Excellent book! This is a study of the rise of irregular warfare among 3 key US adversaries: Iran, China, and Russia. It is told through the biographies of 3 key figures from these states: Qassem Soleimani, Valery Gerasimov, and Zhang Youxia. This makes the book more human and less abstract. Each of these guys became critical, high-ranking figures in their respective governments. They were all responding to the rise of US military hegemony, as exemplified in the Persian Gulf War, and to the larger US dominance of the international system. They all sought to offset US strategic advantages by developing irregular warfare capabilities.
For Iran, this meant the use of proxy forces and alliances with Russia, Syria, and other states that could offset US power. For China, this has meant a lot of cyber activities, intellectual property theft, and other intimidation and gray zone activities in the South China sea. To me, the most interesting set of strategic adaptations came from Russia. After spending the entire Cold War trying to match the US on a symmetrical basis, Russia developed a host of asymmetrical tools to threaten NATO and expand their power. These included mass efforts at spreading disinformation, hacking/leaking operations, killing/intimidation of dissidents, funding extremist parties, using private military contractors like the Wagner group, and deploying irregular forces like the little Green men into Ukraine. These tools enable Russia to reassert its power over its former sphere of influence, manipulate and weaken the US and its adversaries, and keep the regime in power.
The experiences of Gerasimov were particularly illuminating for thinking about why Russia has come to oppose US power so vehemently, and how it has used irregular warfare to do so. Gerasimov, like Putin, was shocked by the USSR's collapse. He believed that the United States was using irregular warfare/influence methods to spark revolts against the Soviets in places like Poland during the Cold War. He and many other Russian elites then viewed the US after the Cold War as a kind of rogue giant, knocking off regimes and undermining others from Serbia, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine under Yanukovych. In some cases, they had a point; in others, they dramatically overstated US activities and understated the agency of local actors and peoples. Russia, like Iran, found itself feeling surrounded by the US and looking for ways to hit back against the US without sparking direct conflict. Hence the rise of irregular warfare as a key tool of states seeking to challenge US power.
This book has some nice overlap with David Kilcullen's Dragons and the Snakes book, which argues that the strategies of non-state actors and states are converging, largely as a way to counterbalance US dominance. Jones also makes a good case that the US should spend more time learning how to counter this kind of warfare rather than obsessing over conventional dominance. Our foes will continue to use irregular tools as long as they work, and eventually we will have to meet them on this territory. Anyways, this is a concise, effective, and interesting book that people interested in contemporary military strategy should check out.