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Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy
Disrupt and Deny is the untold story behind Britain's secret scheming against both enemies and friends from 1945 to the present day.
British leaders use spies and Special Forces to interfere in the affairs of others discreetly and deniably. Since 1945, MI6 has spread misinformation designed to divide and discredit targets from the Middle East to Eastern Europe and Northern Ireland. It has instigated whispering campaigns and planted false evidence on officials working behind the Iron Curtain, tried to foment revolution in Albania, blown up ships to prevent the passage of refugees to Israel, and secretly funnelled aid to insurgents in Afghanistan and dissidents in Poland. MI6 has launched cultural and economic warfare against Iceland and Czechoslovakia. It has tried to instigate coups in Congo, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and elsewhere. Through bribery and blackmail, Britain has rigged elections as colonies moved to independence. Britain has fought secret wars in Yemen, Indonesia, and Oman - and discreetly used Special Forces to eliminate enemies from colonial Malaya to Libya during the Arab Spring.
This is covert a vital, though controversial, tool of statecraft and perhaps the most sensitive of all government activity. If used wisely, it can play an important role in pursuing national interests in a dangerous world. If used poorly, it can cause political scandal - or worse.
In Disrupt and Deny , Rory Cormac tells the remarkable true story of Britain's secret scheming against its enemies, as well as its friends; of intrigue and manoeuvring within the darkest corridors of Whitehall, where officials fought to maintain control of this most sensitive and seductive work; and, above all, of Britain's attempt to use smoke and mirrors to mask decline. He reveals hitherto secret operations, the slush funds that paid for them, and the battles in Whitehall that shaped them.
British leaders use spies and Special Forces to interfere in the affairs of others discreetly and deniably. Since 1945, MI6 has spread misinformation designed to divide and discredit targets from the Middle East to Eastern Europe and Northern Ireland. It has instigated whispering campaigns and planted false evidence on officials working behind the Iron Curtain, tried to foment revolution in Albania, blown up ships to prevent the passage of refugees to Israel, and secretly funnelled aid to insurgents in Afghanistan and dissidents in Poland. MI6 has launched cultural and economic warfare against Iceland and Czechoslovakia. It has tried to instigate coups in Congo, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and elsewhere. Through bribery and blackmail, Britain has rigged elections as colonies moved to independence. Britain has fought secret wars in Yemen, Indonesia, and Oman - and discreetly used Special Forces to eliminate enemies from colonial Malaya to Libya during the Arab Spring.
This is covert a vital, though controversial, tool of statecraft and perhaps the most sensitive of all government activity. If used wisely, it can play an important role in pursuing national interests in a dangerous world. If used poorly, it can cause political scandal - or worse.
In Disrupt and Deny , Rory Cormac tells the remarkable true story of Britain's secret scheming against its enemies, as well as its friends; of intrigue and manoeuvring within the darkest corridors of Whitehall, where officials fought to maintain control of this most sensitive and seductive work; and, above all, of Britain's attempt to use smoke and mirrors to mask decline. He reveals hitherto secret operations, the slush funds that paid for them, and the battles in Whitehall that shaped them.
408 pages, Paperback
First published July 10, 2018
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302 people want to read
About the author
Rory Cormac
12 books10 followersRory Cormac is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and a leading expert among a new generation of intelligence historians, he specialises in British covert operations and the secret pursuit of foreign policy.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
February 13, 2019
For decades now James Bond has vied with the queen as the personification of Britain for the rest of the world. This is perhaps more appropriate than many realize, for as Rory Cormac documents in his book covert action — a term denoting activities ranging from propaganda efforts to direct political and economic manipulation —has emerged in the postwar era as a prominent tool of British foreign policy. His book describes the development of this approach, as well as its successes in failures in achieving British goals in an era of imperial decline and global eclipse by the postwar superpowers.
The employment of covert action was not something that the British embraced at first. Though Britain has a long history of intelligence activities, Cormac notes that it was not until the Second World War that the British professionalized their efforts. In the aftermath of the war, the Foreign Office took over the direction of intelligence activities abroad, a move with important ramifications for their subsequent employment. Though the first foreign secretary to exercise this control, Ernest Bevin, was initially reluctant to utilize covert action, deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union soon led to its employment in response to Soviet aggression. Often in close cooperation with the Americans, British covert activities increasingly became a preferred tool of achieving British aims, albeit not always successfully.
This was true as well in the areas of Britain's former imperial control. Here British leaders were far less reluctant, seeing covert action as a useful means of maintaining influence in areas long viewed as part of their sphere of influence. Over time, however, the use of covert activities proved increasingly controversial politically, and nowhere was this more true than in Northern Ireland. With the ongoing Troubles the region soon became a hive of intelligence activity in the aftermath of the army's failure to restore peace, though many of the activities operated in a grey zone legally. By the end of the Cold War, though, covert action was nonetheless established as a useful tool for achieving Britain's goals abroad, one employed down to the present day.
Cormac's book offers a highly enlightening overview of an often little understood dimension of British foreign policy. While many of the details may be familiar from the reporting of journalists and the revelations of headline-grabbing memoirists, Cormac's archival digging and inter-connective analysis exposes the degree to which covert activities have established themselves as an essential tool of policy execution. Though stronger in its earlier chapters (reflecting perhaps the greater abundance of information available to him), this is nonetheless a book that will be enjoyed by students of both the history of British intelligence and of postwar British foreign policy. By shining a light into these long-shadowed activities, Cormac has helped us to better understand the role they have long played, even if it was unappreciated both and the time and for decades afterward.
The employment of covert action was not something that the British embraced at first. Though Britain has a long history of intelligence activities, Cormac notes that it was not until the Second World War that the British professionalized their efforts. In the aftermath of the war, the Foreign Office took over the direction of intelligence activities abroad, a move with important ramifications for their subsequent employment. Though the first foreign secretary to exercise this control, Ernest Bevin, was initially reluctant to utilize covert action, deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union soon led to its employment in response to Soviet aggression. Often in close cooperation with the Americans, British covert activities increasingly became a preferred tool of achieving British aims, albeit not always successfully.
This was true as well in the areas of Britain's former imperial control. Here British leaders were far less reluctant, seeing covert action as a useful means of maintaining influence in areas long viewed as part of their sphere of influence. Over time, however, the use of covert activities proved increasingly controversial politically, and nowhere was this more true than in Northern Ireland. With the ongoing Troubles the region soon became a hive of intelligence activity in the aftermath of the army's failure to restore peace, though many of the activities operated in a grey zone legally. By the end of the Cold War, though, covert action was nonetheless established as a useful tool for achieving Britain's goals abroad, one employed down to the present day.
Cormac's book offers a highly enlightening overview of an often little understood dimension of British foreign policy. While many of the details may be familiar from the reporting of journalists and the revelations of headline-grabbing memoirists, Cormac's archival digging and inter-connective analysis exposes the degree to which covert activities have established themselves as an essential tool of policy execution. Though stronger in its earlier chapters (reflecting perhaps the greater abundance of information available to him), this is nonetheless a book that will be enjoyed by students of both the history of British intelligence and of postwar British foreign policy. By shining a light into these long-shadowed activities, Cormac has helped us to better understand the role they have long played, even if it was unappreciated both and the time and for decades afterward.
November 22, 2020
Evidently thoroughly researched piece, though equally evidently not written for persons who are not fascinated by the narrow field of UK policy relating to covert actions. The author analyses methodically the policy changes relating to covert activity over the entire post-WWII period. Not surprisingly, the details of specific operations undertaken are rather sparse, given the dearth of available information. It can be safely assumed that much of the source information could not be consulted as it had not been released, and likely may not be released in the near future, or possibly ever for that matter. The result is a book which lacks action detail, but overcompensates this by describing the changing composition of the government structures responsible for covert activities and, specifically, for overseeing the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the primary service vested with covert activities. The changing oversight structures in turn impacted the keenness of the UK government to engage in covert activity, or vice versa, as the causal relationship was clearly two-sided. Overall, undoubtedly a very interesting book for many people. The old saying of “different horses for different courses” would seem to apply, though.
May 25, 2019
Fascinating and enjoyable post-1945 history of British intelligence, propaganda, and special operations. Very readable, with some interesting insights, lessons and especially the national characteristics of UK covert work rooted in colonial rule (empire is about information management, as the author points out) formed over more than half a century by necessity: withdrawal from empire, very limited resources, labyrinthine Whitehall infighting, increasing subservience to Washington's aims and gradually changing strategic policy aimed at masking decline, though the general right-wingery and imperial (and racist) impulses of the players still seem to get in the way of clarity of national self-interest. The work would have deserved five stars but for one our two inaccuracies as well as the odd infelicity of grammar and syntax which the editors should have caught. The author admits that short-term successes in covert action don't necessarily (seldom?) translate into strategic success. Indeed, the British seem to take an increasingly short-term view, especially under people like David Cameron with a short attention span and no real idea of where Britain is heading, or should be heading. Interesting, too, is the way in which GCHQ has become increasingly operational, and how all the players - SIS, Foreign office, GCHQ - have become increasingly fused together. The question has to be: would the world be any different, worse or better, had these operations not been authorised? Would the well-being of British citizens be any worse? Probably not. So anxious is Westminster and Whitehall to win and maintain Washington's approval that they have all too often sight of Britain's own interests. That should surely change.
August 29, 2022
This book frames a small sliver of covert operations known as cover action. It’s not intel-gathering, it’s subversive operations that are discussed. Sabotage, planting material, propaganda were on the table for the period between the Second World War and the war on terror.
What was highlighted more often than not in the materials available to the author was Britain’s self restraint. They don’t coup left and right like the CIA according to the author, but emphasize self restraint in the interference used in foreign policy even at the covert level.
Writing wise, this book is a tad sleepy. It is Oxford University Press, so the academic audience isn’t usually in it for the prose but I did trail off while reading at points.
What was highlighted more often than not in the materials available to the author was Britain’s self restraint. They don’t coup left and right like the CIA according to the author, but emphasize self restraint in the interference used in foreign policy even at the covert level.
Writing wise, this book is a tad sleepy. It is Oxford University Press, so the academic audience isn’t usually in it for the prose but I did trail off while reading at points.
November 7, 2021
Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy by Rory Cormac, 394 pp., Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2018.
The front cover is misleading. The extended arm and the hand holding an automatic pistol with silencer attached (yes, I know it’s really a suppressor) summons visions of James Bond. Actually, the book is an academic study of the decades-long attempts of the British government to control covert action and integrate it into foreign policy. It is not light reading.
In the aftermath of WWII, Britain undertook covert actions for two purposes: to maintain influence in former colonies and/or to prevent the spread of communism. Those actions were pursued in Eastern Europe, and in colonies and the Commonwealth nations in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Peninsula. They were generally defensive and unsuccessful. Reasons included the lack of manpower and finance, concern for world opinion, moral reservations of government leaders, competition among the cabinet departments, and a failure to understand and use the capabilities of special forces. Further, strategic planning was impossible because territories of the empire were in different stages of their transition to independence and were dealing with different ideologies, from nationalism to communism.
Britain formed a rough partnership with the United States, with the CIA providing money and the British providing networks, experience, and manpower. Actions undertaken, with or without the CIA, were rarely successful and, sometimes, spectacular failures. Attempts to undermine the communist regime in Albania reads like a Le Carré novel. Plans were ill-conceived, incompetently executed, and characterized by conflicting goals, competing émigré groups, a misunderstanding of tribal politics, distribution of propaganda leaflets to illiterates, and insertion teams being chased out empty-handed, killed, captured, or doubled back against the CIA.
Parts of this book are interesting and even exciting. Others are reminiscent of sitting through that dull history class, memorizing names, facts, and dates. The missing elements are clear statements of national interests, the foreign policy supporting those interest, and how covert action served (or did not serve) the national interests in each area where such actions were undertaken. Lacking that context, the discussions of the machinery of covert action and the London bureaucratic infighting is like reading a killer’s description of how his gun was made and how it worked (or didn’t), without getting to the reasons for the murders.
The 1956 coup in Iran is a rare exception. The reader is informed that the British could have lost substantia oil revenue and control of a strategic resource if the oil industry had been nationalized or controlled by a pro-communist government. Similarly, the most detailed, lucid, interesting, and explicitly violent section of the book was Chapter 11, dealing with the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. Britain’s national security interest was clear, as was the dilemma of using covert actions against its own citizens. Foes of the state were more lethal than those overseas. The state responded in kind, employing the full spectrum of covert actions, from white propaganda to death squads. Politicians were more united in their propensity to use covert action at home, but organization, command, and control of those actions were muddled and decentralized by design, to shield those politicians from accountability. It is ironic that the most varied, violent, and persistent covert actions were reserved for use against British citizens in Northern Ireland.
The book is well documented, with over a hundred of its 349 pages devoted to footnotes, a bibliography, and an index. It could have been made more engaging by linking each geographical area’s covert actions to specific national security objectives and results, and by providing a timeline showing where and when covert actions took place, and the key covert action players and their impact on the process. Absent those elements, the book’s primary appeal is to academics (as indicated by the back cover blurbs from professors) and those interested in the nuts and bolts of covert action at the national level. Spy thriller enthusiasts need not bother.
The front cover is misleading. The extended arm and the hand holding an automatic pistol with silencer attached (yes, I know it’s really a suppressor) summons visions of James Bond. Actually, the book is an academic study of the decades-long attempts of the British government to control covert action and integrate it into foreign policy. It is not light reading.
In the aftermath of WWII, Britain undertook covert actions for two purposes: to maintain influence in former colonies and/or to prevent the spread of communism. Those actions were pursued in Eastern Europe, and in colonies and the Commonwealth nations in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Peninsula. They were generally defensive and unsuccessful. Reasons included the lack of manpower and finance, concern for world opinion, moral reservations of government leaders, competition among the cabinet departments, and a failure to understand and use the capabilities of special forces. Further, strategic planning was impossible because territories of the empire were in different stages of their transition to independence and were dealing with different ideologies, from nationalism to communism.
Britain formed a rough partnership with the United States, with the CIA providing money and the British providing networks, experience, and manpower. Actions undertaken, with or without the CIA, were rarely successful and, sometimes, spectacular failures. Attempts to undermine the communist regime in Albania reads like a Le Carré novel. Plans were ill-conceived, incompetently executed, and characterized by conflicting goals, competing émigré groups, a misunderstanding of tribal politics, distribution of propaganda leaflets to illiterates, and insertion teams being chased out empty-handed, killed, captured, or doubled back against the CIA.
Parts of this book are interesting and even exciting. Others are reminiscent of sitting through that dull history class, memorizing names, facts, and dates. The missing elements are clear statements of national interests, the foreign policy supporting those interest, and how covert action served (or did not serve) the national interests in each area where such actions were undertaken. Lacking that context, the discussions of the machinery of covert action and the London bureaucratic infighting is like reading a killer’s description of how his gun was made and how it worked (or didn’t), without getting to the reasons for the murders.
The 1956 coup in Iran is a rare exception. The reader is informed that the British could have lost substantia oil revenue and control of a strategic resource if the oil industry had been nationalized or controlled by a pro-communist government. Similarly, the most detailed, lucid, interesting, and explicitly violent section of the book was Chapter 11, dealing with the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. Britain’s national security interest was clear, as was the dilemma of using covert actions against its own citizens. Foes of the state were more lethal than those overseas. The state responded in kind, employing the full spectrum of covert actions, from white propaganda to death squads. Politicians were more united in their propensity to use covert action at home, but organization, command, and control of those actions were muddled and decentralized by design, to shield those politicians from accountability. It is ironic that the most varied, violent, and persistent covert actions were reserved for use against British citizens in Northern Ireland.
The book is well documented, with over a hundred of its 349 pages devoted to footnotes, a bibliography, and an index. It could have been made more engaging by linking each geographical area’s covert actions to specific national security objectives and results, and by providing a timeline showing where and when covert actions took place, and the key covert action players and their impact on the process. Absent those elements, the book’s primary appeal is to academics (as indicated by the back cover blurbs from professors) and those interested in the nuts and bolts of covert action at the national level. Spy thriller enthusiasts need not bother.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews