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Sattuman ontologia – essee tuhoisasta plastisuudesta
Joskus elämänvirta poikkeaa uomastaan. Tapahtuu yllättävä onnettomuus, joka aiheuttaa katkoksen subjektissa: uusi henkilö syntyy ei-mistään.
Sattuman ontologia tutkii ilmiötä, jota Malabou kutsuu aivojen tuhoisaksi plastisuudeksi: yhtäkkiä aivoissa tapahtuu jotain, minkä seurauksena yksilö on peruuttamattomasti toinen kuin ennen. Tuhoisa plastisuus avaa kysymyksen sattumasta, ennalta määrittämättömästä tapahtumasta, joka muuttaa kaiken ja on meidän jokaisen olemassaoloon kuuluva mahdollisuus.
Malabou kutsuu lukijansa pohtimaan, millaista ontologiaa aivojen tuhoisa plastisuus vaatii. Vastausta etsitään niin filosofiasta kuin kirjallisuudesta, kun Freud, Spinoza ja Deleuze kohtaavat Durasin ja Proustin.
Sattuman ontologia tutkii ilmiötä, jota Malabou kutsuu aivojen tuhoisaksi plastisuudeksi: yhtäkkiä aivoissa tapahtuu jotain, minkä seurauksena yksilö on peruuttamattomasti toinen kuin ennen. Tuhoisa plastisuus avaa kysymyksen sattumasta, ennalta määrittämättömästä tapahtumasta, joka muuttaa kaiken ja on meidän jokaisen olemassaoloon kuuluva mahdollisuus.
Malabou kutsuu lukijansa pohtimaan, millaista ontologiaa aivojen tuhoisa plastisuus vaatii. Vastausta etsitään niin filosofiasta kuin kirjallisuudesta, kun Freud, Spinoza ja Deleuze kohtaavat Durasin ja Proustin.
82 pages, Paperback
First published February 23, 2009
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About the author
Catherine Malabou
60 books125 followersCatherine Malabou (b. 1959) is a French philosopher. She is a professor of philosophy at The European Graduate School / EGS and professor of modern European philosophy at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy (CRMEP) at Kingston University, London. She is known for her work on plasticity, a concept she culled from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which has proved fertile within contemporary economic, political, and social discourses. Widely regarded as one of the most exciting figures in what has been called “The New French Philosophy,” Malabou’s research and writing covers a range of figures and issues, including the work of Hegel, Freud, Heidegger, and Derrida; the relationship between philosophy, neuroscience, and psychoanalysis; and concepts of essence and difference within feminism.
Born in Sidi Bel Abbès, Algeria, Catherine Malabou began her advanced studies at the Université Paris-Sorbonne before attending the prestigious École normale supérieure de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, where, in 1994, she submitted her dissertation on G.W.F. Hegel under the direction of Jacques Derrida. Her thesis was published in 1996 under the title L’avenir de Hegel: Plasticité, temporalité, dialectique (The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, 2005) with a long preface by Derrida, whom she would later co-author La Contre-allée (1999; Counterpath, 2004). Before arriving at Kingston University, Malabou became assistant professor at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre in 1995 and, as a frequent lecturer in the USA, has taught at UC Berkeley, The New School in New York City, New York State University at Buffalo, the University of Wisconsin in Madison, UCLA, Johns Hopkins, and, most recently, UC Irvine.
Catherine Malabou’s philosophical work forges new connections and intellectual networks that imaginatively leap across existing synaptic gaps between, for example, continental philosophy and neuroscience; the philosophy of neuroscience and the critique of capitalism; neuroscience and psychoanalysis; and continental and analytic philosophy (notably Kant). As well, her work is explosive and iconoclastic, shattering perceived understandings of Hegel, feminism and gender, and the implications of post-structuralism.
Starting with her 2004 book, Que faire de notre cerveau? (What Should We Do With Our Brain?, 2009), Catherine Malabou has argued passionately and provocatively for a connection between continental philosophy and empirical neuroscience. She centers her argument on a highly original interpretation of the concept of plasticity, an interpretation that she first uncovered in her reading of Hegel’s dialectic. Plasticity refers to the capacity both to receive form and to give form. Although the concept of plasticity is central to neuroscience, Malabou’s work shows that neuroscientists and lay people often misunderstand the basic plasticity of the brain, succumbing to an ideology that focuses solely on its capacity to receive form, that is, the capacity of the brain to be shaped in and through its experience of the world to the exclusion of its creative, form-giving power. In other words, the reigning ideology that governs both the neuroscientific community and the broader culture substitutes flexibility for plasticity, and flexibility, Malabou warns us, “is plasticity minus its genius.” The emphasis on flexibility also fits all too neatly with the demands of capitalism under neoliberalism, which demands efficiency, flexibility, adaptability and versatility as conditions of employability in a post-Fordist economy. The creative, form-giving power of the brain—its genius—consists in its explosive capacity, a capacity that unleashes new possibilities, and herein also lies the capacity for resistance. In her conclusion, Catherine Malabou writes: “To ask ‘What should we do with our brain?’ is above all to visualize the possibility of saying no to an afflicting economic, political, and mediatic culture that celebrate
Born in Sidi Bel Abbès, Algeria, Catherine Malabou began her advanced studies at the Université Paris-Sorbonne before attending the prestigious École normale supérieure de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, where, in 1994, she submitted her dissertation on G.W.F. Hegel under the direction of Jacques Derrida. Her thesis was published in 1996 under the title L’avenir de Hegel: Plasticité, temporalité, dialectique (The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, 2005) with a long preface by Derrida, whom she would later co-author La Contre-allée (1999; Counterpath, 2004). Before arriving at Kingston University, Malabou became assistant professor at the Université Paris Ouest Nanterre in 1995 and, as a frequent lecturer in the USA, has taught at UC Berkeley, The New School in New York City, New York State University at Buffalo, the University of Wisconsin in Madison, UCLA, Johns Hopkins, and, most recently, UC Irvine.
Catherine Malabou’s philosophical work forges new connections and intellectual networks that imaginatively leap across existing synaptic gaps between, for example, continental philosophy and neuroscience; the philosophy of neuroscience and the critique of capitalism; neuroscience and psychoanalysis; and continental and analytic philosophy (notably Kant). As well, her work is explosive and iconoclastic, shattering perceived understandings of Hegel, feminism and gender, and the implications of post-structuralism.
Starting with her 2004 book, Que faire de notre cerveau? (What Should We Do With Our Brain?, 2009), Catherine Malabou has argued passionately and provocatively for a connection between continental philosophy and empirical neuroscience. She centers her argument on a highly original interpretation of the concept of plasticity, an interpretation that she first uncovered in her reading of Hegel’s dialectic. Plasticity refers to the capacity both to receive form and to give form. Although the concept of plasticity is central to neuroscience, Malabou’s work shows that neuroscientists and lay people often misunderstand the basic plasticity of the brain, succumbing to an ideology that focuses solely on its capacity to receive form, that is, the capacity of the brain to be shaped in and through its experience of the world to the exclusion of its creative, form-giving power. In other words, the reigning ideology that governs both the neuroscientific community and the broader culture substitutes flexibility for plasticity, and flexibility, Malabou warns us, “is plasticity minus its genius.” The emphasis on flexibility also fits all too neatly with the demands of capitalism under neoliberalism, which demands efficiency, flexibility, adaptability and versatility as conditions of employability in a post-Fordist economy. The creative, form-giving power of the brain—its genius—consists in its explosive capacity, a capacity that unleashes new possibilities, and herein also lies the capacity for resistance. In her conclusion, Catherine Malabou writes: “To ask ‘What should we do with our brain?’ is above all to visualize the possibility of saying no to an afflicting economic, political, and mediatic culture that celebrate
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews
May 6, 2017
I read this because a friend mentioned Malabou as a French philosopher who criticized (at least in private) the absurdities of 'Speculative Realism.' So, I was well-disposed. What I found was, sadly, an archetypal work of contemporary continental philosophy, which:
* does not state why we should care about the project (i.e., think about destructive plasticity)
* does not state what the project entails, or how it came about
* does not so much work on the project, as state, over and over again, that the project is necessary
* approaches the failure to work on the project by looking at a wide range of disciplines and text and studies, many of which are interesting, but shed no light on the project
* sheds no light on aforementioned disciplines, texts and studies
* is uncannily hip (Proust; Duras; neuroscience; Kafka...)
On the other hand, Malabou's writing is clear, and I'm completely convinced that theorists have ignored the painful and harmful consequences of identity fluidity for, you know, actual people. Of course, she can't come out and say "it's okay for people to have fixed, conservative identities," because, well, contemporary continental philosophy. And she can't say "there is an essence to your identity," because Hume. So some space was created here for interesting thinking. What did not happen? Interesting thinking.
* does not state why we should care about the project (i.e., think about destructive plasticity)
* does not state what the project entails, or how it came about
* does not so much work on the project, as state, over and over again, that the project is necessary
* approaches the failure to work on the project by looking at a wide range of disciplines and text and studies, many of which are interesting, but shed no light on the project
* sheds no light on aforementioned disciplines, texts and studies
* is uncannily hip (Proust; Duras; neuroscience; Kafka...)
On the other hand, Malabou's writing is clear, and I'm completely convinced that theorists have ignored the painful and harmful consequences of identity fluidity for, you know, actual people. Of course, she can't come out and say "it's okay for people to have fixed, conservative identities," because, well, contemporary continental philosophy. And she can't say "there is an essence to your identity," because Hume. So some space was created here for interesting thinking. What did not happen? Interesting thinking.
April 30, 2015
I'm unsure why this book is rated so highly. I'd maybe say a solid 2.5? Her thesis is interesting - that nobody has really looked into the idea of, what she terms, "destructive plasticity," but she doesn't actually look too deeply into what it is. She references some interesting neuroscience studies, and her discussions of Freud and Spinoza were also thought provoking. I felt that her chapter's on Proust and Duras fell flat. She has a clear idea of what she's talking about, and she also seems to have case histories on it, but the book is really just her stating that nobody has traversed the depths of "destructive plasticity."
January 21, 2024
It is an interesting book and its main concept (destructive plasticity) fits well into what can be regarded as the main current of contemporary philosophy. It is a beautifully written essay, without a doubt, but it has some problems on a philosophical (argumentative) level. The essay is quite heterogeneous and it develops around a few topics which are not necessarily in consonance with each other.
a) In the introduction and the first chapter Malabou introduces the concept of destructive plasticity and links it specifically to cerebral injuries. It is a neurological rather than psychoanalytical look at the trauma. Her prime example is Alzheimer's disease.
b) Malabou attempts to present destructive plasticity as something that can help us understand traumas in our contemporary culture. She talks about many kinds of accidents which can work as a trigger to negative plasticity: from political isolation and natural catastrophes to car accidents. She also links it with feelings of desolation and indifference.
c) She discusses a few examples from literature. Kafka's Metamorphosis is only mentioned in the passing. The passage quoted from In Search of Lost Time is interesting, but again, it's only one scene. She also quotes much of the ending from Mann's Buddenbrooks but her interpretation feels flat. She pays the biggest attention to novels by Margarete Duras and her interpretation includes some interesting observations on Duras' style of writing.
d) Using mainly literary examples Malabou tries to broaden the scope of destructive plasticity. She defines it as accidental (but not eventful) and opposes it to Deleuzian becoming. She tries to find the work of negative plasticity in senility and death. She says that although becoming old is a process it always includes that decisive moment of break which erases all possibilities of return. It is unexampled eventfulness in which one becomes other to what one was its entire life.
Destructive plasticity is an interesting concept and Malabou encloses a variety of examples (clinical and fictional) but the ontology of destructive plasticity (which is in the title of the essay) is something that remains to be elaborated.
a) In the introduction and the first chapter Malabou introduces the concept of destructive plasticity and links it specifically to cerebral injuries. It is a neurological rather than psychoanalytical look at the trauma. Her prime example is Alzheimer's disease.
b) Malabou attempts to present destructive plasticity as something that can help us understand traumas in our contemporary culture. She talks about many kinds of accidents which can work as a trigger to negative plasticity: from political isolation and natural catastrophes to car accidents. She also links it with feelings of desolation and indifference.
c) She discusses a few examples from literature. Kafka's Metamorphosis is only mentioned in the passing. The passage quoted from In Search of Lost Time is interesting, but again, it's only one scene. She also quotes much of the ending from Mann's Buddenbrooks but her interpretation feels flat. She pays the biggest attention to novels by Margarete Duras and her interpretation includes some interesting observations on Duras' style of writing.
d) Using mainly literary examples Malabou tries to broaden the scope of destructive plasticity. She defines it as accidental (but not eventful) and opposes it to Deleuzian becoming. She tries to find the work of negative plasticity in senility and death. She says that although becoming old is a process it always includes that decisive moment of break which erases all possibilities of return. It is unexampled eventfulness in which one becomes other to what one was its entire life.
Destructive plasticity is an interesting concept and Malabou encloses a variety of examples (clinical and fictional) but the ontology of destructive plasticity (which is in the title of the essay) is something that remains to be elaborated.
July 4, 2022
Hieno, haastava, mahdoton arvioida, mutta tähdet vaikuttavuuteen perustuen annetut. Vaatisi useampia lukukertoja, hidasta maistelua ja ajatustyötä auetakseen suuremmin, mutta jo näin ensimmäisen kerran jälkeen jätti paljon ajatuksia pyörimään. Palaan tähän vielä takuulla.
Read
November 18, 2022reread bc things are going So Well & I need to talk about trauma more for Ireland. anyway increasingly essential text. I mentioned there's a lack of Hegel on my previous read which is true for what's happening explicitly but I've absolutely come to see him as v v integral, tectonic to it. He's geothermal if you like. Just not announced
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Okay first brush with Malabou! my o my if she doesn't pack everything in this is dense, in true Derridean fashion & I note her style even resembles his - not to diminish her as an independent thinker. It's a short text but with incredible variety in chapters the first is perhaps the most punch & grief to the title this is a disturbing read & one doesn't expect things to go lightly when she's early dropping 'destruction too is formative. A smashed-up face is still a face, a stump a limb, a traumatized psyche remains a psyche'. It's certainly not for everybody but she's doing incredible work there.
Chapter two is where I got to feel very glad I just finished my reread of the Ethics as CM goes into the uses of Spinoza in contemporary neurobiology viz. The Conatus. Also incredible ? I love this reading of Spinoza though I think one would struggle in this chapter if they were a little rusty on him. Interestingly Malabou plays with Deleuze around here - she's had issues with his Kafka reading (I think a very effective critique which also is one of the best explanations of 'becoming-animal' in ATP I've ever seen? nice) - but here she works in tandem with his Spinoza book which I think is probably one of his more 'sensible'. Surprised by how little Hegel appeared in this actually seeing as that was her doctoral thesis with the lovable Derrida but she does drop him once or twice and to great effect
Proust & aging . I think most useful to emphasise 'Ontology' in the title rather than 'Accident'. Destructive plasticity a beautiful concept and one I've already annotated in elsewhere
I just really enjoyed this but my if it isn't heavy first in the morning
---------
Okay first brush with Malabou! my o my if she doesn't pack everything in this is dense, in true Derridean fashion & I note her style even resembles his - not to diminish her as an independent thinker. It's a short text but with incredible variety in chapters the first is perhaps the most punch & grief to the title this is a disturbing read & one doesn't expect things to go lightly when she's early dropping 'destruction too is formative. A smashed-up face is still a face, a stump a limb, a traumatized psyche remains a psyche'. It's certainly not for everybody but she's doing incredible work there.
Chapter two is where I got to feel very glad I just finished my reread of the Ethics as CM goes into the uses of Spinoza in contemporary neurobiology viz. The Conatus. Also incredible ? I love this reading of Spinoza though I think one would struggle in this chapter if they were a little rusty on him. Interestingly Malabou plays with Deleuze around here - she's had issues with his Kafka reading (I think a very effective critique which also is one of the best explanations of 'becoming-animal' in ATP I've ever seen? nice) - but here she works in tandem with his Spinoza book which I think is probably one of his more 'sensible'. Surprised by how little Hegel appeared in this actually seeing as that was her doctoral thesis with the lovable Derrida but she does drop him once or twice and to great effect
Proust & aging . I think most useful to emphasise 'Ontology' in the title rather than 'Accident'. Destructive plasticity a beautiful concept and one I've already annotated in elsewhere
I just really enjoyed this but my if it isn't heavy first in the morning
January 13, 2015
did I understand it?,,,, No
Read
April 14, 2021🥵🥵🥵
Read
November 19, 2024Heti kirjan alku hämmästyttää erilaisuudellaan Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme -kirjaan verrattuna. Tätähän pystyy lukemaan ilman jatkuvia tuskia! Tämä on kieltä, jota ymmärrän! Tämä on kieltä, jota puhun! Saan lause toisensa perään kiinni, mistä tässä puhutaan!
Onko yhtä arvokas lukukokemus, kun sen kanssa ei joudu jatkuvasti kamppailemaan? Ovatko palkkiot yhtä suuret? Näitähän voisi helposti kysyä ihminen, joka arvostaa haastavaa ja hiertävää kirjallisuutta. Toisaalta, eikö oppimista tapahdu aika tehokkaasti juuri sellaisella alueella, jossa tieto on tarpeeksi lähellä ihmisen aiempaa tietosisältöä, jotta se voi kiinnittyä ja muodostaa yhteyksiä? Haa, sanoin “tehokas”: olenko taas osa ongelmaa, olenko “joustava” ja kiltti systeemin ratas? Malaboun aiempi teos on kuin onkin jättänyt jälkensä. Pitäydyn silti ajatuksessani, että Sattuman ontologia on tekstiestetiikaltaan kauniimpi teos kuin Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme. Sen proosa on kauniimpaa. Siitä mielipiteestä pidän kiinni.
Ehkä se, että olen valmis astumaan virrasta sivuun ja olemaan yleisemmän mielipiteen vastaisesti sitä mieltä, että Sattuman ontologia on parempi kirja kuin Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme, olisikin omanlaisensa räjähdys? Ketä minun on tarpeen täällä näkemyksilläni muka miellyttää? Ja: mikä on “hyvä kirja”?
Sattuman ontologian ytimenä on tuhoisa plastisuus, yllättävä tapahtuma, joka muuttaa kokijansa toiseksi. Malabou miettii aihetta niin aivojen toiminnan, psykoanalyysin kuin kirjallisuudenkin kautta. Kirjallisia tapausesimerkkejä ovat Kafkan Muodonmuutos, Durasin tuotanto, Mannin Buddenbrookit ja Proustin Kadonnutta aikaa etsimässä.
Kun aivot vaurioituvat tavalla, joka vaikuttaa tunteiden kokemiseen ja käsittelyyn, tuloksena voi olla tunnekylmyyttä tai hallitsemattomuutta. Vaurioituminen voi olla äkillinen fyysinen tapahtuma, kuten onnettomuus, tai vähittäinen kehitys, jossa aivot reagoivat pitkän ajan kuluessa ympäristöönsä tuhoisalla tavalla. Vähän aikaa sitten Hesarissa kerrottiin tutkimuksesta, jonka mukaan kouluväkivalta vahingoittaa uhriksi joutuneen aivoja. Vaikutuksia on esimerkiksi "muistiin, oppimiseen, tunteiden kokemiseen sekä liikkeiden hallintaan." Parantavassa ympäristössä oleminen voi korjata, sitäkin plastisuus tarkoittaa, mutta jotain voi olla tuhoutunut myös pysyvästi. (Niin, mainitsin aiemmin esimerkiksi sen ahdistuksen oppimisen äärellä...)
Malabou muistuttaa myös tunteen välttämättömyydestä järjen käytössä: ”Jos järkeilyltä vietäisiin emootioista ja affekteista seuraava kriittinen voima, kyky erotella ja saada aikaan eroja, se muuttuisi Damasion sanoja lainatakseni kylmäveriseksi järkeilyksi, se ei enää järkeilisi.”
Myönnän, että loppupuoliskollaan Sattuman ontologian fokus hajoaa ja kirjan pääpointti jää hämärämmäksi kuin Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme -teoksessa. Malabou myös ripottelee sekaan omaan makuuni liikaa Freud-lainauksia. Ei se ehkä olekaan lopulta "parempi kirja", jos mietin tietosisällön vaikuttavuutta. Essee on tasapainoilua tieto- ja kaunokirjallisuuden välillä, molempien sisällä, leikkauspisteessä, jossa väistämättä ajoittain huojuu.
Jään miettimään Marguerite Durasin kasvoja, hänen ”ensimmäistä vanhenemistaan”.
"Kuitenkaan muodonmuutos tuhoutumisen kautta ei ole paon vastine, se on pikemminkin muoto, jonka pakenemisen mahdottomuus ottaa. Se on mahdottomuutta paeta tilanteessa, jossa pako kuitenkin olisi ainoa ratkaisu. On ajateltava paon mahdollisuutta näissä tilanteissa, joissa äärimmäinen jännite, tuska ja pahoinvointi ajavat kohti ulkopuolta, jota ei ole olemassa."
Onko yhtä arvokas lukukokemus, kun sen kanssa ei joudu jatkuvasti kamppailemaan? Ovatko palkkiot yhtä suuret? Näitähän voisi helposti kysyä ihminen, joka arvostaa haastavaa ja hiertävää kirjallisuutta. Toisaalta, eikö oppimista tapahdu aika tehokkaasti juuri sellaisella alueella, jossa tieto on tarpeeksi lähellä ihmisen aiempaa tietosisältöä, jotta se voi kiinnittyä ja muodostaa yhteyksiä? Haa, sanoin “tehokas”: olenko taas osa ongelmaa, olenko “joustava” ja kiltti systeemin ratas? Malaboun aiempi teos on kuin onkin jättänyt jälkensä. Pitäydyn silti ajatuksessani, että Sattuman ontologia on tekstiestetiikaltaan kauniimpi teos kuin Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme. Sen proosa on kauniimpaa. Siitä mielipiteestä pidän kiinni.
Ehkä se, että olen valmis astumaan virrasta sivuun ja olemaan yleisemmän mielipiteen vastaisesti sitä mieltä, että Sattuman ontologia on parempi kirja kuin Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme, olisikin omanlaisensa räjähdys? Ketä minun on tarpeen täällä näkemyksilläni muka miellyttää? Ja: mikä on “hyvä kirja”?
Sattuman ontologian ytimenä on tuhoisa plastisuus, yllättävä tapahtuma, joka muuttaa kokijansa toiseksi. Malabou miettii aihetta niin aivojen toiminnan, psykoanalyysin kuin kirjallisuudenkin kautta. Kirjallisia tapausesimerkkejä ovat Kafkan Muodonmuutos, Durasin tuotanto, Mannin Buddenbrookit ja Proustin Kadonnutta aikaa etsimässä.
Kun aivot vaurioituvat tavalla, joka vaikuttaa tunteiden kokemiseen ja käsittelyyn, tuloksena voi olla tunnekylmyyttä tai hallitsemattomuutta. Vaurioituminen voi olla äkillinen fyysinen tapahtuma, kuten onnettomuus, tai vähittäinen kehitys, jossa aivot reagoivat pitkän ajan kuluessa ympäristöönsä tuhoisalla tavalla. Vähän aikaa sitten Hesarissa kerrottiin tutkimuksesta, jonka mukaan kouluväkivalta vahingoittaa uhriksi joutuneen aivoja. Vaikutuksia on esimerkiksi "muistiin, oppimiseen, tunteiden kokemiseen sekä liikkeiden hallintaan." Parantavassa ympäristössä oleminen voi korjata, sitäkin plastisuus tarkoittaa, mutta jotain voi olla tuhoutunut myös pysyvästi. (Niin, mainitsin aiemmin esimerkiksi sen ahdistuksen oppimisen äärellä...)
Malabou muistuttaa myös tunteen välttämättömyydestä järjen käytössä: ”Jos järkeilyltä vietäisiin emootioista ja affekteista seuraava kriittinen voima, kyky erotella ja saada aikaan eroja, se muuttuisi Damasion sanoja lainatakseni kylmäveriseksi järkeilyksi, se ei enää järkeilisi.”
Myönnän, että loppupuoliskollaan Sattuman ontologian fokus hajoaa ja kirjan pääpointti jää hämärämmäksi kuin Mitä on tehtävä aivoillemme -teoksessa. Malabou myös ripottelee sekaan omaan makuuni liikaa Freud-lainauksia. Ei se ehkä olekaan lopulta "parempi kirja", jos mietin tietosisällön vaikuttavuutta. Essee on tasapainoilua tieto- ja kaunokirjallisuuden välillä, molempien sisällä, leikkauspisteessä, jossa väistämättä ajoittain huojuu.
Jään miettimään Marguerite Durasin kasvoja, hänen ”ensimmäistä vanhenemistaan”.
"Kuitenkaan muodonmuutos tuhoutumisen kautta ei ole paon vastine, se on pikemminkin muoto, jonka pakenemisen mahdottomuus ottaa. Se on mahdottomuutta paeta tilanteessa, jossa pako kuitenkin olisi ainoa ratkaisu. On ajateltava paon mahdollisuutta näissä tilanteissa, joissa äärimmäinen jännite, tuska ja pahoinvointi ajavat kohti ulkopuolta, jota ei ole olemassa."
November 7, 2025
Started sooo strong but really didn't build up to a fully satisfying argument. The destructive plasticity concept — that the self can be so deeply unmade to the point where the person that comes after doesn't have a necessary relation to who came before — is really interesting. Malabou just didn't do as much with it as I'd like. Super accessable and short which is nice
March 3, 2024
el verdadero inicio de mi carrera filosófica
February 27, 2023
Essential postdeconstructionist reading ▓▒░(°◡°)░▒▓
Malabou presents an exposé of denegative possibility, a change beyond the lamentations of différance; an ontological turn which elevates the skeleton of work out of the pools of genealogy, historiographies of being and identitarian psychoanalysis upwards to the pathologies of neuronal synapses.
The accident here is no redemptive messianic condition of possibility, nor an attuning correlative between being and thought or means and ends, nor a mediation or transition – instead, a foundationless necrosis past repair. Memories lost, the nature of form no longer recognisant, a split branch setting up the roots on its own.
“[…] the accident is in no way interiorized by the victim, it remains foreign to the fate of the psyche and is not integrated into the history of the individual. The individual does not reject the trauma outside of him- or herself and has no desire in relation to it, wants neither to eat nor to vomit it” (p. 81).
Safe ventures for each of us down the Mulholland Drives. :')
Malabou presents an exposé of denegative possibility, a change beyond the lamentations of différance; an ontological turn which elevates the skeleton of work out of the pools of genealogy, historiographies of being and identitarian psychoanalysis upwards to the pathologies of neuronal synapses.
The accident here is no redemptive messianic condition of possibility, nor an attuning correlative between being and thought or means and ends, nor a mediation or transition – instead, a foundationless necrosis past repair. Memories lost, the nature of form no longer recognisant, a split branch setting up the roots on its own.
“[…] the accident is in no way interiorized by the victim, it remains foreign to the fate of the psyche and is not integrated into the history of the individual. The individual does not reject the trauma outside of him- or herself and has no desire in relation to it, wants neither to eat nor to vomit it” (p. 81).
Safe ventures for each of us down the Mulholland Drives. :')
April 14, 2019
Tytuł brzmi przerażająco, ale w praktyce mamy całkiem przystępny esej o starości, przemijaniu i chorobie. Znajdziemy w nim odwołania do tekstów Spinozy, Deleuze'a, Freuda, a także do fikcji np. do Manna, Kafki, Prousta i innych.
January 28, 2025
Primeros capítulos muy muy buenos sobre la relación entre cuerpo trauma identidad y reconocimiento. muy chulo muy oscurito como a mí m gusta pero hacia el final se me hizo un poco más pesado por hablar d lógica (?)
November 3, 2024
Siento que estoy demasiado verde como para entender lo que este monstruo de la filosofía quiere comunicar. Aún así, con incertidumbres, me encantó. Malabou es LA filosofa de nuestros tiempos, su pensamiento expande el canon y plantea (con muchisimo rigor y cuidado) preguntas de una finura metodológica ya argumentativa que es envidiable.
Me interesan los posibles ecos entre la teoría de la plasticidad de Malabou con los estudios sobre el masoquismo en Deleuze.
Me interesan los posibles ecos entre la teoría de la plasticidad de Malabou con los estudios sobre el masoquismo en Deleuze.
April 25, 2014
The dark side of plasticity. Destructive plasticity,explosive plasticity; the accident which not only disrupts the form of identity but destroys the very substance of identity. Recalling Kafka's Metamorphoses Malabou asks the reader to imagine a Gregor who is not only transformed but is completely indifferent to this transformation.
Reflecting on split identities and the consequences of brain damage and catastrophe, Malabou demands a philosophical articulation of what happens. To think an ontology that can account for the accidental, for absolute transition wherein the subject becomes a stranger to herself, suddenly.
The question is followed through a philosophic and literary analysis, motivated by the quest to "find a way to think a mutation that engages both form and being, a new form that is literally a form of being." (17) The quest culminates in the wickedly dark suggestion that "the history of being itself consists perhaps of nothing but a series of accident which, in every era and without hope of return, dangerously disfigure the meaning of essence."(91)
This question of change within being, ontological change, is disturbing precisely at the level of identity. Who can resolve to peer into the darkness when it reveals that we may become utterly estranged to ourselves? That emotional coldness is present as a latent threat within all of us, perhaps just a brain injury away?
This destruction, this negativity, is not simple formlessness. Following Hegel, and perhaps going beyond, Malabou attempts to think, through the concept of destructive plasticity, an absolute negation. A destruction without remission which she calls negative possibility. Not the negation of possibility or the impossibility. "Without reducing it to affirmation, the negative possibility is not the expression of any lack or any deficit. It bears witness to a power or aptitude of the negative that is neither affirmed nor lacking, a power that forms."(75)
I find this last phrase particularly challenging.Is this some kind of ultra-rigorous apophatic theology that attempts to think creative formation without regard to essence? To refuse any answer or direction? What of that power to which the negative bears witness? If it can form, does it not have within itself some direction or purpose, even if it is hidden?
And yet, it is dangerous to essenciate. Malabou holds fast to a difficult resolve to pursue the questions of existence through the darkness of life's accidents. By raising it in terms of a way to think the mutation of a form of being she avoids the trap of fascination with either darkness or form. Indeed the very notion of destructive plasticity cuts against the optimism of much of contemporary neurology.
Reflecting on split identities and the consequences of brain damage and catastrophe, Malabou demands a philosophical articulation of what happens. To think an ontology that can account for the accidental, for absolute transition wherein the subject becomes a stranger to herself, suddenly.
The question is followed through a philosophic and literary analysis, motivated by the quest to "find a way to think a mutation that engages both form and being, a new form that is literally a form of being." (17) The quest culminates in the wickedly dark suggestion that "the history of being itself consists perhaps of nothing but a series of accident which, in every era and without hope of return, dangerously disfigure the meaning of essence."(91)
This question of change within being, ontological change, is disturbing precisely at the level of identity. Who can resolve to peer into the darkness when it reveals that we may become utterly estranged to ourselves? That emotional coldness is present as a latent threat within all of us, perhaps just a brain injury away?
This destruction, this negativity, is not simple formlessness. Following Hegel, and perhaps going beyond, Malabou attempts to think, through the concept of destructive plasticity, an absolute negation. A destruction without remission which she calls negative possibility. Not the negation of possibility or the impossibility. "Without reducing it to affirmation, the negative possibility is not the expression of any lack or any deficit. It bears witness to a power or aptitude of the negative that is neither affirmed nor lacking, a power that forms."(75)
I find this last phrase particularly challenging.Is this some kind of ultra-rigorous apophatic theology that attempts to think creative formation without regard to essence? To refuse any answer or direction? What of that power to which the negative bears witness? If it can form, does it not have within itself some direction or purpose, even if it is hidden?
And yet, it is dangerous to essenciate. Malabou holds fast to a difficult resolve to pursue the questions of existence through the darkness of life's accidents. By raising it in terms of a way to think the mutation of a form of being she avoids the trap of fascination with either darkness or form. Indeed the very notion of destructive plasticity cuts against the optimism of much of contemporary neurology.
November 1, 2017
how do you metamorphosize into a wholly alien other, becoming a stranger to yourself, like a patient suffering from Alzheimer's? not simply the change in range of dispositions but also the transformation of the very form which accommodates these dispositions, in other words, the loss of plasticity-- the capacity to give and receive form?
In this neat little exegesis, Catherine Malabou is going to complicate the conventional distinctions between necessity and accident by way of Spinoza (the consubstantiality of the body and the soul), Deleuze (illness and aging on the same ontological plane), and Freud (repression as a negation that nonetheless affirms) in order to flesh out what she calls "destructive plasticity". Ultimately, her goal is to establish the status of the accident as a necessity that "catches itself off-guard", a bursting forth from the order of exclusion. No origins, no genealogies. You can catch the glimpse of this alien indifference in the eyes of the Alzheimer patients...
In this neat little exegesis, Catherine Malabou is going to complicate the conventional distinctions between necessity and accident by way of Spinoza (the consubstantiality of the body and the soul), Deleuze (illness and aging on the same ontological plane), and Freud (repression as a negation that nonetheless affirms) in order to flesh out what she calls "destructive plasticity". Ultimately, her goal is to establish the status of the accident as a necessity that "catches itself off-guard", a bursting forth from the order of exclusion. No origins, no genealogies. You can catch the glimpse of this alien indifference in the eyes of the Alzheimer patients...
March 16, 2017
destructive plasticity is certainly not many things
April 22, 2023
From the outset, giving a numerical rating fails to capture how one feels about this book. It is not possible to say that one “liked it” or “disliked it". I have been fond of Malabou since the age of seventeen, re-reading this was a joy. The discussion on Duras is evergreen. But reading this again was also disenchanting. There is much which is loveable—her écriture is beautiful. Her exposition lends itself well to practical wisdom—if Malabou is (wrongly) criticised for not articulating why a concept is important it is only because the didactic approach so typical of English and American philosophy is not adequate for relating philosophy to the conditions of practical life. In other words one is invited to thinking for themselves why destructive plasticity is important for them.
What I can't stand is how an ontological priority is assigned to the brain as causing mental processes. This constitutes a horrific misunderstanding of Spinoza and attempts to subordinate his brilliance to the current scientific regime, rather than question it or act a counter-point to it so that science may be found different, and found better. The mis-use of the concept of (external) causation completely ignores the possibility of the brain and CNS being the locus of instantiation. What I mean is: consider that a brain does not cause mental processes, it instantiates them. This is supported by the notion that cerebral activity is influenced by a complex network of hormonal activity and microbial activity, mental activity, etc.
Also regrettable is the engagement with classical psychoanalysis: it's done to death and prevents real engagement with later technologies of the self (e.g. existential therapies). This is most telling when she describes word for word Laing's concepts such as ontological insecurity and existential death as if they are a terrain that is yet to be explored.
Lacking in this essay is a discussion of choice and decision—the idea that one is capable of choosing an affectational state is ignored. She acknowledges that destructive and constructive plasticity occur in tandem: the weakening of a neural pathway is associated with the augmenting of another. This is not explained in relation to how beliefs are self-confirming when it is well known that the brain's RAS filters for information that coincides with one's system of beliefs. The ontology of the accident is perhaps situated in our or internal representations of the world which are then out-pictured in the external events of a life.
Her mistake is confusing a destructive metamorphic power as a negative power, rather than seeing that existential deaths can be prompted by decision to change for the better. This is best seen in her otherwise lively discussion of Duras: “there is [supposedly] no cause” of her physical degeneration. In saying this Malabou neglects the power of mental- or self-causation. Is it not reasonable that Duras' physical changes were an instantiation of her self-hatred and an accumulation of her pain throughout childhood? Her “ugliness” would simply reflect the relationship she has with herself, pointing to how affectational states are creative. Ultimately, Malabou does not adequately articulate the relation between an ontology of the accident (which seems to us to be more grounded in attention and choice than she would have us believe) and destructive plasticity.
What I can't stand is how an ontological priority is assigned to the brain as causing mental processes. This constitutes a horrific misunderstanding of Spinoza and attempts to subordinate his brilliance to the current scientific regime, rather than question it or act a counter-point to it so that science may be found different, and found better. The mis-use of the concept of (external) causation completely ignores the possibility of the brain and CNS being the locus of instantiation. What I mean is: consider that a brain does not cause mental processes, it instantiates them. This is supported by the notion that cerebral activity is influenced by a complex network of hormonal activity and microbial activity, mental activity, etc.
Also regrettable is the engagement with classical psychoanalysis: it's done to death and prevents real engagement with later technologies of the self (e.g. existential therapies). This is most telling when she describes word for word Laing's concepts such as ontological insecurity and existential death as if they are a terrain that is yet to be explored.
Lacking in this essay is a discussion of choice and decision—the idea that one is capable of choosing an affectational state is ignored. She acknowledges that destructive and constructive plasticity occur in tandem: the weakening of a neural pathway is associated with the augmenting of another. This is not explained in relation to how beliefs are self-confirming when it is well known that the brain's RAS filters for information that coincides with one's system of beliefs. The ontology of the accident is perhaps situated in our or internal representations of the world which are then out-pictured in the external events of a life.
Her mistake is confusing a destructive metamorphic power as a negative power, rather than seeing that existential deaths can be prompted by decision to change for the better. This is best seen in her otherwise lively discussion of Duras: “there is [supposedly] no cause” of her physical degeneration. In saying this Malabou neglects the power of mental- or self-causation. Is it not reasonable that Duras' physical changes were an instantiation of her self-hatred and an accumulation of her pain throughout childhood? Her “ugliness” would simply reflect the relationship she has with herself, pointing to how affectational states are creative. Ultimately, Malabou does not adequately articulate the relation between an ontology of the accident (which seems to us to be more grounded in attention and choice than she would have us believe) and destructive plasticity.
September 6, 2025
A wee essay on 'destructive plasticity' that dotes on the accident/al. I'm wanting to go back to it at some point because it's a fascinating thing. The closing pages bring the beef home by isolating the nature of the accident as confounding for essentialism, especially of a Heideggerian sort. Funny that the last philosophy I read before this was Leibniz, who brought up metaphysical problems and the concept of entelechy - which I suspect is opposed to Malabou's formulation of the accident, but nevertheless both concepts broach continuity / contiguity as essential to formulations of movement (continuous flows opposed to iterative ones, perhaps). Deleuze and Guattari show their heads because of course they do.
Probably the most interesting part of this for me is a discussion on age and indifference and plasticity - wherein ageing is rendered as 'accident' and discussed through its destructive / 'negative' capacity. Fascinating because it brings in the new perspective to me that accident isn't dramatic but treated with indifference; which probably describes living in a political world that is forever changing for the worst while we experience it indifferently, while recognising it as tragedy.
One for me to revisit because there's some stuff here that it's worth my getting my head around, but for now it's a recommend from me because it's some philosophy that feels like it speaks to a metaphysics which is far more complex than the usual fare.
Probably the most interesting part of this for me is a discussion on age and indifference and plasticity - wherein ageing is rendered as 'accident' and discussed through its destructive / 'negative' capacity. Fascinating because it brings in the new perspective to me that accident isn't dramatic but treated with indifference; which probably describes living in a political world that is forever changing for the worst while we experience it indifferently, while recognising it as tragedy.
One for me to revisit because there's some stuff here that it's worth my getting my head around, but for now it's a recommend from me because it's some philosophy that feels like it speaks to a metaphysics which is far more complex than the usual fare.
March 27, 2025
L’ouvrage contient des idées originales : l’indifférence en est la majeure. Par exemple, l’indifférence impassive à la mort des autres, ou pire, l’attitude moqueuse, telles sont les réactions les plus répandues.
Éclairant est le traitement du traumatisme et la compulsion à la répétition : ils se logent dans « la toute autre origine ». On doit revenir parce que tout aurait pu être autrement.
La riposte à Heidegger est jolie. Contrairement à ce que Heidegger a entretenu : la tombée en inauthenticité par la conscience du temps n’est pas Zufälligkeit, — Malabou dit : l’histoire de l’être n’est que la série d’accidents de défiguration, à chaque époque et sans espoir de retour.
C’est de remède à lire sur des sujets tels que vieillissement, maladie, lésions cérébrales, mort sans un ton apaisant ou embellissant. Il y a une observation que les débilités organiques rendent l’âme susceptible ni à la vie, ni à la pulsion de mort. Elle ne peut donc être comparée ni à l'animal (l'inanimal), ni à l'inertie de la pierre, et « ressemble à rien ».
Éclairant est le traitement du traumatisme et la compulsion à la répétition : ils se logent dans « la toute autre origine ». On doit revenir parce que tout aurait pu être autrement.
La riposte à Heidegger est jolie. Contrairement à ce que Heidegger a entretenu : la tombée en inauthenticité par la conscience du temps n’est pas Zufälligkeit, — Malabou dit : l’histoire de l’être n’est que la série d’accidents de défiguration, à chaque époque et sans espoir de retour.
C’est de remède à lire sur des sujets tels que vieillissement, maladie, lésions cérébrales, mort sans un ton apaisant ou embellissant. Il y a une observation que les débilités organiques rendent l’âme susceptible ni à la vie, ni à la pulsion de mort. Elle ne peut donc être comparée ni à l'animal (l'inanimal), ni à l'inertie de la pierre, et « ressemble à rien ».
August 27, 2025
“destructive plasticity deploys its work starting from the exhaustion of possibilities, when all virtuality has left long ago, when the child in the adult is erased, when cohesion is destroyed, family spirit vanished, friendship lost, links dissipated in the ever more more intense cold of a barren life.
The negative possibility, which remains negative until it is exhausted, never becomes unreal either, but remains suspended in the post-traumatic form of a subject who misses nothing—- who does not even lack lack, as la an. might written— remains to the end this subjective form that is constituted starting from the absence from the self.” (89-90).
The negative possibility, which remains negative until it is exhausted, never becomes unreal either, but remains suspended in the post-traumatic form of a subject who misses nothing—- who does not even lack lack, as la an. might written— remains to the end this subjective form that is constituted starting from the absence from the self.” (89-90).
December 31, 2023
Such a hard book to read for an american football fan. Not just because we're illiterate grunts. The former players are the best example of destructive plasticity in pop culture. It was horrifying reading about the mythology of Daphne, turning into a tree to escape the trauma forced on her. Then reading Zak Keefer's piece on Jeff Herrod, a former linebacker for the Indianapolis Colts, who is no longer recognizable to himself or his family due to CTE. In some ways this essay read more as a horror story.
November 26, 2017
Although the book adds the interesting notion of negative plasticity and starts on an interesting note discussing Metamorphosis, it falls flat in making a clear point and only scratches the surface of the contribution the many scientists and philosophers mentioned, can add to this discussion. The book is focused on empiricist science and misses the philosophical discussion about the meaning of plasticity and specifically negative plasticity and its implications.
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February 20, 2021on denial & repetition compulsion-- "..this attitude is an attitude of minimizing evil. If negation cannot be touched by any revelation, any proof, any presence, if it always resists the trial of fact, it is in as much as it betrays an immense confidence. A naïve, absolute confidence, a child's faith in possibility, a fragile but unconditional belief without which existence would quite simply not be possible." so true bestie
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June 30, 2022“We must all recognize that we might, one day, become someone else, an absolute other, someone who will never be reconciled with themselves again, someone who will be this form of us without redemption or atonement, without last wishes, this damned form, outside of time”
April 24, 2018
Sufficiently interesting essay on destructive plasticity. Along the way, the author wrestles with the likes of Damasio, Spinoza, Kafka and Freud.
December 30, 2019
Promising but then it tapers and draws its case studies from fiction, which seems to me unreliable. The translator insists on "cut and dry." Sigh.
January 6, 2020
I wish to read this book in French.
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April 14, 2020?
July 6, 2023
This is NOT the work with which to start if you want to read Malabou, unless youre already into psychoanalysis
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