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Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II
In this engaging narrative, brought to life by marine artist Ian Marshall’s beautiful full-color paintings, historian Paul Kennedy grapples with the rise and fall of the Great Powers during World War II. Tracking the movements of the six major navies of the Second World War—the allied navies of Britain, France, and the United States and the Axis navies of Germany, Italy, and Japan—Kennedy tells a story of naval battles, maritime campaigns, convoys, amphibious landings, and strikes from the sea. From the elimination of the Italian, German, and Japanese fleets and almost all of the French fleet, to the end of the era of the big-gunned surface vessel, the advent of the atomic bomb, and the rise of an American economic and military power larger than anything the world had ever seen, Kennedy shows how the strategic landscape for naval affairs was completely altered between 1936 and 1946.
544 pages, Hardcover
First published April 26, 2022
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627 people want to read
About the author
Paul Kennedy
151 books275 followersPaul Michael Kennedy is a British historian specialising in the history of international relations, economic power and grand strategy. He has published prominent books on the history of British foreign policy and Great Power struggles.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
July 13, 2022
An interesting book – even an elegant one in many respects. Kennedy looks at the three sea wars of World War II – the Pacific campaign, the war of the Atlantic, and the naval conflict in the Mediterranean – was three interrelated pieces of the global war in its entirety, not three separate and distinct events. He defines the global war itself as comprised of six great theaters of war – the three ocean theaters plus the German-Soviet Eastern Front, the invasion of France and the Japanese invasion of mainland China. Although he expends little attention to the three land campaigns, he does reference them in terms of the vital nature of the three ocean campaigns. Allied success over the course of the war was inextricably tied to success at sea.
Each of the three ocean theaters was different in character, geography, positional effects, combatants, strategies and tactics and the underlying technical resources and industrial depth of support among the powers at war. He focusses on the six naval powers predominant at the onset of war – the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan of which only three were true great powers at sea.
The other three were emerging naval powers caught up in a conflict that exceeded their capacity to respond, to operate and to adapt and pursue national objectives. Germany despite its superb technology an ship design was hampered by limited access, limited ship numbers except U-boats, and limited understanding of how to builds and use naval power. France, also gifted with excellent ships and naval technology, was neutered with its fall in 1940. Italy – another builder of excellent warships – was severely constricted by geography (the tight confines of the Mediterranean) and combat reticence for lack of adequate air cover.
Kennedy does not dwell on individual battles or specific events, using them to illustrate his broader perspectives of the effects of geographical realities, the changing technology and industrial outputs, the advent of new weapons, tactics and strategy, naval doctrines and implementation as induced by distinctive national strategies and histories, and how this myriad of factors often unique to each of the three ocean theaters yet interlinked to affect the outcomes, both at sea and on land. For example, he discusses the convoy battles against the German U-boat campaign. Conventional wisdom maintains that the vast industrial output of the US, building merchant ships faster than the U-boats could sink them was the key to victory. Kennedy argues (at length throughout the book) that it was the actual physical defeat of the U-boats that was the decisive factor. Had the U-boats not been decisively defeated and subsequently withdrawn from the Atlantic, things would have been different – certainly more difficult and problematic.
He has very interesting and cogent observations on submarine warfare and its differing implementation among the six naval powers. As has been observed elsewhere, Japan’s failure to recognize the importance of logistics and fleet support, not to mention commerce interdiction such practiced by German and US submarine forces, was a huge factor in their frankly inevitable defeat.
Kennedy is clearly Anglo-centric in his approach ... Great Britain at sea is his interest. Thus the Atlantic theater (including Norway, Bismarck and the Baltic) is largely confined to the North Atlantic (the prime geographic focus of British efforts) with an occasional nod to the south Atlantic convoys (mostly a US effort) supporting the African landings an subsequent amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. US participation in the battles of the North Atlantic are barely recognized. Similarly the Herculean convoy battles of the Mediterranean theater (virtually exclusively British) are more attended to than the Pacific campaign – a vast US theater of war. He gamely draws little distinction in the Pacific between the US forces and the British naval contingent even though the later was late to the party and in limited numbers until the after the defeat of Germany. Nevertheless in examining the Pacific theater he writes extensively of American navies and operations and actions because that is what they were – from the same overall perspective of geography, position, industry and technology, and doctrines that is the theme of the book. So I found that mildly annoying, but understandable given his heritage.
Other annoyances include some odd anomalies that perhaps are editing oversights. For example, discussing the emergence of a new weapon system, he writes “... and this took less than two years (November 1943 to July 1944).” It appears to me that if so, that actually took less than one year. Another nit-picky example, he refers to a US submarine as a “U-boat.” Technically, any submarine is an Undersee Boat but “U-boat” is a term so inextricably and definitionally bound to German subs that it is jarring used otherwise.
And finally, the illustrations used are just not what I would have liked. The artist whose work comprises all of the illustrations in the book was renowned in his field, and a colleague and friend of the author’s so again, I understand the homage paid. But the art is hazy – akin to impressionist watercolor work, lacking definition and detail. It is very good art and I actually like it, but not so much for illustrating a history of victory at sea – more suitable for a coffee table book of naval art of the World War II era. But, annoyances aside, this is a book well worth the read, and a macro perspective and analysis of the Allied victory at sea that is cogent and stimulating.
Each of the three ocean theaters was different in character, geography, positional effects, combatants, strategies and tactics and the underlying technical resources and industrial depth of support among the powers at war. He focusses on the six naval powers predominant at the onset of war – the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan of which only three were true great powers at sea.
The other three were emerging naval powers caught up in a conflict that exceeded their capacity to respond, to operate and to adapt and pursue national objectives. Germany despite its superb technology an ship design was hampered by limited access, limited ship numbers except U-boats, and limited understanding of how to builds and use naval power. France, also gifted with excellent ships and naval technology, was neutered with its fall in 1940. Italy – another builder of excellent warships – was severely constricted by geography (the tight confines of the Mediterranean) and combat reticence for lack of adequate air cover.
Kennedy does not dwell on individual battles or specific events, using them to illustrate his broader perspectives of the effects of geographical realities, the changing technology and industrial outputs, the advent of new weapons, tactics and strategy, naval doctrines and implementation as induced by distinctive national strategies and histories, and how this myriad of factors often unique to each of the three ocean theaters yet interlinked to affect the outcomes, both at sea and on land. For example, he discusses the convoy battles against the German U-boat campaign. Conventional wisdom maintains that the vast industrial output of the US, building merchant ships faster than the U-boats could sink them was the key to victory. Kennedy argues (at length throughout the book) that it was the actual physical defeat of the U-boats that was the decisive factor. Had the U-boats not been decisively defeated and subsequently withdrawn from the Atlantic, things would have been different – certainly more difficult and problematic.
He has very interesting and cogent observations on submarine warfare and its differing implementation among the six naval powers. As has been observed elsewhere, Japan’s failure to recognize the importance of logistics and fleet support, not to mention commerce interdiction such practiced by German and US submarine forces, was a huge factor in their frankly inevitable defeat.
Kennedy is clearly Anglo-centric in his approach ... Great Britain at sea is his interest. Thus the Atlantic theater (including Norway, Bismarck and the Baltic) is largely confined to the North Atlantic (the prime geographic focus of British efforts) with an occasional nod to the south Atlantic convoys (mostly a US effort) supporting the African landings an subsequent amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. US participation in the battles of the North Atlantic are barely recognized. Similarly the Herculean convoy battles of the Mediterranean theater (virtually exclusively British) are more attended to than the Pacific campaign – a vast US theater of war. He gamely draws little distinction in the Pacific between the US forces and the British naval contingent even though the later was late to the party and in limited numbers until the after the defeat of Germany. Nevertheless in examining the Pacific theater he writes extensively of American navies and operations and actions because that is what they were – from the same overall perspective of geography, position, industry and technology, and doctrines that is the theme of the book. So I found that mildly annoying, but understandable given his heritage.
Other annoyances include some odd anomalies that perhaps are editing oversights. For example, discussing the emergence of a new weapon system, he writes “... and this took less than two years (November 1943 to July 1944).” It appears to me that if so, that actually took less than one year. Another nit-picky example, he refers to a US submarine as a “U-boat.” Technically, any submarine is an Undersee Boat but “U-boat” is a term so inextricably and definitionally bound to German subs that it is jarring used otherwise.
And finally, the illustrations used are just not what I would have liked. The artist whose work comprises all of the illustrations in the book was renowned in his field, and a colleague and friend of the author’s so again, I understand the homage paid. But the art is hazy – akin to impressionist watercolor work, lacking definition and detail. It is very good art and I actually like it, but not so much for illustrating a history of victory at sea – more suitable for a coffee table book of naval art of the World War II era. But, annoyances aside, this is a book well worth the read, and a macro perspective and analysis of the Allied victory at sea that is cogent and stimulating.
March 1, 2022
A well done and beautifully illustrated book. The artwork is amazing and sure to please. A great book for the naval and historical enthusiast!
Thank you to #NetGalley for the ARC in exchange for my honest review.
Thank you to #NetGalley for the ARC in exchange for my honest review.
December 28, 2022
I believe that there was too much emphasis on the war in the Atlantic in this book. The book certainly has an Anglo slant. There is very little discussion of the participation of the U.S. Navy in the North Atlantic. I objected to Kennedy calling U.S. submarines "U-boats". I was not as enabored as others here by the book's artwork. Most of these water colored prints were too fuzzy and blurred for my taste. Don't expect much detail in the description of sea battles, for the most part they are but brief summaries. The Battle at Midway is described in five short paragraphs.
I do agree with Kennedy that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to bring the war with Japan to an end and in doing so saved lives. Continued air bombings of its cities and strangling of food and supplies by an Allied naval blockade would have resulted in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of more Japanese deaths.
I do agree with Kennedy that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to bring the war with Japan to an end and in doing so saved lives. Continued air bombings of its cities and strangling of food and supplies by an Allied naval blockade would have resulted in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of more Japanese deaths.
January 15, 2023
An excellent and in-depth look at the war at sea from both the Axis and Allies points of view. Mr. Kennedy describes both the strengths and weaknesses of all navies involved and provides explanation as to how the outcomes might have been different if actions were adjusted even slightly. Well worth the time investment to read.
January 14, 2023
Victory at Sea charts a broad-brush history of naval power and conflict from the lead-up to the Second World War and through. As is the case for any such single-volume work, it cannot cover things in detail, but has to choose to focus on a theme, and for Kennedy (unsurprisingly, given his experience and expertise) the underlying theme is on the economics and capacity for war that underpinned the great naval conflict. Thus, while the discussion covers most of the expected conflicts and battles, it is done from the perspective of shifts in productive capacity, and the strategic factors that influence maritime power, as well as discussing tangentially and briefly the impact on maritime power on the conflict more broadly. It is a fairly gentle read, and there’s no need to learn scores of names of officers or ships – things move from one place to another sith a steady clip.
As well as the text, the book contains 53 paintings by maritime artist Ian Marshall and, indeed, the project start as a text just around those paintings, before developing into what it is. The books uses good quality stock that shows the paintings off well, and many are provided over two-page spreads for full effect (although sadly affected by some guttering). The paintings are excellent, with phenomenal attention to detail. They have a somewhat abstract approach, and may not be to everyone’s tastes, but they show an accuracy that highlights the artist’s deep interest in naval matters.
The text of the book is very hard to review. Substantial amounts of it do a good job of accurately telling a story (Anglo-American focussed – there are barely references to the Soviet Navy, beyond that it was said “to fight only in the Far North of Europe” – the Black Sea struggles being entirely omitted, and the Baltic struggles only referred to in the briefest of terms), but it is strewn with errors of detail, and occasional more broad errors, such as statements that the Italian Fleet surrendered (it didn’t, it remained under Italian command, and indeed less than a week after arriving at Malta had detached units to operate with Allied navies as co-belligerents). Any work contains errors of detail, of course, but the number in this book, particularly early on, give it a very unpromising start to readers who have a bit more background in the naval history of the period. Chapter 2, the worst, probably averaged more than one error per page. Examples (of which there were far more) include the Royal Oak being described as unmodernised (in fact, she was the only ship of her class that had undergone much in the way of modernisation), the claim that Japanese aerial torpedoes at the start of the war were far larger than those in other navies (the US Mk 13 at the start of the Pacific War was actually heavier) and a couple of odd references to Geary (presumably Gearing) class destroyers.
The analysis contains more than a few questionable arguments. For example, at one point, the astounding statement is made that the Scharnhorst class were much less impressive than the dated, slower and lesser-armoured Kongo class. Then there is the remarkable suggestion that a cruiser’s tonnage did not have an impact on how easy it was to sink, to make the (incorrect, I would argue) case that a larger cruiser had no advantages when facing air or submarine attack. One of the underlying threads of the book talks of the waning of the battleship, but then takes it too far, stating in the first chapter that there were no battleships extant in 1948 except for those mothballed in the US (in 1948 the US, Britain, USSR, France and Italy all had battleships in commission). The final stages of the book hammer the point home further with the statement that “Billy Mitchell was right”, as evidenced by the sinking of the Yamato – quite the claim, given the 20-odd years in technological development between Mitchell’s claims and Yamato’s sinking, and the overwhelming force used to sink Yamato. There wasn’t a warship of any type afloat that could have stood up to the huge aerial attack – if being destroyed by 280 aircraft attacking virtually unopposed made something obsolete, that would have called the curtain on far more than just the battleship (this is not to say that the battleship wasn’t well past its prime and certainly was no longer the prime method of naval force projection by the end of the Second World War, but its career wasn’t quite over yet (seeing service in the Korean War, Vietnam War and even the 1991 Gulf War). Most of the same, tired myths about the Italian Navy get trotted out again as well.
Underpinning these issues, one suspects, is an over-reliance on questionable or shallow sources for information. Time and again a reference for something relating to an action or technical detail is linked back to Wikipedia, and Wikipedia is no substitute for a robust work written by a naval historian. Indeed, “Victory at Sea” could be seen as a case study of why books still matter, and why relying on Wikipedia/Google yields substandard results. Not always (one of the sites cited is the excellent armouredcarriers.com, for example) but often enough that it’s a significant blemish on the work. When books are referenced, the way sources are described was often-enough off the mark to make it worth mentioning – it is certainly not the case that the greatest detail in English on the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon is Wikipedia (now, or back in 2020, when it was referenced for the book – the article in Warship 2013 for example is substantially more detailed). The book is very strong when sourcing longer-run economic/strategic sources, but inconsistent and often very weak when referencing sources of particular navies in World War II (for example, the sources given as the ‘best English-language” for the development of the IJN up to WW2 exclude Peattie and Evans’ Kaigun – a significantly stronger source than either of the two listed, despite it being listed in the bibliography). Boyd’s The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters, an account that only goes until mid-1942, is listed as an example of an extremely positive account of the activities of the British Pacific Fleet, which wasn’t formed until late 1944. All up, narratively the book relies very heavily on the official histories by Morison and Roskill which in many situations stands it in good stead when talking about the Anglo-American navies, but means discussion of the Regia Marina, for example, suffers heavily, and discussions of the Imperial Japanese Navy could be better.
The standard of writing is robust, and it is an easy and accessible read – although the loose and frequent application of “brilliant”, “classy” and similar can grate at times. Editing for grammar/spelling is also of a high standard, although there is the occasional oddness (for example, the phrase “during the first twelve months of the year”) – but editing for consistency is patchy – for example, the reference to the 23-inch Long Lance torpedo in submarines (wrong diameter, wrong platform – the submarines referred to used 21-inch Type 95 torpedoes, while the 24-inch Type 93 were used by destroyers and cruisers); or the Ju-87 Stuka by the middle of the book being referred to as the Stuka, Ju-87, J-87 or Ju-47; or the Abdiel-class fast minelayers described as destroyer-minelayers at one point and then later as light cruisers (minelayers). Editing for facts is addressed in the discussion above, and is by far and away the weakest technical element of the work.
As well as the text and the images, the book has maps, charts and tables, a good number of notes (as noted above, of varying quality), and a bibliography and an index. There are also helpful indexes of the artwork, maps, charts and tables, making it easy to find things should one want to go back.
The book still gets far more right than it gets wrong – there’s a lot to like about it, from its reinforcing at the end that economics (while very important) isn’t destiny and people are the key component of successfully prosecuting a conflict, to its much more insightful analysis of the underlying economics of the protagonists – but one can’t help but feel that those who have read more about the Soviet, Italian or Japanese navies, or of the detailed shift in balance between ships and airpower (there’s no mention at all of the impact of radar-directed AA fire, for example, and proximity-fused shells only get the briefest mention) will find themselves occasionally (or, in chapters one and two, more frequently) jarred by some of the statements, while those who haven’t ready more broadly about these things will have some of the old myths reinforced. The artwork is an easy recommend, but the text more broadly is probably best for people with almost no background in naval history/the war at sea in World War Two, where they can get an interesting overview of the conflict and not be put-off by the errors, and won’t expect so much from the sourcing.
As well as the text, the book contains 53 paintings by maritime artist Ian Marshall and, indeed, the project start as a text just around those paintings, before developing into what it is. The books uses good quality stock that shows the paintings off well, and many are provided over two-page spreads for full effect (although sadly affected by some guttering). The paintings are excellent, with phenomenal attention to detail. They have a somewhat abstract approach, and may not be to everyone’s tastes, but they show an accuracy that highlights the artist’s deep interest in naval matters.
The text of the book is very hard to review. Substantial amounts of it do a good job of accurately telling a story (Anglo-American focussed – there are barely references to the Soviet Navy, beyond that it was said “to fight only in the Far North of Europe” – the Black Sea struggles being entirely omitted, and the Baltic struggles only referred to in the briefest of terms), but it is strewn with errors of detail, and occasional more broad errors, such as statements that the Italian Fleet surrendered (it didn’t, it remained under Italian command, and indeed less than a week after arriving at Malta had detached units to operate with Allied navies as co-belligerents). Any work contains errors of detail, of course, but the number in this book, particularly early on, give it a very unpromising start to readers who have a bit more background in the naval history of the period. Chapter 2, the worst, probably averaged more than one error per page. Examples (of which there were far more) include the Royal Oak being described as unmodernised (in fact, she was the only ship of her class that had undergone much in the way of modernisation), the claim that Japanese aerial torpedoes at the start of the war were far larger than those in other navies (the US Mk 13 at the start of the Pacific War was actually heavier) and a couple of odd references to Geary (presumably Gearing) class destroyers.
The analysis contains more than a few questionable arguments. For example, at one point, the astounding statement is made that the Scharnhorst class were much less impressive than the dated, slower and lesser-armoured Kongo class. Then there is the remarkable suggestion that a cruiser’s tonnage did not have an impact on how easy it was to sink, to make the (incorrect, I would argue) case that a larger cruiser had no advantages when facing air or submarine attack. One of the underlying threads of the book talks of the waning of the battleship, but then takes it too far, stating in the first chapter that there were no battleships extant in 1948 except for those mothballed in the US (in 1948 the US, Britain, USSR, France and Italy all had battleships in commission). The final stages of the book hammer the point home further with the statement that “Billy Mitchell was right”, as evidenced by the sinking of the Yamato – quite the claim, given the 20-odd years in technological development between Mitchell’s claims and Yamato’s sinking, and the overwhelming force used to sink Yamato. There wasn’t a warship of any type afloat that could have stood up to the huge aerial attack – if being destroyed by 280 aircraft attacking virtually unopposed made something obsolete, that would have called the curtain on far more than just the battleship (this is not to say that the battleship wasn’t well past its prime and certainly was no longer the prime method of naval force projection by the end of the Second World War, but its career wasn’t quite over yet (seeing service in the Korean War, Vietnam War and even the 1991 Gulf War). Most of the same, tired myths about the Italian Navy get trotted out again as well.
Underpinning these issues, one suspects, is an over-reliance on questionable or shallow sources for information. Time and again a reference for something relating to an action or technical detail is linked back to Wikipedia, and Wikipedia is no substitute for a robust work written by a naval historian. Indeed, “Victory at Sea” could be seen as a case study of why books still matter, and why relying on Wikipedia/Google yields substandard results. Not always (one of the sites cited is the excellent armouredcarriers.com, for example) but often enough that it’s a significant blemish on the work. When books are referenced, the way sources are described was often-enough off the mark to make it worth mentioning – it is certainly not the case that the greatest detail in English on the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon is Wikipedia (now, or back in 2020, when it was referenced for the book – the article in Warship 2013 for example is substantially more detailed). The book is very strong when sourcing longer-run economic/strategic sources, but inconsistent and often very weak when referencing sources of particular navies in World War II (for example, the sources given as the ‘best English-language” for the development of the IJN up to WW2 exclude Peattie and Evans’ Kaigun – a significantly stronger source than either of the two listed, despite it being listed in the bibliography). Boyd’s The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters, an account that only goes until mid-1942, is listed as an example of an extremely positive account of the activities of the British Pacific Fleet, which wasn’t formed until late 1944. All up, narratively the book relies very heavily on the official histories by Morison and Roskill which in many situations stands it in good stead when talking about the Anglo-American navies, but means discussion of the Regia Marina, for example, suffers heavily, and discussions of the Imperial Japanese Navy could be better.
The standard of writing is robust, and it is an easy and accessible read – although the loose and frequent application of “brilliant”, “classy” and similar can grate at times. Editing for grammar/spelling is also of a high standard, although there is the occasional oddness (for example, the phrase “during the first twelve months of the year”) – but editing for consistency is patchy – for example, the reference to the 23-inch Long Lance torpedo in submarines (wrong diameter, wrong platform – the submarines referred to used 21-inch Type 95 torpedoes, while the 24-inch Type 93 were used by destroyers and cruisers); or the Ju-87 Stuka by the middle of the book being referred to as the Stuka, Ju-87, J-87 or Ju-47; or the Abdiel-class fast minelayers described as destroyer-minelayers at one point and then later as light cruisers (minelayers). Editing for facts is addressed in the discussion above, and is by far and away the weakest technical element of the work.
As well as the text and the images, the book has maps, charts and tables, a good number of notes (as noted above, of varying quality), and a bibliography and an index. There are also helpful indexes of the artwork, maps, charts and tables, making it easy to find things should one want to go back.
The book still gets far more right than it gets wrong – there’s a lot to like about it, from its reinforcing at the end that economics (while very important) isn’t destiny and people are the key component of successfully prosecuting a conflict, to its much more insightful analysis of the underlying economics of the protagonists – but one can’t help but feel that those who have read more about the Soviet, Italian or Japanese navies, or of the detailed shift in balance between ships and airpower (there’s no mention at all of the impact of radar-directed AA fire, for example, and proximity-fused shells only get the briefest mention) will find themselves occasionally (or, in chapters one and two, more frequently) jarred by some of the statements, while those who haven’t ready more broadly about these things will have some of the old myths reinforced. The artwork is an easy recommend, but the text more broadly is probably best for people with almost no background in naval history/the war at sea in World War Two, where they can get an interesting overview of the conflict and not be put-off by the errors, and won’t expect so much from the sourcing.
April 9, 2025
A lofty title and a solid pedigree in historical writing sucked me into reading this although I knew very well there is little if anything new or spectacular to say about the watery aspects of grand strategy in WW2 at this late stage, nearly a hundred years on from the conclusion of the war. After a fairly interesting opening 2 chapters concerning background and geography, he proved me right for the remainder of the book. It is to his detriment that he also wants to sing the praises of the Royal Navy so loudly and so often that it makes you grind your teeth. Aside from his frequent dips into the Mediterranean Sea, this long, long narrative has little to offer on the bright side and many, many matters that induce rage.
Harping on the role of battleships, U Boats and the Battle of the Atlantic again and again and yet again, he invariably gives himself away as a man who doesn't understand statistical analysis (the war against U Boats) or the idea that battleships did have a vital role to play even though he tells you about it many times. Entirely too pleased with knocking the German surface fleet back to Norwegian/Baltic waters hardly shows up the hard fact that the German Navy was in no position to play sea dominance games with the RN and what they did achieve early in the war is not to be laughed off. Giving far too much credit to the Italian Navy for having lovely designed cruisers pleasing to the eye does not excuse that Navy's unwillingness and inability to fight well when it needed to. Obsessing over battleship admirals desires to fight a second Jutland in the Pacific theater does nothing to advance the narrative of the events that did occur while slighting the efforts of the heavy units at Guadalcanal begs the question of why he broods over it for endless, endless pages.
There is also the astounding bit about the seagull's point of view at the battle of Midway (not kidding), the oh so breezily assumed ability of the IJN to simply invade Hawaii rather than mount a carrier raid on it, the disinterest in the US submarine campaign against Japan's mercantile fleet... and on and on.
But the worst of it is, as ever with British naval historians, the determination to over amplify the convoy battles of early 1943, specifically HX229/SC122.. Time and time again, decade after decade, British historians run up the Union Jack and holler and shout about the decimation and slaughter of these two combined convoys and the very near panic in the admiralty over their losses and the supposed fear of needing to surrender to the Germans because of the losses in material to the British Isles. It's complete nonsense, as Clay Blair convincingly and for all time demonstrated in Hitler's U Boat War Vol. 2 back in '98. Stats don't lie -- their interpreters sometimes will and in the case of this convoy battle, a British interpreter is nearly invariably going to lie. It's simply mind boggling to me that master's degree and sometimes PhD scholars cannot wrap their heads around this one convoy battle and come up with the correct analysis -- that it was no more decisive to the war than any other and if anything -- was on par for its loss in ships at the high end of the spectrum, not a Mount Everest spike in the stats to warrant any special attention. Both PQ17 and SC7 had suffered higher losses with (much) lower numbers of ships in their respective convoys than had HX229/SC122 yet neither of those events heralded a moment of utter despair over the entire war effort that British scholars imply happened with this March 1943 event.
Kennedy is only too happy to continue the nonsense about it.
He has a few solid moments when speaking about productive capacities and logistics, which hearken back to his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers days, but it's far too little in this massive recounting of the struggle which is really just a dressed up general history of naval events posing (not even disguised) as an effort to speak to larger trends and world order ramifications.
Harping on the role of battleships, U Boats and the Battle of the Atlantic again and again and yet again, he invariably gives himself away as a man who doesn't understand statistical analysis (the war against U Boats) or the idea that battleships did have a vital role to play even though he tells you about it many times. Entirely too pleased with knocking the German surface fleet back to Norwegian/Baltic waters hardly shows up the hard fact that the German Navy was in no position to play sea dominance games with the RN and what they did achieve early in the war is not to be laughed off. Giving far too much credit to the Italian Navy for having lovely designed cruisers pleasing to the eye does not excuse that Navy's unwillingness and inability to fight well when it needed to. Obsessing over battleship admirals desires to fight a second Jutland in the Pacific theater does nothing to advance the narrative of the events that did occur while slighting the efforts of the heavy units at Guadalcanal begs the question of why he broods over it for endless, endless pages.
There is also the astounding bit about the seagull's point of view at the battle of Midway (not kidding), the oh so breezily assumed ability of the IJN to simply invade Hawaii rather than mount a carrier raid on it, the disinterest in the US submarine campaign against Japan's mercantile fleet... and on and on.
But the worst of it is, as ever with British naval historians, the determination to over amplify the convoy battles of early 1943, specifically HX229/SC122.. Time and time again, decade after decade, British historians run up the Union Jack and holler and shout about the decimation and slaughter of these two combined convoys and the very near panic in the admiralty over their losses and the supposed fear of needing to surrender to the Germans because of the losses in material to the British Isles. It's complete nonsense, as Clay Blair convincingly and for all time demonstrated in Hitler's U Boat War Vol. 2 back in '98. Stats don't lie -- their interpreters sometimes will and in the case of this convoy battle, a British interpreter is nearly invariably going to lie. It's simply mind boggling to me that master's degree and sometimes PhD scholars cannot wrap their heads around this one convoy battle and come up with the correct analysis -- that it was no more decisive to the war than any other and if anything -- was on par for its loss in ships at the high end of the spectrum, not a Mount Everest spike in the stats to warrant any special attention. Both PQ17 and SC7 had suffered higher losses with (much) lower numbers of ships in their respective convoys than had HX229/SC122 yet neither of those events heralded a moment of utter despair over the entire war effort that British scholars imply happened with this March 1943 event.
Kennedy is only too happy to continue the nonsense about it.
He has a few solid moments when speaking about productive capacities and logistics, which hearken back to his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers days, but it's far too little in this massive recounting of the struggle which is really just a dressed up general history of naval events posing (not even disguised) as an effort to speak to larger trends and world order ramifications.
August 7, 2022
This history book includes a remarkable series of fifty-five paintings of warships by Ian Marshall who was a fellow and past president of the American Society of Marine Artists. The paintings are a valuable addition, bringing the text alive.
Written in five parts and three appendices, it begins with stage-setting background of the development of the six navies involved in WW II: USA, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan. There is also a discussion of sea power in the sweep of history, and an overview of geographic and economic considerations. Kennedy argues, persuasively, that geography and economics favoured the United States, while both factors worked against the Axis alliance.
The next four parts cover the periods: 1939-42 (the early years, which favoured the Axis); 1943 (the critical year); 1944-45 (triumph of the Allies); and Aftermath and Reflections. In these sections, Kennedy does not describe the sea battles in detail. Rather, he describes the situation, the strategies, the combatants, and the results materially and psychologically. Even without the real time detail, one has a feeling for what the battle was like.
The principle point which Kennedy is making in this book is that once the US decided to enter the war, the conclusion was inevitable principally because of the economic potential of the country. It had access to all the natural resources it needed; at the end of a major recession, the human resources were available; and the financial resources were made available by wealthy, patriotic individuals. Geography also favoured the US in the sense that none of the conflict came within its borders.
In the appendices, there are examples of American production of weapons. In 1945, the US had a cumulative total of eleven an a a half million tons of warships, and increase of nine million tons since 1941. In 1945, the US had considerably more warships than the rest of the world, combined. Similar gains were achieved in aircraft and tank production. Kennedy argues that this increase in productivity resulted in the US becoming the world leader with about 50% of the world's GDP.
This book makes clear that, given the right resources and motivation, major changes in the world order are possible in a short time period.
Written in five parts and three appendices, it begins with stage-setting background of the development of the six navies involved in WW II: USA, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan. There is also a discussion of sea power in the sweep of history, and an overview of geographic and economic considerations. Kennedy argues, persuasively, that geography and economics favoured the United States, while both factors worked against the Axis alliance.
The next four parts cover the periods: 1939-42 (the early years, which favoured the Axis); 1943 (the critical year); 1944-45 (triumph of the Allies); and Aftermath and Reflections. In these sections, Kennedy does not describe the sea battles in detail. Rather, he describes the situation, the strategies, the combatants, and the results materially and psychologically. Even without the real time detail, one has a feeling for what the battle was like.
The principle point which Kennedy is making in this book is that once the US decided to enter the war, the conclusion was inevitable principally because of the economic potential of the country. It had access to all the natural resources it needed; at the end of a major recession, the human resources were available; and the financial resources were made available by wealthy, patriotic individuals. Geography also favoured the US in the sense that none of the conflict came within its borders.
In the appendices, there are examples of American production of weapons. In 1945, the US had a cumulative total of eleven an a a half million tons of warships, and increase of nine million tons since 1941. In 1945, the US had considerably more warships than the rest of the world, combined. Similar gains were achieved in aircraft and tank production. Kennedy argues that this increase in productivity resulted in the US becoming the world leader with about 50% of the world's GDP.
This book makes clear that, given the right resources and motivation, major changes in the world order are possible in a short time period.
August 31, 2022
“Victory at Sea: Naval power and the transformation of the global order in World War II,” by Paul Kennedy, with paintings by Ian Marshall (Yale, 2022). Kennedy wrote “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” and Engineers of Victory,” about the inventions that powered the far-from-inevitable triumph of the Allies. Here he uses a similar, painstaking method to describe and analyze the war at sea, with the addition of a much broader scope. But the book began, he says, almost by accident: he had signed on to write short pieces to accompany the paintings of his friend Ian Marshall. Gradually the work became all-encompassing. First he describes what the planners thought of maritime power, up to and past Mahan. He describes the six navies at the start of the war: Italian, German, French, British, Japanese, and American, and the relative positions of each of their nations. From the beginning the Royal Navy was by far the largest, but also the most stretched: it had to cover the globe. The French and Italians considered each other their primary rivals, with the Mediterranean their focus. The Germans, other than the Imperial German Navy during the buildup to World War I, were not primarily a maritime power. The Japanese knew that they needed a powerful navy if they were to become a dominant power in the Pacific. The Americans---well, they knew that they needed a navy more than a big army. They indeed had one, but it was not fully prepared for what happened. At the beginning the Japanese were brilliant. Superbly trained, well-led, equipped with by far the best weapons on sea and air, but they knew that they had to win quickly before being suffocated by lack of resources. When the Americans finally got fully organized and productive, they swamped all rivals. The British did not need to keep up, and the Japanese could not. Fabulous book, brilliantly written, with lots of detailed charts, diagrams, and maps. I’m going to buy this one.
https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/97803...
September 13, 2025
An outstanding single volume history of World War at Sea focused on the main combatants (France, Italy, Germany, Japan, UK, USA). Paul Kennedy is a historical master and offers insight and analysis as well as asking a few key "What ifs" (Japan running rampage in the Indian Ocean toward Mombasa or Suez in 1942) and dismisses a few others (A decisive Japanese victory at Midway would not have changed the balance of power in the Pacific). Kennedy is also a great writer able to seamingless zoom in on a small battle and then back out to the geopolitical. Those looking of individuals in the conflict (save maybe Churchill and a few other stars) should look elswhere.
There are a few quibbles at one points he states that the U.S. suffered no civilian casualties in WW2. This is a bit insensitive civilians were killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in a few other scattered incidents.
The author has his biases and doesn't hide them. He is no fan of Gen. Douglas MacArthur for example. And he goes out of his way to point out how Gen. Mark Clark held back British forces so American forces would enter Rome first.
The situation is actually far worse. Free French forces broke the Gustav Line and probably deserved the credit of capturing Rome. Instead as the author points out American forces captured Rome.
Also the author criticizes the Japanese for using carrier forces (albeit without warplanes) to lure Admiral Halsey into a trap at the Battle of Leyete. He points out how ridiculous that was but, to be fair the British tried to lure out the Tirpitz several times to attack arctic convoys.
The fact is this game the British were masters at down-playing or marginalizing the role of other forces in allied coaltiions. Including Arab forces in WWI in the Middle East or Indonesian nationalists in Java in late 1945.
There are a few quibbles at one points he states that the U.S. suffered no civilian casualties in WW2. This is a bit insensitive civilians were killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in a few other scattered incidents.
The author has his biases and doesn't hide them. He is no fan of Gen. Douglas MacArthur for example. And he goes out of his way to point out how Gen. Mark Clark held back British forces so American forces would enter Rome first.
The situation is actually far worse. Free French forces broke the Gustav Line and probably deserved the credit of capturing Rome. Instead as the author points out American forces captured Rome.
Also the author criticizes the Japanese for using carrier forces (albeit without warplanes) to lure Admiral Halsey into a trap at the Battle of Leyete. He points out how ridiculous that was but, to be fair the British tried to lure out the Tirpitz several times to attack arctic convoys.
The fact is this game the British were masters at down-playing or marginalizing the role of other forces in allied coaltiions. Including Arab forces in WWI in the Middle East or Indonesian nationalists in Java in late 1945.
September 18, 2022
A complete analysis of naval power and battles, starting with the naval disarmament agreements of the years after World War I and running right into the 1950s.
It’s a valuable history because Kennedy constructs the narrative chronologically. Even those familiar with the naval war probably don’t have an idea what was happening elsewhere during the Battle of the North Atlantic or realize how quickly that battle turned against the Germans in May, 1943 with the introduction of radar that allowed Allied destroyers to see in the dark and fog.
Kennedy caps the history with an “audit” of naval performances by each of the great powers. He quotes historian Correlli Barnett who argued great military conflicts are “auditors” of all things “because it is only when societies are mobilized for a giant war that every part of the whole is tested: national direction, strategic decision-making, productive resources, science and technological capacity, the armed services, and their weapon systems.”
He is critical of Japanese naval performance, which went from being “flawless” in the first five months of the war to mis-steps at the Battle of Coral Sea, Midway, the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf.
A heavy portion of the credit for winning the naval war comes from the overwhelming productivity of American factories and shipyards, which not just out-produced the Axis countries but were a backstop for repairing British warships and getting them back in service.
It’s a valuable history because Kennedy constructs the narrative chronologically. Even those familiar with the naval war probably don’t have an idea what was happening elsewhere during the Battle of the North Atlantic or realize how quickly that battle turned against the Germans in May, 1943 with the introduction of radar that allowed Allied destroyers to see in the dark and fog.
Kennedy caps the history with an “audit” of naval performances by each of the great powers. He quotes historian Correlli Barnett who argued great military conflicts are “auditors” of all things “because it is only when societies are mobilized for a giant war that every part of the whole is tested: national direction, strategic decision-making, productive resources, science and technological capacity, the armed services, and their weapon systems.”
He is critical of Japanese naval performance, which went from being “flawless” in the first five months of the war to mis-steps at the Battle of Coral Sea, Midway, the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf.
A heavy portion of the credit for winning the naval war comes from the overwhelming productivity of American factories and shipyards, which not just out-produced the Axis countries but were a backstop for repairing British warships and getting them back in service.
January 3, 2023
Kennedy masterfully explains the role of economics, strategy, tactics, and geography on the war at sea. Kennedy begins the book with a fascinating review of each major power’s naval situation entering the war—their strengths, weaknesses, geographic dispositions, and more. What stands out from this is how much can change in only a short few years. At the start of the war, the Royal Navy remained the most powerful navy in the world, with naval bases spanning from England to Gibraltar to Malta to Suez and to Singapore. And yet, its nightmare scenario of facing three navies at once—one in the Baltic and north Atlantic, one in the Mediterranean, and one in the Pacific was too much and in the end, the Royal Navy had to sacrifice its position in the Pacific to maintain its control over the sea lanes approaching Great Britain and in the Mediterranean. Kennedy deftly shows how power balances shifted as the war progressed and highlights the role of technology and production. The statistics for American production are staggering. And yet, as Kennedy explains, should not be surprising: while the Axis spent upwards of 25% of their national income on their militaries before WWII, the Allies spent less than 10%, with the US only spending 1.5% (that 1.5% in nominal terms was still more than the 28% Japan was spending—America’s economic potential was just that great!). The Allies had room to grow and grow they did. Fascinating read
April 28, 2025
Kennedy is an able historian writing in his element here, and this is a very readable and digestible history of the naval history of World War II. I think the best parts are those covering the first two thirds of the war, through about late 1943, partially because this is where Kennedy weaves together the overall history and interconnectedness of the three main naval theaters (Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean) the best, and also because the connections between the three theaters is the highest during this period, making the story the most compelling. While drier, Kennedy’s description of the sheer weight of American industrial capacity is staggering, making it clear how the US fiscal-industrial state could convert its latent economic power into a massive navy relatively quickly. Tracing the war as a story of change from a multipolar naval world to a unipolar one is probably the most interesting and compelling insight from the book. Also, Kennedy does a great job showing how deeply interconnected key campaigns of the war truly were; the Battle of the Atlantic, the Western invasion of Europe, the Eastern Front, the strategic bombing campaign, all interacted, reinforced, and relied upon each other. Overall a compelling read!
September 7, 2022
Remarkable work on the navies of WWII and the battles they fought. The author doesn't treat the battles themselves with intricate detail. Instead, he uses the backdrop of the various constituent navies to tell the story of how those battles came together and how changing technology, often times technology that seemed to change with the month, altered the course of the war and of world history.
The most striking thing for me was the sheer power that the United States had put forward on the world's oceans by the end of the war. Even as someone who has read military history for over 40 years, it was hard to contemplate the country's complete transformation. For example, after starting the war with only three aircraft carriers, by August 1945 the US had over 100 carriers in service (counting the lighter escort carriers) and approximately 70 percent of the world's distribution of capital ships. The author also highlights the navy war in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic convoys, both of which I wasn't as familiar with. All told Kennedy brings this history to vivid life as the wars in the Atlantic and Pacific grind on toward their cataclysmic conclusions.
The most striking thing for me was the sheer power that the United States had put forward on the world's oceans by the end of the war. Even as someone who has read military history for over 40 years, it was hard to contemplate the country's complete transformation. For example, after starting the war with only three aircraft carriers, by August 1945 the US had over 100 carriers in service (counting the lighter escort carriers) and approximately 70 percent of the world's distribution of capital ships. The author also highlights the navy war in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic convoys, both of which I wasn't as familiar with. All told Kennedy brings this history to vivid life as the wars in the Atlantic and Pacific grind on toward their cataclysmic conclusions.
August 28, 2022
A great book, presenting a maritime history of WWII. The author, noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy, explains how the maritime victory of the allied powers was the major fulcrum which created the post-WWII world. The book is a continuation of his previous works. Essentially a detailed case study of his theories on industrial capacity, maritime strength, and great power status. Kennedy emphasizes the importance of the maritime campaigns in both theaters of WWII, lays out the inherent advantages of the allied maritime nations, and describes how economic power translated into military superiority. I appreciated Kennedy’s division of the war into different phases by time rather than geography. His understanding of the strategic links between the Pacific and European theaters point to importance of a global strategic outlook vice regional strategic silos. Highly recommended for understanding WWII as a global maritime struggle.
June 14, 2024
Kennedy focuses his history on the ships, strengths, missions and outcomes of the six largest navies at the start of WWII; British, American, Japanese, Italian, French and German.
Why I started this book: Looking through Audible for Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned The Tide in the Second World War and found this title too.
Why I finished it: It's good to read history from different perspectives. Listening to a British historian talk about the Naval battles of WWII highlights his biases. (Isn't interesting that it's so much easier to find someone else's biases than our own? And if you are humble enough to listen, they will tell you your blindspots in their narratives.)
Why I started this book: Looking through Audible for Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned The Tide in the Second World War and found this title too.
Why I finished it: It's good to read history from different perspectives. Listening to a British historian talk about the Naval battles of WWII highlights his biases. (Isn't interesting that it's so much easier to find someone else's biases than our own? And if you are humble enough to listen, they will tell you your blindspots in their narratives.)
February 25, 2023
This is an unsurprisingly great piece of history, given the considerable talents of the author, and one replete with all the geeky details naval history nerds enjoy. I happen to be reading The Martin / Parker work, "Armada" and I can't help but be struck by a similar theme. Spanish Admirals were wed to the success of a particular platform, the galleas, in recent prior battles. In WW II admirals loved their battleships. In both cases the preferred platform of the naval leadership proved largely irrelevant in the next conflict. Now, in an era of mutually (US and PRC) undetectable submarines, high-speed torpedoes, and hyper=sonic missiles I can't help but wonder about the efficacy of the multi-billion dollar investments in super carriers. Will the USS Gerald R Ford become the next USS Arizona, doomed to irrelevance minutes from the onset of hostilities?
July 11, 2022
B: Outstanding overview of the allied victory in the Second World War. A pleasure to read. It is a history not a prescription for how things might go in the future, but one is tempted to ask, could the West do it again? The economies undergirding success in the war have changed drastically as has our capacity to absorb the massive debts incurred to build and support such an endeavor. The recent GAO report https://www.gao.gov/assets/730/721511... indicates we are not aligning our economic resources effectively.
Strikingly Kennedy shows that not one but several strategies were required to defeat the Axis and that too closely adhering to one theory may expose weaknesses the enemy could exploit.
Strikingly Kennedy shows that not one but several strategies were required to defeat the Axis and that too closely adhering to one theory may expose weaknesses the enemy could exploit.
September 26, 2025
It seems this book started as a scene-setting forward to a book of watercolors of WWII naval subjects. But the painter died, so the paintings that existed became illustrations for an account of grand naval strategy in that war. It is a very high quality production, with glossy pages and beautifully reproduced artworks. The narrative gives some interesting insights and high-level judgments about the war: The decisive element was the overwhelming material advantage of the Allies; the IJN performed rather poorly after its victories in the first six months. The paintings are beautiful, but kind of all the same--gray, moody, impressionistic.
June 6, 2023
A very interesting look at World War II from the naval aspect. The author examines World War II from the global naval aspect from the earliest days of the war in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific. He describes the geopolitical world before the war and describes how that situation changed as a result of the war. He also looks at the war from the point of view of the economies of the combatants. He compares strengths and weaknesses of the participants and shows how the war, in a few short years changed the global economic and political landscape.
January 6, 2023
It’s an interesting book. There are several typos that bothered me. The biggest being that author and editors don’t know the difference between millimeters and caliber. This isn’t a book for everyone. It reads more like a text book. However, it is interesting because it focuses on the navies and why they had the ships they did when the war started. If you are a WWII nerd, this is a book that will interest you. Maybe.
August 27, 2024
A fascinating book that covers the strategic environment for naval warfare in WW2, which provided a great additional perspective to the equally good, but more tactically focussed books: Battle of the Atlantic (Jonathan Dimbleby), Cinderella Boys (RAF Coastal Command, Leo McKinstry) and A Game of Birds and Wolves (the intelligence and planning aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic, Simon Parkin). Well worth a read.
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May 12, 2023Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, via Naval Power...
A good introductory overview of WW2, focusing on naval power and its impact of operations on land. Great if you'd looking for somewhere to start on the subject.
If you're already familiar with WW2 though, I'd advise a pass as this doesn't really add anything interesting to what you already know.
A good introductory overview of WW2, focusing on naval power and its impact of operations on land. Great if you'd looking for somewhere to start on the subject.
If you're already familiar with WW2 though, I'd advise a pass as this doesn't really add anything interesting to what you already know.
March 27, 2025
3.5 stars. Not a great entry point into WW2 naval history as he skimmed over much of the actual engagements and actions; however, his treatment of the development of each nation’s navy leading up to the war was very good, as was the strategic analysis of how each navy fared relative to their potential at the end of the conflict.
November 10, 2022
Extremely comprehensive (too comprehensive IMO) review of the decline of British naval power over the ages, and the corresponding growth of US naval power. Just wish there was less repetitive layering on of fact after fact, detail after detail about this change in naval power...
July 9, 2023
In Victory at Sea, Paul Kennedy demonstrates why he is the world’s leading scholar on naval strategy. For serious students of World War II or naval history, this book is a must read.
John J. Mearsheimer
John J. Mearsheimer
December 25, 2024
Very repetitive in places and then disappointedly cursory in others. Feels like couldn’t quite decide if it was a coffee table book of Marshall’s paintings or a naval-economic history of WWII by Kennedy.
July 19, 2022
Only four stars because, at times, the narration was a bit too dry and overly wordy. I would have preferred a more action-driven narrative.
November 15, 2022
the man is an all time great, still pitching his fastball in this work
November 25, 2022
Great description of the war at sea. Lots of stats but not so many that they interfere with the narritive.
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