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The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
Given the turbulence in the international order in recent years, one of the central concerns among observers of world politics is the question of China's ultimate goals. As China emerges as a superpower that rivals the United States, American policymakers grappling with this century's greatest geopolitical challenge are looking for answers to a series of critical questions. Does China have expansive ambitions? Does it have a grand strategy to achieve them? If so, what is it and what should the United States do about it?
In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, and memoirs by party leaders, to demonstrate that China is in fact playing a long, methodical game to replace America as a regional and global hegemon. He traces the basic evolution of Chinese strategy, showing how it evolved in response to changes in US policy and its position in the world order. After charting these shifts over time, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet "asymmetric" plan for an effective US response to this challenge: one that undermines China's ambitions without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan. Ironically, the approach mirrors China's own current strategy of subtly weakening Chinese leverage in the region and elsewhere while expanding US leverage over China.
A bold assessment of what the Chinese government's true foreign policy objectives are, The Long Game offers valuable insight to the most important rivalry in world politics.
In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, and memoirs by party leaders, to demonstrate that China is in fact playing a long, methodical game to replace America as a regional and global hegemon. He traces the basic evolution of Chinese strategy, showing how it evolved in response to changes in US policy and its position in the world order. After charting these shifts over time, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet "asymmetric" plan for an effective US response to this challenge: one that undermines China's ambitions without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan. Ironically, the approach mirrors China's own current strategy of subtly weakening Chinese leverage in the region and elsewhere while expanding US leverage over China.
A bold assessment of what the Chinese government's true foreign policy objectives are, The Long Game offers valuable insight to the most important rivalry in world politics.
430 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 11, 2021
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August 2, 2021
This book is certainly an important book for readers, especially policymakers and scholars in the U.S., to obtain more understanding of China's interaction with the U.S. and perhaps conceive U.S.'s next moves regarding China. And it is written by a rising scholar of the new generation who may exert consequential policy impacts on the U.S. policy toward China and shape sentiments among scholars, public opinion, and so on. The book is certainly helpful for readers to understand many histories and aspects of China's international behavior at the regional, international, and dyadic levels. However, while the information contained in the book is helpful to understand the substantive behaviors of China in the past three decades, it is hard to agree with many of the authors' arguments and claims. This review will briefly explain some of the critiques of the book:
To begin with, as the author explains in Table 2.1 Hierarchy of Primary Sources, primary sources are heavily used throughout the entire book to support Doshi's claims. However, several major issues arise when the primary sources are heavily relied upon in the entire book such as public speech record and "Think Tank and Academic Commentary". This may be less so for the use of policy documents.
The first issue is that the leaders' intentions are hard to be accurately inferred from their public speeches. In fact, leaders in authoritarian regimes often need to satisfy a very broad spectrum of domestic audiences when making a public speech. Many of the speeches may not always work as guiding principles for leaders at lower levels and the ones that are policy-related at top levels can be undisclosed to the public. This would make it hard to accurately extrapolate the real intentions of the Chinese leadership throughout the decades from the primary sources. In essence, intentions, which Doshi's book is about, are hard to be highly accurately conjectured.
The second issue is that this book seems to be subject to a certain degree of confirmation bias toward using the sources that are consistent with the book's argument. Although China is a de facto authoritarian regime, the policy ideas and especially "think tank and academic commentaries" in China can still be highly diverse and pluralist. This abundance of pluralist policy preferences and textual materials makes it extremely easy for the author to select the ones that are consistent with the book's idea. Indeed, the book tends to quote the ones that support the author's arguments while ignoring the ones that are irrelevant or inconsistent with the argument.
Meanwhile, from the acknowledgement section of the book, it seems that most reviewers and readers of the book before publishing are unable to read the original Chinese text. It seems some translations are definitely inaccurate and misleading. This can be a severe issue as most of the arguments in the book were deduced from the original Chinese version of the primary and secondary sources such as speech and policy documents.
For instance, in Chap 7:
"[A]nd on militarized territorial disputes, Hu declared that China “must more actively promote the resolution of international and regional hot-spots related to China’s core interests . . . strengthen our strategic planning, make more offensive moves [先手棋], and actively guide the situation to develop in a favorable direction." The term of Go in Chinese [先手棋] / forcing move (or move of intiative, first-hand move etc) is mistakenly translated by Doshi as "offensive moves" in English.
This translation is misleading and largely inconsistent with China's relatively constrained behavior during Hu's era in the mid- and late-2000s.
Moreover, alongside the above possible minor drawbacks of the book, one major issue with this book is that the book's title and its arguments do not seem to correspond to a large proportion of the contents of most of the chapters. In fact, as the author tries to convey, China has been resorting to the grand strategy of "blunting", "building", and "expansion" from 1989 to 2017 and beyond to displace the American order. In doing so, the book is divided into these sections based on blunting, building, and expansion. However, the chapters within each section are heavily related to the "behaviors" of China (i.e. what China has been doing regarding building regional/international organizations and building new weapons and etc.) rather than China's "strategies" or intentions". In reality, from 1989 to 2017 and until the publishing of the book in 2021, four leaders (Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi) ruled China, they have different personalities, visions, and ambitions during their tenure and they even had disagreements and political conflicts with other leaders during the period. It is hard to agree that, as Doshi tries to convey, China has a consistent and smooth grand strategy to replace the U.S. during the three decades.
This book is certainly helpful for readers to have more comprehensive knowledge about China's behaviors on the international stage and their consequences and implications for the U.S. given the abundant quotes Doshi uses in the book. But based on the above critiques, it is hard for me and perhaps many other readers (especially those who have some previous knowledge of and experience in China) to agree that China has been playing a "long game" since 30 years ago, as Doshi tries to argue in the book, although a large portion of China's foreign policy may have been craftily designed and although many of its behaviors certainly challenge the U.S. at dyadic, regional, and international levels as a result.
To begin with, as the author explains in Table 2.1 Hierarchy of Primary Sources, primary sources are heavily used throughout the entire book to support Doshi's claims. However, several major issues arise when the primary sources are heavily relied upon in the entire book such as public speech record and "Think Tank and Academic Commentary". This may be less so for the use of policy documents.
The first issue is that the leaders' intentions are hard to be accurately inferred from their public speeches. In fact, leaders in authoritarian regimes often need to satisfy a very broad spectrum of domestic audiences when making a public speech. Many of the speeches may not always work as guiding principles for leaders at lower levels and the ones that are policy-related at top levels can be undisclosed to the public. This would make it hard to accurately extrapolate the real intentions of the Chinese leadership throughout the decades from the primary sources. In essence, intentions, which Doshi's book is about, are hard to be highly accurately conjectured.
The second issue is that this book seems to be subject to a certain degree of confirmation bias toward using the sources that are consistent with the book's argument. Although China is a de facto authoritarian regime, the policy ideas and especially "think tank and academic commentaries" in China can still be highly diverse and pluralist. This abundance of pluralist policy preferences and textual materials makes it extremely easy for the author to select the ones that are consistent with the book's idea. Indeed, the book tends to quote the ones that support the author's arguments while ignoring the ones that are irrelevant or inconsistent with the argument.
Meanwhile, from the acknowledgement section of the book, it seems that most reviewers and readers of the book before publishing are unable to read the original Chinese text. It seems some translations are definitely inaccurate and misleading. This can be a severe issue as most of the arguments in the book were deduced from the original Chinese version of the primary and secondary sources such as speech and policy documents.
For instance, in Chap 7:
"[A]nd on militarized territorial disputes, Hu declared that China “must more actively promote the resolution of international and regional hot-spots related to China’s core interests . . . strengthen our strategic planning, make more offensive moves [先手棋], and actively guide the situation to develop in a favorable direction." The term of Go in Chinese [先手棋] / forcing move (or move of intiative, first-hand move etc) is mistakenly translated by Doshi as "offensive moves" in English.
This translation is misleading and largely inconsistent with China's relatively constrained behavior during Hu's era in the mid- and late-2000s.
Moreover, alongside the above possible minor drawbacks of the book, one major issue with this book is that the book's title and its arguments do not seem to correspond to a large proportion of the contents of most of the chapters. In fact, as the author tries to convey, China has been resorting to the grand strategy of "blunting", "building", and "expansion" from 1989 to 2017 and beyond to displace the American order. In doing so, the book is divided into these sections based on blunting, building, and expansion. However, the chapters within each section are heavily related to the "behaviors" of China (i.e. what China has been doing regarding building regional/international organizations and building new weapons and etc.) rather than China's "strategies" or intentions". In reality, from 1989 to 2017 and until the publishing of the book in 2021, four leaders (Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi) ruled China, they have different personalities, visions, and ambitions during their tenure and they even had disagreements and political conflicts with other leaders during the period. It is hard to agree that, as Doshi tries to convey, China has a consistent and smooth grand strategy to replace the U.S. during the three decades.
This book is certainly helpful for readers to have more comprehensive knowledge about China's behaviors on the international stage and their consequences and implications for the U.S. given the abundant quotes Doshi uses in the book. But based on the above critiques, it is hard for me and perhaps many other readers (especially those who have some previous knowledge of and experience in China) to agree that China has been playing a "long game" since 30 years ago, as Doshi tries to argue in the book, although a large portion of China's foreign policy may have been craftily designed and although many of its behaviors certainly challenge the U.S. at dyadic, regional, and international levels as a result.
September 15, 2021
An important but dull contribution with a solid argument which I struggled to finish due to its very very draggy prose. If you’re looking for a coffee shop read, stay VERY far away.
Rush suggests that Chinese grand strategy (vis a vis the US) for the longest time focused on blunting and disruption. Looking at official party texts, leader statements and news sources, he finds that Chinese grand strategy shapeshifted following a number of watershed events. These are the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Gulf War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 2008 GFC. He shows how Chinese actions in the political military and economic realms have evolved following these seminal events.
Although it would have helped with sales, his book is purely factual and shies from irresponsible or speculatory rhetoric like whether there is an existing or imminent Cold War. To deal with an assertive China which has moved on from “peripheral diplomacy” he suggests that the US should take a page from China’s playbook and adopt strategic blunting.
Rush’s book has gained increased prominence and for very good reason too. Since its publication, he now works the China desk for Biden’s NSC so it’s fair to assume this book’s contents will guide his views on the job despite the multiple disclaimers
Doshi is no high priest of American declinism. Instead he believes American values, systems and institutions are often underestimated. Many waves of declinism have passed . The American experiment survived and remains to this day intact. He believes that US values and openness attracts allies, strengthens the liberal order and sustains global dominance. In its conclusion, Doshi ends with a quote from Kennedy. “Maybe our high moon has passed, maybe our brightest days were earlier and were now going into the long slow afternoon… I don’t hold that view at all and neither do the people of this country…”
In hindsight this book could be a 4. Unfortunately,l i deal enough with official texts and all at work so I was really looking for something which would go well with cafe and background music - or at least which struck a finer balance.
Rush suggests that Chinese grand strategy (vis a vis the US) for the longest time focused on blunting and disruption. Looking at official party texts, leader statements and news sources, he finds that Chinese grand strategy shapeshifted following a number of watershed events. These are the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Gulf War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 2008 GFC. He shows how Chinese actions in the political military and economic realms have evolved following these seminal events.
Although it would have helped with sales, his book is purely factual and shies from irresponsible or speculatory rhetoric like whether there is an existing or imminent Cold War. To deal with an assertive China which has moved on from “peripheral diplomacy” he suggests that the US should take a page from China’s playbook and adopt strategic blunting.
Rush’s book has gained increased prominence and for very good reason too. Since its publication, he now works the China desk for Biden’s NSC so it’s fair to assume this book’s contents will guide his views on the job despite the multiple disclaimers
Doshi is no high priest of American declinism. Instead he believes American values, systems and institutions are often underestimated. Many waves of declinism have passed . The American experiment survived and remains to this day intact. He believes that US values and openness attracts allies, strengthens the liberal order and sustains global dominance. In its conclusion, Doshi ends with a quote from Kennedy. “Maybe our high moon has passed, maybe our brightest days were earlier and were now going into the long slow afternoon… I don’t hold that view at all and neither do the people of this country…”
In hindsight this book could be a 4. Unfortunately,l i deal enough with official texts and all at work so I was really looking for something which would go well with cafe and background music - or at least which struck a finer balance.
Read
March 23, 2022Dry yet compelling case that China sees the United States as its main strategic rival, has seen things that way for a long time, and has undertaken strategies aimed at blunting U.S. power in Asia and beyond. I think that such a reality has been obvious for some time but this book gives a lot of substantiation based on primary source Chinese Communist Party documents. Interesting its own recommendations rely on blunting and asymmetric strategies to indirectly curtail Chinese ascendancy, but to do so at minimal cost and while avoiding direct confrontation. This book is a bit of a data dump but it makes its point.
June 26, 2023
Spoiler alert: China wants to displace the US.
This is an incredibly dry analysis of China’s geopolitical strategy based largely on the CCP’s own internal documents since the 1990s. The conclusion is pretty obvious and undeniable: China wants to overtake the US’s world hegemonic control. I know, I’m as shocked as you are. I think the author here does a good job of laying out the strategy although with a serious amount of repetition.
The crux of the story is this: starting in the 1990s, China has had a grand strategy of blunting and displacing. The author argues that three events in the 1990s catalyzed this strategy for China: Tiananmen square, the US Gulf War and the Soviet collapse. Since those events, China has had a strategy of hiding its ability and keeping a low profile while shoring up regional control in Asia. The whole idea in the 1990s was to not appear as a threat to the US so the US doesn’t do what it always does: manufacture the collapse of socialist regimes. Clearly, China was successful in keeping this low profile while ramping up its manufacturing and becoming an export behemoth. During this time, China has a weird naval strategy: overinvesting in submarine and mine technology and doing nothing about trying to get aircraft carriers. The plan was to thwart US advanced aircraft carrier capabilities rather than to directly challenge its own aircraft carriers. It was all a defensive strategy. China developed the world’s largest submarine fleet to blunt regional US naval control.
Another strategy is that China was worried about neighbors colluding with the US, so China has made many attempts at diplomatic multilateral efforts by joining organizations like APEC, all with the attempt at blunting the US in the pacific rim. China basically sabotaged the APEC so it wouldn’t become an Asian NATO where the US could exert influence. China has also been obsessed with maintaining MFN (Most Favored Nation) status which has greatly helped globalize its markets and catapult its GDP to rival that of the US’s, primed to change their strategy into being more aggressive after the 2008 financial collapse.
Cue the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China just took a page from the US and how it's used the IMF and WTO to slap down BRI projects all over the place even if they make zero economic sense to maintain debt leverage and control over smaller countries with budding economies. The entire point of BRI is for China to gain regional dominance and put China at the center of other country’s economies. China has successfully executed monterey diversification even offering up its own China back payment systems, CIPS, to compete with SWIFT.
Now with the rise of Trumpism and fracturing of social and cultural cohesion, China likely sees the time is ripe to become more aggressive with US hegemonic blunting. China basically now overtly states its aims are to subvert the US’s position in the world. Does this mean more military aggression? Probably not. As the author argues, you can take over hegemonic control peacefully which it seems China has become adept at doing.
Here’s what’s missing from this book: China’s incredible weaknesses like its burdensome dependence on supply chains for its exporting and manufacturing. China’s success for the last 20-30 years is because of its hyper financed model based on cheap credit. The unraveling of the American lead order may completely upend China’s model of success. China's navy is large but only has 3 aircraft carriers opposite of US’s 11. Yes, China can bomb the hell out of its own waterways if any southeast asian country tries to take control but it will cut off mainland China from essential trading that it needs to even support its own population. Combine a plummeting fertility rate that will destroy its work force with mass starvation and single party rule and you have the perfect cocktail for social upheaval. China could be right around the corner at any moment of its own society unraveling.
Also missing from this book is how much US treasury China holds: it’s a lot. It does this to keep its export prices low to keep its labor force robust. China depends on the US to maintain a trade surplus which is one of the entire reasons China has been so successful. China is dependent on US consumption. The point is, the US and China are locked into interdependence. How can you blunt your rival when your literal success depends on theirs? Anything China does to disrupt this arrangement will be much much worse for China than the US.
Anyway, I found this book worthwhile.
This is an incredibly dry analysis of China’s geopolitical strategy based largely on the CCP’s own internal documents since the 1990s. The conclusion is pretty obvious and undeniable: China wants to overtake the US’s world hegemonic control. I know, I’m as shocked as you are. I think the author here does a good job of laying out the strategy although with a serious amount of repetition.
The crux of the story is this: starting in the 1990s, China has had a grand strategy of blunting and displacing. The author argues that three events in the 1990s catalyzed this strategy for China: Tiananmen square, the US Gulf War and the Soviet collapse. Since those events, China has had a strategy of hiding its ability and keeping a low profile while shoring up regional control in Asia. The whole idea in the 1990s was to not appear as a threat to the US so the US doesn’t do what it always does: manufacture the collapse of socialist regimes. Clearly, China was successful in keeping this low profile while ramping up its manufacturing and becoming an export behemoth. During this time, China has a weird naval strategy: overinvesting in submarine and mine technology and doing nothing about trying to get aircraft carriers. The plan was to thwart US advanced aircraft carrier capabilities rather than to directly challenge its own aircraft carriers. It was all a defensive strategy. China developed the world’s largest submarine fleet to blunt regional US naval control.
Another strategy is that China was worried about neighbors colluding with the US, so China has made many attempts at diplomatic multilateral efforts by joining organizations like APEC, all with the attempt at blunting the US in the pacific rim. China basically sabotaged the APEC so it wouldn’t become an Asian NATO where the US could exert influence. China has also been obsessed with maintaining MFN (Most Favored Nation) status which has greatly helped globalize its markets and catapult its GDP to rival that of the US’s, primed to change their strategy into being more aggressive after the 2008 financial collapse.
Cue the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China just took a page from the US and how it's used the IMF and WTO to slap down BRI projects all over the place even if they make zero economic sense to maintain debt leverage and control over smaller countries with budding economies. The entire point of BRI is for China to gain regional dominance and put China at the center of other country’s economies. China has successfully executed monterey diversification even offering up its own China back payment systems, CIPS, to compete with SWIFT.
Now with the rise of Trumpism and fracturing of social and cultural cohesion, China likely sees the time is ripe to become more aggressive with US hegemonic blunting. China basically now overtly states its aims are to subvert the US’s position in the world. Does this mean more military aggression? Probably not. As the author argues, you can take over hegemonic control peacefully which it seems China has become adept at doing.
Here’s what’s missing from this book: China’s incredible weaknesses like its burdensome dependence on supply chains for its exporting and manufacturing. China’s success for the last 20-30 years is because of its hyper financed model based on cheap credit. The unraveling of the American lead order may completely upend China’s model of success. China's navy is large but only has 3 aircraft carriers opposite of US’s 11. Yes, China can bomb the hell out of its own waterways if any southeast asian country tries to take control but it will cut off mainland China from essential trading that it needs to even support its own population. Combine a plummeting fertility rate that will destroy its work force with mass starvation and single party rule and you have the perfect cocktail for social upheaval. China could be right around the corner at any moment of its own society unraveling.
Also missing from this book is how much US treasury China holds: it’s a lot. It does this to keep its export prices low to keep its labor force robust. China depends on the US to maintain a trade surplus which is one of the entire reasons China has been so successful. China is dependent on US consumption. The point is, the US and China are locked into interdependence. How can you blunt your rival when your literal success depends on theirs? Anything China does to disrupt this arrangement will be much much worse for China than the US.
Anyway, I found this book worthwhile.
May 31, 2024
There is a fundamental framework on which this book has been built. It claims the blunt and build strategies of great powers and maps to what China did against US along with different phases by China to become what it has. It then proposes what US should do.
It also details the parameters- military economic and political on which the strategies should be played. The guidance is that US should counter Chinese attempts for their type of coercion based world order in a asymmetric manner. This is in contrast to coercion consent and legitimacy based world world US has built.
I find the book highly repetitive although the framework is interesting.
It is definitely an important book however the framework underlying seems to be the overriding feature of the book.
A 20 pages description and a tabular description or couple of diagrams could have explained the framework clearly.
Author could have included the framework as an appendix for people who will not be having time to read the book.
Atleast the length could have been half of what it is currently.
Irrespective I do think and recommend this book for everyone who has some interest in world power dynamics of great powers.
It also details the parameters- military economic and political on which the strategies should be played. The guidance is that US should counter Chinese attempts for their type of coercion based world order in a asymmetric manner. This is in contrast to coercion consent and legitimacy based world world US has built.
I find the book highly repetitive although the framework is interesting.
It is definitely an important book however the framework underlying seems to be the overriding feature of the book.
A 20 pages description and a tabular description or couple of diagrams could have explained the framework clearly.
Author could have included the framework as an appendix for people who will not be having time to read the book.
Atleast the length could have been half of what it is currently.
Irrespective I do think and recommend this book for everyone who has some interest in world power dynamics of great powers.
June 27, 2024
This is a significant text for future US foreign policy towards China. The author is sponsored by the important Brookings Institute think tank.
Takeaways:
The US elite has finally concluded that there will be no rapprochement with China.
The Chinese elite are confident that the US is in terminal decline for a variety of reasons which include ethnic diversity causing domestic strife (true) and populism of the left and right which may lead to the US withdrawing from the world.
The Chinese changed strategies from a "hiding their power" strategy to a "build global relationships" strategy after the 2008 financial crisis and again in 2016 after Trump's election to an "actively displace American power" strategy.
The Chinese elite are too entrenched to be overthrown through a gradual opening or violent revolution. And furthermore, any attempt to overthrow the CCP would lead to war since the CCP suspect America is behind any revolt against their power (possibly true).
The author proposes a "blunting" strategy to contain China, similar to China's policy before 2008 against the US. Blunting includes:
Being conservative with financial resources (since China's resources are greater than the US)
Not competing with China everywhere but focusing on key American allies (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc)
Focus on cheap asymmetric denial weapons (anti-carrier missiles, ocean mines, etc) rather than expensive power projection/prestige weapons (carriers) to deny any actors control of a region (like the South China Sea)
Given weapons technology to the countries listed above
Prevent China from establishing new military bases outside of China (not building new expensive US bases) using international or regional organizations (ASEAN, etc.) and financial aid (both government aid and cheap financing from US-dominated finacial institutions)
Finance "democratic dissidence" in Chinese-dominated states (I think we know what that means)
Prevent any further technology transfers to China, which include limiting Chinese attendance at US Universities, moving production of important technologies out of China (decoupling), and doing all of this through more state intervention in business.**
Censor and outlaw Chinese companies in the US (TikTok, etc.)
Maintain the US dollar's status as the global reserve currency by avoiding using financial sanctions against foreign countries (unlikely after the grave mistake of starting a war with Russia and seizing their foreign exchange reserve).
Increase foreign h1b visas by a lot. (Likely to exacerbate internal elite conflict in the US, especially between Indian, Jewish, and Chinese elite. This also increases the risk of Chinese elites betraying America for China as conflict grows between the two countries. In the long run, I suspect the US will make life uncomfortable for Chinese Americans.)
Increase US spending on technology.
In conclusion, the author recommends America become more like China to compete with China.
Self-directed businesses cannot compete with competent corporatist systems like China so America's system must become more corporatist. It has already been moving in this direction for a while, but the balance might finally be shifting from the business to the political elite in the West. Since the 80s the business plutocracy has been in the driving seat in the West. They used their power to lower taxes, move jobs overseas, etc. now the state will force companies to reshore production (to the US and friendly countries like Mexico) and cooperate with a larger economic plan. The government will also need to extract more wealth from businesses and the population at large to finance increased military and technology spending which almost necessitates capital controls on money moving between the US and overseas. It has been shown, although not mentioned in this book, that countries with strong capital controls (such as China) extract higher effective tax rates from their companies than countries with free movement of capital, such as the US. How this jives with maintaining the US dollar's global reserve currency status I must give some more thought.
The author mentions populism as a threat to US power globally so it will likely be suppressed and/or given concession to placate the masses. If you've been paying attention to current events from about 2020 onward including the... 2020 election you would have been able to deduce this strategy already. That being said the current recruiting shortfall in the US military will likely be the catalyst for the concessions to the masses. Concessions include allowing Trump to be reelected president.
The diversity problem was not addressed. I suspect the US government will make concessions to businesses and continue allowing mass immigration of both skilled (especially from India and East Asia) and unskilled migration (from Latin America, the middle east, and Africa) but increase policing of blacks and remove explicit anti-white propaganda from the media and schools to keep the population quiescent. The Chinese are definitely correct when they highlight diversity as one of America's greatest "contradictions."
Takeaways:
The US elite has finally concluded that there will be no rapprochement with China.
The Chinese elite are confident that the US is in terminal decline for a variety of reasons which include ethnic diversity causing domestic strife (true) and populism of the left and right which may lead to the US withdrawing from the world.
The Chinese changed strategies from a "hiding their power" strategy to a "build global relationships" strategy after the 2008 financial crisis and again in 2016 after Trump's election to an "actively displace American power" strategy.
The Chinese elite are too entrenched to be overthrown through a gradual opening or violent revolution. And furthermore, any attempt to overthrow the CCP would lead to war since the CCP suspect America is behind any revolt against their power (possibly true).
The author proposes a "blunting" strategy to contain China, similar to China's policy before 2008 against the US. Blunting includes:
Being conservative with financial resources (since China's resources are greater than the US)
Not competing with China everywhere but focusing on key American allies (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc)
Focus on cheap asymmetric denial weapons (anti-carrier missiles, ocean mines, etc) rather than expensive power projection/prestige weapons (carriers) to deny any actors control of a region (like the South China Sea)
Given weapons technology to the countries listed above
Prevent China from establishing new military bases outside of China (not building new expensive US bases) using international or regional organizations (ASEAN, etc.) and financial aid (both government aid and cheap financing from US-dominated finacial institutions)
Finance "democratic dissidence" in Chinese-dominated states (I think we know what that means)
Prevent any further technology transfers to China, which include limiting Chinese attendance at US Universities, moving production of important technologies out of China (decoupling), and doing all of this through more state intervention in business.**
Censor and outlaw Chinese companies in the US (TikTok, etc.)
Maintain the US dollar's status as the global reserve currency by avoiding using financial sanctions against foreign countries (unlikely after the grave mistake of starting a war with Russia and seizing their foreign exchange reserve).
Increase foreign h1b visas by a lot. (Likely to exacerbate internal elite conflict in the US, especially between Indian, Jewish, and Chinese elite. This also increases the risk of Chinese elites betraying America for China as conflict grows between the two countries. In the long run, I suspect the US will make life uncomfortable for Chinese Americans.)
Increase US spending on technology.
In conclusion, the author recommends America become more like China to compete with China.
Self-directed businesses cannot compete with competent corporatist systems like China so America's system must become more corporatist. It has already been moving in this direction for a while, but the balance might finally be shifting from the business to the political elite in the West. Since the 80s the business plutocracy has been in the driving seat in the West. They used their power to lower taxes, move jobs overseas, etc. now the state will force companies to reshore production (to the US and friendly countries like Mexico) and cooperate with a larger economic plan. The government will also need to extract more wealth from businesses and the population at large to finance increased military and technology spending which almost necessitates capital controls on money moving between the US and overseas. It has been shown, although not mentioned in this book, that countries with strong capital controls (such as China) extract higher effective tax rates from their companies than countries with free movement of capital, such as the US. How this jives with maintaining the US dollar's global reserve currency status I must give some more thought.
The author mentions populism as a threat to US power globally so it will likely be suppressed and/or given concession to placate the masses. If you've been paying attention to current events from about 2020 onward including the... 2020 election you would have been able to deduce this strategy already. That being said the current recruiting shortfall in the US military will likely be the catalyst for the concessions to the masses. Concessions include allowing Trump to be reelected president.
The diversity problem was not addressed. I suspect the US government will make concessions to businesses and continue allowing mass immigration of both skilled (especially from India and East Asia) and unskilled migration (from Latin America, the middle east, and Africa) but increase policing of blacks and remove explicit anti-white propaganda from the media and schools to keep the population quiescent. The Chinese are definitely correct when they highlight diversity as one of America's greatest "contradictions."
November 19, 2022
China's Long Game, In Flames
This was a very good book on foreign policy - a topic I have double-downed on over the last 12 months or so.
This book detailed the true plans behind the CCP and it holds up with recent news and details about what is going on inside China.
Important political read.
Rush out and get this one!
4.7/5
This was a very good book on foreign policy - a topic I have double-downed on over the last 12 months or so.
This book detailed the true plans behind the CCP and it holds up with recent news and details about what is going on inside China.
Important political read.
Rush out and get this one!
4.7/5
November 3, 2025
While at times the author is unnecessarily repetitive, this is the most systematic, comprehensive, longitudinal review of Chinese grand strategy I have read. The author’s approach is balanced in that he addresses counter arguments fairly. The book is researched and cited deeply.
Most of the text is dedicated to explaining the development and application of Chinese strategy. However, the end of the book does address limited recommendations for a US strategy to compete with China.
As an aside, there is also one of the most useful descriptions of grand strategy at the beginning of the book that I found to be uncommonly clear. Within the US, we tend to call everything a strategy and poorly distinguish between types of strategies. The author’s explanation was helpful.
This book is a must read for anyone interested in understand China’s historical, present, and future aims and grand strategy.
***2nd Reading - I revisited this book after having read more books on China and this remains the best book on China I’ve read. Balanced and comprehensive, it remains current despite having aged 3 years.
Thesis: Rush Doshi argues that China has been implementing a coherent, long-term grand strategy to displace American global leadership and reshape the international order to better serve its interests. This strategy evolved through distinct phases (3x) in response to China's perception of American power and the international system.
1. Blunting Strategy (1989-2008) - China assesses the US to be the sole superpower and a threat to Chinese interests. Self-assessing as too weak to directly confront the US, China pursues asymmetric means to blunt US power and influence.
2. Building Strategy (2009-2016) - China assesses the US is declining and abandons the low profile approach of the previous two decades for a more assertive engagement strategy focused on building long-term advantage.
3. Expansion Strategy (2017-Present) - China assesses the US is weakening further and pulling back from global leadership. Capitalizing on this, they adopt more direct confrontation, expand their influence regionally and globally, and seek to advance geopolitical objectives.
Most of the text is dedicated to explaining the development and application of Chinese strategy. However, the end of the book does address limited recommendations for a US strategy to compete with China.
As an aside, there is also one of the most useful descriptions of grand strategy at the beginning of the book that I found to be uncommonly clear. Within the US, we tend to call everything a strategy and poorly distinguish between types of strategies. The author’s explanation was helpful.
This book is a must read for anyone interested in understand China’s historical, present, and future aims and grand strategy.
***2nd Reading - I revisited this book after having read more books on China and this remains the best book on China I’ve read. Balanced and comprehensive, it remains current despite having aged 3 years.
Thesis: Rush Doshi argues that China has been implementing a coherent, long-term grand strategy to displace American global leadership and reshape the international order to better serve its interests. This strategy evolved through distinct phases (3x) in response to China's perception of American power and the international system.
1. Blunting Strategy (1989-2008) - China assesses the US to be the sole superpower and a threat to Chinese interests. Self-assessing as too weak to directly confront the US, China pursues asymmetric means to blunt US power and influence.
2. Building Strategy (2009-2016) - China assesses the US is declining and abandons the low profile approach of the previous two decades for a more assertive engagement strategy focused on building long-term advantage.
3. Expansion Strategy (2017-Present) - China assesses the US is weakening further and pulling back from global leadership. Capitalizing on this, they adopt more direct confrontation, expand their influence regionally and globally, and seek to advance geopolitical objectives.
January 7, 2022
To date, best book I've read on China's rise, why it's so consequential for the world, and what the U.S. ought to do in response.
Drawing on hundreds of primary texts translated from into English, Doshi does a superb job offering thoughtful, supported analysis. Balanced in his approach, Doshi persuasively articulates why this moment is significant & addresses various perspectives on the consequences of the current geopolitical situation. While he's realistic, he also (rightly) doesn't paint our epoch as hopeless.
Highly recommend!
Drawing on hundreds of primary texts translated from into English, Doshi does a superb job offering thoughtful, supported analysis. Balanced in his approach, Doshi persuasively articulates why this moment is significant & addresses various perspectives on the consequences of the current geopolitical situation. While he's realistic, he also (rightly) doesn't paint our epoch as hopeless.
Highly recommend!
July 7, 2021
One of the best books I’ve read on the US-China strategic competition. Uses a host of CCP primary sources to explain China’s grand strategy to become the worlds hegemony.
September 1, 2024
I picked up this book by my esteemed friend and classmate - Rush Doshi - mostly because I needed an expert opinion on why banning TikTok was so important. Not many people would invest 18+ hours to get to the bottom of that question… but in the end Doshi’s diligently compiled CCP document database is the evidence I wanted to see before shifting to support a US policy more openly competitive & confrontational vis-a-vis China.
A note I took from the final chapter sums it up best. Doshi's factbase of 100s of party documents - calibrated based on perceived authoritativeness - make a compelling case that "Chinese [read CCP] economic scale, growth, and explicitly zero-sum competitive orientation toward the US are facts. How we choose to deal with them are opinions / policy, but denying them is illogical." There's only so many times that you can listen to consistent citation of concepts like Tao Guang Yang Hui, National Rejuvenation, Actively Accomplishing Something, Hegemony, and Multipolarity in speeches and memos over 60 years without believing that either A) The CCP is in fact a scholarly think tank posing as a political party, or B) The CCP justifies its continued existence by claiming it is fighting a war for national survival against the United States.
It was eerie seeing Doshi outline how Chinese national interest has steadily increased in scope; if "overseas interests" in the form of global supply lines, international communications control, and then "ideology" become matters of national political security... we're watching European Christian imperialism 2.0. There's no natural limit to the “national rejuvenation” equation. I also spent a lot of time trying to discern what “authoritarian values” and “Chinese order” meant in practice, open to legitimate points of divergence from American values. Possibly: diversity as weakness, information flows as dangerous, emphasis of order over freedom. But the evidence Doshi presents could also lead you to conclude all this fancy CCP rhetoric boils down to a bombastic, nationalist, historical victim narrative with little resonance for anyone not Chinese. Which is as stupefying as it is sad. If you go on a century-long quest for world dominance, shouldn't it at least be in the name of some kind of universal value you'd bestow on the rest of us? Though if you don't believe values can be universal... then I suppose gaining power for power's sake merits no further explanation.
The Long Game does suffer from the academia curse in that - as a barely adapted PhD thesis - this Game is twice as Long as it needed to be. Doshi's bolder policy proposals - embrace BRI to institutionalize it and thereby neuter it as a weapon of economic statecraft! - are crushed entirely by the weight of repetitive evidence he presents. Some sentences that are repeated word-for-word across chapters; shame on your editor. And I know much too much about aircraft carriers now. I do feel more knowledgeable about dynamics of the impending Chinese-American cold war, which given I otherwise wouldn't, was worth reading the book for.
A note I took from the final chapter sums it up best. Doshi's factbase of 100s of party documents - calibrated based on perceived authoritativeness - make a compelling case that "Chinese [read CCP] economic scale, growth, and explicitly zero-sum competitive orientation toward the US are facts. How we choose to deal with them are opinions / policy, but denying them is illogical." There's only so many times that you can listen to consistent citation of concepts like Tao Guang Yang Hui, National Rejuvenation, Actively Accomplishing Something, Hegemony, and Multipolarity in speeches and memos over 60 years without believing that either A) The CCP is in fact a scholarly think tank posing as a political party, or B) The CCP justifies its continued existence by claiming it is fighting a war for national survival against the United States.
It was eerie seeing Doshi outline how Chinese national interest has steadily increased in scope; if "overseas interests" in the form of global supply lines, international communications control, and then "ideology" become matters of national political security... we're watching European Christian imperialism 2.0. There's no natural limit to the “national rejuvenation” equation. I also spent a lot of time trying to discern what “authoritarian values” and “Chinese order” meant in practice, open to legitimate points of divergence from American values. Possibly: diversity as weakness, information flows as dangerous, emphasis of order over freedom. But the evidence Doshi presents could also lead you to conclude all this fancy CCP rhetoric boils down to a bombastic, nationalist, historical victim narrative with little resonance for anyone not Chinese. Which is as stupefying as it is sad. If you go on a century-long quest for world dominance, shouldn't it at least be in the name of some kind of universal value you'd bestow on the rest of us? Though if you don't believe values can be universal... then I suppose gaining power for power's sake merits no further explanation.
The Long Game does suffer from the academia curse in that - as a barely adapted PhD thesis - this Game is twice as Long as it needed to be. Doshi's bolder policy proposals - embrace BRI to institutionalize it and thereby neuter it as a weapon of economic statecraft! - are crushed entirely by the weight of repetitive evidence he presents. Some sentences that are repeated word-for-word across chapters; shame on your editor. And I know much too much about aircraft carriers now. I do feel more knowledgeable about dynamics of the impending Chinese-American cold war, which given I otherwise wouldn't, was worth reading the book for.
October 15, 2024
“The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order” is an excellent book that does what it says. Through close reading of the speeches of Chinese leaders, official papers and academic publications, Doshi teases out, to my mind indisputably, various phases of Chinese Grand Strategy that is meant to lead China to its expected role of global hegemon.
The first phase he reviews comes from 1973 (when China and the US reestablished a working relationship after the Nixon-Mao meeting) to circa 1992. This phase was characterized by the Chinese need to balance Soviet power with American support. Here China was subservient to the US and took the opportunity to recover from the desolation left by Maoist policies. This phase ended as China saw that the US was an unreliable ally after it punished China for the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, that it was a dangerous enemy after it defeated Saddam Hussein’s army in the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 (even though after the war it was common to regard the Iraqis as weak, before the was their armed forces were regarded as powerful and well equipped), and that there was no countervailing force after the Soviet collapse of 1992.
The Chinese then shifted their strategy to denying control to the US in Eastern Asia, and to hiding their capabilities and biding their time until they were strong enough to challenge the US. This strategy held as China played the international system created by the US to its advantage, in as many fields as possible, starting with attaining most favored nation status in trade. Every facet of Chinese foreign policy, from diplomacy to trade to military and weapons, was aligned to the strategy, something I find admirable. This is clearly a strength of autocratic states with competent rulers and administration. The strategy shifted in 2007 as the financial crisis and the inept handling of the war on terror by the Bush administration showed the Chinese leadership that American leaders were erratic and incompetent and the country was poorly run.
So they moved on to the third phase, the policy of actively accomplishing something, a much more aggressive one. Here, China became much more active in obtaining international support in its belt and road initiative and in taking over smaller international organizations without American or Japanese presence. It also heightened its military strategy to more aggressive weapons and rules of engagement. This deepened under the more authoritarian leadership of Xi Jinping starting in 2013, and after the Brexit vote in the UK and Trump’s election in 2016. American mishandling of the Covid 19 pandemic convinced Chinese leaders that the American period as global hegemon was ending because of inept leadership created by populism as a consequence of economic inequality. This final phase was named after “great changes unseen for a century”, namely a historic opportunity for China to reclaim its position as the only power with global potential due to the apparent collapse of the international system of alliances created in the wake of WWII due to its dismantlement under Trump.
Were these “Strategies of Displacement” successful? Not really. The US showed its ability to lead a coalition of allies against a common foe in a way that hasn’t escalated so far, in the war against Russia, although so far it hasn’t been able to find a way to stop the Middle Eastern crisis that began in October 2023. Should Trump be reelected, the US would be back to erratic leadership that would further erode its international standing (although it can’t be denied that most hostile American policies against China enacted by Trump remain in place under Biden, and wouldn’t go away in a Harris presidency). Could they eventually work? Of course, given the enormous economic heft and quite competent administration in China. Doshi makes some interesting suggestions on how the US may blunt emerging Chinese power at a low price, mainly by copying Chinese smart asymmetric tactics, which require that the cost of countering a rivals be measure be less costly than that measure.
This book left me with great respect for the ability of the Chinese leadership to devise and execute policies that respond well to changes in the environment and to execute these policies consistently across a wide spectrum of fields. There is a single message competently translated into tactics, something rarely seen in US or European policies for decades. The disparaging Chinese assessment of Western leadership seems largely warranted based on what we’ve seen at least since the Clinton administrations: political infighting that doesn’t stop at the border, factions taking key issues as hostages to petty infighting and turf wars, powerful lobbies impeding necessary changes, inefficiencies that are not remedied for decades. Although Doshi is optimistic about the ability of US leadership to regenerate after a crisis, I am not so sanguine. Unless something exceptional happens over the next few years, the Strategies of displacement are likely to succeed after all.
The first phase he reviews comes from 1973 (when China and the US reestablished a working relationship after the Nixon-Mao meeting) to circa 1992. This phase was characterized by the Chinese need to balance Soviet power with American support. Here China was subservient to the US and took the opportunity to recover from the desolation left by Maoist policies. This phase ended as China saw that the US was an unreliable ally after it punished China for the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, that it was a dangerous enemy after it defeated Saddam Hussein’s army in the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 (even though after the war it was common to regard the Iraqis as weak, before the was their armed forces were regarded as powerful and well equipped), and that there was no countervailing force after the Soviet collapse of 1992.
The Chinese then shifted their strategy to denying control to the US in Eastern Asia, and to hiding their capabilities and biding their time until they were strong enough to challenge the US. This strategy held as China played the international system created by the US to its advantage, in as many fields as possible, starting with attaining most favored nation status in trade. Every facet of Chinese foreign policy, from diplomacy to trade to military and weapons, was aligned to the strategy, something I find admirable. This is clearly a strength of autocratic states with competent rulers and administration. The strategy shifted in 2007 as the financial crisis and the inept handling of the war on terror by the Bush administration showed the Chinese leadership that American leaders were erratic and incompetent and the country was poorly run.
So they moved on to the third phase, the policy of actively accomplishing something, a much more aggressive one. Here, China became much more active in obtaining international support in its belt and road initiative and in taking over smaller international organizations without American or Japanese presence. It also heightened its military strategy to more aggressive weapons and rules of engagement. This deepened under the more authoritarian leadership of Xi Jinping starting in 2013, and after the Brexit vote in the UK and Trump’s election in 2016. American mishandling of the Covid 19 pandemic convinced Chinese leaders that the American period as global hegemon was ending because of inept leadership created by populism as a consequence of economic inequality. This final phase was named after “great changes unseen for a century”, namely a historic opportunity for China to reclaim its position as the only power with global potential due to the apparent collapse of the international system of alliances created in the wake of WWII due to its dismantlement under Trump.
Were these “Strategies of Displacement” successful? Not really. The US showed its ability to lead a coalition of allies against a common foe in a way that hasn’t escalated so far, in the war against Russia, although so far it hasn’t been able to find a way to stop the Middle Eastern crisis that began in October 2023. Should Trump be reelected, the US would be back to erratic leadership that would further erode its international standing (although it can’t be denied that most hostile American policies against China enacted by Trump remain in place under Biden, and wouldn’t go away in a Harris presidency). Could they eventually work? Of course, given the enormous economic heft and quite competent administration in China. Doshi makes some interesting suggestions on how the US may blunt emerging Chinese power at a low price, mainly by copying Chinese smart asymmetric tactics, which require that the cost of countering a rivals be measure be less costly than that measure.
This book left me with great respect for the ability of the Chinese leadership to devise and execute policies that respond well to changes in the environment and to execute these policies consistently across a wide spectrum of fields. There is a single message competently translated into tactics, something rarely seen in US or European policies for decades. The disparaging Chinese assessment of Western leadership seems largely warranted based on what we’ve seen at least since the Clinton administrations: political infighting that doesn’t stop at the border, factions taking key issues as hostages to petty infighting and turf wars, powerful lobbies impeding necessary changes, inefficiencies that are not remedied for decades. Although Doshi is optimistic about the ability of US leadership to regenerate after a crisis, I am not so sanguine. Unless something exceptional happens over the next few years, the Strategies of displacement are likely to succeed after all.
November 14, 2021
This book is very useful to understand China's foreign policy during the last 40 years. The author argues that China's strategy and evolution as a global power can be broken down into three phases:
Blunting Phase (1989-2008): During this period, China sees itself as clearly inferior to the US, economically, politically and militarily. It fears US intervention in its own internal affairs (especially after Tiananmen Square) and adopts a blunting strategy that consists of maximising its very limited resources to counter US influence. It silently develops defensive military capabilities and enters political and economic organisations (for example the World Trade Organisation) to reduce US power over China.
Building Phase (2009-2016): Having built a massive economy and accumulated vast foreign reserves, China feels it has the power to exert regional influence. The Belt & Road Initiative and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are good examples of these efforts. Their goal is not immediate economic profit, but to grow China's influence in the region and create productive infrastructure that would make neighbour countries China-dependant in the future.
Global Expansion (2017 - Present): Events such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the US lead Chinese leaders to believe that the West is in decline. China believes that democracies are increasingly unable to cope with the social inequality that they create through their neoliberal economic policies. It sees its authoritarian socialist system as better prepared for coming decades. At the forefront of China's plan is developing its own technology capabilities; it sees the "Fourth Industrial Revolution” as the opportunity to overtake the West. During the last part of the book, the author outlines how the US can counter China's rise during the coming decade.
Although the ideas in the book are very interesting, some sections can get boring and repetitive. Each chapter and section begins with a short introduction to an idea. The author then tries to justify it at length with numerous facts and quotes by Chinese politicians. It is not a smooth read, but a book worth reading, especially the content in the last few chapters.
Blunting Phase (1989-2008): During this period, China sees itself as clearly inferior to the US, economically, politically and militarily. It fears US intervention in its own internal affairs (especially after Tiananmen Square) and adopts a blunting strategy that consists of maximising its very limited resources to counter US influence. It silently develops defensive military capabilities and enters political and economic organisations (for example the World Trade Organisation) to reduce US power over China.
Building Phase (2009-2016): Having built a massive economy and accumulated vast foreign reserves, China feels it has the power to exert regional influence. The Belt & Road Initiative and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are good examples of these efforts. Their goal is not immediate economic profit, but to grow China's influence in the region and create productive infrastructure that would make neighbour countries China-dependant in the future.
Global Expansion (2017 - Present): Events such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the US lead Chinese leaders to believe that the West is in decline. China believes that democracies are increasingly unable to cope with the social inequality that they create through their neoliberal economic policies. It sees its authoritarian socialist system as better prepared for coming decades. At the forefront of China's plan is developing its own technology capabilities; it sees the "Fourth Industrial Revolution” as the opportunity to overtake the West. During the last part of the book, the author outlines how the US can counter China's rise during the coming decade.
Although the ideas in the book are very interesting, some sections can get boring and repetitive. Each chapter and section begins with a short introduction to an idea. The author then tries to justify it at length with numerous facts and quotes by Chinese politicians. It is not a smooth read, but a book worth reading, especially the content in the last few chapters.
December 21, 2024
I read this in 2021 in grad school when it was first released and it was THE China book at the time. It’s clearly stood the test of time (a few years, at least), because my younger sister (who will be commissioned into the USAF soon) recently told me that one of her superior officers recommended that they should all read this book to better understand the past and future of US-China competition.
Naturally, after hearing that, I re-read it to brush up and reevaluate it post-grad school fog and after a few years of working in the international affairs space. It definitely serves as a thorough background for anyone curious about how the US-China competition got to where it is today, and I really appreciate Doshi’s methodology of contextualizing Party documents to support his argument. It’s no small feat to argue that a country has held and pursued a cohesive grand strategy for 35 years and counting, but he makes a compelling case - and I love his conclusion and recommendations for US policy options moving forward.
It reads like an academic polisci book, so it is a bit dry, which makes me question the idea of recommending it as a primer on the topic for those looking for a tldr, but I guess they could just skim the topic sentences and get his gist. The two biggest counterpoints that came to mind during this re-read, though, were (1) His recurring point that “China handled COVID amazing, the US/West failed” has not withstood the test of time, especially given the economic downturn China has taken post-COVID and the public outcry against government restrictions through the White Paper Protests in 2022 and beyond. I’m not saying the US did great, but I don’t think we can say that China thrived either. Also, (2), just coming from your humble neighborhood human rights-in-China watcher, I found myself wishing for more discussion of the general Chinese population’s support (or lack thereof) for this “grand strategy,” and how the public’s opinion affects these strategies’ efficacy - or how increased pro-democracy activism in China moving forward could spoil this Party grand strategy. He already covered a lot, so I can’t be too picky, but a girl can dream!
Naturally, after hearing that, I re-read it to brush up and reevaluate it post-grad school fog and after a few years of working in the international affairs space. It definitely serves as a thorough background for anyone curious about how the US-China competition got to where it is today, and I really appreciate Doshi’s methodology of contextualizing Party documents to support his argument. It’s no small feat to argue that a country has held and pursued a cohesive grand strategy for 35 years and counting, but he makes a compelling case - and I love his conclusion and recommendations for US policy options moving forward.
It reads like an academic polisci book, so it is a bit dry, which makes me question the idea of recommending it as a primer on the topic for those looking for a tldr, but I guess they could just skim the topic sentences and get his gist. The two biggest counterpoints that came to mind during this re-read, though, were (1) His recurring point that “China handled COVID amazing, the US/West failed” has not withstood the test of time, especially given the economic downturn China has taken post-COVID and the public outcry against government restrictions through the White Paper Protests in 2022 and beyond. I’m not saying the US did great, but I don’t think we can say that China thrived either. Also, (2), just coming from your humble neighborhood human rights-in-China watcher, I found myself wishing for more discussion of the general Chinese population’s support (or lack thereof) for this “grand strategy,” and how the public’s opinion affects these strategies’ efficacy - or how increased pro-democracy activism in China moving forward could spoil this Party grand strategy. He already covered a lot, so I can’t be too picky, but a girl can dream!
September 14, 2021
Rush Dushi is an American officer linked to the Brookings Institution, himself a brilliant example of how immigrants shape up American visions of the world an policy. Despite his particular background, the vision he has doesn't differ much from what would be "The Blob" main vision of China.
His book try to disentangle the concept of Chinese Grand Strategy in the long term. He says is influenced by the way Gaddis saw the Cold War, and it's not entirely off. The book is almost completely based on written documents, memoires and other Chinese-language texts. I guess because of how difficult it may be to get people talking on these issues there are some missing voices and on-the-ground experience.
Nevertheless, he makes his point pretty well and the book touches on very important topics to understand the logic of great power competition in the XXI century with a lot of anecdotal conferences but good grasp of a realist theory.
Basically his thesis is that Chinese post-cold-war grand strategy had three moments marked by several critical events that triggered a change in the perception of the Chinese elites about American power and their own role in the world.
1. "The Trifecta" - Tinanmen, the Fall of the Soviet Union and something else I forgot. It was a moment where China perceived itself as weak, and had to "Hide its capabilities" and restrain from major conflicts with the west. The main strategy would be blunt American efforts to consolidate its hegemony in Asia. Here the most interesting part mentions the choice for assymetrical weapons even when conventional militar doctrines would suggest otherwise. Even when restraining, China kept building theory and ideas with a grand strategic goal in the horizon: the US was perceived as the major rival even when there were moments of cooperation. The main challenge was to avoid being isolated from the newly-created American hegemony world even when Chinese system was illiberal. The basic idea was to avoid direct conflict (diplomatic, economic, military), build assymetrical capacities and blunt American efforts to build their own)
2. The 2008 crisis. There is a perception of decline in the American order, and China perceives this moment as an opportunity to start building their own proactive capabilities. The main focus is in the Asian region through the "community of shared destiny" or something like that. The basic idea is that China slowly would abandon a restrained and deffensive position to start building their own partnerships and initiatives with the confidence that America would keep declining.
3. Trump election, Brexit, COVID-19. Acceleration of the historical time. Period of uncertainty and ultimately, crisis. China has a one-in-a-century possibility to take advantage of America's poor response to these events including not only their domestic problems but also the coordination with key allies and partners. China built capacities not only to balance American power in Asia, but globally. The country would be now devoted to exploit economic and technological advantages while improving and readying the military. Chinese projects flow to the world despite their economic convenience to set targets of geopolitical relevance, and the "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy" aims to challenge America in direct and aggressive terms.
Lastly, the book suggests that America should learn from the lessons of the past and use some of the same tools China used to protect its position in the world. Some of them are using assymetrical means to blunt the Chinese power wherever possible, make use of deals and partnerships to jointly balance difficult positions, and continue building an American orden based in liberal values and transparency. It's a "full engagement" kind of approach, where it is recognized that there are elements where China and US will necesarily cooperate (climate change for example), while others where they have to compete (technological development).
In the end, the author suggests that America has the capabilities, resources and resilience to stand up against this challenge, but China's rise won't go away any soon, and it's a new reality the world has to live with.
His book try to disentangle the concept of Chinese Grand Strategy in the long term. He says is influenced by the way Gaddis saw the Cold War, and it's not entirely off. The book is almost completely based on written documents, memoires and other Chinese-language texts. I guess because of how difficult it may be to get people talking on these issues there are some missing voices and on-the-ground experience.
Nevertheless, he makes his point pretty well and the book touches on very important topics to understand the logic of great power competition in the XXI century with a lot of anecdotal conferences but good grasp of a realist theory.
Basically his thesis is that Chinese post-cold-war grand strategy had three moments marked by several critical events that triggered a change in the perception of the Chinese elites about American power and their own role in the world.
1. "The Trifecta" - Tinanmen, the Fall of the Soviet Union and something else I forgot. It was a moment where China perceived itself as weak, and had to "Hide its capabilities" and restrain from major conflicts with the west. The main strategy would be blunt American efforts to consolidate its hegemony in Asia. Here the most interesting part mentions the choice for assymetrical weapons even when conventional militar doctrines would suggest otherwise. Even when restraining, China kept building theory and ideas with a grand strategic goal in the horizon: the US was perceived as the major rival even when there were moments of cooperation. The main challenge was to avoid being isolated from the newly-created American hegemony world even when Chinese system was illiberal. The basic idea was to avoid direct conflict (diplomatic, economic, military), build assymetrical capacities and blunt American efforts to build their own)
2. The 2008 crisis. There is a perception of decline in the American order, and China perceives this moment as an opportunity to start building their own proactive capabilities. The main focus is in the Asian region through the "community of shared destiny" or something like that. The basic idea is that China slowly would abandon a restrained and deffensive position to start building their own partnerships and initiatives with the confidence that America would keep declining.
3. Trump election, Brexit, COVID-19. Acceleration of the historical time. Period of uncertainty and ultimately, crisis. China has a one-in-a-century possibility to take advantage of America's poor response to these events including not only their domestic problems but also the coordination with key allies and partners. China built capacities not only to balance American power in Asia, but globally. The country would be now devoted to exploit economic and technological advantages while improving and readying the military. Chinese projects flow to the world despite their economic convenience to set targets of geopolitical relevance, and the "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy" aims to challenge America in direct and aggressive terms.
Lastly, the book suggests that America should learn from the lessons of the past and use some of the same tools China used to protect its position in the world. Some of them are using assymetrical means to blunt the Chinese power wherever possible, make use of deals and partnerships to jointly balance difficult positions, and continue building an American orden based in liberal values and transparency. It's a "full engagement" kind of approach, where it is recognized that there are elements where China and US will necesarily cooperate (climate change for example), while others where they have to compete (technological development).
In the end, the author suggests that America has the capabilities, resources and resilience to stand up against this challenge, but China's rise won't go away any soon, and it's a new reality the world has to live with.
March 11, 2025
If you want to understand why US policymakers across both parties have had a similar foreign policy/strategy toward the PRC in recent years I highly recommend this book. It uses primary sources directly from the CCP detailing their grand strategy to replace the United States and explains it chronologically/step by step. While it can get dense at times it explains it in fairly layman’s terms; aka detailed yet easy to comprehend.
The last quote of the book spoke to me, especially with current events:
“As a presidential candidate sixty years ago, when Americans were still reeling from the Sputnik shock, John F. Kennedy addressed a municipal auditorium in Canton, Ohio. The country faces serious crises, and Kennedy enumerated them: low wages, high housing costs, a growing risk of conflict, the gradual shrinkage of industry, and the rise of a new rival that appeared to be on the march while the United States stood still. ‘What we have to overcome,’ Kennedy said then, is ‘that psychological feeling in the world that the United States has reached maturity, that maybe our high noon has passed, maybe our brightest days were earlier, and that now we are going into the long, slow afternoon….I don’t hold that view at all, and neither do the people of this country’”
The last quote of the book spoke to me, especially with current events:
“As a presidential candidate sixty years ago, when Americans were still reeling from the Sputnik shock, John F. Kennedy addressed a municipal auditorium in Canton, Ohio. The country faces serious crises, and Kennedy enumerated them: low wages, high housing costs, a growing risk of conflict, the gradual shrinkage of industry, and the rise of a new rival that appeared to be on the march while the United States stood still. ‘What we have to overcome,’ Kennedy said then, is ‘that psychological feeling in the world that the United States has reached maturity, that maybe our high noon has passed, maybe our brightest days were earlier, and that now we are going into the long, slow afternoon….I don’t hold that view at all, and neither do the people of this country’”
October 18, 2023
This was one of the most impressive books I have ever read. The sheer amount of notes and citations throughout the text are mind-blowing; no wonder it took the author so long to write it. It should be said this is an academic text and not geared for popular reading (so it may seem dry to those who approach it as such). That being said, it is extremely well organized and easy to navigate.
I came into the book a bit skeptical and not in agreement with the author, that changed. The argument is clearly presented and has very convincing evidence to back it up. It is likely to be one of the most influential books I read about the PRC in my life.
I highly recommend it to everyone (especially any American politicians).
I came into the book a bit skeptical and not in agreement with the author, that changed. The argument is clearly presented and has very convincing evidence to back it up. It is likely to be one of the most influential books I read about the PRC in my life.
I highly recommend it to everyone (especially any American politicians).
January 5, 2022
A very interesting analysis of the evolution of China's policy towards the USA and the West more in general. A must read for anybody who is interested in the current China-USA disputes.
The book is written from a biased point of view (from the USA side) but is therefore all the more interesting as it explains to a large extent the current [policy of the USA and the Biden administration towards China.
The text is sometimes a bit repetitive and a next edition could benefit from a bit of editing.
The book is written from a biased point of view (from the USA side) but is therefore all the more interesting as it explains to a large extent the current [policy of the USA and the Biden administration towards China.
The text is sometimes a bit repetitive and a next edition could benefit from a bit of editing.
February 15, 2024
If you enjoy geopolitical books describing great power competition, this is a solid book. Easily digestible academic-style format that covers China’s blunting, building, and dominating periods as it strives to be a great world power. If you don’t want to read the whole book, jump to Part 3 that offers a whole government approach for how to compete across all instruments of power.
April 2, 2024
Comprehensive and convincing, it proves that China is trying to displace the U.S.-led world order and details how the CCP is trying to do it. It’s written a bit like an academic essay, which is good for building a holistic argument but can make it a little repetitive. Im very happy the author ended up on the NSC and was able to commit some of these ideas into practice.
August 16, 2022
Best review and data driven analysis of great power competition I’ve read. Incredible level of detail while still keeping it relatable to all audiences. It’s a must read.
March 15, 2023
A book that examines Chinese grand strategy by looking at Chinese foreign policy documents. Read it if you care about such things.
March 3, 2025
Really good overview of the primary challenge before us. Likely should be required reading for anyone in NATSEC.
November 22, 2025
That said, never meet your heroes lol
January 16, 2024
An educative crash-course into the “how we got here” for U.S.-PRC competition today. While dull at points, Doshi is very detailed and thorough in his argument. I would suggest this to those interested in geopolitics/national security whose focus is not traditionally the PRC.
December 8, 2023
I'm considering just calling this book "The Long Book" because it's, well, long and often repetitive. How many ways can you prove the same point?
Still, I think it's an important read, and I can see why it's a foundational work for a lot of thinking on the subject of CCP's evolving aims. I also appreciate its thoroughness. It is a good example of PMESII-PT analysis. It flips the cube and looks at the problem from many perspectives, and I appreciate that.
Still, I think it's an important read, and I can see why it's a foundational work for a lot of thinking on the subject of CCP's evolving aims. I also appreciate its thoroughness. It is a good example of PMESII-PT analysis. It flips the cube and looks at the problem from many perspectives, and I appreciate that.
October 25, 2021
Very interesting view about China and it grand strategy. For those that hope the conflict or trade war will end, don't be fool, this will be last and not even end with possible third WW.
September 17, 2021
Drawing on an expansive landscape of often-seclusive authoritative Chinese-language Communist Party documents, leader-level speeches, media, and other commentary, Rush Doshi’s “The Long Game” traces the geostrategic playbook of China’s political leaders over the last several decades. Doshi discerns three discrete thought-regimes China has leveraged to become a formidable adversary to the US, beginning with a long period in the 1970s and 1980s of lying in the wait (“hiding capabilities and biding time”) by tepidly “blunting” an assertive American regional presence in the Asia Pacific, followed by a more self-confident “building” strategy of effectuating a modest regional presence after the fall of the Soviet Union, and lastly a more aggressive “expansion” strategy of sparring with the US for global superpower status after the 2008 financial crisis.
Doshi masterfully dissects the Chinese Communist Party’s evolving foreign policy weltanschauung by meticulously parsing trends in dense reams of party doctrine, making clear how China’s reactive foreign policy lens fuels its debut to the foreground of the world’s stage. While the author’s writing is often circular and distended (it’s easy to imagine this book could have been one-third its length without sacrificing the incisiveness of its thesis), his painstaking hairsplitting of the minutiae in these materials is impressive, and he succeeds at laying bare the stunning arc of China’s shape shifting foreign policy doctrine during a series of key junctures in recent global history.
Doshi masterfully dissects the Chinese Communist Party’s evolving foreign policy weltanschauung by meticulously parsing trends in dense reams of party doctrine, making clear how China’s reactive foreign policy lens fuels its debut to the foreground of the world’s stage. While the author’s writing is often circular and distended (it’s easy to imagine this book could have been one-third its length without sacrificing the incisiveness of its thesis), his painstaking hairsplitting of the minutiae in these materials is impressive, and he succeeds at laying bare the stunning arc of China’s shape shifting foreign policy doctrine during a series of key junctures in recent global history.
April 12, 2022
Brilliant analysis.
Ch 1: what is grand strategy? A coherent body of thought that guides the state’s action.
-what is hegemonic order? A form of control by a hegemonic state to regulate and control subordinates. Done by coercive capacity, consensual inducements, and legitimacy.
- strategies to displace a hegemon:
1 blunt the hegemony’s power
2 build alternative forms of control
Do it in sequence
Ch 2: the party leads everything
-Leninism has no checks and balances, all power is concentrated at the top. They claim this makes it efficient.
-The core theme animating the CCP is nationalist, not communist. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese ppl is not a communist slogan.
-Leninism is the tool to achieve this great rejuvenation.
-all key foreign policy decisions are made by the party, not the state
-Grand strategy is set at the very top of the party, paramount leader level
-The party communicates to itself via speeches and texts
-Doshi’s method is the use of a hierarchy of primary sources listed on page 42
Part 1: 1989 to 2008
Hiding Capabilities and Biding Time
Ch 3: New Cold Wars have Begun - The trifecta and the new American threat
-China’s traumatic trifecta:
1.) Tianaman Square
2.) The gulf war
3.) Soviet Collapse
-These events lead China to focus on the US as the number one security threat. Deng and other Chinese leaders understood that the US was trying to bring about peaceful evolution.
-Phase 1 of China’s Grand Strategy: bide and hide
While the relative power differentials between the US and China were high in US’a favor, China should hide its growing strength so as not to alarm the US who could build a balancing coalition. When balance of power changes, can move to phase 2.
-Phase 1: Blunting
1.) Focus on sea denial to stop US dominating waters near China
2.) Join regional institutions and sew dysfunction in them, constrain US within them, use to them to re-assure neighbors of China’s benign intentions.
3.) secure most favored nation trading status with the US - reduces discretionary use of American economic power. Also join WTO.
Ch 4: Implementing Military Blunting: Grasping the assassins mace
-Grand strategy principle: whatever the enemy is afraid of, we develop that. To blunt US military develop sea denial strategy, anti access/area denial
- Develop asymmetric weapons that are cheap and blunt American power.
-PRC developed 3 denial platforms:
1.) subs - built to operate in China’s coastal waters
2.) mines - cheap way to deny US access to coastal waters
3.) missiles - developed asbm carrier killers
-China could have developed aircraft carriers but held off since it didn’t fit with blunting phase strategy.
Ch 5: Implementing Political Blunting: Demonstrate Benign Intentions
-China undermined all US attempts at order building in Asia by joining organizations then working against them—APEC and others
-China supported east Asia institutions that lacked US presence, ex. Shanghai Cooperation Organization & APEC +3
-Also used regional orgs to project China’s benign intentions. Good neighbor policy existed to blunt encirclement while China was weak.
Ch 6: implementing Economic blunting: permanent normal trade relations
-China’s economic blunting strategy was to blunt American efforts to manipulate chinas economic dependence on the US in ways that could harm China.
-The blunting tools were: get most favored nation MFN status for China, and to accede to the WTO
-MFN + WTO accession would tie American hands in regard to use of trade as an economic coercion tool. Limit US use of: trade sanctions, tariffs, USTR section 301 investigations, and tech restrictions
-Chinese leaders were aware of the risks of this type of economic liberalization, and that US’s strategic idea was that it would lead to political liberalization and peaceful evolution. CCP took note and stood up counter measures.
-China used APEC to get developing nation status which would transfer to WTO and make it less onerous to join.
-All in all, Econ blunting strategy reduced US Econ leverage over China.
Part II: 2009-2016 “Actively Accomplish Something”: Building as China’s Second Displacement Strategy
Ch 7: The Financial Crisis & The Dawn of Building: A Change in the Balance of Power
-Long history of China longing for a multipolar world in official party speeches and docs. Read: diminishment of US power
-Global Financial Crisis causes China to reevaluate the relative power differentials. It then moves from blunting strategy to order building strategy in Asia.
-Building strategy begins under Hu, not Xi. Hu announced end of bide and hide and need to ‘actively accomplish something.’
-PRC order building in Asia: BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Community of Common Destiny
-All these things lead to the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.
Ch. 8: Implementing Military Building: Make More Offensive Moves
-After GFC China turns from military blunting to military building the foundations for regional hegemony.
-Focus ways to build to protect China’s maritime interests and secure resource flows from overseas.
-2012 China builds blue water navy — aircraft carriers, more surface vessels, mine counter measures, amphibious warfare capability, marine transport crafts and builds out overseas facilities, including Djibouti and other supply bases
Ch. 9: Implementing Political Building: Establish Regional Architecture
-During blunting phase China played spoiler in Asian institutions and kept them weak and thin. Post GFC by contrast China went on an institution building spree and sought to thicken those it led.
-PRC shifts focus to “peripheral diplomacy” ie. building multilateral orgs in Asia that would reflect China’s interests. Called this Community of Common Destiny = China’s Asian Order
-China built two major regional orgs 1 AIIB 2 CICA
-AIIB offers China 3 things:
1 coercive capacity to constrain neighbors by withholding funding 2 allows China to set development and Econ governance rules 3 Provides Chinese leadership with legitimacy. States will align their foreign policy more closely with China’s to gain access to capital.
-CICA used to develop a China led Asian Security Framework that is used to oppose US security alliances. CICA reflects Chinese and Russian security goals. CICA can limit members ability to cooperate with the US and it can help secure BRI projects that China sees as a global public good.
Ch 10: Implementing Economic Building: Aboard our development train
-China wants to use its economic power over infrastructure and finance for the purpose of geo-strategic ends ie. it seeks to create economic leverage for political ends
-China’s economic order in Asia makes other regional states asymmetrically dependent on China due to its size while giving China more freedom to maneuver and constrain others.
-Two main economic order building bodies: bri and credit rating agencies + SWIFT alternative
-BRI- Most BRI projects are loss making, which is okay for CCP because the goal is to create asymmetric economic leverage, not profit. -
-BRI creates ports, choke points to exclude western countries and many have dual use military purposes in mind. Can help China defend its sea lanes.
-China makes 3 main attempts to fight US financial hegemony
1 Promote trade in RMB to weaken dollar
2 Build alternatives to SWIFT system
3 Build alternative to big 3 credit rating agencies
-Goal is global economic multipolarity
Part III: 2017-Present - Global Expansion as China’s Third Displacement Strategy. “Great Changes Unseen in a Century”
Ch 11: American Decline and China’s Global Ambition. “Toward the World’s Center Stage”
-Trump + Brexit + COVID-19 Mark and then solidify shift in China’s grand strategy. These events confirm the west is in terminal decline.
-2017 @ 19th party Congress Xi gives 3 hour speech outlining the new phase - beyond blunting and building - the concept is “great changes unseen in a century” meaning the global balance of power is now shifted enough that China can directly contest the US for superpower status.
-The plan to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation = replace the US as the world’s most powerful state by 2049 - the CCP’s centenary
-Current situation provide risks and opportunities, Xi believes the opportunities outweigh the risks and time is on China’s side
-US remains biggest impediment, China still fears containment and encirclement
Ch 12: The ways and means of China’s global expansion: Standing Tall and Seeing Far
-Sweden story—wine for our friends, shotguns for our enemies.
-China’s list of demands on Australia are blueprint for the Chinese order. Reduce foreign investment screening, tolerate Huawei, rollback foreign interference legislation, end human rights criticisms, change South China Sea stance, join the belt and Road initiative, muzzle the media, think tanks and officials that China dislikes. Or else face the economic consequences.
-3 ways and means of China’s global strategy
1.) Beijing puts forward a liberal norms in global institutions this is at the political level
2) economic level: seize the fourth industrial revolution and limit United States financial power
3) military level: acquire global capabilities/force posture and build new global support infrastructure
-Community of shared future for mankind is the grand strategic concept that defines China’s actions since 2017. This envisions China providing public goods to create a loose political block that supports China globally.
1.) China views moment since trumps election as “period of strategic opportunity“ to replace a retreating America as leader in many international organizations and to insert its own illiberal norms. China has also exported illiberalism and its development model to the Third World.
2.) China sees winning the fourth industrial revolution as key to leapfrogging the US and laying the base for its future superpower status. Already out invests the US 10 times on quantum computing. China also wants to set global tech standards.
3.) expanding military expeditionary capabilities to safeguard natural resource flows, ceilings, energy resources.
Ch. 13: an asymmetric strategy for US China competition
-Great power contest is back, the United States must now use some of the tools that China used against us. We need to engage in asymmetric blunting and order building.
-asymmetric blunting is blunting Chinese power at a cost that is less than it took the Chinese to establish/build the order. Some examples:
-provide regional allies with A2D area denial capabilities
-Undermined China’s efforts to build overseas bases
Report on belt and Road initiative corruption, build belt and -Road initiative funding alternatives
Close tech loopholes and brain drain out of China
Washington and its allies should join Chinese multilateral organizations and play spoiler
-The United States should then build/rebuild the American order:
-Harden critical facilities and get more dispersed for example the Pacific deterrence initiative
– build resilient information infrastructure
– maintain dollar hegemony
– audit supply chains and do more research and development
– there is no chance of a grand bargain with China. China will agree well week and then discard the agreement wind strong enough
– no attempts at peaceful evolution or manipulating Chinese domestic politics will work. These efforts will backfire and it is impossible to do given the amount of control the CCP has.
Ch 1: what is grand strategy? A coherent body of thought that guides the state’s action.
-what is hegemonic order? A form of control by a hegemonic state to regulate and control subordinates. Done by coercive capacity, consensual inducements, and legitimacy.
- strategies to displace a hegemon:
1 blunt the hegemony’s power
2 build alternative forms of control
Do it in sequence
Ch 2: the party leads everything
-Leninism has no checks and balances, all power is concentrated at the top. They claim this makes it efficient.
-The core theme animating the CCP is nationalist, not communist. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese ppl is not a communist slogan.
-Leninism is the tool to achieve this great rejuvenation.
-all key foreign policy decisions are made by the party, not the state
-Grand strategy is set at the very top of the party, paramount leader level
-The party communicates to itself via speeches and texts
-Doshi’s method is the use of a hierarchy of primary sources listed on page 42
Part 1: 1989 to 2008
Hiding Capabilities and Biding Time
Ch 3: New Cold Wars have Begun - The trifecta and the new American threat
-China’s traumatic trifecta:
1.) Tianaman Square
2.) The gulf war
3.) Soviet Collapse
-These events lead China to focus on the US as the number one security threat. Deng and other Chinese leaders understood that the US was trying to bring about peaceful evolution.
-Phase 1 of China’s Grand Strategy: bide and hide
While the relative power differentials between the US and China were high in US’a favor, China should hide its growing strength so as not to alarm the US who could build a balancing coalition. When balance of power changes, can move to phase 2.
-Phase 1: Blunting
1.) Focus on sea denial to stop US dominating waters near China
2.) Join regional institutions and sew dysfunction in them, constrain US within them, use to them to re-assure neighbors of China’s benign intentions.
3.) secure most favored nation trading status with the US - reduces discretionary use of American economic power. Also join WTO.
Ch 4: Implementing Military Blunting: Grasping the assassins mace
-Grand strategy principle: whatever the enemy is afraid of, we develop that. To blunt US military develop sea denial strategy, anti access/area denial
- Develop asymmetric weapons that are cheap and blunt American power.
-PRC developed 3 denial platforms:
1.) subs - built to operate in China’s coastal waters
2.) mines - cheap way to deny US access to coastal waters
3.) missiles - developed asbm carrier killers
-China could have developed aircraft carriers but held off since it didn’t fit with blunting phase strategy.
Ch 5: Implementing Political Blunting: Demonstrate Benign Intentions
-China undermined all US attempts at order building in Asia by joining organizations then working against them—APEC and others
-China supported east Asia institutions that lacked US presence, ex. Shanghai Cooperation Organization & APEC +3
-Also used regional orgs to project China’s benign intentions. Good neighbor policy existed to blunt encirclement while China was weak.
Ch 6: implementing Economic blunting: permanent normal trade relations
-China’s economic blunting strategy was to blunt American efforts to manipulate chinas economic dependence on the US in ways that could harm China.
-The blunting tools were: get most favored nation MFN status for China, and to accede to the WTO
-MFN + WTO accession would tie American hands in regard to use of trade as an economic coercion tool. Limit US use of: trade sanctions, tariffs, USTR section 301 investigations, and tech restrictions
-Chinese leaders were aware of the risks of this type of economic liberalization, and that US’s strategic idea was that it would lead to political liberalization and peaceful evolution. CCP took note and stood up counter measures.
-China used APEC to get developing nation status which would transfer to WTO and make it less onerous to join.
-All in all, Econ blunting strategy reduced US Econ leverage over China.
Part II: 2009-2016 “Actively Accomplish Something”: Building as China’s Second Displacement Strategy
Ch 7: The Financial Crisis & The Dawn of Building: A Change in the Balance of Power
-Long history of China longing for a multipolar world in official party speeches and docs. Read: diminishment of US power
-Global Financial Crisis causes China to reevaluate the relative power differentials. It then moves from blunting strategy to order building strategy in Asia.
-Building strategy begins under Hu, not Xi. Hu announced end of bide and hide and need to ‘actively accomplish something.’
-PRC order building in Asia: BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Community of Common Destiny
-All these things lead to the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.
Ch. 8: Implementing Military Building: Make More Offensive Moves
-After GFC China turns from military blunting to military building the foundations for regional hegemony.
-Focus ways to build to protect China’s maritime interests and secure resource flows from overseas.
-2012 China builds blue water navy — aircraft carriers, more surface vessels, mine counter measures, amphibious warfare capability, marine transport crafts and builds out overseas facilities, including Djibouti and other supply bases
Ch. 9: Implementing Political Building: Establish Regional Architecture
-During blunting phase China played spoiler in Asian institutions and kept them weak and thin. Post GFC by contrast China went on an institution building spree and sought to thicken those it led.
-PRC shifts focus to “peripheral diplomacy” ie. building multilateral orgs in Asia that would reflect China’s interests. Called this Community of Common Destiny = China’s Asian Order
-China built two major regional orgs 1 AIIB 2 CICA
-AIIB offers China 3 things:
1 coercive capacity to constrain neighbors by withholding funding 2 allows China to set development and Econ governance rules 3 Provides Chinese leadership with legitimacy. States will align their foreign policy more closely with China’s to gain access to capital.
-CICA used to develop a China led Asian Security Framework that is used to oppose US security alliances. CICA reflects Chinese and Russian security goals. CICA can limit members ability to cooperate with the US and it can help secure BRI projects that China sees as a global public good.
Ch 10: Implementing Economic Building: Aboard our development train
-China wants to use its economic power over infrastructure and finance for the purpose of geo-strategic ends ie. it seeks to create economic leverage for political ends
-China’s economic order in Asia makes other regional states asymmetrically dependent on China due to its size while giving China more freedom to maneuver and constrain others.
-Two main economic order building bodies: bri and credit rating agencies + SWIFT alternative
-BRI- Most BRI projects are loss making, which is okay for CCP because the goal is to create asymmetric economic leverage, not profit. -
-BRI creates ports, choke points to exclude western countries and many have dual use military purposes in mind. Can help China defend its sea lanes.
-China makes 3 main attempts to fight US financial hegemony
1 Promote trade in RMB to weaken dollar
2 Build alternatives to SWIFT system
3 Build alternative to big 3 credit rating agencies
-Goal is global economic multipolarity
Part III: 2017-Present - Global Expansion as China’s Third Displacement Strategy. “Great Changes Unseen in a Century”
Ch 11: American Decline and China’s Global Ambition. “Toward the World’s Center Stage”
-Trump + Brexit + COVID-19 Mark and then solidify shift in China’s grand strategy. These events confirm the west is in terminal decline.
-2017 @ 19th party Congress Xi gives 3 hour speech outlining the new phase - beyond blunting and building - the concept is “great changes unseen in a century” meaning the global balance of power is now shifted enough that China can directly contest the US for superpower status.
-The plan to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation = replace the US as the world’s most powerful state by 2049 - the CCP’s centenary
-Current situation provide risks and opportunities, Xi believes the opportunities outweigh the risks and time is on China’s side
-US remains biggest impediment, China still fears containment and encirclement
Ch 12: The ways and means of China’s global expansion: Standing Tall and Seeing Far
-Sweden story—wine for our friends, shotguns for our enemies.
-China’s list of demands on Australia are blueprint for the Chinese order. Reduce foreign investment screening, tolerate Huawei, rollback foreign interference legislation, end human rights criticisms, change South China Sea stance, join the belt and Road initiative, muzzle the media, think tanks and officials that China dislikes. Or else face the economic consequences.
-3 ways and means of China’s global strategy
1.) Beijing puts forward a liberal norms in global institutions this is at the political level
2) economic level: seize the fourth industrial revolution and limit United States financial power
3) military level: acquire global capabilities/force posture and build new global support infrastructure
-Community of shared future for mankind is the grand strategic concept that defines China’s actions since 2017. This envisions China providing public goods to create a loose political block that supports China globally.
1.) China views moment since trumps election as “period of strategic opportunity“ to replace a retreating America as leader in many international organizations and to insert its own illiberal norms. China has also exported illiberalism and its development model to the Third World.
2.) China sees winning the fourth industrial revolution as key to leapfrogging the US and laying the base for its future superpower status. Already out invests the US 10 times on quantum computing. China also wants to set global tech standards.
3.) expanding military expeditionary capabilities to safeguard natural resource flows, ceilings, energy resources.
Ch. 13: an asymmetric strategy for US China competition
-Great power contest is back, the United States must now use some of the tools that China used against us. We need to engage in asymmetric blunting and order building.
-asymmetric blunting is blunting Chinese power at a cost that is less than it took the Chinese to establish/build the order. Some examples:
-provide regional allies with A2D area denial capabilities
-Undermined China’s efforts to build overseas bases
Report on belt and Road initiative corruption, build belt and -Road initiative funding alternatives
Close tech loopholes and brain drain out of China
Washington and its allies should join Chinese multilateral organizations and play spoiler
-The United States should then build/rebuild the American order:
-Harden critical facilities and get more dispersed for example the Pacific deterrence initiative
– build resilient information infrastructure
– maintain dollar hegemony
– audit supply chains and do more research and development
– there is no chance of a grand bargain with China. China will agree well week and then discard the agreement wind strong enough
– no attempts at peaceful evolution or manipulating Chinese domestic politics will work. These efforts will backfire and it is impossible to do given the amount of control the CCP has.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 4, 2021
A well-researched book on contemporary US-China relations. Doshi's use of primary sources (e.g. leader-level speeches, Party documents, doctrinal texts, etc.) demonstrates the painstaking care of bringing the readers to the minds and inner workings of the notoriously opaque CCP as close as possible.
While I appreciate the amount of effort taken in the methodology, the book's recommendations remain highly idealistic and would require more flexibility and pragmatism to be more "palatable". This part also seems to be a bit rushed.
While I appreciate the amount of effort taken in the methodology, the book's recommendations remain highly idealistic and would require more flexibility and pragmatism to be more "palatable". This part also seems to be a bit rushed.
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