Fantastic book, exquisitely researched, excitingly written. Ben did the SEAL community an immense service writing this book.
Key parts that I want to remember:
At Tarawa, the reef was the identified obstacle and the Marines could only consider the Landing Vehicle Tracked as the solution...'one track minds tend to prefer dual-tracked solutions'...the Navy however, particularly RADM Kelly Turner, CDR 5th Amphib force, obsessed with vengeance and the Navy's preeminent role in exacting it...wanted a solution that would enable the Higgins landing boats to be used which were much more effective and faster...but only if the coral could be removed...Handed a plan by an Army General, Turner examined it and declared: "it stinks. Whose is it?" "it's mine, declared the General. "It still stinks!"
Turners belief over the divine right of Navy admirals over Marine Corps generals was inherent, and based on an old Fleet Tactical Pub 167, it was overturned by ADM Nimitz, establishing the Marine Corps invasion commander as equivalent to the Navy's Amhib CDR...this would take away from Turner's command all the Marine special units, Raiders, Recon, Scout snipers, and also cut him out of any solution to the coral that did not involve the LVT. Unless, he came up with tasking the Seabees to figure out a solution...which led to the establishment of UDT.
Turner opened the doors of these teams to the NCDUs from Fort Pierce and local Seabees, the main requirements for joining being an ability to swim one mile through choppy water and dive to a depth of fifteen feet---skills so hard to find that they were soon opened to ratings of every sort...'cooks who never cooked, ship fitters who never worked on a ship, and storekeepers who never kept a single store." In March 1944, Draper Kaufman arrived in Maui.
After scouting the approaches to the island of Tsugen Shima, one UDT CPO 'bawled out' a pair of his swimmers for extending their recon past the beach. 'I was perfectly save, chief" the accused responded indignantly. 'My buddy was covering me with his knife.'
Raised in the only branch of service where estrangement from one's chain of command was routine, Miles nevertheless knew that such a plan would not only isolate its members with unheard of distances, but would also force them to fight the enemy in seas not of water but of people--a people that nearly every American viewed as backward but that Miles knew to be descendants of one of the most ancient civilizations on the planet.
To smooth those points of friction that would stunt the teamwork so needed in his plans, Miles dressed his sailors and Marines in the rank free Army khakis, then issue them a list of don'ts: Don't say 'Chinaman'; Don't say 'Coolie'; Don't call American food 'civilized'; Don't use pidgin English. Miles would request from the Navy a particular type of recruit: 'No high hat, rank conscious, red tape clerks or Old China Hands"...He wanted the kind of men who could 'fight the nips in any job assigned' but also the kind who could do so without 'fighting his shipmates'.
When Miles and Metzel, plus an entourage of two admirals, one Chinese colonel, and one OSS man, arrived at General Marshall's Washington office in Feb 1943 to obtain agreement to the arrangment that cut the Army out of guerrilla warfare in China except by way of its OSS levers...a staff officer kept them waiting...when they were finally ushered in...Marshall greeted them 'straight mouthed' never standing from behind his desk and leaving them locked at attention. All Marshall had to do, said one of the admirals, respectfully, was initial the agreement and it would be whisked to the President's desk. At this, Marshal paused. There were, he said, still 'some minor changes to make.'
Instead of retreating before the guns of the 4 star...Metzel broke rank and marched right up to Marshall's desk, an act so abrupt that, as Miles remembered, 'the very office seemed to gasp'.
'Do you mind if I smoke, General?' asked Metzel as he lit his cig with nary an ashtray in sight. Metzel then braced a hand on Marshall's desk--leanded in, his free hand ready to deposit ash on the antique...'To attempt to make changes will delay things for months, even if we get the Agreement back without additional Chinese requirements. All you have to do, General, is put your initials here next to Admiral King's." Barely a foot note today, Metzel was on history's stage, playing all the way to the last row.
Navy LT Eugene Franklin Clark, sent to Korea after being a POW in PI for much of WWII and now hoping to change all that by leading a guerrilla army in Korea. Clark was mature, deliberate, and calculating. In manner he was agreeable, somewhat quiet but not overly so, and like all sailors, was never shy of tobacco, Scotch or a joke....had grown fond of all the Asian amenities: geisha houses, massage parlors, hot baths, cold showers...but unlike most servicemen, these luxuries did not seem to have dulled his inclinations or imbued him with a sense of superiority to Asian peoples.
1961 CNOs director of strategic plans, William Gentner, answered ADM Burke's memo with a 6 page response that began with a single question: 'How can the Navy improve its contribution to US guerrilla/counter-guerilla warfare capability?' He provided a laundry list of 8 recommendations, A through H, including new shallow-water boats, new mines, a comprehensive study of naval assistance to indigenous fighters, an increased emphasis on guerrilla training, a manual for operations in restricted waters...and lastly, the establishment of a unit that was specialized to perform 'naval guerrilla and counter guerilla operations'...a unit that could cross-pollinate with the CIA and sister services, training for the unit could include elements of Army SF and UDT...An appropriate name for such a unit could be 'SEAL' units, a contraction of SEA, AIR, LAND and thereby indicating an all-around universal capability.
ADM Ward...submariner from WWII...truly understood the concepts of decentralized command because you had no other choice as a submarine commander...he valued the concept of 'latitude' and giving his subordinates plenty of it to foster creativity. But unless the subordinate is aggressive, latitude is limited...faced with the failure of the first SEAL deployment to Viet Nam, Ward could have hung it up, but he knew better...though Ward had not expected an outcome so underwhelming, let alone one of near criminality. In response to this scandal, Ward's operations officer arranged a conference call with the Coronado-based commander of Naval Operations Support Group, administrative head of all UDTs and SEALs in the Pacific. He ran through the rap sheet of Det Delta's offenses, lack of aggressiveness, lack of operations, the booze, the girls--all problems that could be solved by kicking the SEALs out of the AO...any other commander might have dumped the SEALs in the dustbin of history, but Commodore Phil Bucklew offered another solution...the problem, Bucklew contended, was LEADERSHIP. Fix that and everything would sort itself out. The rest is history.
Lots more great stuff in here, too much to continue to record. I loved the book and probably need to own it as a reference. My son who is headed to BUD/S needs a copy. I will probably buy several.