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Egemen Kentler: Tarih Boyunca Kent Devletleri
Kent devletini jeopolitik bir form olarak ele alan ve kentin sürekli değişen statüsünü araştıran Geoffrey Parker bu eserinde, dünya tarihi boyunca çeşitli kentleri ve kent devletlerini inceliyor. Platon ve Aristoteles’in mükemmel bir devlet türü olarak gördüğü Yunan polis’ini, Roma imparatorluk başkentini, Venedik ve Rönesans kentlerini, Alman Hanse’sini, Rus ve Baltık kentlerini derinlemesine ele alıyor. Parker ayrıca erken dönem İslam toplumunda kente atfedilen politik rolü tartışıyor ve kent devletlerinin Kuzey Avrupa’da yeniden canlanmasıyla başlayan ancak ulus devletin yükselmesiyle son bulan gelişme sürecini gözler önüne seriyor.
Egemen Kentler, Batı uygarlığının doğuşundan 21. yüzyılın küreselleşme olgusuna kadar kentin tarihteki rolünü anlamaya çalışan en güçlü ve kapsamlı incelemelerden biri.
Egemen Kentler, Batı uygarlığının doğuşundan 21. yüzyılın küreselleşme olgusuna kadar kentin tarihteki rolünü anlamaya çalışan en güçlü ve kapsamlı incelemelerden biri.
- GenresHistory
280 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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About the author
Geoffrey Parker
11 books2 followersGeoffrey Parker (b. 1933) is the Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Political Geography and Geopolitics at the University of Birmingham. His books include Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future; The Geopolitics of Domination from the Ottoman Empire to the Soviet Union; and The Logic of Unity (1986), Sovereign City and Power in Stone.
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November 2, 2023
This is a panoramic and sweeping history of the city, from the very beginning of civilization to modern times. Geoffrey Parker’s beautifully written and deeply scholarly book sheds light on many variants of the city—the Greek city-state, the Roman ‘urbs’, the medieval European trading town, the league of cities, and the imperial capital—and why they formed, grew in stature and declined.
Parker starts with a bit of context. Each age, according to him, is dominated by a type of political formation. He identifies four: the city-state, the nation state, the empire, and the federation. From a Eurocentric perspective, the earliest period was dominated by the city state. These gave way to empire and empires collapsed into nation states. Often, we have also seen federations -- of cities or nations. But Parker points out that though one form has predominated at any time, other forms too have coexisted. For example, though the nation-state dominates now, there are also city-states such as Singapore, Malta and Liechtenstein and some nations such as the Russian Federation are empires.
As he chronicles the various forms of the city that have emerged over time, Parker focuses on some key elements: territorial control (or lack thereof), political and administrative structures, economic foundations, and the degree of liberty.
Parker’s account begins with the growth of cities in ancient west Asia. The ancient Philistines occupied the eastern Mediterranean coast between Gaza and Tel Aviv, and the Phoenicians to their north. Both were trading cultures but the Phoenicians had a geographical advantage. Their territory on the landward side was shielded by a dual range of mountains. So the Philistines soon fell to the Israelites (David), but the Phoenicians survived much longer and expanded to the West.
While the Phoenicians were mostly sea-faring, trading cultures with little territorial ambitions (though Carthage, a Phoenician colony did grow to control territory), the Greek city states (chapter 3) created a more enduring connection between itself (the “asty”) and the surrounding countryside (the “chora”). The “asty-chora” structure of the polis was ruled by a variety of political forms, though most polis had rejected monarchy. They had a set of civic institutions (magistracy, council et cetera) and common facilities (temple, gymnasium, baths, agora). But the predominant feature of the Greek polis was its small size that permitted participatory decision-making.
The main problem for the Greek city states was unity. At most times a state of “no war no peace” prevailed. But there was cooperation in the face of an external threat—most notably the Persian invasion (provoked by Athenian support for the Persian vassal cities in Ionia). After the Persian defeat, Athens created the Delian league as a defensive alliance (notably absent—Sparta). But Athens began to show domineering tendencies (within the league as well as outside), leading to the Peloponnesian war with Sparta. Sparta one but both sides were weakened. Sensing opportunity, the Macedonians under Philip and his son Alexander launched an invasion (chapter 4). The Macedonian expansion led to the establishment of more than 70 new city states many named after Alexander. These were modelled on the Greek polis and had their own constitution as well as civic institutions and public and religious buildings most did not survive though some (Alexandria, Egypt) became great urban centers.
Rome's founding (Chapter 5) was contemporary with the Greek city states but resulted in an altogether new model of the city. Parker masterfully identifies the split personality inherent in the Roman model of the city—a profoundly urban and urbane culture that venerated the rural virtues. Prestige was earned through landholdings and the elite, even when enmeshed in city life hankered for the rural life (the legend of Cincinnatus). Parker traces this dichotomy to the very founding of Rome—probably an Etruscan city but with a large Latini population. The emergent city was a cultural amalgam of these two peoples—the city of the Etruscans but with the valorization of rural life and land ownership of the farming Latini.
Rome prioritized control of land from the very beginning, which was a major difference with the Greek city states—instead of celebrating the “polis,” Romans saw the “urbs” as is necessary inconvenience. Desire for land made Rome expansionist. The conflict with Carthage made Rome shift from land power to sea power and from farming to trade—but it also made Rome an empire. The new cities in the expanding empire were modeled after Rome had no self-government or even political identity, other than as provincial capitals or urban centers. Rome itself lost position over time—Constantine founded a rival capital in Byzantium; and when Theodosius split the empire, it was Mediolanum (Milan) that became capital of the western half.
In the 5th century AD, after the collapse of Rome, an entirely new type of city came into being. Venice was founded by refugees escaping the barbarian invasions, at a location at the head of the Adriatic sea, ideally positioned for trade. It was close to the Brenner pass over the Alps, and from there to central Europe, and connected by sea to Constantinople. The relationship to Byzantium was close and symbiotic. There was strong influence of Byzantine art and architecture, but resistance to political control: Venice jealously guarded its sovereignty. In the religious schism, Venice preferred to remain with the Roman church. Internally, politics was free of tyrannical power—the Doge was only a figurehead while power rested with the “merchant princes.” Organizations like Maggiore Consiglio, Council of Ten, etc. divided power with the Doge. Venice’s prosperity was ultimately due to trade with Byzantium. But after centuries of being the “eastern outpost of Byzantium” and “Byzantium’s favorite daughter,” Venice managed to conquer and rule over Byzantium after the fourth crusade.
Cities modeled on Venice came up in northern Italy (Florence, Milan) (Chapter 7). But their position—between state and church—was always fraught. To survive, they had to pool their resources. The Lombard league, the combined forces of northern Italian city states, defeated the Holy Roman Empire. Though the northern Italian cities survived for a time by playing off church and empire, a third front emerged in the form of France that invaded and occupied northern Italy in the 14th century. External threats were only part of the story. Cities also had to contend with different interest groups within—notably the Guelphs who sided with the Vatican and the Ghibellines, with the Emperor. Republicanism hung on until, in city after city, autocrats took over promising to restore order. Example, the Medici in Florence.
Chapter 8 is on the cities in Kievan Rus. With the rise of Byzantium, trade began to flow between northern Europe and the east. Trading settlements emerged along the major route from Scandinavia to Byzantium (along the river Volkov southwards, and then portage to the Dnieper, then down the Dnieper to the Black Sea). Cities emerged along this route—Novgorod first, and later Kiev, Smolensk, Stara Ladoga, Tver, and Pskov. But Kiev was the biggest. It was closely tied to Byzantium, based on its location on the Dnieper. Byzantine emperors appointed Kiev’s rulers and its architecture, customs and religion were all modeled on Byzantium. In politics too, Kiev copied the dyarchy of emperor and patriarch, through joint rule of the Kievan prince and the Bishop of Kiev. Kiev was the foremost Russian city at this time, though it could never get status as the capital. The region was called “Kievan Rus.”
But when the Mongols attacked in the 13th century, Kiev fell quickly. Since it was on the edge of the steppe (compared to other Russian cities deeper in the forest and further West), Kiev was defenseless against the horsemen. Also, Kievan Rus was a loose federation, no one came to Kiev’s aid. But Kiev’s decline had begun even earlier. In 1204, the fourth crusade had conquered Byzantium and replaced it with a Latin kingdom. This was the goal of Venice that had bankrolled the 4th crusade. With the fall of Byzantium, Kiev 's main trade partner was no longer there—the Mongol invasion was only the last straw.
With Kiev in Mongol hands, and trade now directed further east to the Mongol capital at Sarai Batu on the Volga, Novgorod came to dominate. Simultaneously, southern Europe was beginning to weaken (Venice-Byzantium-Kiev), in favor of northern Europe (the Teutonic league). Novgorod, farther to the north, was much better suited for trade with northern Europe. Trade from Novgorod bypassed Kiev and went straight to Sarai Batu. Novgorod was also very different from Kiev. If Kiev was an autocratic dyarchy of king and bishop, Novgorod was controlled by its merchants. It was much more republican in character with several kings sent packing after trying to rule by force. It was more of a city state in the Greek sense than Kiev was.
A league of cities, akin to the Lombard league in northern Italy, was emerging in northern Europe too (Chapter 9)—the Hanseatic League. Cities had slowly come up on the eastern fringe of the Holy Roman (German) Empire and along the coast of the Baltic. One fascinating example is Lubeck, which first emerged as a staging point for the trade for goods from Hamburg to the east. Hamburg faced the western flank of the Denmark peninsula, and ships had to make the long circumambulation of the peninsula before proceeding eastward. Someone came up with the idea of porting goods to the eastern side and shipping from there—this little terminus on the sea because Lubeck, eventually a major port in its own right.
Hamburg, Lubeck and other trading settlements at Danzig, Riga, Reval (Tallinn), etc. banded together to protect their trade and became the Hanseatic League. When territorial states such as Denmark tried to muscle in on the Baltic trade, the Hanse defeated them in battle—mirroring the Lombard League’s earlier exploits against the Holy Roman Empire. Several factors contributed to the success of the Hanse. (1) they were expanding into territory outside the established states; (2) their emergence coincided with a period of weakness for the Holy Roman Empire (Frederick Barbarossa killed in the third crusade) and other kingdoms (Russia devastated by the Mongols, Sweden yet to emerge).
Though they struggled to assert their independence against the territorial states, the Hanse city states were internally oligarchies where the patrician class dominated. But unlike the Guelph-Ghibelline paralysis that led to autocratic rule in the Italian states, the Hanse remain partially democratic throughout.
Chapter 10 shifts focus to cities in Castile/Spain. After the Reconquista, a new Spanish state emerged as a union of Castile (Isabella) and Aragon (Ferdinand). To increase the production of armor and weaponry, the state gave concessions to trade groups and cities. Having tasted limited autonomy, the cities wanted more – a league of 18 cities formed in 1500. But the Spanish king (also the Holy Roman Emperor and Ferdinand and Isabella 's grandson) Charles V was not amenable. The revolt of the cities was crushed. Autonomy was a short-lived dream; the city state lost decisively to the territorial state. The Spanish state that emerged was highly centralized, authoritarian, theocratic, and aggressive. Interestingly, oppression was not the catalyst for revolt: the cities in the formerly Muslim states in Andalusia were the most strictly governed, but they did not revolt. Those that did were in the north, that had tasted half freedom.
From Spain, Parker moves in Chapter 11 to cities in the Low countries (Belgium and the Netherlands, once united), an easy move since these too were once Spanish possessions. As an inheritance from his father, the Duke of Burgundy, the Low countries were part of the domains of Charles, the Spanish king. Located at the intersection of the north-south trade route (using the Rhine) and the east-west Baltic trade route, the Low country—especially Bruges—was ideally placed to be a hub. Charles himself was indulgent: he was born in Ghent and had a deep affection for the region. With his encouragement, a number of small, independent trading towns emerged. Charles was also much more tolerant of religious differences between the Protestant north and the Catholic South. With these favorable factors, Bruges became a major trading city and the eastern terminus of the English wool trade. On the other side, it was also connected to the Baltic Hanse network. It was the main entry port to northern Europe for Spanish spices and gold.
But the good times did not last. Philip II, the successor of Charles V was much more ambitious and religiously intolerant. He wanted control of the Low countries as a steppingstone to the reconquest of Europe for Catholicism. The Catholic South was amenable, but the Protestant North resisted. War soon broke out and trade dried up as the Spanish authorities blockaded the coast—Bruges declined. But Antwerp emerged. Originally a small port, but it was as a result off the radar of the Spanish authorities. English wool traders also shifted their business to Antwerp. But only temporarily. With the English reformation (and the creation of the Anglican church), the English were no longer keen to hand business to Spanish ports or trade networks. They set up their own nationally owned (and royally controlled) trading companies. Though Antwerp continued to be a major center for the gold trade (South American Spanish gold continued to come), its status declined. In the newly independent Holland, Amsterdam emerged as a new trading centre—the business community in Antwerp moved en masse to Amsterdam.
Meanwhile, in the east, a new city, a classic “imperial city” was emerging (Chapter 12). Moscow emerged during the Mongol period, as a tax collecting agent for the Mongols. With the proceeds it grew stronger until it was able to fight off the oppressors. The new state centered on Moscow, “Muscovy” was not at all like Kievan Rus which was a loose federation of city states. It was a highly centralized, autocratic, expansionist state. Under Ivan Grozny (Terrible), Russia captured Novgorod, its rival. Further expansion continued all the way to the Baltic coast during Peter the Great's rule. Moscow saw itself as the third Rome, the center of the orthodox world, and inheritor of Byzantium. It was (is) an imperial capital, the heart of empire, rather than a city.
Chapter 13 traces the vicissitudes of the city state in the era of empires and militant nation states. In northern Italy the Napoleonic invasion finally led to the end of Venice which had been hanging on as a relic of its former glory and a destination on many a young man's Grand Tour. In Germany the old hands towns of Bremen, Lubeck and Hamburg survived as Friestadts through the Second Reich (created after the victory in the Franco Prussian war the same one that undid Louis Napoleon). Other cities were swallowed up in empires—but a few survive, Singapore and Malta for example.
Parker starts with a bit of context. Each age, according to him, is dominated by a type of political formation. He identifies four: the city-state, the nation state, the empire, and the federation. From a Eurocentric perspective, the earliest period was dominated by the city state. These gave way to empire and empires collapsed into nation states. Often, we have also seen federations -- of cities or nations. But Parker points out that though one form has predominated at any time, other forms too have coexisted. For example, though the nation-state dominates now, there are also city-states such as Singapore, Malta and Liechtenstein and some nations such as the Russian Federation are empires.
As he chronicles the various forms of the city that have emerged over time, Parker focuses on some key elements: territorial control (or lack thereof), political and administrative structures, economic foundations, and the degree of liberty.
Parker’s account begins with the growth of cities in ancient west Asia. The ancient Philistines occupied the eastern Mediterranean coast between Gaza and Tel Aviv, and the Phoenicians to their north. Both were trading cultures but the Phoenicians had a geographical advantage. Their territory on the landward side was shielded by a dual range of mountains. So the Philistines soon fell to the Israelites (David), but the Phoenicians survived much longer and expanded to the West.
While the Phoenicians were mostly sea-faring, trading cultures with little territorial ambitions (though Carthage, a Phoenician colony did grow to control territory), the Greek city states (chapter 3) created a more enduring connection between itself (the “asty”) and the surrounding countryside (the “chora”). The “asty-chora” structure of the polis was ruled by a variety of political forms, though most polis had rejected monarchy. They had a set of civic institutions (magistracy, council et cetera) and common facilities (temple, gymnasium, baths, agora). But the predominant feature of the Greek polis was its small size that permitted participatory decision-making.
The main problem for the Greek city states was unity. At most times a state of “no war no peace” prevailed. But there was cooperation in the face of an external threat—most notably the Persian invasion (provoked by Athenian support for the Persian vassal cities in Ionia). After the Persian defeat, Athens created the Delian league as a defensive alliance (notably absent—Sparta). But Athens began to show domineering tendencies (within the league as well as outside), leading to the Peloponnesian war with Sparta. Sparta one but both sides were weakened. Sensing opportunity, the Macedonians under Philip and his son Alexander launched an invasion (chapter 4). The Macedonian expansion led to the establishment of more than 70 new city states many named after Alexander. These were modelled on the Greek polis and had their own constitution as well as civic institutions and public and religious buildings most did not survive though some (Alexandria, Egypt) became great urban centers.
Rome's founding (Chapter 5) was contemporary with the Greek city states but resulted in an altogether new model of the city. Parker masterfully identifies the split personality inherent in the Roman model of the city—a profoundly urban and urbane culture that venerated the rural virtues. Prestige was earned through landholdings and the elite, even when enmeshed in city life hankered for the rural life (the legend of Cincinnatus). Parker traces this dichotomy to the very founding of Rome—probably an Etruscan city but with a large Latini population. The emergent city was a cultural amalgam of these two peoples—the city of the Etruscans but with the valorization of rural life and land ownership of the farming Latini.
Rome prioritized control of land from the very beginning, which was a major difference with the Greek city states—instead of celebrating the “polis,” Romans saw the “urbs” as is necessary inconvenience. Desire for land made Rome expansionist. The conflict with Carthage made Rome shift from land power to sea power and from farming to trade—but it also made Rome an empire. The new cities in the expanding empire were modeled after Rome had no self-government or even political identity, other than as provincial capitals or urban centers. Rome itself lost position over time—Constantine founded a rival capital in Byzantium; and when Theodosius split the empire, it was Mediolanum (Milan) that became capital of the western half.
In the 5th century AD, after the collapse of Rome, an entirely new type of city came into being. Venice was founded by refugees escaping the barbarian invasions, at a location at the head of the Adriatic sea, ideally positioned for trade. It was close to the Brenner pass over the Alps, and from there to central Europe, and connected by sea to Constantinople. The relationship to Byzantium was close and symbiotic. There was strong influence of Byzantine art and architecture, but resistance to political control: Venice jealously guarded its sovereignty. In the religious schism, Venice preferred to remain with the Roman church. Internally, politics was free of tyrannical power—the Doge was only a figurehead while power rested with the “merchant princes.” Organizations like Maggiore Consiglio, Council of Ten, etc. divided power with the Doge. Venice’s prosperity was ultimately due to trade with Byzantium. But after centuries of being the “eastern outpost of Byzantium” and “Byzantium’s favorite daughter,” Venice managed to conquer and rule over Byzantium after the fourth crusade.
Cities modeled on Venice came up in northern Italy (Florence, Milan) (Chapter 7). But their position—between state and church—was always fraught. To survive, they had to pool their resources. The Lombard league, the combined forces of northern Italian city states, defeated the Holy Roman Empire. Though the northern Italian cities survived for a time by playing off church and empire, a third front emerged in the form of France that invaded and occupied northern Italy in the 14th century. External threats were only part of the story. Cities also had to contend with different interest groups within—notably the Guelphs who sided with the Vatican and the Ghibellines, with the Emperor. Republicanism hung on until, in city after city, autocrats took over promising to restore order. Example, the Medici in Florence.
Chapter 8 is on the cities in Kievan Rus. With the rise of Byzantium, trade began to flow between northern Europe and the east. Trading settlements emerged along the major route from Scandinavia to Byzantium (along the river Volkov southwards, and then portage to the Dnieper, then down the Dnieper to the Black Sea). Cities emerged along this route—Novgorod first, and later Kiev, Smolensk, Stara Ladoga, Tver, and Pskov. But Kiev was the biggest. It was closely tied to Byzantium, based on its location on the Dnieper. Byzantine emperors appointed Kiev’s rulers and its architecture, customs and religion were all modeled on Byzantium. In politics too, Kiev copied the dyarchy of emperor and patriarch, through joint rule of the Kievan prince and the Bishop of Kiev. Kiev was the foremost Russian city at this time, though it could never get status as the capital. The region was called “Kievan Rus.”
But when the Mongols attacked in the 13th century, Kiev fell quickly. Since it was on the edge of the steppe (compared to other Russian cities deeper in the forest and further West), Kiev was defenseless against the horsemen. Also, Kievan Rus was a loose federation, no one came to Kiev’s aid. But Kiev’s decline had begun even earlier. In 1204, the fourth crusade had conquered Byzantium and replaced it with a Latin kingdom. This was the goal of Venice that had bankrolled the 4th crusade. With the fall of Byzantium, Kiev 's main trade partner was no longer there—the Mongol invasion was only the last straw.
With Kiev in Mongol hands, and trade now directed further east to the Mongol capital at Sarai Batu on the Volga, Novgorod came to dominate. Simultaneously, southern Europe was beginning to weaken (Venice-Byzantium-Kiev), in favor of northern Europe (the Teutonic league). Novgorod, farther to the north, was much better suited for trade with northern Europe. Trade from Novgorod bypassed Kiev and went straight to Sarai Batu. Novgorod was also very different from Kiev. If Kiev was an autocratic dyarchy of king and bishop, Novgorod was controlled by its merchants. It was much more republican in character with several kings sent packing after trying to rule by force. It was more of a city state in the Greek sense than Kiev was.
A league of cities, akin to the Lombard league in northern Italy, was emerging in northern Europe too (Chapter 9)—the Hanseatic League. Cities had slowly come up on the eastern fringe of the Holy Roman (German) Empire and along the coast of the Baltic. One fascinating example is Lubeck, which first emerged as a staging point for the trade for goods from Hamburg to the east. Hamburg faced the western flank of the Denmark peninsula, and ships had to make the long circumambulation of the peninsula before proceeding eastward. Someone came up with the idea of porting goods to the eastern side and shipping from there—this little terminus on the sea because Lubeck, eventually a major port in its own right.
Hamburg, Lubeck and other trading settlements at Danzig, Riga, Reval (Tallinn), etc. banded together to protect their trade and became the Hanseatic League. When territorial states such as Denmark tried to muscle in on the Baltic trade, the Hanse defeated them in battle—mirroring the Lombard League’s earlier exploits against the Holy Roman Empire. Several factors contributed to the success of the Hanse. (1) they were expanding into territory outside the established states; (2) their emergence coincided with a period of weakness for the Holy Roman Empire (Frederick Barbarossa killed in the third crusade) and other kingdoms (Russia devastated by the Mongols, Sweden yet to emerge).
Though they struggled to assert their independence against the territorial states, the Hanse city states were internally oligarchies where the patrician class dominated. But unlike the Guelph-Ghibelline paralysis that led to autocratic rule in the Italian states, the Hanse remain partially democratic throughout.
Chapter 10 shifts focus to cities in Castile/Spain. After the Reconquista, a new Spanish state emerged as a union of Castile (Isabella) and Aragon (Ferdinand). To increase the production of armor and weaponry, the state gave concessions to trade groups and cities. Having tasted limited autonomy, the cities wanted more – a league of 18 cities formed in 1500. But the Spanish king (also the Holy Roman Emperor and Ferdinand and Isabella 's grandson) Charles V was not amenable. The revolt of the cities was crushed. Autonomy was a short-lived dream; the city state lost decisively to the territorial state. The Spanish state that emerged was highly centralized, authoritarian, theocratic, and aggressive. Interestingly, oppression was not the catalyst for revolt: the cities in the formerly Muslim states in Andalusia were the most strictly governed, but they did not revolt. Those that did were in the north, that had tasted half freedom.
From Spain, Parker moves in Chapter 11 to cities in the Low countries (Belgium and the Netherlands, once united), an easy move since these too were once Spanish possessions. As an inheritance from his father, the Duke of Burgundy, the Low countries were part of the domains of Charles, the Spanish king. Located at the intersection of the north-south trade route (using the Rhine) and the east-west Baltic trade route, the Low country—especially Bruges—was ideally placed to be a hub. Charles himself was indulgent: he was born in Ghent and had a deep affection for the region. With his encouragement, a number of small, independent trading towns emerged. Charles was also much more tolerant of religious differences between the Protestant north and the Catholic South. With these favorable factors, Bruges became a major trading city and the eastern terminus of the English wool trade. On the other side, it was also connected to the Baltic Hanse network. It was the main entry port to northern Europe for Spanish spices and gold.
But the good times did not last. Philip II, the successor of Charles V was much more ambitious and religiously intolerant. He wanted control of the Low countries as a steppingstone to the reconquest of Europe for Catholicism. The Catholic South was amenable, but the Protestant North resisted. War soon broke out and trade dried up as the Spanish authorities blockaded the coast—Bruges declined. But Antwerp emerged. Originally a small port, but it was as a result off the radar of the Spanish authorities. English wool traders also shifted their business to Antwerp. But only temporarily. With the English reformation (and the creation of the Anglican church), the English were no longer keen to hand business to Spanish ports or trade networks. They set up their own nationally owned (and royally controlled) trading companies. Though Antwerp continued to be a major center for the gold trade (South American Spanish gold continued to come), its status declined. In the newly independent Holland, Amsterdam emerged as a new trading centre—the business community in Antwerp moved en masse to Amsterdam.
Meanwhile, in the east, a new city, a classic “imperial city” was emerging (Chapter 12). Moscow emerged during the Mongol period, as a tax collecting agent for the Mongols. With the proceeds it grew stronger until it was able to fight off the oppressors. The new state centered on Moscow, “Muscovy” was not at all like Kievan Rus which was a loose federation of city states. It was a highly centralized, autocratic, expansionist state. Under Ivan Grozny (Terrible), Russia captured Novgorod, its rival. Further expansion continued all the way to the Baltic coast during Peter the Great's rule. Moscow saw itself as the third Rome, the center of the orthodox world, and inheritor of Byzantium. It was (is) an imperial capital, the heart of empire, rather than a city.
Chapter 13 traces the vicissitudes of the city state in the era of empires and militant nation states. In northern Italy the Napoleonic invasion finally led to the end of Venice which had been hanging on as a relic of its former glory and a destination on many a young man's Grand Tour. In Germany the old hands towns of Bremen, Lubeck and Hamburg survived as Friestadts through the Second Reich (created after the victory in the Franco Prussian war the same one that undid Louis Napoleon). Other cities were swallowed up in empires—but a few survive, Singapore and Malta for example.
August 9, 2016
Despite the book being a little bland and tailored to undergraduate political science students, I thought the writer did an admirable job of presenting a history of the city-state. City-states are the ideal form of political unit. They do not present the problems of Empires and often are thought of as the state every large and unwieldy political community should aim towards. This is not often appreciated and Parker gets this message across. He also elaborates on the dichotomy of city vs country and the various interpretations 'city' can yield to. Well written and nicely paced, an enjoyable read.
July 9, 2017
This is a really interesting survey placing city-states in the historical context from Ancient Greece and Rome to the present day. Many of the arguments made by Parker with regards to "city-states" could apply to cities and are relevant today as we are perhaps seeing the nation state in crisis. Although this book goes into a really great level of detail about city states in ancient times, it very much rushes through the present time. Therefore, if there are going to be future editions of this book, I would very much like to see the discussion and the description elaborated upon for the 19th, 20th and 21st century city states.
November 27, 2014
High-level surveys often provide hints as to where to go next. The bibliography here is less dense than I would hope. Though really, Braudel does add weight to anything. A decent overview with some thought as to a typology.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews