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Tiere wie wir: Warum wir moralische Pflichten gegenüber Tieren haben
WAS WIR TIEREN SCHULDIG SIND - EINE RADIKALE ETHIK
Hat das Leben eines Tieres einen anderen Wert als das eines Menschen? Nein, sagt die Harvard-Professorin Christine M. Korsgaard und begründet in ihrem Buch "Tiere wie wir", warum Tiere nicht getötet oder benutzt werden dürfen. Sie belässt es aber nicht bei der abstrakten Analyse, sondern erörtert an konkreten Beispielen, warum die handelsüblichen Rechtfertigungen von Massentierhaltung und Tierversuchen moralisch unhaltbar sind. Ihr radikales Buch setzt einen neuen Maßstab in der Debatte und gilt als wichtigster Beitrag zur Tierethik seit Peter Singer.
Christine Korsgaard setzt bei der Grundfrage an, was der Wert eines Lebens ist. In einer klar vorgetragenen, von Kants Moralphilosophie und einer Theorie des Guten nach Aristoteles ausgehenden Argumentation gelangt sie zu weitreichenden Schlussfolgerungen: Menschen sind nicht wichtiger als Tiere, und unsere moralische Natur macht uns Tieren auch nicht überlegen. Stattdessen ist es unsere Empathie, die uns erkennen lässt, dass Tieren als bewussten Wesen ebenso wie Menschen ein "Zweck an sich selbst" im Sinne Kants inne sind. Damit erweitert sie Kants Ideen einer moralischen Gemeinschaft grundlegend: Menschen haben nicht nur gegenüber Mitmenschen, sondern auch gegenüber Tieren moralische Pflichten. Anhand praktischer ethischer Fragen veranschaulicht die Philosophin schließlich, warum das Erniedrigen oder Töten von Tieren in keinem Fall moralisch gerechtfertigt ist.
"Korsgaards vertritt unbestreitbar eine starke und wenn sie sich durchsetzt, dann wird sie eine der größten moralischen Transformationen in der Geschichte der Menschheit zur Folge haben."
Thomas Nagel, The New York Review of Books
Dürfen wir das Wohl der Tiere unseren Bedürfnissen unterordnen?
Die Achtung des Tierwohls als ethische Grundfrage unserer Gesellschaft
Ist die Würde der Tiere unantastbar oder heiligt der Zweck die Mittel?
Das bedeutendste Werk zur Tierethik seit Peter Singer
Die Autorin setzt neue Maßstäbe in der Debatte um den Tierschutz
Hat das Leben eines Tieres einen anderen Wert als das eines Menschen? Nein, sagt die Harvard-Professorin Christine M. Korsgaard und begründet in ihrem Buch "Tiere wie wir", warum Tiere nicht getötet oder benutzt werden dürfen. Sie belässt es aber nicht bei der abstrakten Analyse, sondern erörtert an konkreten Beispielen, warum die handelsüblichen Rechtfertigungen von Massentierhaltung und Tierversuchen moralisch unhaltbar sind. Ihr radikales Buch setzt einen neuen Maßstab in der Debatte und gilt als wichtigster Beitrag zur Tierethik seit Peter Singer.
Christine Korsgaard setzt bei der Grundfrage an, was der Wert eines Lebens ist. In einer klar vorgetragenen, von Kants Moralphilosophie und einer Theorie des Guten nach Aristoteles ausgehenden Argumentation gelangt sie zu weitreichenden Schlussfolgerungen: Menschen sind nicht wichtiger als Tiere, und unsere moralische Natur macht uns Tieren auch nicht überlegen. Stattdessen ist es unsere Empathie, die uns erkennen lässt, dass Tieren als bewussten Wesen ebenso wie Menschen ein "Zweck an sich selbst" im Sinne Kants inne sind. Damit erweitert sie Kants Ideen einer moralischen Gemeinschaft grundlegend: Menschen haben nicht nur gegenüber Mitmenschen, sondern auch gegenüber Tieren moralische Pflichten. Anhand praktischer ethischer Fragen veranschaulicht die Philosophin schließlich, warum das Erniedrigen oder Töten von Tieren in keinem Fall moralisch gerechtfertigt ist.
"Korsgaards vertritt unbestreitbar eine starke und wenn sie sich durchsetzt, dann wird sie eine der größten moralischen Transformationen in der Geschichte der Menschheit zur Folge haben."
Thomas Nagel, The New York Review of Books
Dürfen wir das Wohl der Tiere unseren Bedürfnissen unterordnen?
Die Achtung des Tierwohls als ethische Grundfrage unserer Gesellschaft
Ist die Würde der Tiere unantastbar oder heiligt der Zweck die Mittel?
Das bedeutendste Werk zur Tierethik seit Peter Singer
Die Autorin setzt neue Maßstäbe in der Debatte um den Tierschutz
346 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 2021
72 people are currently reading
1228 people want to read
About the author
Christine M. Korsgaard
18 books85 followersChristine M. Korsgaard is an American philosopher whose main academic interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general. She has taught at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago; since 1991 she has been a professor at Harvard University.
Korsgaard received a B.A. from the University of Illinois and a Ph.D from Harvard where she was a student of John Rawls.
Korsgaard received a B.A. from the University of Illinois and a Ph.D from Harvard where she was a student of John Rawls.
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Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
June 9, 2018
Here are several reasons to read Korsgaard's new book followed by a summary:
1) Korsgaard offers a promising alternative to utilitarianism that has dominated the field of animal ethics which she uses to defend some novel conclusions.
2) This book is a really nice introduction to Korsgaard's larger philosophy (which I have always felt intimidated by).
3) Korsgaard brings together two philosophers, Aristotle and Kant, and shows how they complement rather than oppose each other.
Summary:
Most readers on animal ethics will be most familiar with the utilitarian approach pioneered by Peter Singer. Korsgaard defends a view of a creature's good that although yields some similar conclusions to utilitarianism (e.g., an animals pain matters) is importantly different. Firstly, the most striking feature of Korsgaard's account is that it is naturalistic. Bringing together Aristotle and Kant, Korsgaard recognises that animals establish themselves as ends in themselves through their activity of self-maintenance. A second essential feature of animals as ends in themselves is that unlike functions we attribute knives, only animals have a point-of-view from which things (including their own well-functioning) are perceived as essentially "valenced". Secondly, a feature of animals of ends in themselves is that we care about their welfare not for it's own sake (like utilitarianisms) but for the creature's sake. This excludes the possibility of simple utilitarian aggregation. Finally, unlike utilitarianism, Korsgaard recognises an animals life (when it is not suffering) as essentially good for it, this means that an animals death can be bad for it not because it experiences death as bad but because death robs it of a good that cannot be replaced even by the birth of a new animal.
1) Korsgaard offers a promising alternative to utilitarianism that has dominated the field of animal ethics which she uses to defend some novel conclusions.
2) This book is a really nice introduction to Korsgaard's larger philosophy (which I have always felt intimidated by).
3) Korsgaard brings together two philosophers, Aristotle and Kant, and shows how they complement rather than oppose each other.
Summary:
Most readers on animal ethics will be most familiar with the utilitarian approach pioneered by Peter Singer. Korsgaard defends a view of a creature's good that although yields some similar conclusions to utilitarianism (e.g., an animals pain matters) is importantly different. Firstly, the most striking feature of Korsgaard's account is that it is naturalistic. Bringing together Aristotle and Kant, Korsgaard recognises that animals establish themselves as ends in themselves through their activity of self-maintenance. A second essential feature of animals as ends in themselves is that unlike functions we attribute knives, only animals have a point-of-view from which things (including their own well-functioning) are perceived as essentially "valenced". Secondly, a feature of animals of ends in themselves is that we care about their welfare not for it's own sake (like utilitarianisms) but for the creature's sake. This excludes the possibility of simple utilitarian aggregation. Finally, unlike utilitarianism, Korsgaard recognises an animals life (when it is not suffering) as essentially good for it, this means that an animals death can be bad for it not because it experiences death as bad but because death robs it of a good that cannot be replaced even by the birth of a new animal.
December 22, 2018
i luv u korsgaard and ur sharp mind and ur luv for CATS
October 8, 2020
I will preface this by saying I am unfamiliar with Korsgaard’s work. This was the first text I have read by her. I have read a small amount of philosophy (some Aristotle, Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Singer) and found the first half of this book to be challenging at times. It is written for an educated audience that already has some basic knowledge of philosophy. This is my reason for giving it 4 stars rather than 5. For me personally, it was a rather slow read for the first two parts of the book and was more interesting and easier to follow in the final part. After digesting the contents of the book, I think I will go back and read it a second time.
I have heard some of these arguments before, but this book was a far more thorough and detailed defense of them. Korsgaard provides a strong philosophical foundation for her arguments, bringing together ideas mainly from Aristotle and Kant, but also engages with ideas from some other philosophers such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Gary Francione, and others. There were also some things I had not read or heard elsewhere.
In Fellow Creatures, Korsgaard makes a Kantian defense of the claim that “human beings are obligated to treat all sentient animals, that is, all animals who have subjective experiences that are pleasant or painful, as what Kant called ‘ends in themselves" (xi). The animals that we are concerned with when we think about whether we have duties to animals are sentient beings who perceive the world in valenced ways and act accordingly (more on this below). Korsgaard makes a case for why we ought to treat animals as ends in themselves, rather than as mere means to an end. “To avoid using someone as a mere means, we have to make sure that her consent is free, informed, and uncoerced… But animals cannot give their free, unforced, and informed consent to what we do to them” (176-77). She rejects Kant’s view that our duties to animals are owed to ourselves rather than to animals. Korsgaard argues that we should treat animals well for their own sake. Her arguments differ from the utilitarian arguments in favor of animal rights that I am more familiar with, although they come to similar conclusions.
My understanding of Korsgarard’s account is that having a final good is the ground of moral standing. A final good is something worth having, realizing, or bringing about for its own sake, the end or aim of all our strivings, a state of affairs that is desirable or valuable or worth achieving for its own sake. Our fellow creatures establish themselves as ends in themselves in their activity of tending to their own well-functioning. Animals have a conscious perspective from which things can be good or bad, important or not important (a “valenced” character). An animal perceives the world evaluatively, as a place full of things which present themselves as attractive and to be sought and things that are aversive and to be avoided. An animal experiences her own condition, and the things that affect it, as good and bad for her. These valenced experiences guide her to pursue her own functional good. “It is almost a necessary truth that for an animal who functions by taking her own well-functioning as an end, a final good, her life itself is a good for her, her very existence is a good for her, so long as she is well-functioning, and in good enough condition to keep herself that way… So life itself is a good for almost any animals who in reasonably good shape” (21). For most animals (the ones we are most often concerned with when we are discussing animal rights), “eating and drinking, sexual activity, physical activity, playing with children and with each other, warmth and comfort, and companionship are positive goods” (22). Essentially, the final good for an animal is to lead a healthy life of her kind in reasonably good condition. Death, therefore, is bad for an individual animal (unless she is suffering and no longer capable of living a reasonably good life) because it robs her of a good that is not replaced by the birth of another animal. This point by Korsgaard seems to be a strong defense of not killing animals when compared to the utilitarian-style argument of aggregate wellbeing. Plants and sponges do not have final goods since they are not conscious, sentient organisms and lack valenced experiences that guide them to pursue their own funcitonal goods. We therefore have moral duties to animals, but do not have moral duties to plants or sponges.
Korsgaard also argues that while humans differ from animals, we are not intrinsically superior, more important, or more valuable. A ranking of importance or value from an objective, neutral perspective is impossible, so it is almost meaningless to make a judgement about what species is more important. Importance or value is a tethered property; to be important is to be important to an individual (are owls more important than squirrels? The question almost doesn’t make sense. Being an owl is important to an owl, and being a squirrel is important to a squirrel). Humans differ from other animals because we can reflect on our reasons for action and act accordingly. We are rationally self-governed creatures (autonomous). This gives human beings an additional layer of well-functioning, and is what makes humans moral agents in a way that animals are not. While animals may not be able to reflect upon their reasons for action, their nature is not different from ours in the sense that we all have a point of view from which things are good or bad for our well-functioning. We should value animals and relate to them in this way, as ends in themselves.
In Part 3 of the book, “Consequences,” Korsgaard deals with more practical questions and implications of her arguments. I personally found this part of the book to be most interesting and easiest to follow on my first read through the book. She discusses the idea of eliminating predator species, human extinction, eating animals, working animals, using animals in the military, using animals in research, and companion animals/pet ownership.
I have heard some of these arguments before, but this book was a far more thorough and detailed defense of them. Korsgaard provides a strong philosophical foundation for her arguments, bringing together ideas mainly from Aristotle and Kant, but also engages with ideas from some other philosophers such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Gary Francione, and others. There were also some things I had not read or heard elsewhere.
In Fellow Creatures, Korsgaard makes a Kantian defense of the claim that “human beings are obligated to treat all sentient animals, that is, all animals who have subjective experiences that are pleasant or painful, as what Kant called ‘ends in themselves" (xi). The animals that we are concerned with when we think about whether we have duties to animals are sentient beings who perceive the world in valenced ways and act accordingly (more on this below). Korsgaard makes a case for why we ought to treat animals as ends in themselves, rather than as mere means to an end. “To avoid using someone as a mere means, we have to make sure that her consent is free, informed, and uncoerced… But animals cannot give their free, unforced, and informed consent to what we do to them” (176-77). She rejects Kant’s view that our duties to animals are owed to ourselves rather than to animals. Korsgaard argues that we should treat animals well for their own sake. Her arguments differ from the utilitarian arguments in favor of animal rights that I am more familiar with, although they come to similar conclusions.
My understanding of Korsgarard’s account is that having a final good is the ground of moral standing. A final good is something worth having, realizing, or bringing about for its own sake, the end or aim of all our strivings, a state of affairs that is desirable or valuable or worth achieving for its own sake. Our fellow creatures establish themselves as ends in themselves in their activity of tending to their own well-functioning. Animals have a conscious perspective from which things can be good or bad, important or not important (a “valenced” character). An animal perceives the world evaluatively, as a place full of things which present themselves as attractive and to be sought and things that are aversive and to be avoided. An animal experiences her own condition, and the things that affect it, as good and bad for her. These valenced experiences guide her to pursue her own functional good. “It is almost a necessary truth that for an animal who functions by taking her own well-functioning as an end, a final good, her life itself is a good for her, her very existence is a good for her, so long as she is well-functioning, and in good enough condition to keep herself that way… So life itself is a good for almost any animals who in reasonably good shape” (21). For most animals (the ones we are most often concerned with when we are discussing animal rights), “eating and drinking, sexual activity, physical activity, playing with children and with each other, warmth and comfort, and companionship are positive goods” (22). Essentially, the final good for an animal is to lead a healthy life of her kind in reasonably good condition. Death, therefore, is bad for an individual animal (unless she is suffering and no longer capable of living a reasonably good life) because it robs her of a good that is not replaced by the birth of another animal. This point by Korsgaard seems to be a strong defense of not killing animals when compared to the utilitarian-style argument of aggregate wellbeing. Plants and sponges do not have final goods since they are not conscious, sentient organisms and lack valenced experiences that guide them to pursue their own funcitonal goods. We therefore have moral duties to animals, but do not have moral duties to plants or sponges.
Korsgaard also argues that while humans differ from animals, we are not intrinsically superior, more important, or more valuable. A ranking of importance or value from an objective, neutral perspective is impossible, so it is almost meaningless to make a judgement about what species is more important. Importance or value is a tethered property; to be important is to be important to an individual (are owls more important than squirrels? The question almost doesn’t make sense. Being an owl is important to an owl, and being a squirrel is important to a squirrel). Humans differ from other animals because we can reflect on our reasons for action and act accordingly. We are rationally self-governed creatures (autonomous). This gives human beings an additional layer of well-functioning, and is what makes humans moral agents in a way that animals are not. While animals may not be able to reflect upon their reasons for action, their nature is not different from ours in the sense that we all have a point of view from which things are good or bad for our well-functioning. We should value animals and relate to them in this way, as ends in themselves.
In Part 3 of the book, “Consequences,” Korsgaard deals with more practical questions and implications of her arguments. I personally found this part of the book to be most interesting and easiest to follow on my first read through the book. She discusses the idea of eliminating predator species, human extinction, eating animals, working animals, using animals in the military, using animals in research, and companion animals/pet ownership.
May 17, 2023
On Ash Sunday 2020, I became a vegetarian. I’ve been looking for a philosopher to give me words to help me think about this change because it’s not dietary as much as ethical as relates to how we treat animals and the environmental impact of animal consumption. Korsgaard’s attempt to ground animal ethics in a Kantian framework has a lot to offer. Her writing has begun to reshape my understanding of “the good,” how humans relate to other animals in our differences and similarities to other creatures; and why we humans shouldn’t think of ourselves as superior to other creatures. Yet, Korsgaard notes that what makes us different also makes us responsible and while she concludes things like vegetarianism is ethically ideal and that factory farming is deeply immoral, so also draws the readers into ongoing conversations about topics like breeding animals away from being predatory; whether we should have pets; whether we should leave all animals to be wild, among other topics. It’s the type of book I plan on reading again in the future.
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August 28, 2024what if uuuhhhhhhhhhhhhh you had a dog
September 25, 2020
Great book but above my head in some respects....
This book was definitely worth the read but I took off one star because for the first half of the book it was flying well above my head. I felt like it was written for a philosophy major rather than a casual reader. I however am just five months away from a masters in business management so it was outside my area of expertise. Still though it has actually created in me a strong desire to learn more philosophy because last IQ test I scored a 165 and I don't like the feeling of things flying over my head.
If you are just starting out reading about animal ethics I would recommend starting with Peter Singers Animal Liberation. This book is better after you have a fundamental knowledge under your belt. Also take at least an intro course in philosophy before reading this book so it will make more sense. I decided to watch the philosophy series on the Great Courses channel available on Amazon video.
This book was definitely worth the read but I took off one star because for the first half of the book it was flying well above my head. I felt like it was written for a philosophy major rather than a casual reader. I however am just five months away from a masters in business management so it was outside my area of expertise. Still though it has actually created in me a strong desire to learn more philosophy because last IQ test I scored a 165 and I don't like the feeling of things flying over my head.
If you are just starting out reading about animal ethics I would recommend starting with Peter Singers Animal Liberation. This book is better after you have a fundamental knowledge under your belt. Also take at least an intro course in philosophy before reading this book so it will make more sense. I decided to watch the philosophy series on the Great Courses channel available on Amazon video.
March 23, 2022
Christine Korsgaard ist eine ganz tolle Philosophin, die unfassbar kluge und neue Gedankengänge formuliert. Das macht sie mit einer Präzision und tiefe, die wirklich beachtlich ist. Auch wenn ich ihr nicht in allem, was sie schreib, zustimmen würde und ich in einigen Aspekten ihrer Tierethik auch deutliche Schwächen sehe, so hat sie dennoch einen ganz neuen und großen Ansatz herausgearbeitet, den ich so noch nicht kannte. Ganz anders als Singers pathozentrische und utilitaristische Herangehensweisen versucht sie es über den anthropozentrischen Weg und knüpft damit an Kant an, der sich dafür ausspricht, Tiere nicht um ihrer selbst Willen gut behandeln zu müssen. Sie schafft es aus dieser Auffassung Kants eine Tierethik zu begründen, die viele Tiere mit einschließt und deren Wohlergehen als genauso wichtig ansieht, wie das des Menschen.
Das Buch ist keine leichte Kost und man* muss sehr aufmerksam lesen, aber es lohnt sich, wie ich finde.
Das Buch ist keine leichte Kost und man* muss sehr aufmerksam lesen, aber es lohnt sich, wie ich finde.
June 17, 2024
I don't know what to make of this book. I agree with many of the things Korsgaard writes (we shouldn't eat animals, factory farming is particularly bad, and abusing animals for scientific experiments cannot be justified by saying that we are saving human lives). At the same time, I always ask myself why we shouldn't do this, and I'm not convinced that she has developed the correct arguments to answer these questions. Many of her views are also only addressed superficially, and she jumps from one aspect to another (e.g. in chapter 10, she settles accounts with both Singer and McMahan in two pages). And in general I ask myself about her entire work: is it really still necessary to formulate such a strict idea of rationality that it only applies to humans and excludes all other animals? Or would it perhaps have been more interesting to dissolve this strong distinction and ask what follows from it?
February 25, 2026
auf jeden fall ein paar gute gedanken und argumente drinnen und bestimmt mit viel zeit, motivation und kraft auch ein richtig gutes buch
aber für mich wars leider nix, ich hab die hälfte nicht verstanden und ich hatte das gefühl ich lese abgetipptes vom collegeblock ab. eben waren wir noch da, jetzt sind wir wieder da, dann soll ich in kapitel das und das springen, um mehr davon zu erfahren dann wieder zurück ....
habs wieder abgebrochen
ich glaube ich bleibe doch bei peter singer
aber für mich wars leider nix, ich hab die hälfte nicht verstanden und ich hatte das gefühl ich lese abgetipptes vom collegeblock ab. eben waren wir noch da, jetzt sind wir wieder da, dann soll ich in kapitel das und das springen, um mehr davon zu erfahren dann wieder zurück ....
habs wieder abgebrochen
ich glaube ich bleibe doch bei peter singer
August 5, 2025
this book (3 different copies of it, borrowed from different libraries) has followed me to many places. full review here: https://chlorophos.substack.com/p/rev... because 4k words is a bit much to write here. veryy glad that i finally found the time to break down some literature on ethics, but i will be moving on to other fields of philosophy!
November 19, 2023
Gostei muito. Se calhar fiz demasiadas pausas para perceber melhor os argumentos. Acho que a posição deontológica mais forte na defesa dos animais do que o utilitarismo. Also, hei de ler Kant
May 21, 2018
A scholarly exploration of an emotional subject
George Eliot once wrote “We are all born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves”(Middlemarch). In Fellow Creatures, Harvard philosophy professor Christine Korsgaard challenges this attitude and argues that humans have obligations to other sentient creatures, that is, other creatures who can feel pleasure or pain, and that our sense of human superiority does not confer on us the right to treat other creatures merely as means to gratify our own ends.
Korsgaard makes her argument through very basic philosophical inquiry, with chapters like:
Are People More Important than the Other Animals?
Reasons to Treat People and Animals Differently
Tethered Values
The Origin of the Good
Self-Consciousness and the Self
Ethics and Science
The Role of Pleasure and Pain
The Value of a Species
Basically, she acknowledges that humans are different from other living creatures but thoroughly rejects a traditional view that we are entitled to use other creatures for any ends of our own, short of malicious enjoyment, and that this outweighs any interests of the animals. She makes a case that animals have moral standing even though they do not participate in a relationship of moral reciprocity that forms the basis for interactions among humans. She acknowledges that since animals are not themselves “moral beings” they do not “deserve” to be treated any way, either good or bad, but ultimately concludes that non-human animals “deserve” a good life simply by virtue of existing.
In addition to the main thread of Korsgaard’s argument, discussions like the value of a species raised some interesting points I had not seen elsewhere, like the good of the individual versus the good of the species. Later chapters get more real-world, like the chapters on using animals in the military and in scientific experiments, but even so her arguments are rational rather than emotional.
Korsgaard bases her argument heavily on the work of Immanuel Kant and Aristotle and agrees both with Kant’s account of why we have obligations and with a theory derived from Aristotle about why things are good or bad, although she ultimately departs from their conclusions about what this implies about our obligation to other nonhuman lives. Over a third of the book is devoted to discussing Kant, and it gave me a much better understanding of some of his thinking, even though Korsgaard (and I) rejects his ultimate stance. She also discusses the utilitarian view of morality and where she departs from it.
Fellow Creatures is part of the Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics published by the University of Oxford, so it is a scholarly work of philosophy in addition to being a plea for better treatment of other animals. You need not be an academic philosopher to understand and enjoy it, but you will be more comfortable if you have some background in philosophy through reading or coursework. To me, she made her case admirably, but I was already convinced of her conclusion, albeit having arrived at it via a much less rational route.
If, after reading her scholarly arguments, the reader still has some reservations about classifying humans with other life as “fellow creatures”, Korsgaard reminds us of a more fundamental bond: “There is something about the naked, unfiltered joy that animals take in little things—a food treat, an uninhibited romp, a patch of sunlight, a belly rub from a friendly human---that reawakens our sense of the all-important thing that we share with them: the sheer joy and terror of conscious existence. “ In recognition of that bond Korsgaard dedicates the book to the cats who have shared her adult life.
George Eliot once wrote “We are all born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves”(Middlemarch). In Fellow Creatures, Harvard philosophy professor Christine Korsgaard challenges this attitude and argues that humans have obligations to other sentient creatures, that is, other creatures who can feel pleasure or pain, and that our sense of human superiority does not confer on us the right to treat other creatures merely as means to gratify our own ends.
Korsgaard makes her argument through very basic philosophical inquiry, with chapters like:
Are People More Important than the Other Animals?
Reasons to Treat People and Animals Differently
Tethered Values
The Origin of the Good
Self-Consciousness and the Self
Ethics and Science
The Role of Pleasure and Pain
The Value of a Species
Basically, she acknowledges that humans are different from other living creatures but thoroughly rejects a traditional view that we are entitled to use other creatures for any ends of our own, short of malicious enjoyment, and that this outweighs any interests of the animals. She makes a case that animals have moral standing even though they do not participate in a relationship of moral reciprocity that forms the basis for interactions among humans. She acknowledges that since animals are not themselves “moral beings” they do not “deserve” to be treated any way, either good or bad, but ultimately concludes that non-human animals “deserve” a good life simply by virtue of existing.
In addition to the main thread of Korsgaard’s argument, discussions like the value of a species raised some interesting points I had not seen elsewhere, like the good of the individual versus the good of the species. Later chapters get more real-world, like the chapters on using animals in the military and in scientific experiments, but even so her arguments are rational rather than emotional.
Korsgaard bases her argument heavily on the work of Immanuel Kant and Aristotle and agrees both with Kant’s account of why we have obligations and with a theory derived from Aristotle about why things are good or bad, although she ultimately departs from their conclusions about what this implies about our obligation to other nonhuman lives. Over a third of the book is devoted to discussing Kant, and it gave me a much better understanding of some of his thinking, even though Korsgaard (and I) rejects his ultimate stance. She also discusses the utilitarian view of morality and where she departs from it.
Fellow Creatures is part of the Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics published by the University of Oxford, so it is a scholarly work of philosophy in addition to being a plea for better treatment of other animals. You need not be an academic philosopher to understand and enjoy it, but you will be more comfortable if you have some background in philosophy through reading or coursework. To me, she made her case admirably, but I was already convinced of her conclusion, albeit having arrived at it via a much less rational route.
If, after reading her scholarly arguments, the reader still has some reservations about classifying humans with other life as “fellow creatures”, Korsgaard reminds us of a more fundamental bond: “There is something about the naked, unfiltered joy that animals take in little things—a food treat, an uninhibited romp, a patch of sunlight, a belly rub from a friendly human---that reawakens our sense of the all-important thing that we share with them: the sheer joy and terror of conscious existence. “ In recognition of that bond Korsgaard dedicates the book to the cats who have shared her adult life.
February 18, 2022
Superb. The use of an Aristotelian conception of telos, in order to broaden the Kantian sense of an "end in itself", in particular, is precisely what I have long wished for to remedy the shortcomings of Kantian morality.
May 14, 2024
(took a break from writing reviews cause it's my sister's bday)
I have an animal rights activist grandmother and a vegan sister, roommate, and extremely close friend from home, so the notion of reconsidering how humans treat animals is not new to me. That being said, approaches from a philosophical perspective are fairly new. Most I've heard have been variations of Thomson's abortion argument, or else considerations of animals having moral status due to consciousness, sentience, or sapience.
At the start of this semester, I read a paper called "On the moral status of social robots: considering the consciousness criterion” by Kestutis Mosakas, and built a presentation based on it about assigning moral status to beings that aren't human, but have some criteria by which we may assign moral status. These could include: Animals! Robots! Fetuses (this one being most relevant to modern day American politics. Most people's introduction to philosophy of self and philosophy of mind comes through the abortion debate these days I feel)! And others.
Korsgaard provides an extremely in depth look into the nature of humans and animals, and what humans can owe animals even without granting them moral status. The first section of the book is just a general overview on the philosophy of animals and human relations to wards animals. Chapter 2 is particularly instrumental is forging the idea that animals are good, and have selves.
The second section talks about kant's theory of animals. First off, section 5.2 of the book is a masterpiece, arguing against the "argument for marginal cases." This is one of my least favorite edge cases in philosophy: "If your argument only works for rational beings, what about infants/people with dementia/etc," so I'm very glad she takes it down. She discusses at length Kants somewhat bizarre position, in which (in my view) he tries to have it both ways. Animals are things, yet human beings have moral obligations to them. Animals being things is key in his groundwork, but eveyr other writing treats them as something more than, say, a toaster.
Korsgaard does a great job both elucidating his position and then providing chapter 8 as a way to synthesize Kant with a pro-animal perspective. Arguable (as she herself admits freely), but really good!
The extremely interesting final four chapters apply this to real world cases, including very controversial ones!
I'd highly recommend this book if you are an animal rights advocate looking to bolster your position, or if you are curious about philosophy of animals, or if you like good books!
PS: if you have a harvard email, the whole book is free on hollis!
PPS: Korsgaard doesn't mention this, but Kant's second ever book, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755) talks about aliens! Sick!
I have an animal rights activist grandmother and a vegan sister, roommate, and extremely close friend from home, so the notion of reconsidering how humans treat animals is not new to me. That being said, approaches from a philosophical perspective are fairly new. Most I've heard have been variations of Thomson's abortion argument, or else considerations of animals having moral status due to consciousness, sentience, or sapience.
At the start of this semester, I read a paper called "On the moral status of social robots: considering the consciousness criterion” by Kestutis Mosakas, and built a presentation based on it about assigning moral status to beings that aren't human, but have some criteria by which we may assign moral status. These could include: Animals! Robots! Fetuses (this one being most relevant to modern day American politics. Most people's introduction to philosophy of self and philosophy of mind comes through the abortion debate these days I feel)! And others.
Korsgaard provides an extremely in depth look into the nature of humans and animals, and what humans can owe animals even without granting them moral status. The first section of the book is just a general overview on the philosophy of animals and human relations to wards animals. Chapter 2 is particularly instrumental is forging the idea that animals are good, and have selves.
The second section talks about kant's theory of animals. First off, section 5.2 of the book is a masterpiece, arguing against the "argument for marginal cases." This is one of my least favorite edge cases in philosophy: "If your argument only works for rational beings, what about infants/people with dementia/etc," so I'm very glad she takes it down. She discusses at length Kants somewhat bizarre position, in which (in my view) he tries to have it both ways. Animals are things, yet human beings have moral obligations to them. Animals being things is key in his groundwork, but eveyr other writing treats them as something more than, say, a toaster.
Korsgaard does a great job both elucidating his position and then providing chapter 8 as a way to synthesize Kant with a pro-animal perspective. Arguable (as she herself admits freely), but really good!
The extremely interesting final four chapters apply this to real world cases, including very controversial ones!
I'd highly recommend this book if you are an animal rights advocate looking to bolster your position, or if you are curious about philosophy of animals, or if you like good books!
PS: if you have a harvard email, the whole book is free on hollis!
PPS: Korsgaard doesn't mention this, but Kant's second ever book, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755) talks about aliens! Sick!
January 29, 2026
Το έργο της Christine M. Korsgaard, «Οικεία πλάσματα: Η καντιανή ηθική και οι υποχρεώσεις μας προς τα ζώα» (Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals), αποτελεί μια ριζοσπαστική παρέμβαση στην ηθική φιλοσοφία. Η συγγραφέας επιχειρεί να αναθεωρήσει το παραδοσιακό καντιανό πλαίσιο —το οποίο ιστορικά θεωρούσε ότι έχουμε υποχρεώσεις μόνο απέναντι σε έλλογα όντα— προκειμένου να θεμελιώσει ισχυρά ηθικά καθήκοντα απέναντι στα μη ανθρώπινα ζώα.
1. Σύντομη Συνολική Περίληψη
Το κεντρικό επιχείρημα του βιβλίου είναι ότι η ιδιότητα του «έλλογου όντος» δεν αποτελεί προϋπόθεση για να έχει ένα πλάσμα ηθική αξία, αλλά είναι το εργαλείο μέσω του οποίου συνειδητοποιούμε ότι κάθε ον που έχει ένα «δικό του καλό» (a good of its own) αποτελεί αυτοσκοπό. Η Korsgaard υποστηρίζει ότι η διάκριση μεταξύ ανθρώπων και ζώων δεν έγκειται στην ανωτερότητα της αξίας μας, αλλά στη φύση της συνείδησής μας: οι άνθρωποι έχουν «κανονιστική αυτοδιοίκηση», η οποία τους επιβάλλει την υποχρέωση να προστατεύουν το καλό των άλλων αισθανόμενων όντων, τα οποία βιώνουν τον κόσμο με όρους ευημερίας ή πόνου.
2. Κεντρικές Θέσεις και Ιδέες
1. Η απόρριψη της απόλυτης αξίας: Η Korsgaard υποστηρίζει ότι τίποτα δεν είναι «καλό» με την έννοια της απόλυτης κοσμικής αξίας. Κάτι είναι καλό για κάποιον. Επομένως, το καλό ενός ζώου είναι εξίσου σημαντικό για το ίδιο, όσο το καλό ενός ανθρώπου για τον άνθρωπο.
2. Το ζώο ως «λειτουργική ενότητα»: Τα ζώα δεν είναι αντικείμενα, αλλά οργανικές ενότητες που επιδιώκουν τη διατήρηση της ύπαρξής τους και την αποφυγή του πόνου.
3. Ηθική χωρίς αμοιβαιότητα: Παρόλο που τα ζώα δεν μπορούν να έχουν ηθικές υποχρεώσεις (δεν είναι ηθικοί δρώντες), εμείς έχουμε ηθικές υποχρεώσεις προς αυτά, καθώς η λογική μας επιτάσσει να αναγνωρίζουμε την αξία της ζωής τους.
4. Κριτική στην ιεραρχία των ειδών: Η συγγραφέας αποδομεί την ιδέα ότι η ανθρώπινη νοημοσύνη μας καθιστά «ανώτερα» όντα σε μια μεταφυσική κλίμακα. Η λογική είναι απλώς μια ειδική ικανότητα, όπως η όσφρηση είναι για τον σκύλο.
3. Θεωρητικό Πλαίσιο
Το βιβλίο κινείται αυστηρά εντός της Δεοντοκρατικής Ηθικής (Deontology) και συγκεκριμένα του Νεοκαντιανισμού. Η Korsgaard χρησιμοποιεί τη μεθοδολογία του Immanuel Kant, αλλά τον διορθώνει: ενώ ο Kant πίστευε ότι η κακή συμπεριφορά προς τα ζώα είναι λάθος μόνο επειδή «σκληραίνει» τον ανθρώπινο χαρακτήρα (έμμεσο καθήκον), η Korsgaard υποστηρίζει ότι έχουμε άμεσα καθήκοντα προς αυτά, βασιζόμενη στην καντιανή έννοια της «νομοθεσίας του λόγου».
4. Βασικές Έννοιες
• Ηθικός Δρών (Moral Agent): Το ον που μπορεί να αξιολογεί τις πράξεις του και να ακολουθεί ηθικούς νόμους (άνθρωποι).
• Ηθικός Αποδέκτης (Moral Patient): Το ον προς το οποίο οφείλεται ηθική αντιμετώπιση επειδή μπορεί να υποφέρει ή να ευημερήσει (ζώα).
• Κανονιστική Αυτοδιοίκηση (Normative Self-government): Η ικανότητα του ανθρώπου να αποστασιοποιείται από τις παρορμήσεις του και να αναρωτιέται «πρέπει να το κάνω αυτό;».
• Το Κατά Σχέση Καλό (Good-for): Η ιδέα ότι η αξία είναι πάντα σχετική με τις ανάγκες και την εμπειρία ενός υποκειμένου.
5. Σκοπός του Βιβλίου
Σκοπός της Korsgaard είναι να αποδείξει ότι η υπεράσπιση των δικαιωμάτων των ζώων δεν απαιτεί την εγκατάλειψη της καντιανής φιλοσοφίας, αλλά την πλήρη συνέπεια με τις αρχές της. Επιχειρεί να καταρρίψει τον «ανθ��ωποκεντρισμό» της παραδοσιακής ηθικής, υποστηρίζοντας ότι η ηθική μας υπόσταση μας καθιστά «κηδεμόνες» και όχι «ιδιοκτήτες» της φύσης.
Σημασία, Σύγκριση και Κριτική
Σημασία στο πεδίο:
Το βιβλίο θεωρείται ένα από τα σημαντικότερα έργα ηθικής του 21ου αιώνα. Κατόρθωσε να γεφυρώσει το χάσμα μεταξύ της καντιανής παράδοσης και του κινήματος για την απελευθέρωση των ζώων, προσφέροντας μια εναλλακτική στη χρησιιοκρατική προσέγγιση.
Σύγκριση με άλλους στοχαστές:
• Peter Singer (Ωφελιμισμός): Ο Singer βασίζει τα δικαιώματα των ζώων στον υπολογισμό του πόνου/ηδονής. Η Korsgaard διαφωνεί, υποστηρίζοντας ότι η βάση είναι ο σεβασμός στην ακεραιότητα του ζώου ως αυτοσκοπού, ανεξάρτητα από το αν η χρήση του «παράγει» περισσότερη ευτυχία συνολικά.
• Tom Regan (Deontology): Παρόμοια με τον Regan, η Korsgaard μιλά για εγγενή αξία, αλλά τη θεμελιώνει στην καντιανή θεωρία της συγκρότησης του εαυτού και όχι απλώς στην ιδιότητα του «υποκειμένου μιας ζωής».
Κύριες Κριτικές:
1. Εσωτερική ασυνέπεια: Ορισμένοι μελετητές του Kant υποστηρίζουν ότι αν αφαιρέσουμε την έλλογη φύση ως κριτήριο της «αξίας», τότε ολόκληρο το καντιανό οικοδόμημα καταρρέει.
2. Πρακτική εφαρμογή: Η κριτική εστιάζει στη δυσκολία εφαρμογής της θεωρίας σε περιπτώσεις σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων (π.χ. έρευνα για φάρμακα), καθώς η Korsgaard θέτει πολύ υψηλά τον πήχη για την ηθική νομιμοποίηση της χρήσης ζώων.
1. Σύντομη Συνολική Περίληψη
Το κεντρικό επιχείρημα του βιβλίου είναι ότι η ιδιότητα του «έλλογου όντος» δεν αποτελεί προϋπόθεση για να έχει ένα πλάσμα ηθική αξία, αλλά είναι το εργαλείο μέσω του οποίου συνειδητοποιούμε ότι κάθε ον που έχει ένα «δικό του καλό» (a good of its own) αποτελεί αυτοσκοπό. Η Korsgaard υποστηρίζει ότι η διάκριση μεταξύ ανθρώπων και ζώων δεν έγκειται στην ανωτερότητα της αξίας μας, αλλά στη φύση της συνείδησής μας: οι άνθρωποι έχουν «κανονιστική αυτοδιοίκηση», η οποία τους επιβάλλει την υποχρέωση να προστατεύουν το καλό των άλλων αισθανόμενων όντων, τα οποία βιώνουν τον κόσμο με όρους ευημερίας ή πόνου.
2. Κεντρικές Θέσεις και Ιδέες
1. Η απόρριψη της απόλυτης αξίας: Η Korsgaard υποστηρίζει ότι τίποτα δεν είναι «καλό» με την έννοια της απόλυτης κοσμικής αξίας. Κάτι είναι καλό για κάποιον. Επομένως, το καλό ενός ζώου είναι εξίσου σημαντικό για το ίδιο, όσο το καλό ενός ανθρώπου για τον άνθρωπο.
2. Το ζώο ως «λειτουργική ενότητα»: Τα ζώα δεν είναι αντικείμενα, αλλά οργανικές ενότητες που επιδιώκουν τη διατήρηση της ύπαρξής τους και την αποφυγή του πόνου.
3. Ηθική χωρίς αμοιβαιότητα: Παρόλο που τα ζώα δεν μπορούν να έχουν ηθικές υποχρεώσεις (δεν είναι ηθικοί δρώντες), εμείς έχουμε ηθικές υποχρεώσεις προς αυτά, καθώς η λογική μας επιτάσσει να αναγνωρίζουμε την αξία της ζωής τους.
4. Κριτική στην ιεραρχία των ειδών: Η συγγραφέας αποδομεί την ιδέα ότι η ανθρώπινη νοημοσύνη μας καθιστά «ανώτερα» όντα σε μια μεταφυσική κλίμακα. Η λογική είναι απλώς μια ειδική ικανότητα, όπως η όσφρηση είναι για τον σκύλο.
3. Θεωρητικό Πλαίσιο
Το βιβλίο κινείται αυστηρά εντός της Δεοντοκρατικής Ηθικής (Deontology) και συγκεκριμένα του Νεοκαντιανισμού. Η Korsgaard χρησιμοποιεί τη μεθοδολογία του Immanuel Kant, αλλά τον διορθώνει: ενώ ο Kant πίστευε ότι η κακή συμπεριφορά προς τα ζώα είναι λάθος μόνο επειδή «σκληραίνει» τον ανθρώπινο χαρακτήρα (έμμεσο καθήκον), η Korsgaard υποστηρίζει ότι έχουμε άμεσα καθήκοντα προς αυτά, βασιζόμενη στην καντιανή έννοια της «νομοθεσίας του λόγου».
4. Βασικές Έννοιες
• Ηθικός Δρών (Moral Agent): Το ον που μπορεί να αξιολογεί τις πράξεις του και να ακολουθεί ηθικούς νόμους (άνθρωποι).
• Ηθικός Αποδέκτης (Moral Patient): Το ον προς το οποίο οφείλεται ηθική αντιμετώπιση επειδή μπορεί να υποφέρει ή να ευημερήσει (ζώα).
• Κανονιστική Αυτοδιοίκηση (Normative Self-government): Η ικανότητα του ανθρώπου να αποστασιοποιείται από τις παρορμήσεις του και να αναρωτιέται «πρέπει να το κάνω αυτό;».
• Το Κατά Σχέση Καλό (Good-for): Η ιδέα ότι η αξία είναι πάντα σχετική με τις ανάγκες και την εμπειρία ενός υποκειμένου.
5. Σκοπός του Βιβλίου
Σκοπός της Korsgaard είναι να αποδείξει ότι η υπεράσπιση των δικαιωμάτων των ζώων δεν απαιτεί την εγκατάλειψη της καντιανής φιλοσοφίας, αλλά την πλήρη συνέπεια με τις αρχές της. Επιχειρεί να καταρρίψει τον «ανθ��ωποκεντρισμό» της παραδοσιακής ηθικής, υποστηρίζοντας ότι η ηθική μας υπόσταση μας καθιστά «κηδεμόνες» και όχι «ιδιοκτήτες» της φύσης.
Σημασία, Σύγκριση και Κριτική
Σημασία στο πεδίο:
Το βιβλίο θεωρείται ένα από τα σημαντικότερα έργα ηθικής του 21ου αιώνα. Κατόρθωσε να γεφυρώσει το χάσμα μεταξύ της καντιανής παράδοσης και του κινήματος για την απελευθέρωση των ζώων, προσφέροντας μια εναλλακτική στη χρησιιοκρατική προσέγγιση.
Σύγκριση με άλλους στοχαστές:
• Peter Singer (Ωφελιμισμός): Ο Singer βασίζει τα δικαιώματα των ζώων στον υπολογισμό του πόνου/ηδονής. Η Korsgaard διαφωνεί, υποστηρίζοντας ότι η βάση είναι ο σεβασμός στην ακεραιότητα του ζώου ως αυτοσκοπού, ανεξάρτητα από το αν η χρήση του «παράγει» περισσότερη ευτυχία συνολικά.
• Tom Regan (Deontology): Παρόμοια με τον Regan, η Korsgaard μιλά για εγγενή αξία, αλλά τη θεμελιώνει στην καντιανή θεωρία της συγκρότησης του εαυτού και όχι απλώς στην ιδιότητα του «υποκειμένου μιας ζωής».
Κύριες Κριτικές:
1. Εσωτερική ασυνέπεια: Ορισμένοι μελετητές του Kant υποστηρίζουν ότι αν αφαιρέσουμε την έλλογη φύση ως κριτήριο της «αξίας», τότε ολόκληρο το καντιανό οικοδόμημα καταρρέει.
2. Πρακτική εφαρμογή: Η κριτική εστιάζει στη δυσκολία εφαρμογής της θεωρίας σε περιπτώσεις σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων (π.χ. έρευνα για φάρμακα), καθώς η Korsgaard θέτει πολύ υψηλά τον πήχη για την ηθική νομιμοποίηση της χρήσης ζώων.
June 6, 2025
Kantian ethics has long struggled to understand animals as having any kind of moral status or being worthy of moral consideration, except insofar as we have a secondary duty that is actually to ourselves (as in Kant’s famous claim that it is morally acceptable to kick one’s dog but that one should consider the pernicious effect this can have on one’s own moral character and will).
Korsgaard critiques such Kantian and non-Kantian positions that see animals as having no or lesser moral standing, especially those that derive this from their lack of moral agency or rationality. She then advances her own position, informed by mainly Kantian but also Aristotelian naturalist concepts, that animals are to be regarded as ends in themselves and that we have moral obligations to do no harm to them but also to help them fulfil their natural ends.
I had not read much Korsgaard before this, but the book served as a good introduction to key concepts in her moral philosophy, such as the nature of moral agency, practical reason, selfhood, and her interpretations of the categorical imperative and kingdom of ends. It has prompted me to want to read her attempt to salvage and defend Kantian ethics.
Korsgaard critiques such Kantian and non-Kantian positions that see animals as having no or lesser moral standing, especially those that derive this from their lack of moral agency or rationality. She then advances her own position, informed by mainly Kantian but also Aristotelian naturalist concepts, that animals are to be regarded as ends in themselves and that we have moral obligations to do no harm to them but also to help them fulfil their natural ends.
I had not read much Korsgaard before this, but the book served as a good introduction to key concepts in her moral philosophy, such as the nature of moral agency, practical reason, selfhood, and her interpretations of the categorical imperative and kingdom of ends. It has prompted me to want to read her attempt to salvage and defend Kantian ethics.
December 9, 2025
Loved this. the inevitable conclusion is that animals deserve autonomy, choice, love and respect.
korsgaard discusses whether a human life is more valuable than a rabbit life. the question is, "more valuable to whom?"
..."For even if the rabbit’s life is not as important to her as yours is to you, nevertheless, for her it contains absolutely everything of value, all that can ever be good or bad for her, except possibly the lives of her offspring. The end of her life is the end of all value and goodness for her. So there is something imponderable about these comparisons."
Does a good job of combatting meat-eaters' idea that dying is nbd for animals.
I miss my bunny and i read philosophy and think of her <3
korsgaard discusses whether a human life is more valuable than a rabbit life. the question is, "more valuable to whom?"
..."For even if the rabbit’s life is not as important to her as yours is to you, nevertheless, for her it contains absolutely everything of value, all that can ever be good or bad for her, except possibly the lives of her offspring. The end of her life is the end of all value and goodness for her. So there is something imponderable about these comparisons."
Does a good job of combatting meat-eaters' idea that dying is nbd for animals.
I miss my bunny and i read philosophy and think of her <3
March 15, 2021
Though my knowledge of philosophical writing is limited to a few undergraduate classes and personal education, I enjoyed the unconventional and personable approach to her views of Kantian moral philosophy that Korsgaard takes in Fellow Creatures. She's comfortable leaving questions that she doesn't know the answer to as unanswered. I respect that this book and her ideas further the aim of Kantian moral philosophy to include others not included for arbitrary reasons. I've yet to determine what my own moral view is - Kantian, utilitarian, etc - but I appreciate the way this book walks us carefully through her framework with clear examples and often, uncomplicated prose.
December 8, 2021
a must read for animal ethics. felt it lined up with my moral intuitions even though I feel like I didn’t quite grasp some of the more explicitly Kantian arguments in the latter half of the book.
the notion of goodness being ‘tethered’ such that there is no good without a given creature to whom the good is “good-for” was an especially lucid point. especially knowing a lot of people who argue along the lines of exploitation of other animals serving some “good” for humans
the notion of goodness being ‘tethered’ such that there is no good without a given creature to whom the good is “good-for” was an especially lucid point. especially knowing a lot of people who argue along the lines of exploitation of other animals serving some “good” for humans
June 18, 2021
5/5 for a fascinating and compelling argument
3/5 for readability
3/5 for readability
July 23, 2021
Wow! Read this book. It will change the way you think if all animals including your pets.
Read
May 12, 2024lots of kant
June 15, 2025
Given the data Korsgaard refers to, this is succinct and brilliant argumentation. More though I endorse the conclusion entirely, I do not agree with all of the arguments leading to it - for example that humans are more rational animals at all, I consider utter nonsense. One need only read Enlightenment 2.0 to see what is wrong with such arguments.
January 6, 2026
A compelling case for extending Kant's ethical theories to other animals. She covers the practical implications of doing so and takes a fresh look at related issues. Great stuff!
February 3, 2020
I agree with Korsgaard's conclusion, but I disagree with how she gets there. My two biggest complaints are the following.
First, Korsgaard tries and fails to refute the argument from marginal cases. The argument from marginal cases is one of the strongest (if not the strongest) arguments for animal rights. Korsgaard's argument that she considers the strongest against AMC, if I am not misrepresenting her, is that nonparadigmatic humans (such as the severely mentally enfeebled) and non-human animals are different in the sense that nonparadigmatic humans are defectively rational, while non-human animals are not defectively rational. Rationality for Korsgaard is a function and not a property (a distinction that apparently matters greatly for her argument against AMC). Severely mentally enfeebled humans may not be autonomous, but, in being human, they function as rational beings, but are born or become defectively rational beings. The point is made clearer, and the supposed moral equivalence AMC hopes to defend is attacked, when she argues that nonparadigmatic humans require the aid of other humans to survive. Non-human animals, without a certain level of rationality, are capable of surviving on their own.
At bottom, Korsgaard diagnoses the fundamental confusion of AMC as that of treating rationality as a mere property one can have or lack, rather than the sort of functioning of an individual (hence, severely mentally enfeebled humans are "rationally defective" instead of "non-rational," and, well, you can figure out what this means for non-human animals). Non-human animals are functioning properly without the sort of lofty autonomy Kant valued. So, there is a morally relevant difference between nonparadigmatic humans and non-human animals. Therefore, the argument from marginal cases fails. That is, at least, my interpretation of her self-proclaimed strongest argument against AMC.
I think it's clear, however, that this fails to address, much less refute, the argument from marginal cases. Tom Regan, Peter Singer, and other proponents of the argument could, I think, happily concede this is a difference, and, further, that rationality is a matter of functioning rather than a property one either lacks or possesses. Yet, does any of this establish a morally relevant difference when it comes to permitting the treatment of non-human animals as mere resources (in the case of Regan) or treating their interests less importantly than human interests (in the case of Singer)? I don't see how it does. For the supposed confusion of proponents of AMC (that is, of treating rationality as a property rather than a state of functioning), the tension of AMC is only pushed back, not resolved. In other words, we're now in a position of asking whether this functioning is a morally relevant difference.
Obviously, though, I am not accusing Korsgaard of defending radically differing conclusions than that of Regan or Singer (though, she is opposing Singer to a greater degree). Yet, the question remains whether Korsgaard gives good reasons against the moral parity that the AMC argues for between nonparadigmatic humans and non-human animals. As argued above, I don't think she does. If this difference and distinction Korsgaard stresses reaches any moral conclusions, it could be that it informs us of the positive duties we may have toward nonparadigmatic humans who are dependent on others to live or, at least, live well.
Overall, I find Korsgaard's arguments against AMC to be needlessly convoluted and incredibly unconvincing, especially when compared to the clear arguments of Regan and Singer. When we hold all the arguments up before us, AMC comes out on top. It was good when Porphyry used it, and it's good today.
Second, and this will be harder to pin down and will be more of a personal gripe that I'll quickly air here without much argument, but the undercurrent of anti-realism in Korsgaard's writing makes it difficult for me to see why we should take morality that seriously. Constructivism and the Kantian influence of anti-realist trends seems absolutely opposed to any strong moral case for animals as ends-in-themselves or for any obligation to be vegan. Again, I'm already convinced of Korsgaard's main conclusion, but I don't see this work as a compelling case.
First, Korsgaard tries and fails to refute the argument from marginal cases. The argument from marginal cases is one of the strongest (if not the strongest) arguments for animal rights. Korsgaard's argument that she considers the strongest against AMC, if I am not misrepresenting her, is that nonparadigmatic humans (such as the severely mentally enfeebled) and non-human animals are different in the sense that nonparadigmatic humans are defectively rational, while non-human animals are not defectively rational. Rationality for Korsgaard is a function and not a property (a distinction that apparently matters greatly for her argument against AMC). Severely mentally enfeebled humans may not be autonomous, but, in being human, they function as rational beings, but are born or become defectively rational beings. The point is made clearer, and the supposed moral equivalence AMC hopes to defend is attacked, when she argues that nonparadigmatic humans require the aid of other humans to survive. Non-human animals, without a certain level of rationality, are capable of surviving on their own.
At bottom, Korsgaard diagnoses the fundamental confusion of AMC as that of treating rationality as a mere property one can have or lack, rather than the sort of functioning of an individual (hence, severely mentally enfeebled humans are "rationally defective" instead of "non-rational," and, well, you can figure out what this means for non-human animals). Non-human animals are functioning properly without the sort of lofty autonomy Kant valued. So, there is a morally relevant difference between nonparadigmatic humans and non-human animals. Therefore, the argument from marginal cases fails. That is, at least, my interpretation of her self-proclaimed strongest argument against AMC.
I think it's clear, however, that this fails to address, much less refute, the argument from marginal cases. Tom Regan, Peter Singer, and other proponents of the argument could, I think, happily concede this is a difference, and, further, that rationality is a matter of functioning rather than a property one either lacks or possesses. Yet, does any of this establish a morally relevant difference when it comes to permitting the treatment of non-human animals as mere resources (in the case of Regan) or treating their interests less importantly than human interests (in the case of Singer)? I don't see how it does. For the supposed confusion of proponents of AMC (that is, of treating rationality as a property rather than a state of functioning), the tension of AMC is only pushed back, not resolved. In other words, we're now in a position of asking whether this functioning is a morally relevant difference.
Obviously, though, I am not accusing Korsgaard of defending radically differing conclusions than that of Regan or Singer (though, she is opposing Singer to a greater degree). Yet, the question remains whether Korsgaard gives good reasons against the moral parity that the AMC argues for between nonparadigmatic humans and non-human animals. As argued above, I don't think she does. If this difference and distinction Korsgaard stresses reaches any moral conclusions, it could be that it informs us of the positive duties we may have toward nonparadigmatic humans who are dependent on others to live or, at least, live well.
Overall, I find Korsgaard's arguments against AMC to be needlessly convoluted and incredibly unconvincing, especially when compared to the clear arguments of Regan and Singer. When we hold all the arguments up before us, AMC comes out on top. It was good when Porphyry used it, and it's good today.
Second, and this will be harder to pin down and will be more of a personal gripe that I'll quickly air here without much argument, but the undercurrent of anti-realism in Korsgaard's writing makes it difficult for me to see why we should take morality that seriously. Constructivism and the Kantian influence of anti-realist trends seems absolutely opposed to any strong moral case for animals as ends-in-themselves or for any obligation to be vegan. Again, I'm already convinced of Korsgaard's main conclusion, but I don't see this work as a compelling case.
November 22, 2021
Interessantes Buch, regt zum Mitdenken an. Hat in seiner Argumentation in meinen Augen aber einige Schwächen.
Korsgaard beruft sich auf Kant. Allerdings kommt sie nicht rein mit kantianischer Argumentation aus: Sie beruft sich auf Aristoteles und sagt (moralisch) gut ist, was (funktional) für ein Geschöpf gut ist. Geschöpfe (Menschen, Säugetiere, Vögel, etc.) haben ein Bewusstsein darüber, was (funktional) gut für sie ist. Das ist eine Argumentation, die Kant hätte machen können, aber (vermutlich aus guten, mir unbekannten Gründen) verwarf. Womöglich enthält das auch einen naturalistischen Fehlschluss.
Kant hat stattdessen seine Ethik rein aus den Voraussetzungen der Vernunft gefolgert. Wichtig ist dafür die logische Widerspruchsfreiheit. Im Abschnitt "Ärger im Reich der Zwecke" räumt Korsgaard selbst ein, dass ihre Argumentation zu Widersprüchen führt, hält aber ihre (aristotelisch gewonnenes) moralisches Gutsein für wichtiger. Ich kann mir bei bestem Willen nicht vorstellen, dass das mit einr kantische Ethik vereinbar ist.
Nebenbei setzt Koorsgaard das (funktional) Gute für Geschöpfe mit dem Selbsterhalt gleich. Nun gibt es aber sowohl unter Menschen als auch unter Tieren Suizide. Jedenfalls bei manchen Tierarten ist das auch ein regelmäßiges Verhalten. (Auch, dass die meisten Tierarten nicht auf ein "langes Leben" vorbereitet sind, ist vielleicht ein Gegenargument.) Die Biologie erklärt den Suizid mit Tieren dadurch, dass dies zwar nicht dem individuellen Selbsterhalt dient, aber dem Erhalt eines Staates oder Verwandter mit ähnlichen Genen. Ich vermute, dass Koorsgard ihre persönlichen oder zumindest menschlichen Einstellungen und das Verhalten von Haustieren hier verallgemeinert und projiziert. Gewissermaßen ein "Anthtro- und Haustierzentrismus". Die Konsequenzen des Generhalts als funktional und damit als moralisch Gutes will ich mir kaum vorstellen, sowohl aus menschlicher als auch aus tierischer Perspektive.
Ich kann mir gut vorstellen, dass sich auf die vorgestellte oder zumindest eine ähnliche Art eine vernünftige Tierethik aufbauen lässt; aber man sollte dabei nicht suggerieren (oder jedenfalls nicht so wie in diesem Buch), dass das eine notwendige Folgerung aus der kantianischen Philosophie wäre.
Korsgaard beruft sich auf Kant. Allerdings kommt sie nicht rein mit kantianischer Argumentation aus: Sie beruft sich auf Aristoteles und sagt (moralisch) gut ist, was (funktional) für ein Geschöpf gut ist. Geschöpfe (Menschen, Säugetiere, Vögel, etc.) haben ein Bewusstsein darüber, was (funktional) gut für sie ist. Das ist eine Argumentation, die Kant hätte machen können, aber (vermutlich aus guten, mir unbekannten Gründen) verwarf. Womöglich enthält das auch einen naturalistischen Fehlschluss.
Kant hat stattdessen seine Ethik rein aus den Voraussetzungen der Vernunft gefolgert. Wichtig ist dafür die logische Widerspruchsfreiheit. Im Abschnitt "Ärger im Reich der Zwecke" räumt Korsgaard selbst ein, dass ihre Argumentation zu Widersprüchen führt, hält aber ihre (aristotelisch gewonnenes) moralisches Gutsein für wichtiger. Ich kann mir bei bestem Willen nicht vorstellen, dass das mit einr kantische Ethik vereinbar ist.
Nebenbei setzt Koorsgaard das (funktional) Gute für Geschöpfe mit dem Selbsterhalt gleich. Nun gibt es aber sowohl unter Menschen als auch unter Tieren Suizide. Jedenfalls bei manchen Tierarten ist das auch ein regelmäßiges Verhalten. (Auch, dass die meisten Tierarten nicht auf ein "langes Leben" vorbereitet sind, ist vielleicht ein Gegenargument.) Die Biologie erklärt den Suizid mit Tieren dadurch, dass dies zwar nicht dem individuellen Selbsterhalt dient, aber dem Erhalt eines Staates oder Verwandter mit ähnlichen Genen. Ich vermute, dass Koorsgard ihre persönlichen oder zumindest menschlichen Einstellungen und das Verhalten von Haustieren hier verallgemeinert und projiziert. Gewissermaßen ein "Anthtro- und Haustierzentrismus". Die Konsequenzen des Generhalts als funktional und damit als moralisch Gutes will ich mir kaum vorstellen, sowohl aus menschlicher als auch aus tierischer Perspektive.
Ich kann mir gut vorstellen, dass sich auf die vorgestellte oder zumindest eine ähnliche Art eine vernünftige Tierethik aufbauen lässt; aber man sollte dabei nicht suggerieren (oder jedenfalls nicht so wie in diesem Buch), dass das eine notwendige Folgerung aus der kantianischen Philosophie wäre.
March 5, 2026
I liked Korsgaard’s work while I was in school, and I love animals, so I picked this up a while back. I think she builds a good case. Honestly, I feel like her idea of tethered values was the strongest and most impactful argument of the book. I suspect it’ll show up in my thinking more often (though by the end I started to lose track of what exactly absolute good is—still think I generally get it). I also feel like I’ve come out of this with a better understanding of Kantian ethics (though I’ll have to bite the bullet and read Kant himself eventually, rather than just relying on modern interpretations).
April 29, 2021
A mammoth of a work, combining history of philosophy, metaethics, and applied ethics into a coherent whole that depicts Koorsgard's distinctive approach to questions of morality.
August 2, 2024
korsgaard at her best! a well argued book and a refreshing, kantian take on animal rights. can get a little pedantic but not excessively for a philosophical text. convincing and generative arguments
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