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Law, Liberty, and Morality
"The three lectures collected in this slim but important volume resume a controversy that has been one of the recurrent themes of legal philosophy: is it the function of law to enforce the moral convictions of a community, or is the function of law a more limited one..." W. Friedmann, Natural Law Forum
96 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1963
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About the author
H.L.A. Hart
23 books79 followersHerbert Lionel Adolphus Hart was a legal philosopher of the 20th century. He was Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and the Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford. He authored The Concept of Law and made contributions to political philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
July 1, 2018
محتوای کتابش خیلی جالب بود،
چیزی شبیه به یه تاریخ معاصر از بخشهایی از حقوق بودکه در کنارش فلسفه و اخلاق هم داشت. در واقع هرآنچه حقوق به گردن آزادی حق داشته، در کتاب بود. البته که کتاب خیلی جدید نیست و یقینا این اطلاعات برای حداقل قبل از 20 سال پیشه...
خوندنش خالی از لطف نیست خلاصه..
و اما ترجمه کتاب که بسیااار اعصابم رو خورد کرد.
مترجمی که هموسکشوال رو همجنسبار ترجمه میکنه حتی اگر خیلی مترجم خوبی هم باشه، برام کافیه تا بگم بد بوده ترجمش!
آقای راسخ یقینا مترجم قابلی هستن، پس چرا دقیقا در کتابی که میبایست ترجمش خیلی همجهت با کنه کتاب باشه و آزادی رو به رسمیت بشناسه ُ همجنسگرا رو همجنسباز ترجمه کرده؟؟
واقعا بد بود...
واقعا ناراحتم کرد.
چیزی شبیه به یه تاریخ معاصر از بخشهایی از حقوق بودکه در کنارش فلسفه و اخلاق هم داشت. در واقع هرآنچه حقوق به گردن آزادی حق داشته، در کتاب بود. البته که کتاب خیلی جدید نیست و یقینا این اطلاعات برای حداقل قبل از 20 سال پیشه...
خوندنش خالی از لطف نیست خلاصه..
و اما ترجمه کتاب که بسیااار اعصابم رو خورد کرد.
مترجمی که هموسکشوال رو همجنسبار ترجمه میکنه حتی اگر خیلی مترجم خوبی هم باشه، برام کافیه تا بگم بد بوده ترجمش!
آقای راسخ یقینا مترجم قابلی هستن، پس چرا دقیقا در کتابی که میبایست ترجمش خیلی همجهت با کنه کتاب باشه و آزادی رو به رسمیت بشناسه ُ همجنسگرا رو همجنسباز ترجمه کرده؟؟
واقعا بد بود...
واقعا ناراحتم کرد.
September 10, 2012
Hart defends JS Mill's proposal that laws regulating "self-regarding" vices ought to be abolished, pushing back against a fairly unconvincing argument by Lord Devlin and a much stronger one by James Fitzjames Stephen. Stephen claims that morality is largely upheld by cultural norms, and that these norms need the support of law to be sustained to any productive purpose.
Hart's response to Stephen rested on an empirical claim:
"in any full investigation of the part played by legal prohibition in sustaining the conviction that conduct is morally wrong, we should have to distinguish between various types of immorality. Some, like fornication, though they may be quite sincerely condemned morally, represent temptations to a majority of men; others, such as incest or homosexuality, are practices for which most men may feel aversion and disgust. In relation to the latter it would be very surprising if legal prohibition were a significant factor in preserving the general sense that the practice is immoral."
In the fifty years since legal prohibitions have been removed, the general sense of the morality of homosexuality has clearly changed radically. In the 1960s, allies of racial segregation opposed federal legislation under the slogan: "You can't legislate morality". In both cases, it is clear that legal change has done much to reorient society -- not least by reshaping its moral opinions and customs.
As a result, Hart's reasoning now seems more than a little dubious -- even if public policy has, on some issues, moved closer to his preferences.
Hart's response to Stephen rested on an empirical claim:
"in any full investigation of the part played by legal prohibition in sustaining the conviction that conduct is morally wrong, we should have to distinguish between various types of immorality. Some, like fornication, though they may be quite sincerely condemned morally, represent temptations to a majority of men; others, such as incest or homosexuality, are practices for which most men may feel aversion and disgust. In relation to the latter it would be very surprising if legal prohibition were a significant factor in preserving the general sense that the practice is immoral."
In the fifty years since legal prohibitions have been removed, the general sense of the morality of homosexuality has clearly changed radically. In the 1960s, allies of racial segregation opposed federal legislation under the slogan: "You can't legislate morality". In both cases, it is clear that legal change has done much to reorient society -- not least by reshaping its moral opinions and customs.
As a result, Hart's reasoning now seems more than a little dubious -- even if public policy has, on some issues, moved closer to his preferences.
January 24, 2020
Hart's analytical treatise, if it were a coctail, would be tangy and refreshing. It dissolves bad arguments with a cool bite. It showcases a painstaking attention to the minute details of law and morality. It therefore showcases Hart's brilliance as a worthy successor to Mill. The problem is that a lot of his targets, here, are basically roadkills (i.e. unworthy opponents). It feels like a giant wielding its axe at rabbits. And a lot of the arguments on both sides seem outdated since society has come a long way since when the book was written. So, as a piece of timeless philosophy it only gets a modest recommendation from me despite its clear dialectical brilliance as a piece of contemporary commentary.
February 5, 2021
A challenging + insightful exploration of morality, criminal law, and the limits of freedom with equally as insightful critiques of John Stuart Mill, James Fitzjames Stephen, and Lord Patrick Devlin. Woohoo!
“The real solvent of social morality, as one critic of Lord Devlin has pointed out, is not the failure of the law to endorse its restrictions with legal punishment, but free critical discussion. It is this—or the self-criticism which it engenders—that forces apart mere instinctive disgust from moral condemnation.”
“The real solvent of social morality, as one critic of Lord Devlin has pointed out, is not the failure of the law to endorse its restrictions with legal punishment, but free critical discussion. It is this—or the self-criticism which it engenders—that forces apart mere instinctive disgust from moral condemnation.”
April 22, 2018
- 1957, London: Report of Commission on Homosexual Offences and prostitution published
- It recommends that consenting adult homosexual activity should no longer be a criminal offence, and that prostitution should be driven off the street
- Prominent conservative judge Lord Devlin criticises report, making a criminal law should protect both the individual and the community argument in an either we have shared morals or fall of western civilisation type way
- Government legislates to get prostitution off the street, does not legislate to decriminalise homosexual activity
- Closeted gay legal philosopher HLA Hart gives three lectures at Stanford University, which are published as this book
- Hart largely ignores the question of prostitution and attempts to come up with a liberal theory to justify consensual homosexual intercourse
- He finds this in concepts of what is private and what is public
- He argues that that sexuality and acts in furtherance of sexual identity exist in a private domain that is shielded from the enforcement of positive morality through criminal law
- He argues that the infiltration of the private by public morality through criminal law is not legitimate
- And by extension: it wouldn't be permissible to ban purely private acts of prostitution
- Entering this book as a legal positivism loving, pro gay rights radfem who agrees with its primary conclusion, I wasn’t expecting to walk away from Hart’s own book slightly more on the side of some of the path of reasoning used by conservative Lord Devlin and his law-protects-not-just-the-individual-but-the-community argument, but gosh darn do I hate rich white men spruiking a path of libertarianism to achieve their ends
- It recommends that consenting adult homosexual activity should no longer be a criminal offence, and that prostitution should be driven off the street
- Prominent conservative judge Lord Devlin criticises report, making a criminal law should protect both the individual and the community argument in an either we have shared morals or fall of western civilisation type way
- Government legislates to get prostitution off the street, does not legislate to decriminalise homosexual activity
- Closeted gay legal philosopher HLA Hart gives three lectures at Stanford University, which are published as this book
- Hart largely ignores the question of prostitution and attempts to come up with a liberal theory to justify consensual homosexual intercourse
- He finds this in concepts of what is private and what is public
- He argues that that sexuality and acts in furtherance of sexual identity exist in a private domain that is shielded from the enforcement of positive morality through criminal law
- He argues that the infiltration of the private by public morality through criminal law is not legitimate
- And by extension: it wouldn't be permissible to ban purely private acts of prostitution
- Entering this book as a legal positivism loving, pro gay rights radfem who agrees with its primary conclusion, I wasn’t expecting to walk away from Hart’s own book slightly more on the side of some of the path of reasoning used by conservative Lord Devlin and his law-protects-not-just-the-individual-but-the-community argument, but gosh darn do I hate rich white men spruiking a path of libertarianism to achieve their ends
April 22, 2019
با توجه به حجم کتاب، هارت توی مباحث خیلی عمیق نشده و این کتاب رو میشه بنوعی پیش درآمد کتاب مفهوم قانون هارت دونست
قطعن دروازه خوبیه برا ورود به گفتمان فلسفه حقوق و اخلاق و حقوقی شدن اخلاق و چالشهاش
October 29, 2019
A melegházasság kapcsán jutottam el ehhez a könyvhöz. A könyvtárban akadtam rá, gondoltam, kevesebb, mint száz oldal, majd átszaladok rajta. Hát… az átszaladásból semmi nem lett, de összességében több volt, mint tanulságos.
Volt ez a Devlin-Hart jogfilozófiai vita Nagy-Britanniában, a ’60-as évek közepén. Egy bizonyos Lord Devlin (akinek a neve csaknem annyira anakronisztikus, mint a világképe) amellett érvelt, hogy a jognak feladata a erkölcs kikényszerítése, még akkor is, ha olyan cselekedet ellen irányul, ami nem meríti ki a konkrét károkozás fogalmát. Legfontosabb argumentuma az volt, hogy létezik egyfajta „közös társadalmi erkölcs”, és ami ezt veszélyezteti, az magát a társadalmat veszélyezteti. (Az egész vita középpontjában az azonos neműek közötti szexuális kapcsolat és a prostitúció állt.) Meghallotta ezt Hart, az oxfordi filozófiai iskola prominens képviselője, és be is irányozta a hajóágyúkat. Válaszában először is (Millel némiképp szembehelyezkedve*) leszögezte, hogy ő megkülönbözteti az állami paternalizmust** attól az igénytől, hogy a jog erkölcsi kérdésekben alkalmazzon kényszert. Az első esetet megszorításokkal el tudja fogadni, a másodikat viszont nem. Hart érvei nyomósak és kellően súlyosak, amit talán az is jelez, hogy az általa képviselt felfogás azóta tulajdonképpen uralkodó a nyugati jogalkotásban. Másrészt viszont némileg éppen ez csökkenti a szöveg erejét: hogy bizonyos pontokon (számomra legalábbis) evidenciává vált. Aligha hiszem ugyanis, hogy épeszű ember hihet jogi kényszer alkalmazásában bárki ellen anélkül, hogy előbb tényekkel alátámasztott érvekkel bizonyítaná az adott személy cselekedeteinek káros voltát. Vagy tud valaki ilyen épeszű emberről?
* Stuart Mill A szabadságról írott könyvében 1859-ben fogalmazta meg a liberalizmus alapelveit. Egyik kulcsmondata: „Az egyetlen cél, amelynek érdekében jogosan lehet egy civilizált közösség bármely tagjával szemben – akarata ellenére – erőszakot alkalmazni: mások sérelmének a megakadályozása.” Hart ezzel szemben elfogadhatónak tartja a kényszert olyan indokolt esetben is, amikor a közösség tagja önmagának okozhat kárt – pl. kötelezheti az autóvezetőt, hogy biztonsági övet használjon. Hiszen ha saját felelőtlensége miatt sérülést szenved, akkor esetlen a tőle függő családtagjait éri sérelem.
** Az állami paternalizmus az a folyamat, amikor az állampolgár életébe egy kormány azért avatkozik be, hogy magának kárt ne okozhasson. Lásd az előző lábjegyzetben leírt példát.
Volt ez a Devlin-Hart jogfilozófiai vita Nagy-Britanniában, a ’60-as évek közepén. Egy bizonyos Lord Devlin (akinek a neve csaknem annyira anakronisztikus, mint a világképe) amellett érvelt, hogy a jognak feladata a erkölcs kikényszerítése, még akkor is, ha olyan cselekedet ellen irányul, ami nem meríti ki a konkrét károkozás fogalmát. Legfontosabb argumentuma az volt, hogy létezik egyfajta „közös társadalmi erkölcs”, és ami ezt veszélyezteti, az magát a társadalmat veszélyezteti. (Az egész vita középpontjában az azonos neműek közötti szexuális kapcsolat és a prostitúció állt.) Meghallotta ezt Hart, az oxfordi filozófiai iskola prominens képviselője, és be is irányozta a hajóágyúkat. Válaszában először is (Millel némiképp szembehelyezkedve*) leszögezte, hogy ő megkülönbözteti az állami paternalizmust** attól az igénytől, hogy a jog erkölcsi kérdésekben alkalmazzon kényszert. Az első esetet megszorításokkal el tudja fogadni, a másodikat viszont nem. Hart érvei nyomósak és kellően súlyosak, amit talán az is jelez, hogy az általa képviselt felfogás azóta tulajdonképpen uralkodó a nyugati jogalkotásban. Másrészt viszont némileg éppen ez csökkenti a szöveg erejét: hogy bizonyos pontokon (számomra legalábbis) evidenciává vált. Aligha hiszem ugyanis, hogy épeszű ember hihet jogi kényszer alkalmazásában bárki ellen anélkül, hogy előbb tényekkel alátámasztott érvekkel bizonyítaná az adott személy cselekedeteinek káros voltát. Vagy tud valaki ilyen épeszű emberről?
* Stuart Mill A szabadságról írott könyvében 1859-ben fogalmazta meg a liberalizmus alapelveit. Egyik kulcsmondata: „Az egyetlen cél, amelynek érdekében jogosan lehet egy civilizált közösség bármely tagjával szemben – akarata ellenére – erőszakot alkalmazni: mások sérelmének a megakadályozása.” Hart ezzel szemben elfogadhatónak tartja a kényszert olyan indokolt esetben is, amikor a közösség tagja önmagának okozhat kárt – pl. kötelezheti az autóvezetőt, hogy biztonsági övet használjon. Hiszen ha saját felelőtlensége miatt sérülést szenved, akkor esetlen a tőle függő családtagjait éri sérelem.
** Az állami paternalizmus az a folyamat, amikor az állampolgár életébe egy kormány azért avatkozik be, hogy magának kárt ne okozhasson. Lásd az előző lábjegyzetben leírt példát.
January 24, 2021
Ahlakın tarih öncesine ait ve aslinda insan ruhuna aykiri olarak gorulen şeyleri, sonunda insan ozgurlugunu kısıtlamak ve cezai yaptirim uygulamak neticesinde de insanlara elem ve keder, ıstırap uygulamak zorunda olunan degerler olarak gorulmeye iten ilkeri ele alan bir kitap. Ancak genel olarak sadece es cinsellik, kadin ticareti ve evlilik birligi icerisinde gayri resmi iliskiler bazinda ele alaarak ve sadece bunlar uzerinden, genel toplumsal "ahlak" kurallarini anlatiyor. Kitabin sonlarina dogru ahlakin Burke ve Hegel uzerinden felsefi tanimina giriyor. genel olarak tekerrür cok fazla var ama cezai yaptirim olarak toplumsal "ahlaka" aykiri dusen insan davranislarinin yaptirimi olmali mi sorusunun cevabini kendi dusunceleri ile naçizane olarak acikliyor.
December 2, 2017
I may disagree with elements of the argument but I'm not going to argue with the status of the argument and its influence on twentieth and twenty-first century society.
Extraordinarily readable and it is hard not to enter the debate. In fact I've probably contributed a year or more to it.
This measures out my life in the same way that rock n roll does. I'm not very keen where either ended up but it was a heck of a journey.
Extraordinarily readable and it is hard not to enter the debate. In fact I've probably contributed a year or more to it.
This measures out my life in the same way that rock n roll does. I'm not very keen where either ended up but it was a heck of a journey.
March 14, 2018
This short book digs into the reasons offered as to why law should enforce morality. Hart makes a number of distinctions that are very useful in teasing apart more popular arguments. The categories he develops helped clear up some of the confusions I had about the debate.
October 11, 2017
Even better than the concept of law
November 27, 2019
Hart's refutation of Devlin and defense of limited interference in private morality--an excellent defense and modification of JS Mill. LOVE
October 19, 2023
Een reductio ad Hitlerum doet het altijd goed, maar is en blijft een drogreden Hart!
Read
June 7, 2024also academic read, actually liked it as a good critique to devlin and interpretation to law and morality
December 29, 2024
i loved the evaluation of the need for punishment to ensure morality but overall i found it a bit hard to follow
February 11, 2017
Ceza hukuku felsefesini özümsemek açısından önemli bir kitap. Mesleki merakım icabı okudum, Goodreads arkadaşlarımın hiçbirinin bu kitapla ilgileneceğini -ve faydasını göreceğini- zannetmem, dolayısıyla kitaba ilişkin herhangi bir açıklama yapmaya gerek duymuyorum. Şu kadarını söyleyeyim ki uzmanlık alanı ceza hukuku olan bir kişi için bile dili oldukça ağır ve anlaşılması zor bir kitap. Özel bir sebebiniz yoksa yanına bile yaklaşmayın :)
January 26, 2017
- eleştirel ahlak / pozitif ahlak ayrımı. soru hukukun ahlak dayatıp dayatamayacağı değil, bu ahlaklardan hangisini dayatabileceğidir. mill'in zarar prensibi de neticede eleştirel bir ahlak ilkesidir.
- shaw v. director of public prosecutions davası hakkında, mahkemenin "custos morum" olarak hareket etmesi hakkında önemli bir uyarı: mahkemelerin ahlak bekçisi olarak hareket etmesinin "ex post facto hukuk" uygulamasıyla neticelenebileceği, yani kanunilik ilkesini tehlikeye sokacağı... (tck'daki ahlaki içeriğe sahip olan bazı maddelerin de bu bağlamda risk taşıdığı savunulabilir mi?)
- ahlakın hukuki dayatımı yalnızca suçun işlenmesi üzerine uygulanan ceza yoluyla olmaz, kişilerin kendi davranışları üzerinde sürekli bir otokontrol sağlamak zorunda kalışı da hukuki dayatımın bir yönüdür. ahlakın hukuki dayatımında feda edilen özgürlük bu açıdan da değerlendirilmelidir.
- mill'in paternalizm karşıtlığının gerçekçi olmadığı argümanı: s. 39
- demokrasi ve pozitif ahlak dayatması: s. 74
- shaw v. director of public prosecutions davası hakkında, mahkemenin "custos morum" olarak hareket etmesi hakkında önemli bir uyarı: mahkemelerin ahlak bekçisi olarak hareket etmesinin "ex post facto hukuk" uygulamasıyla neticelenebileceği, yani kanunilik ilkesini tehlikeye sokacağı... (tck'daki ahlaki içeriğe sahip olan bazı maddelerin de bu bağlamda risk taşıdığı savunulabilir mi?)
- ahlakın hukuki dayatımı yalnızca suçun işlenmesi üzerine uygulanan ceza yoluyla olmaz, kişilerin kendi davranışları üzerinde sürekli bir otokontrol sağlamak zorunda kalışı da hukuki dayatımın bir yönüdür. ahlakın hukuki dayatımında feda edilen özgürlük bu açıdan da değerlendirilmelidir.
- mill'in paternalizm karşıtlığının gerçekçi olmadığı argümanı: s. 39
- demokrasi ve pozitif ahlak dayatması: s. 74
February 25, 2022
I READ THE ITALIAN VERSION SO THE REVIEW WILL BE IN ITALIAN.
"Diritto, libertà e moralità" è una raccolta delle lezioni tenute dal filosofo Hart in cui si va a criticare una nozione base del diritto contemporaneo: quella della sua compenetrazione con la morale. Vi è una morale condivisa? E' necessario che il diritto la preservi? Fino a che punto e a che costo? Per fare ciò il richiamo centrale è l'utilitarismo di J. S. Mill, autore incredibilmente avanguardista in materia e come la riflessione intorno al diritto, alla libertà ed alla moralità non sia così semplice come si pensa ma che, in realtà, forse, i piani si sono mescolati creando più danni che altro.
Incredibilmente interessante rispetto alle tematiche odierne, specialmente per comprendere i punti di vista conservatori, i loro potenziali problemi e capire come funziona il modo di pensare il diritto, le libertà, la società di ieri e, per forza, di oggi.
"Diritto, libertà e moralità" è una raccolta delle lezioni tenute dal filosofo Hart in cui si va a criticare una nozione base del diritto contemporaneo: quella della sua compenetrazione con la morale. Vi è una morale condivisa? E' necessario che il diritto la preservi? Fino a che punto e a che costo? Per fare ciò il richiamo centrale è l'utilitarismo di J. S. Mill, autore incredibilmente avanguardista in materia e come la riflessione intorno al diritto, alla libertà ed alla moralità non sia così semplice come si pensa ma che, in realtà, forse, i piani si sono mescolati creando più danni che altro.
Incredibilmente interessante rispetto alle tematiche odierne, specialmente per comprendere i punti di vista conservatori, i loro potenziali problemi e capire come funziona il modo di pensare il diritto, le libertà, la società di ieri e, per forza, di oggi.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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