justify the idea that one culture is better than another, or one way of life is better than another, because there’s no such thing as moral truth. They’ve somehow drawn this lesson from twentieth-century science and philosophy, and now, in the twenty-first century, even very smart people—even physicists whose names would be well known to you, with whom I’ve collided on this point—think there’s no place to stand where you can say, for instance, that slavery is wrong. They consider a condemnation of slavery a mere preference that has no possible connection to science.
I'll give you an example of just how crazy this hypocrisy and doublethink can become among well-educated people. I was at a meeting at the Salk Institute to talk about things like the alleged gulf between facts and values, which I consider one of the more spurious exports from philosophy that has been widely embraced by scientists. I was making an argument for moral realism and said something like, “If there’s any culture that we can be sure has not given the best possible answer to the question of how to live a good life, it’s the Taliban. Consider, for instance, the practice of forcing half the population to live in cloth bags, and beating them or killing them when they try to get out. If we know anything about human well-being, we know that this is an idiotic and immoral practice.”
It turns out that to disparage the Taliban at an academic conference is to court controversy. After my talk, a woman who holds multiple graduate degrees in relevant fields—she’s technically a bioethicist, but she has graduate degrees in science, philosophy, and law
DEUTSCH: That doesn’t fill me with confidence.
HARRIS: Right. I should also say that this prodigy has gone on to serve on the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. She’s now one of thirteen people advising President Obama on the ethical implications of current advances in medicine.
After my talk, she said, “How could you possibly say that forcing women and girls to live under the veil is wrong? I understand you don’t like it, but that’s just your Western notion of right and wrong.”
I said, “The moment you admit that questions of right and wrong relate to the well-being of conscious creatures—in this case, human beings—then you have to admit that we know something about morality. And we know, in this case, that the burqa isn’t the best solution to the mystery of how to maximize human well-being.”
“That’s just your opinion,” she said.
“Well, let’s make it simpler. Let’s say we found a culture on an island somewhere that was removing the eyeballs of every third child. Would you then agree that we had found a culture that was not perfectly maximizing human well-being?”
“It would depend on why they were doing it,” she said.
“Let’s say they’re doing it for religious reasons. They have a scripture which says, ‘Every third should walk in darkness,’ or some such nonsense.”
Then she said, “Well, then you could never say that they were wrong.”
The fact that these hypothetical barbarians were laboring under a religious precept trumped all other possible truth claims for her, leaving us with no way to declare anything better or worse in moral terms. I’ve had the same kinds of conversations with physicists who say, “I don’t like slavery. I personally wouldn't want to be a slave, or to keep slaves. But there’s no place to stand scientifically that allows me to say that slaveholders are in the wrong.”
Once we acknowledge the link between morality and human wellbeing, or the well-being of all possible conscious persons, this kind of moral relativism is tantamount to saying not only that we don’t know anything about well-being, but that we will mever know anything about it. The underlying claim is that no conceivable breakthrough in knowledge would tell us anything relevant to navigating the difference between the worst possible misery for everyone and every other state of the universe that is better than that.
What worries me is that many of the things you've said about prog. ress, and about there being only a subset of humanity that has found creative methods for improving human life, will seem controversial~ even bigoted—to many of the people who make decisions about how we should live.
DEUTSCH: Yes, that is scary. But it has always been so. The thing is, our culture is wiser than we are in many ways. The people who defeated communism, for instance, might well have said that they were doing it for Jesus. In fact they weren’t. They were doing it for Western values, which they had been brought up to reinterpret as “doing it for Jesus.” They'd say things like “The values of democracy and freedom are enshrined in the Bible.” Well, those things aren’t enshrined in the Bible. But the practice of saying that they are is part of a subculture which was extraordinarily good, and did good. So things are not as bad as the existence of perverse academics like those might lead you to think.
HARRIS: One thing that makes it not as bad as one might think is that it’s impossible, even for someone like her, to live out the implications of such hypocrisy. I could have said, ���You've convinced me. I'll send my daughter to Afghanistan for a year abroad, forcing her to live in a burqa with a Taliban family. What do you think? Is that the best use of her time? Am I a good father? After all, there’s really no basis for judging that this could be bad for her, apart from my succumbing to my own xenophobic biases, so presumably you support me in this decision.” I have to imagine that even she would balk at that, because we all know in our bones that certain ways of living are undesirable.
DEUTSCH: Right. There’s another, related irony, which is that she’s willing to condemn you for not being a moral relativist. But moral relativism is a pathology that arises only in Western culture. Every other culture has no doubt that there’s such a thing as right and wrong, they’ve just got the wrong idea of what right and wrong are, but they don’t doubt that there is such a thing, and she wouldn’t condemn them for that, although she does condemn you for it.
You say “hypocrisy.” I think this all originated in the same mistake we discussed at the beginning of this conversation—empiricism, or the idea that knowledge comes to us through the senses, which has led to scientism, which is the idea that science, by itself, constitutes the whole of reason—that the scientific method constitutes the whole of rationality. Which leads to the idea that there can’t be such a thing as morality since we can’t do an experiment to test it. Your answer to that seems to be, “But we can, if we adopt the simple criterion of human well-being.” But we can’t just leave it at that. The idea that there can’t be any morality because it can’t be derived from the senses is the same argument chat there can’t be any scientific knowledge because it can’t be derived from the senses.
In the twentieth century, empiricism was found to be nonsense, and some people therefore concluded that scientific knowledge was nonsense. But the real truth is that science isn’t based on empiricism, it’s based on reason, and so is morality. So if you adopt a rational attitude toward morality, and therefore say that morality consists of moral knowledge—and knowledge always consists of conjectures, doesn’t need a basis, only needs modes of criticism; and those modes of criticism operate by criteria that are themselves subject to modes of criticism—then you come to a transcendent moral truth. If all knowledge is conjectural and subject to improvement, then protecting the means of improving knowledge is more important than any particular piece of knowledge. That idea—before one even invokes ideas like “humans should flourish,” and then “all humans are equal,” and so on—will lead directly to, for example, the fact that slavery is an abomination. Human well-being is a good approximation in most practical situations, but not an absolute truth. I can imagine, for example, situations in which it would be right for the human race as a whole to commit suicide.