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Buddhism As Philosophy
In Buddhism As Philosophy , Mark Siderits makes the Buddhist philosophical tradition accessible to a Western audience. Offering generous selections from the canonical Buddhist texts and providing an engaging, analytical introduction to the fundamental tenets of Buddhist thought, this revised, expanded, and updated edition builds on the success of the first edition in clarifying the basic concepts and arguments of the Buddhist philosophers.
384 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2007
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October 21, 2025
160513: this is a book i have had for years, i read now, in chapter reads a day each, but not studying. this could be an excellent text for undergraduate courses, with your prof working through this particular logic, because it draws on an entire unfamiliar tradition for most who know only western philosophy. i enjoyed this a lot...
i do not know why this text intimidated me, because it is actually very readable, very organized, very concise- though it does examine many schools or orientations that have discussed, decided, argued, Buddhist ideas, and this history and its groups, can be intricate, complex, and do rely on common (eastern) cultural beliefs such as karma, samsara, moksha, though through the principle of 'lightness' (like occam's razor) there are few truly difficult concepts...
perhaps the only reason i found the text so amenable, so perceptive, is in the fact so much previous Buddhism and philosophy i have read, familiarity with philosophical argument, dialectic, assertion, and Buddhist insistence on only accepting what you can think, not dogma, not sources, no other faith than in human power of thought... there is here in buddhism, at least as philosophy, no excessive jargon, no necessary acceptance of the supernatural, of god or prophet or messiah, no necessary belief in some kind of order, some author, some metaphysics of being and the world- it is possible to be an atheistic Buddhist (though apparently to be christian you have to believe in christ, to be muslim believe in mohammed) - and so all ideas are open to all dispute, are open to objections, are open even to revision...
truly, this is a favourite philosophy text...
more:
What the Buddha Taught
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School
The Kyoto School
Nishida And Western Philosophy
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy
Why I Am Not a Buddhist
Why I Am a Buddhist: No-Nonsense Buddhism with Red Meat and Whiskey
Indian Buddhist Philosophy: Metaphysics as Ethics
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy
i do not know why this text intimidated me, because it is actually very readable, very organized, very concise- though it does examine many schools or orientations that have discussed, decided, argued, Buddhist ideas, and this history and its groups, can be intricate, complex, and do rely on common (eastern) cultural beliefs such as karma, samsara, moksha, though through the principle of 'lightness' (like occam's razor) there are few truly difficult concepts...
perhaps the only reason i found the text so amenable, so perceptive, is in the fact so much previous Buddhism and philosophy i have read, familiarity with philosophical argument, dialectic, assertion, and Buddhist insistence on only accepting what you can think, not dogma, not sources, no other faith than in human power of thought... there is here in buddhism, at least as philosophy, no excessive jargon, no necessary acceptance of the supernatural, of god or prophet or messiah, no necessary belief in some kind of order, some author, some metaphysics of being and the world- it is possible to be an atheistic Buddhist (though apparently to be christian you have to believe in christ, to be muslim believe in mohammed) - and so all ideas are open to all dispute, are open to objections, are open even to revision...
truly, this is a favourite philosophy text...
more:
What the Buddha Taught
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School
The Kyoto School
Nishida And Western Philosophy
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy
Why I Am Not a Buddhist
Why I Am a Buddhist: No-Nonsense Buddhism with Red Meat and Whiskey
Indian Buddhist Philosophy: Metaphysics as Ethics
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy
February 23, 2013
This book is a good historical introduction to Buddhism. The section on early buddhism was by far the most interesting. The later sections tend to repeat some of the same stuff and go into not so relevant details. Here are my reading notes.
As published here.
# Early Buddhism
Early Buddhism contains references to the following ideas:
- the Dharma (middle path taught by the Buddha)
- the eightfold path
- the four noble truths
- the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination (not mentioned yet anywhere but first if ignorance)
- the three characteristics of existence: impermanence, suffering, and non-self
In short, the Buddha teaches the Dharma, as a patch to liberate oneself from suffering. This liberation requires the removal of suffering through the removal of its causes and is based on the knowledge of the human condition, notably impermanence, suffering, and non-self. This philosophy is stated as the four noble truths.
## Four Noble Truths
- There is suffering
- There is the origination of suffering: suffering comes into existence in dependence on causes (fancy way to say that suffering is caused by something)
- There is the cessation of suffering: all future suffering can be prevented
- There is a path to the cessation of suffering
## The Paradox of Liberation
The paradox of liberation goes like this:
- 1: Liberation is desirable
- 2: Selfish desire prevents us from attaining liberation
- 3: In order to attain liberation one must train oneself to live without selfish desires
- 4: One does not engage in deliberate action unless one desires the foreseen result of the action
- → It's unclear how a person can find liberation if seeking it is selfish and selfish actions are to be dismissed
This paradox can be worked around in various ways, weak or strong. One is to say that training oneself to not desire anything is a way to obtain liberation. Liberation is then reached "incidentally". Another way is to say that liberation is the only desirable thing.
## Five Skandhas
These fives aggregates try to define every part of a human being. The so-called exhaustiveness claim states that these are the only entities forming a human being:
- rupa: anything corporeal or physical
- feeling: sensations of pleasure or pain or indifference
- perception: those mental events where we understand perceptions
- volition: mental forces responsible for bodily and mental activity: e.g. hunger and attentiveness
- consciousness: the awareness of physical and mental states
Similar but different to this idea is the idea behind physicalism, that human beings are nothing but physical stuff. All feelings and perceptions and consciousness are all explained eventually through complex physical interactions. Physicalism, as well as Buddhism, then denies the existence of a soul, a conscience, or a self. But Buddhism is not as radical and does not deny conciousness for instance.
## Non-Self
The Buddha gave two arguments for non-self, one from impermanence and one from control.
### Argument from Impermanence
- 1: Rupa is impermanent
- 2: Sensation is impermanent
- 3: Perception is impermanent
- 4: Volition is impermanent
- 5: Consciousness is impermanent
- 6: If there were a self it would be permanent
- IP: There is no more to the person than the five skandhas
- → There is no self
### Argument from Control
- 1: I sometimes dislike and seek to change rupa
- 2: I sometimes dislike and seek to change feeling
- 3: I sometimes dislike and seek to change perception
- 4: I sometimes dislike and seek to change volition
- 5: I sometimes dislike and seek to change consciousness
- 6: If the self existed it would be the part of the person that performs the executive function
- IP: There is no more to the person than the five skandhas
- → There is no self
In general, early Buddhism rejects the existence of wholes. A whole is made of parts and the name we call the whole is only a convenient designator, a label.
> In early Buddhism we just have what looks like a kind of ontological bias against wholes. (loc 1570)
In short, the idea of non-self states that when we say _I_, _me_, or _mine_, we are not addressing a real thing. We use these words as a useful fiction to represent the various skandhas and their interactions throughout life.
## Rebirth and Karma
Another tenet of Buddhism is the one of transmigration. The idea is that people are re-born after they die and the level of comfort of their next life is based on the good they did in their current life. This is the famous karma.
I don't think it is necessary to believe in this idea in order to use Buddhism as a philosophy. The assertions around transmigration and karma are clearly far-fetched and seem to imply cosmic justice. Therefore, these assertions are very difficult to prove rationally.
# Buddhist Ethics
Buddhism states that there are three poisons that get in the way of liberation:
- ignorance
- greed
- hatred
For instance, the ignorance of the non-self leads to false philosophical answers. And the greed that leads to wanting something reinforces the belief that the self can be improve through the accumulation of stuff.
The idea behind Buddhist ethics is threefold:
- doing good will lead to a pleasant rebirth
- doing good is part of the training necessary to attain nirvana
- doing good will prevent suffering everywhere which is the goal
This third layer is the most interesting claim. The argument goes something like this:
- 1: Suppose that we are each obligated to prevent only our own suffering
- 2: In the case of one's own future suffering it is one set of skandhas that does the preventing for another set that has the suffering
- 3: In the case of one's own present suffering, it is one part that does the preventing for another part that has the suffering
- 4: The sense of "I" that leads one to call future skandhas and distinct present parts "me" is a conceptual fiction
- 5: Hence it cannot be ultimately true that some suffering is one's own and some suffering is that of others
- 6: Hence the claim that we are obligated to prevent only our own suffering lacks ultimate grounding
- 7: Hence either there is an obligation to prevent suffering regardless of where it occurs, or else there is no obligation to prevent any suffering
- 8: But everyone agrees that at least some suffering should be prevented
- → There is an obligation to prevent suffering regardless of where it occurs
The author says that "what this argument in effect does is accuse us of irrationality if we think it's justifiable to be concerned about our own pain and not be equally concerned about the pain of other people." (loc.2348)
# Nyaya
Nyaya sets up a few categories to define existence:
- substance
- quality
- motion
- universal
- inherence
- individuator
- absence
And four ways to acquire knowledge:
- perception
- inference
- testimony
- comparison
## Indian Induction
Indian logicians typically induct in the following way:
- there is a subject
- a property to be proven
- a reason for the conclusion
- a positive example
- and a negative example
The conclusion is that the subject exhibits the property because of the reason, like the positive example and unlike the negative one.
## The Problem of Unification
Nyaya disputes the Buddhist belief in non-self by stating that the person having a memory seems to be the same person that performed the action in the memory. The memory can last for as long as the person's life, therefore it can be considered the self or part of the self.
# Abhidharma
The Abhidharma the third group of texts that relate the Buddhist philosophy:
1. Sutra: first group of texts about the discourse of the Buddha
2. Vinaya: second group of texts laying out monastic rules
3. Abhidharma: third group of texts written later as commentary on the earlier teachings
The Abhidharma begins by asserting that wholes are not real. The reasoning is one of elimination. Only one of the four possible cases must be real:
1. Wholes and parts are real:
2. Wholes are real; parts are not real: absolute monism
3. Wholes and parts are not real: metaphysical nihilism
4. Wholes are not real; parts are real: booya
The reasoning is tortuous but only statement 4 is kept as valid.
The Abhidharma goes on to discuss dharmas (parts that do not disappear under analysis—i.e. atoms) and to respond to the Nyaya critique.
The Abhidharma metaphysics also talk about the various dharmas of water, air, fire, and earth.
# Mahayana
This is a later school of Buddhism whose historical origins are unclear.
The texts reflect two main ideas:
- The bodhisattva ideal
- The doctrine of emptiness
The metaphysics of Mahayana also go farther than early Buddhism in negating wholes. They even claim that dharmas are conceptual fictions. Various schools justify this claim in various ways.
The two main schools of Mahayana are Yogacara and Madhyamaka.
## Yogacara
This school advocates that there is no rupa. That there are only four skhandas.
This school states that the contents of sensory experiences are mere impressions. It denies the existence of external objects and reduces everthing to mental experiences.
Objections to this view include:
- Since we all experience the same mental image at the same time when looking at an object, that object must exist
- Whenever our senses wander, we see different things than other people but a consensus usually forms around what the thing is. Colorblinds might disagree about the color of a thing, but they will be a tiny majority. What makes such a vast majority of people agree on colors? These must exist as external objects.
- Actions have consequences that we can feel through subsequent sensory experiences. When I eat, I feel full; but if I dream about eating, I do not feel full. What is the difference? The food must exist in itself.
The response to these objections includes the idea that dreams are impressions that exhibit a lot of the same properties as reality. The rest is a bit tortuous.
## Madhyamaka
The foundational textboot of this school is Mulamadhyamakarika.
The important claim where this school branches off is the following: all things are empty, which is to say, they are devoid of intrinsic nature. Various arguments are given at this point...
# The School of Dinnaga
This school began with Dinnaga (480-540 CE). It refrains from answering various metaphysical questions and concentrates on epistemology and logics.
As published here.
# Early Buddhism
Early Buddhism contains references to the following ideas:
- the Dharma (middle path taught by the Buddha)
- the eightfold path
- the four noble truths
- the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination (not mentioned yet anywhere but first if ignorance)
- the three characteristics of existence: impermanence, suffering, and non-self
In short, the Buddha teaches the Dharma, as a patch to liberate oneself from suffering. This liberation requires the removal of suffering through the removal of its causes and is based on the knowledge of the human condition, notably impermanence, suffering, and non-self. This philosophy is stated as the four noble truths.
## Four Noble Truths
- There is suffering
- There is the origination of suffering: suffering comes into existence in dependence on causes (fancy way to say that suffering is caused by something)
- There is the cessation of suffering: all future suffering can be prevented
- There is a path to the cessation of suffering
## The Paradox of Liberation
The paradox of liberation goes like this:
- 1: Liberation is desirable
- 2: Selfish desire prevents us from attaining liberation
- 3: In order to attain liberation one must train oneself to live without selfish desires
- 4: One does not engage in deliberate action unless one desires the foreseen result of the action
- → It's unclear how a person can find liberation if seeking it is selfish and selfish actions are to be dismissed
This paradox can be worked around in various ways, weak or strong. One is to say that training oneself to not desire anything is a way to obtain liberation. Liberation is then reached "incidentally". Another way is to say that liberation is the only desirable thing.
## Five Skandhas
These fives aggregates try to define every part of a human being. The so-called exhaustiveness claim states that these are the only entities forming a human being:
- rupa: anything corporeal or physical
- feeling: sensations of pleasure or pain or indifference
- perception: those mental events where we understand perceptions
- volition: mental forces responsible for bodily and mental activity: e.g. hunger and attentiveness
- consciousness: the awareness of physical and mental states
Similar but different to this idea is the idea behind physicalism, that human beings are nothing but physical stuff. All feelings and perceptions and consciousness are all explained eventually through complex physical interactions. Physicalism, as well as Buddhism, then denies the existence of a soul, a conscience, or a self. But Buddhism is not as radical and does not deny conciousness for instance.
## Non-Self
The Buddha gave two arguments for non-self, one from impermanence and one from control.
### Argument from Impermanence
- 1: Rupa is impermanent
- 2: Sensation is impermanent
- 3: Perception is impermanent
- 4: Volition is impermanent
- 5: Consciousness is impermanent
- 6: If there were a self it would be permanent
- IP: There is no more to the person than the five skandhas
- → There is no self
### Argument from Control
- 1: I sometimes dislike and seek to change rupa
- 2: I sometimes dislike and seek to change feeling
- 3: I sometimes dislike and seek to change perception
- 4: I sometimes dislike and seek to change volition
- 5: I sometimes dislike and seek to change consciousness
- 6: If the self existed it would be the part of the person that performs the executive function
- IP: There is no more to the person than the five skandhas
- → There is no self
In general, early Buddhism rejects the existence of wholes. A whole is made of parts and the name we call the whole is only a convenient designator, a label.
> In early Buddhism we just have what looks like a kind of ontological bias against wholes. (loc 1570)
In short, the idea of non-self states that when we say _I_, _me_, or _mine_, we are not addressing a real thing. We use these words as a useful fiction to represent the various skandhas and their interactions throughout life.
## Rebirth and Karma
Another tenet of Buddhism is the one of transmigration. The idea is that people are re-born after they die and the level of comfort of their next life is based on the good they did in their current life. This is the famous karma.
I don't think it is necessary to believe in this idea in order to use Buddhism as a philosophy. The assertions around transmigration and karma are clearly far-fetched and seem to imply cosmic justice. Therefore, these assertions are very difficult to prove rationally.
# Buddhist Ethics
Buddhism states that there are three poisons that get in the way of liberation:
- ignorance
- greed
- hatred
For instance, the ignorance of the non-self leads to false philosophical answers. And the greed that leads to wanting something reinforces the belief that the self can be improve through the accumulation of stuff.
The idea behind Buddhist ethics is threefold:
- doing good will lead to a pleasant rebirth
- doing good is part of the training necessary to attain nirvana
- doing good will prevent suffering everywhere which is the goal
This third layer is the most interesting claim. The argument goes something like this:
- 1: Suppose that we are each obligated to prevent only our own suffering
- 2: In the case of one's own future suffering it is one set of skandhas that does the preventing for another set that has the suffering
- 3: In the case of one's own present suffering, it is one part that does the preventing for another part that has the suffering
- 4: The sense of "I" that leads one to call future skandhas and distinct present parts "me" is a conceptual fiction
- 5: Hence it cannot be ultimately true that some suffering is one's own and some suffering is that of others
- 6: Hence the claim that we are obligated to prevent only our own suffering lacks ultimate grounding
- 7: Hence either there is an obligation to prevent suffering regardless of where it occurs, or else there is no obligation to prevent any suffering
- 8: But everyone agrees that at least some suffering should be prevented
- → There is an obligation to prevent suffering regardless of where it occurs
The author says that "what this argument in effect does is accuse us of irrationality if we think it's justifiable to be concerned about our own pain and not be equally concerned about the pain of other people." (loc.2348)
# Nyaya
Nyaya sets up a few categories to define existence:
- substance
- quality
- motion
- universal
- inherence
- individuator
- absence
And four ways to acquire knowledge:
- perception
- inference
- testimony
- comparison
## Indian Induction
Indian logicians typically induct in the following way:
- there is a subject
- a property to be proven
- a reason for the conclusion
- a positive example
- and a negative example
The conclusion is that the subject exhibits the property because of the reason, like the positive example and unlike the negative one.
## The Problem of Unification
Nyaya disputes the Buddhist belief in non-self by stating that the person having a memory seems to be the same person that performed the action in the memory. The memory can last for as long as the person's life, therefore it can be considered the self or part of the self.
# Abhidharma
The Abhidharma the third group of texts that relate the Buddhist philosophy:
1. Sutra: first group of texts about the discourse of the Buddha
2. Vinaya: second group of texts laying out monastic rules
3. Abhidharma: third group of texts written later as commentary on the earlier teachings
The Abhidharma begins by asserting that wholes are not real. The reasoning is one of elimination. Only one of the four possible cases must be real:
1. Wholes and parts are real:
2. Wholes are real; parts are not real: absolute monism
3. Wholes and parts are not real: metaphysical nihilism
4. Wholes are not real; parts are real: booya
The reasoning is tortuous but only statement 4 is kept as valid.
The Abhidharma goes on to discuss dharmas (parts that do not disappear under analysis—i.e. atoms) and to respond to the Nyaya critique.
The Abhidharma metaphysics also talk about the various dharmas of water, air, fire, and earth.
# Mahayana
This is a later school of Buddhism whose historical origins are unclear.
The texts reflect two main ideas:
- The bodhisattva ideal
- The doctrine of emptiness
The metaphysics of Mahayana also go farther than early Buddhism in negating wholes. They even claim that dharmas are conceptual fictions. Various schools justify this claim in various ways.
The two main schools of Mahayana are Yogacara and Madhyamaka.
## Yogacara
This school advocates that there is no rupa. That there are only four skhandas.
This school states that the contents of sensory experiences are mere impressions. It denies the existence of external objects and reduces everthing to mental experiences.
Objections to this view include:
- Since we all experience the same mental image at the same time when looking at an object, that object must exist
- Whenever our senses wander, we see different things than other people but a consensus usually forms around what the thing is. Colorblinds might disagree about the color of a thing, but they will be a tiny majority. What makes such a vast majority of people agree on colors? These must exist as external objects.
- Actions have consequences that we can feel through subsequent sensory experiences. When I eat, I feel full; but if I dream about eating, I do not feel full. What is the difference? The food must exist in itself.
The response to these objections includes the idea that dreams are impressions that exhibit a lot of the same properties as reality. The rest is a bit tortuous.
## Madhyamaka
The foundational textboot of this school is Mulamadhyamakarika.
The important claim where this school branches off is the following: all things are empty, which is to say, they are devoid of intrinsic nature. Various arguments are given at this point...
# The School of Dinnaga
This school began with Dinnaga (480-540 CE). It refrains from answering various metaphysical questions and concentrates on epistemology and logics.
May 18, 2015
It was going fairly well until I got to the chapters on Yogacara and Madhyamaka. The Yogacara chapter was superficial while the Madhyamaka chapter did exactly what the writer says it doesn’t do: it read lightweight postmodern views into a profound religious philosophy.
Favoring a semantic interpretation of emptiness which says there is no ultimate truth as opposed to the ineffable interpretation which says that nothing can be said of ultimate truth that is ultimately true including this statement. I and many others favor the ineffable interpretation, thought I think a more appropriate name would be the inexhaustible interpretation: a whole lot can be said about ultimate truth [and it has been!] but nothing is exhaustive or complete or non-contradictory or ultimately true about it. TRV Murti’s Central Philosophy of Buddhism is still one of the better readings of Buddhist philosophy I’ve come across despite its age which supports the ineffable position. Also recommended is Nonduality by David Loy for a more comparative approach.
Overall disappointing but not unexpected, it seems a popular academic stance to Buddhist philosophy over the last three decades. Still gets three stars because the first half of the book dealing with early Buddhist philosophy was very clear and the whole book contained long excerpts from sutras and commentaries.
Also the book would be more accurately titled Buddhist thought as western analytic philosophy. It seems limiting to try and separate certain philosophical issues discussed in Buddhism from their religious/spiritual contexts and treat them as if they were mainly abstract discussions of semantic truth. The reason I enjoy Buddhist thinking is that it takes pace in the context of a deeply religious/spiritual worldview.
It reminded me of certain modern existentialist readings of Saint Augustine which try to purge God and Christianity from his thought!
Favoring a semantic interpretation of emptiness which says there is no ultimate truth as opposed to the ineffable interpretation which says that nothing can be said of ultimate truth that is ultimately true including this statement. I and many others favor the ineffable interpretation, thought I think a more appropriate name would be the inexhaustible interpretation: a whole lot can be said about ultimate truth [and it has been!] but nothing is exhaustive or complete or non-contradictory or ultimately true about it. TRV Murti’s Central Philosophy of Buddhism is still one of the better readings of Buddhist philosophy I’ve come across despite its age which supports the ineffable position. Also recommended is Nonduality by David Loy for a more comparative approach.
Overall disappointing but not unexpected, it seems a popular academic stance to Buddhist philosophy over the last three decades. Still gets three stars because the first half of the book dealing with early Buddhist philosophy was very clear and the whole book contained long excerpts from sutras and commentaries.
Also the book would be more accurately titled Buddhist thought as western analytic philosophy. It seems limiting to try and separate certain philosophical issues discussed in Buddhism from their religious/spiritual contexts and treat them as if they were mainly abstract discussions of semantic truth. The reason I enjoy Buddhist thinking is that it takes pace in the context of a deeply religious/spiritual worldview.
It reminded me of certain modern existentialist readings of Saint Augustine which try to purge God and Christianity from his thought!
February 18, 2025
a very good overview of some of the buddhist schools, written well for a philo beginner or a philo master. my only qualms was that it was a philo book so unsurprisingly some parts were boring or teccy, but thats user error on my part because i just dont find the problem of universals or all the buddhist variations of 'there is nothing' very interesting, at least not enough to warrant a 4 or 5 star. lowkey got me through the first half of indian philosophy tho so shoutout mark siderits
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 3, 2012
I'd pair it with a classic text book on analytic philosophy (e.g. Armstrong's short book) and teach an undergraduate course as "Buddhism as Philosophy and Philosophy as Buddhism"
August 7, 2024
Це для тих, хто хоче зануритися у глибини філософії буддизму і не вилізти звідти ніколи. Такого рівня академізму, який цікавий на планеті Земля кільком людям, я бачив небагато. Поважно, фундаментально, докладно. І нудно як гра у перебирання складними словами без цілісної мети.
Read
May 31, 2024I read this for a lecture at university. It's a good introduction to buddhist philosophy, but not an introduction to philosophy in general, which is why I imagine it to be quite frustrating and confusing for complete philosophy beginners.
There are some things I have mixed feelings about, though it's hard for me to distinguish wether those concern Siderit's presentation or the topics themselves. Probably a bit of both.
There are some things I have mixed feelings about, though it's hard for me to distinguish wether those concern Siderit's presentation or the topics themselves. Probably a bit of both.
July 24, 2011
With a succinct introduction to Buddhism, covering impermanence, suffering, non-self, karma and rebirth, the in-depth philosophical discussions are focussed primarily on non-self and emptiness, analysing and comparing texts from Abhidharma and various schools of Buddhism including Mahayana, Yogacara, Madhyamaka and Dinnaga. It covers concepts like ultimate vs conventional truth, impressions-only vs representationalists, principle of lightness and inference. Definitely not a light read!
December 9, 2015
This is a philosophy book. It is not about the practice of Buddhism, but the concepts. It's clear, concise and academic. Its rewards a close reading. There are some 'useful truths' here. They might lead to better practice.
I recommend it for anyone interested in Buddhism and philosophy.
I recommend it for anyone interested in Buddhism and philosophy.
August 14, 2023
Sometimes life feels unsatisfying. A shallow version of the feeling comes and goes with ordinary disappointments. You look at the burned enchiladas you've pulled from the oven, and reflexively your shoulders slump.
A deeper version of the feeling is possible. It could be prompted by something like a burned dinner, but more typically it is brought on by the thought of death, someone else's or the prospect of your own. You ask yourself, "is this all there is?" Doubt arises that life has meaning or value. Existential anxiety is one name for this feeling.
Religion takes this kind of anxiety seriously. It says yes, mundane existence is lacking. But it also also says, good news: there is a means of addressing it called salvation. The means of salvation differ from one religion to another. We typically think of salvation as involving non-rational commitment (eg, faith), and for that reason many people don't find it credible.
Siderits points out that not all religions are like that. Some religions claim salvation can be arrived at by rational investigation of the world: for example, Indian Buddhism and medieval Islam. This book surveys the rational means of salvation proposed by various traditions within Indian Buddhism.
Buddhism summarizes our situation with the Nobles' Four Truths:
(NT1) There is suffering.
(NT2) The suffering originates from known causes.
(NT3) The suffering will cease when the causes are removed.
(NT4) There is path that can be followed to remove the causes.
Each of these four truths is elaborated. The suffering mentioned in (NT1) can be categorized into three kinds, the deepest of which is a cosmic ennui like the existential anxiety mentioned earlier. The origin in (NT2) is a chain of causes and effects with twelve links, the first of which is our ignorance; and in particular, we are ignorant of three characteristics of reality, the third and deepest of which is "non-self" (more on this in a sec). Siderits doesn't say much about (NT3), but the suggestion seems to be that ridding ourself of ignorance (the first link in the chain of cause and effect) is going to be key. Finally, the path mentioned in (NT4) is the Nobles' Eightfold Path, the first "step" (a slight misnomer; again, more on this in a sec) of which is indeed coming around to the right view of reality, including the fact of non-self mentioned above.
Siderits points out that the eight steps in the path don't have a simple ordered and directed relationship ("first this, then that"). Instead they are mutually reinforcing. To understand how the mutual reinforcement works, it is helpful to think of each of the steps as pertaining to either wisdom, morality, or meditative practice. With those categories in mind, you can think of the mutual reinforcement of the steps like so:
* Attaining wisdom clarifies why you should be moral; and moral conduct prepares the mind for wisdom.
* Wisdom and morality in combination deepen our understanding in a way that facilitates meditation.
* Meditation in turn strengthens our appreciation of wisdom and morality.
Some of this is practical advice grounded in psychology. I don't have any experience with meditation, and I don't have any reason to doubt it could be helpful.
From a philosophical perspective I am with Siderits in thinking the really interesting stuff has got to be the doctrine of non-self that, allegedly, would free us from existential anxiety or cosmic ennui. What is this doctrine and what the arguments for it?
Across the different traditions he surveys, there are different formulations of the non-self doctrine with different supporting arguments. If I were interested in Buddhism as such, I would take more care to represent the arguments faithfully, but instead I'm just going to formulate something borrowing from them and Siderits explanations that seems close in spirit and at least gives me pause -- here goes:
Our existential suffering arises from a misperception. On examination the word "I" is merely a convenient designator. If it refers to anything, it is a complex of on-going, overlapping, time-limited processes rather than anything ultimately real and enduring. No part of you, physical or mental, plausibly spans a lifetime. Probably there is no part of you that spans even a decade, maybe not even an hour. To accept this truth, it may help to know how such a profound mistake came about. It's quite natural: to bring about right action, it is instilled in children (brush your teeth now so you don't have cavities later), who naturally come to think of themselves as the protagonist in the story of their life. In adults it is reinforced by counsels of prudence (save for retirement) and sharing a world populated by people making the same mistake and acting accordingly. But the "I" is only a convenient designator, a mental crutch, and if we can throw it away while maintaining right action, we can rid ourselves of existential anxiety.
I think there is something to this view. It is hard to hold it in mind for long. So it seems plausible that a lot of special practice like meditation would be required to really live in it.
Some philosophers in the western tradition have arrived at similar ideas. Below are a few quotations/notes on the doctrine of non-self in relation to Hume, Parfit, and Kant.
Here is David Hume (cited by Siderits): "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me."
And here is Derek Parfit (quoted by Siderits): "Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating, and consoling. When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my life, and more concerned about the lives of other people"
Finally, I have to call out an interesting twist on Kant. In his first critique, Kant argued that the concept of "I" implies an objective world. For Kant this was part of a modus ponens: we have the concept of "I", therefore there is an objective world. In the Yogacara tradition of Buddhism, Vasubandhu arrives at the same implication: the concept of "I" implies an objective world. But because Vasubandhu embraces the non-self, he wants the deduction to flow in the other direction, via modus tollens: [he argues on independent grounds] there is no objective world; therefore there is no "I". Beautiful.
(I am raising this book a full star because I keep referring back to it. It is good.)
A deeper version of the feeling is possible. It could be prompted by something like a burned dinner, but more typically it is brought on by the thought of death, someone else's or the prospect of your own. You ask yourself, "is this all there is?" Doubt arises that life has meaning or value. Existential anxiety is one name for this feeling.
Religion takes this kind of anxiety seriously. It says yes, mundane existence is lacking. But it also also says, good news: there is a means of addressing it called salvation. The means of salvation differ from one religion to another. We typically think of salvation as involving non-rational commitment (eg, faith), and for that reason many people don't find it credible.
Siderits points out that not all religions are like that. Some religions claim salvation can be arrived at by rational investigation of the world: for example, Indian Buddhism and medieval Islam. This book surveys the rational means of salvation proposed by various traditions within Indian Buddhism.
Buddhism summarizes our situation with the Nobles' Four Truths:
(NT1) There is suffering.
(NT2) The suffering originates from known causes.
(NT3) The suffering will cease when the causes are removed.
(NT4) There is path that can be followed to remove the causes.
Each of these four truths is elaborated. The suffering mentioned in (NT1) can be categorized into three kinds, the deepest of which is a cosmic ennui like the existential anxiety mentioned earlier. The origin in (NT2) is a chain of causes and effects with twelve links, the first of which is our ignorance; and in particular, we are ignorant of three characteristics of reality, the third and deepest of which is "non-self" (more on this in a sec). Siderits doesn't say much about (NT3), but the suggestion seems to be that ridding ourself of ignorance (the first link in the chain of cause and effect) is going to be key. Finally, the path mentioned in (NT4) is the Nobles' Eightfold Path, the first "step" (a slight misnomer; again, more on this in a sec) of which is indeed coming around to the right view of reality, including the fact of non-self mentioned above.
Siderits points out that the eight steps in the path don't have a simple ordered and directed relationship ("first this, then that"). Instead they are mutually reinforcing. To understand how the mutual reinforcement works, it is helpful to think of each of the steps as pertaining to either wisdom, morality, or meditative practice. With those categories in mind, you can think of the mutual reinforcement of the steps like so:
* Attaining wisdom clarifies why you should be moral; and moral conduct prepares the mind for wisdom.
* Wisdom and morality in combination deepen our understanding in a way that facilitates meditation.
* Meditation in turn strengthens our appreciation of wisdom and morality.
Some of this is practical advice grounded in psychology. I don't have any experience with meditation, and I don't have any reason to doubt it could be helpful.
From a philosophical perspective I am with Siderits in thinking the really interesting stuff has got to be the doctrine of non-self that, allegedly, would free us from existential anxiety or cosmic ennui. What is this doctrine and what the arguments for it?
Across the different traditions he surveys, there are different formulations of the non-self doctrine with different supporting arguments. If I were interested in Buddhism as such, I would take more care to represent the arguments faithfully, but instead I'm just going to formulate something borrowing from them and Siderits explanations that seems close in spirit and at least gives me pause -- here goes:
Our existential suffering arises from a misperception. On examination the word "I" is merely a convenient designator. If it refers to anything, it is a complex of on-going, overlapping, time-limited processes rather than anything ultimately real and enduring. No part of you, physical or mental, plausibly spans a lifetime. Probably there is no part of you that spans even a decade, maybe not even an hour. To accept this truth, it may help to know how such a profound mistake came about. It's quite natural: to bring about right action, it is instilled in children (brush your teeth now so you don't have cavities later), who naturally come to think of themselves as the protagonist in the story of their life. In adults it is reinforced by counsels of prudence (save for retirement) and sharing a world populated by people making the same mistake and acting accordingly. But the "I" is only a convenient designator, a mental crutch, and if we can throw it away while maintaining right action, we can rid ourselves of existential anxiety.
I think there is something to this view. It is hard to hold it in mind for long. So it seems plausible that a lot of special practice like meditation would be required to really live in it.
Some philosophers in the western tradition have arrived at similar ideas. Below are a few quotations/notes on the doctrine of non-self in relation to Hume, Parfit, and Kant.
Here is David Hume (cited by Siderits): "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me."
And here is Derek Parfit (quoted by Siderits): "Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating, and consoling. When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my life, and more concerned about the lives of other people"
Finally, I have to call out an interesting twist on Kant. In his first critique, Kant argued that the concept of "I" implies an objective world. For Kant this was part of a modus ponens: we have the concept of "I", therefore there is an objective world. In the Yogacara tradition of Buddhism, Vasubandhu arrives at the same implication: the concept of "I" implies an objective world. But because Vasubandhu embraces the non-self, he wants the deduction to flow in the other direction, via modus tollens: [he argues on independent grounds] there is no objective world; therefore there is no "I". Beautiful.
(I am raising this book a full star because I keep referring back to it. It is good.)
May 14, 2018
As another reviewer says, this might better be called "The Analytic Philosophy of Buddhism." This is very much a text about philosophy, not a text about Buddhism in any sense; to read it as a book about Buddhism would be like reading texts of medieval European logic as books about Christianity. This is frustrating at times; Siderits goes out of his way to ignore the more colorful aspects of the texts he describes, including some extraordinary attempts to suggest that they can be read without committing them to the doctrine of reincarnation (compare: "this text of Einstein's is really interesting, but I think it's best read as really being about something I find more congenial than physics, like, say, spaghetti").
Once I got over that, I enjoyed the book. It clarified a lot of things left murky by 'Introduction to Buddhism' books (which do, on the other hand, go into the colorful bits about the multiple hells and Gautama's encounters with divinities and so on), and also brought out very important background assumptions for classical Indian philosophy as a whole (to my shame, I had no idea, for instance, that non-reflexivity--the knife cannot cut itself; the eye cannot see itself; the mind cannot think itself--was just a shared assumption that wasn't thought to require argument.
It would be pretty turgid if you don't care about history of philosophy, though. Fair warning.
Once I got over that, I enjoyed the book. It clarified a lot of things left murky by 'Introduction to Buddhism' books (which do, on the other hand, go into the colorful bits about the multiple hells and Gautama's encounters with divinities and so on), and also brought out very important background assumptions for classical Indian philosophy as a whole (to my shame, I had no idea, for instance, that non-reflexivity--the knife cannot cut itself; the eye cannot see itself; the mind cannot think itself--was just a shared assumption that wasn't thought to require argument.
It would be pretty turgid if you don't care about history of philosophy, though. Fair warning.
September 18, 2017
Absolutely Brilliant! :D
July 13, 2025
I regret my interest in the subject flitted away halfway through. Nevertheless, this is accessibly written, perhaps too much so.
November 13, 2012
Siderits writes in his introduction that the purpose of his book is "to examine Buddhism as philosophy." That a book such as this has been very dearly needed for decades is cause for excitement and gratitude! Students of philosophy will find much to ponder in these pages, as Siderits does a great job of situating Buddhist philosophical concerns historically, and compares to western philosophical traditions, showing the similarities and perhaps more importantly, where Buddhist philosophers took different tacks.
I love that Siderits shows respect for the traditions and provides the exemplary model of what critical thinking is, by prodding the reader to think for herself as to whether the arguments offered hold up, what questions are left unresolved and where further investigation is warranted.
Buddhist practitioners would do themselves a favor by reading this as well, as it provides just that respectful questioning so rarely seen within the Buddhist sanghas. Yes, I know "debate" is highly valued in Tibetan Buddhism, but as Stephen Batchelor makes clear, the debate is always contained within a rigid format. The "result" is always already understood, so debate becomes an exercise in proving the 'truth value' of dogma, and never really questioning the dogma or the questions the dogma is designed to respond to.
Very valuably, this text contains large tracts of original canonical texts and commentaries. This makes for at times a bit of a turgid read which knocks my total valuation from five to four stars....
I love that Siderits shows respect for the traditions and provides the exemplary model of what critical thinking is, by prodding the reader to think for herself as to whether the arguments offered hold up, what questions are left unresolved and where further investigation is warranted.
Buddhist practitioners would do themselves a favor by reading this as well, as it provides just that respectful questioning so rarely seen within the Buddhist sanghas. Yes, I know "debate" is highly valued in Tibetan Buddhism, but as Stephen Batchelor makes clear, the debate is always contained within a rigid format. The "result" is always already understood, so debate becomes an exercise in proving the 'truth value' of dogma, and never really questioning the dogma or the questions the dogma is designed to respond to.
Very valuably, this text contains large tracts of original canonical texts and commentaries. This makes for at times a bit of a turgid read which knocks my total valuation from five to four stars....
May 3, 2009
Siderits does a much better job, in my opinion, than Jay Garfield explaining the Buddhist texts. However, it's still pretty intricate and difficult to understand. For what it's designed, it does an okay job, but I still feel as though there ought to be a better introductory Buddhist text.
July 12, 2024
Two years later, I have finally completed this book!
June 1, 2022
The first half was interesting.
I was too dumb for the second half tho.
I was too dumb for the second half tho.
April 30, 2023
I read this over the course of a seven day silent retreat at a Forest Sangha monastery which had a copy in their library.
It is not an easy read though it is well-written, and accessible on its own terms. It is not really aimed at a lay audience and I struggled quite a lot of the time. Specifically the sections which used logic to interrogate some of the philosophical arguments of various Buddhist schools (mostly the Mahayana ones were the ones that had my head spinning). Someone with a decent grasp of philosophy will probably find the book far more rewarding because they'd have the foundations, based on Western thought, to really get to the gist of the arguments. To me, while the specialist terms were explained very well, within a page or two I'd forget precisely what they meant and so I found the unfolding arguments tricky and sometimes boring.
But it was worth persevering for the bits that I could get a handle on: the Yogacara ideas, or those I understood, were very interesting, for example. I clearly didn't understand dependent origination as well as I thought I did, or not the three lifetimes model that Siderits refers to. I have never heard upādāna described as appropriation before either (I prefer the simpler term clinging and most dhamma I have heard - and that's a fair bit now - refers always to clinging as well). I think I could read the chapter on emptiness and the Mādhyamaka school several more times but not get any nearer to cracking it.
Despite these and a number of other qualms I'm glad to have read this and will explore some of the topics some more.
Rated 3.5/5 but rounded up to 4. The author is probably writing for an advanced Bachelor's or maybe even a Master's level audience. That he lost me quite a few times is not his fault, far from it!
It is not an easy read though it is well-written, and accessible on its own terms. It is not really aimed at a lay audience and I struggled quite a lot of the time. Specifically the sections which used logic to interrogate some of the philosophical arguments of various Buddhist schools (mostly the Mahayana ones were the ones that had my head spinning). Someone with a decent grasp of philosophy will probably find the book far more rewarding because they'd have the foundations, based on Western thought, to really get to the gist of the arguments. To me, while the specialist terms were explained very well, within a page or two I'd forget precisely what they meant and so I found the unfolding arguments tricky and sometimes boring.
But it was worth persevering for the bits that I could get a handle on: the Yogacara ideas, or those I understood, were very interesting, for example. I clearly didn't understand dependent origination as well as I thought I did, or not the three lifetimes model that Siderits refers to. I have never heard upādāna described as appropriation before either (I prefer the simpler term clinging and most dhamma I have heard - and that's a fair bit now - refers always to clinging as well). I think I could read the chapter on emptiness and the Mādhyamaka school several more times but not get any nearer to cracking it.
Despite these and a number of other qualms I'm glad to have read this and will explore some of the topics some more.
Rated 3.5/5 but rounded up to 4. The author is probably writing for an advanced Bachelor's or maybe even a Master's level audience. That he lost me quite a few times is not his fault, far from it!
November 10, 2016
This book was really hard to read, and at times seemed to make little sense. Maybe it was beyond me. It could use better paragraph structure to make it more readable. Reading is not light and requires complete focus. It annoyed me that it tried to show how Buddhism knew about quantum physics 4500 years ago – because they knew of the “true nature of the world”. It could have used metaphors more readily to explain the concepts, to make them more understandable.
In the hands of a more skilled writer this might have been easier to understand and about half the length. I got the feeling that a lot of the concepts being presented were written in an overly complex manner. This limited the utility of the book. Or maybe I am just too stupid for the book. Mostly I read for guidance of how to be better – this book provided little such guidance.
A lot of the Buddhist they wrote about seem to reflect a message I got from the work of Karen Armstrong that God is unknowable and beyond understanding. Karen Armstrong writes it better and more clearly. I would not recommend reading this book
In the hands of a more skilled writer this might have been easier to understand and about half the length. I got the feeling that a lot of the concepts being presented were written in an overly complex manner. This limited the utility of the book. Or maybe I am just too stupid for the book. Mostly I read for guidance of how to be better – this book provided little such guidance.
A lot of the Buddhist they wrote about seem to reflect a message I got from the work of Karen Armstrong that God is unknowable and beyond understanding. Karen Armstrong writes it better and more clearly. I would not recommend reading this book
February 10, 2024
A great introductory text to Buddhist philosophy - yes, there is a deep and profound philosophy underlying this "religious" (debatable term usage!) tradition and it has been evolving since the Buddha's first teaching over 2,600 years ago right up to today. This book covers that historic evolution of major thought currents within the Buddhist tradition as well as makes some connections with Western philosophic tradition (but note that is NOT the primary purpose of the book - but I felt there was enough presented that made me go back and review some of my past philosophy studies as well as add next texts to my reading list - such as Parfit's work). Definitely worth the read if someone has experience/interest in the western philosophy tradition and looking to learn more about Buddhism.
November 2, 2025
This was an engaging but challenging read. So much was covered in such a short volume, yet there is so very much more to read! Every chapter has many recommendations for further reading that I will revisit to build out a reading list.
I read this as background for an online lecture series given by Mark Siderits through Wisdom publications. I think he met his objective of providing the reader the tools to read and understand the logic in Buddhist sutras, but as a bear of little brain, I will likely need another run through to get a better grasp. Certainly watching the lecture series will help to strengthen my understanding.
I read this as background for an online lecture series given by Mark Siderits through Wisdom publications. I think he met his objective of providing the reader the tools to read and understand the logic in Buddhist sutras, but as a bear of little brain, I will likely need another run through to get a better grasp. Certainly watching the lecture series will help to strengthen my understanding.
November 21, 2024
The Second Edition is much better than the first. This is a much more understandable and digestible book than Hiriyanna’s The Essentials of Indian Philosophy. The metaphysics is explained well and corrections have been made to the Second Edition that improve the reading overall.
June 13, 2018
Clear but dry overview of Buddhist thinking.
Read
September 18, 2022Execrable. Worse even than Garfield’s appalling Engaging Buddhism.
February 22, 2025
Academic approach looking at Buddhist schools through traditional metaphysical lens. Best section is on the notion of emptiness.
Author is professor whose tone is that of classroom dialogue.
Author is professor whose tone is that of classroom dialogue.
January 3, 2026
Neither fish nor fowl
June 6, 2012
For the right person, I can't recommend this book highly enough!! It is absolutely the best PHILOSOPHY book I've read in a number of years, explaining matters in a sophisticated yet understandable way. Siderits makes many helpful connections to Western philosophers such as Kant and Hume. And he models a rigorous philosophical method in his discussion, building an argument before sometimes dissembling that argument, and then drawing some tentative conclusions. I used this book in a "Philosophy of Religion" course I taught, and some of his passages about the task and methodology of philosophy are truly inspiring!
And, oh yeah, it's about Buddhism too!! It doesn't shy away from the depth or full implications of Buddhist thought, like many texts about Buddhism for Western audiences do. It also shows the great diversity and disagreements of Buddhist schools of thought, which is refreshing in its refusal to homogenize "Eastern" philosophy. I found it fascinating and refreshing to follow along as a capable philosopher fully explored the coherence and implication of Buddhist claims that there is "no self" (anatman), for instance. Many times I would start asking a hard question about the text or Buddhism, only to read on and find Siderits addressing that very question!
While this book is not "easy" (but nor is it unnecessarily obtuse!), I cannot say enough good things about it!
And, oh yeah, it's about Buddhism too!! It doesn't shy away from the depth or full implications of Buddhist thought, like many texts about Buddhism for Western audiences do. It also shows the great diversity and disagreements of Buddhist schools of thought, which is refreshing in its refusal to homogenize "Eastern" philosophy. I found it fascinating and refreshing to follow along as a capable philosopher fully explored the coherence and implication of Buddhist claims that there is "no self" (anatman), for instance. Many times I would start asking a hard question about the text or Buddhism, only to read on and find Siderits addressing that very question!
While this book is not "easy" (but nor is it unnecessarily obtuse!), I cannot say enough good things about it!
September 10, 2016
This was a fascinating book and really opened my mind. I had previously taken 2 introductory buddhism classes in college and this just went into far more detail and I learned so much. I had many of the questions, pitfalls, and misunderstandings he mentions in the early buddhism chapters and these definitely had an impact on me. For instance, I thought that knowledge of impermanence was the key to ending suffering and not that it really was the Anatman or No Self doctrine. He describes these esoteric and hard to understand concepts with ease from various angles. He gives very charitable readings of counterarguments and makes sure all sides of every debate are shown well. I will definitely have to read this again and take notes and read more books to truly understand the philosophy. The later sections are much more advanced and somewhat bored me, probably not his fault, just the fact that I am new and even taking in the philosophy of early buddhism was a challenge, not to mention much more rigorous philosophical arguments that came later as defenses to challenges from other schools of thought.
TL;DR
It's amazing, especially the early buddhism chapters and you will learn a lot about difficult to grasp subjects. Highly recommended.
TL;DR
It's amazing, especially the early buddhism chapters and you will learn a lot about difficult to grasp subjects. Highly recommended.
June 29, 2016
Mark Siderits' Buddhism as Philosophy examines and reconstructs arguments in the Buddhist literature concerning Buddhism's positions on life, the self, and happiness, and also on topics like Idealism (the belief that there are no external objects) and the Buddhist concept of emptiness (which I still don't think I understand). To be honest, I enjoyed the first fourth or fifth of this book. I was especially thrilled to read in more detail the Buddha's proposals for moderation in life and one way in which the idea of Nirvana can be interpreted. But after that first fourth or fifth, I lost interest. It could be just a matter of taste.
May 12, 2014
This was an excellent read. I think that something heavily criticized by other reviewers was the books difficulty level. While it was a concern at times, I felt like this was one of the first books I have read about Buddhism that does not feel the need to water down the philosophy. It makes other texts I have read look incomplete and lacking in actual explanations. This is especially evident in the chapters regarding emptiness. While I had read/listened to many people explain it, this was the first text which helped me actually understand the concept. I am sure I will be returning to this text to re-read. The chapters also have excellent references for further reading.
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