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The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler's Final Solution
Laqueur's new introduction, written for this paperback edition of his classic work, revives the lesson of the Holocaust and broadens our understanding of one of history's most terrible crimes.
Despite the outrage that swept the world when the Nazi death camps were first liberated in 1945, the truth about the extermination of European Jewry had been an open secret since at least 1941. Using sources and documentaries only recently made available, Walter Laqueur examines when and how information about the genocide became known to millions of Germans, international Jewish organizations, leaders of Jewish communities throughout Europe, and top government officials in neutral and Allied countries. Laying bare the lethal combination of disbelief and indifference that met this news, The Terrible Secret offers a brilliant and chilling demonstration of paralysis in the face of ultimate evil.
Despite the outrage that swept the world when the Nazi death camps were first liberated in 1945, the truth about the extermination of European Jewry had been an open secret since at least 1941. Using sources and documentaries only recently made available, Walter Laqueur examines when and how information about the genocide became known to millions of Germans, international Jewish organizations, leaders of Jewish communities throughout Europe, and top government officials in neutral and Allied countries. Laying bare the lethal combination of disbelief and indifference that met this news, The Terrible Secret offers a brilliant and chilling demonstration of paralysis in the face of ultimate evil.
304 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1980
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About the author
Walter Laqueur
141 books46 followersWalter Ze'ev Laqueur was an American historian, journalist and political commentator. Laqueur was born in Breslau, Lower Silesia, Prussia (modern Wrocław, Poland), into a Jewish family. In 1938, he left Germany for the British Mandate of Palestine. His parents, who were unable to leave, became victims of the Holocaust.
Laqueur lived in Israel from 1938 to 1953. After one year at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he joined a Kibbutz and worked as an agricultural laborer from 1939 to 1944. In 1944, he moved to Jerusalem, where he worked as a journalist until 1953, covering Palestine and other countries in the Middle East.
Since 1955 Laqueur has lived in London. He was founder and editor, with George Mosse, of the Journal of Contemporary History and of Survey from 1956 to 1964. He was also founding editor of The Washington Papers. He was Director of the Institute of Contemporary History and the Wiener Library in London from 1965 to 1994. From 1969 he was a member, and later Chairman (until 2000), of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. He was Professor of the History of Ideas at Brandeis University from 1968 to 1972, and University Professor at Georgetown University from 1976 to 1988. He has also been a visiting professor of history and government at Harvard, the University of Chicago, Tel Aviv University and Johns Hopkins University.
Laqueur's main works deal with European history in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially Russian history and German history, as well as the history of the Middle East. The topics he has written about include the German Youth Movement, Zionism, Israeli history, the cultural history of the Weimar Republic and Russia, Communism, the Holocaust, fascism, and the diplomatic history of the Cold War. His books have been translated into many languages, and he was one of the founders of the study of political violence, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. His comments on international affairs have appeared in many American and European newspapers and periodicals.
(Wikipedia)
Laqueur lived in Israel from 1938 to 1953. After one year at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he joined a Kibbutz and worked as an agricultural laborer from 1939 to 1944. In 1944, he moved to Jerusalem, where he worked as a journalist until 1953, covering Palestine and other countries in the Middle East.
Since 1955 Laqueur has lived in London. He was founder and editor, with George Mosse, of the Journal of Contemporary History and of Survey from 1956 to 1964. He was also founding editor of The Washington Papers. He was Director of the Institute of Contemporary History and the Wiener Library in London from 1965 to 1994. From 1969 he was a member, and later Chairman (until 2000), of the International Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. He was Professor of the History of Ideas at Brandeis University from 1968 to 1972, and University Professor at Georgetown University from 1976 to 1988. He has also been a visiting professor of history and government at Harvard, the University of Chicago, Tel Aviv University and Johns Hopkins University.
Laqueur's main works deal with European history in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially Russian history and German history, as well as the history of the Middle East. The topics he has written about include the German Youth Movement, Zionism, Israeli history, the cultural history of the Weimar Republic and Russia, Communism, the Holocaust, fascism, and the diplomatic history of the Cold War. His books have been translated into many languages, and he was one of the founders of the study of political violence, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. His comments on international affairs have appeared in many American and European newspapers and periodicals.
(Wikipedia)
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 3, 2018
This book begins with the question: What was publicly known about Nazi genocide against the Jews prior to the end of 1942? The answer, referenced to different populations (f.i. the Allied nations, the German population, the various Jewish populations), is that quite a lot was known, enough that a fairly accurate picture could have been drawn from readily accessible sources. This book ends with a consideration of why such a picture was not widely and powerfully broadcast, even within Jewish circles with the Allied states.
March 13, 2018
Brutal and shameful what the allies already knew in '42.
June 7, 2018
Although this book seems somewhat dated, little new material has surfaced since 1980 on its central theme: what did the Allies know about the Holocaust, when did they know it, and how did they react. The eternal nature of its subject guarantees its inexhaustible freshness. Laqueur bore a long pedigree of scholarly work on German, European, and Jewish history so was more than qualified to take on the specifics he chose; yet there was a certain blinkeredness here that surprised me.
First let me recapitulate the book's strong points. Laqueur rightly begins the Holocaust in 1941, with the death squad Einsatzgruppen in occupied Soviet territory, rather than the gas chambers proper. He examines the main sources of information at great length: emigres, exiles, or escapees from the Third Reich and Nazi-occupied Europe; reports of resistance groups; foreign observers, including Axis personnel and Allied agents; and last but far from least Nazi sources - witnesses who broached classified information to family and confidantes, who set the rumor mills turning and whose statements were picked up by Allied intelligence. Combined together it's apparent from the first that the Holocaust was one of the worst-kept secrets of the Twentieth Century at the time of its infliction. Everything could not be known during its course; but enough was certain to leave the non-Nazi world little excuse for pleading ignorance, at least at top levels.
Yet Laqueur makes statements that only further befuddle the issue, and his own conclusions. He rightly argues that WWI's manufactured propaganda led to incredulity of said rumors at first hearing. This did not mean, however, that outsiders misjudged the true nature of Nazism. When he writes that "there was no precedent in recent European history for the murderous character of German National Socialism," and thus "for this reason most contemporaries were caught unprepared," he is off mark. The Russian Civil War was surely part of recent European history; as was the Spanish Civil War. In the latter case genocidal pronouncements on "exterminating the Red seed" were regularly broadcast over Franquista radio. But most tellingly Laqueur forgets that WW I was itself the murderous precedent. The brutality of Europe's trenches created a soul-scarred swarm of survivors who formed Nazism's first cadres, bringing the front home to German civil society, to subsequently recreate it across Europe without any pretensions of "culture" or "democracy."
Laqueur writes that "democratic societies demonstrated on this occasion as on many others, before and after, that they are incapable of understanding political regimes of a different character." This is his call for cold, hard realism - such as during the cold war, ongoing at his time of writing; or Israel's struggle with the PLO, also concurrent with the book's publication; or during the but-recently concluded US war in Indochina - all three of which he strongly supported. Laqueur's call for realism, however, seems to breed the same dilemma. Americans still shrug off My Lai and Hiroshima or respond with patriotic vitriol, as Germans did when confronting Holocaust allegations during WW II. Israelis will rationalize every IDF action in the OTs, with genocidal fantasies commonly spoken aloud on the streets. Thus either these are phenomena which transcend political labels; or there is little substantial difference between democracy and totalitarianism when vital interests are at stake.
But my third criticism goes to the heart of Laqueur's dilemma in exploring the Allied reaction to the Terrible Secret. They did not respond as he thought they should (ie, showing "profound interest in the fate of the Jews") because they did not regard the Nazi treatment of Jews as a sui generis event; but as inextricably bound with all the human suffering inflicted by the war. Jews suffered terribly, so the Allied leaders knew; and so, they continued, did Russians and Poles; or Chinese under Japanese occupation in Nanking, Shanghai, and Manchuria. None of the Allied leaders felt that Jewish suffering, on principle, should be - or must be - given greater weight than the travails of other civilians under Axis rule. To judge otherwise was to single out the Jews, as the Nazis did, or to minimize the oppression of others. Such rationale does not make them anti-Semitic. It merely underscores that they viewed the Holocaust as non-Jews and saw no reason to give it special status in wartime context. This misjudgment ("paralysis in the face of evil") leads to accusations of "betrayal." Laqueur is careful not to slap the term around, but his conclusion comes close and for the same reason.
That said, Laqueur's little book will always be a worthy addition to the Holocaust library for its in-depth recounting of how the Terrible Secret escaped its barbed wire, one drop of blood at a time.
First let me recapitulate the book's strong points. Laqueur rightly begins the Holocaust in 1941, with the death squad Einsatzgruppen in occupied Soviet territory, rather than the gas chambers proper. He examines the main sources of information at great length: emigres, exiles, or escapees from the Third Reich and Nazi-occupied Europe; reports of resistance groups; foreign observers, including Axis personnel and Allied agents; and last but far from least Nazi sources - witnesses who broached classified information to family and confidantes, who set the rumor mills turning and whose statements were picked up by Allied intelligence. Combined together it's apparent from the first that the Holocaust was one of the worst-kept secrets of the Twentieth Century at the time of its infliction. Everything could not be known during its course; but enough was certain to leave the non-Nazi world little excuse for pleading ignorance, at least at top levels.
Yet Laqueur makes statements that only further befuddle the issue, and his own conclusions. He rightly argues that WWI's manufactured propaganda led to incredulity of said rumors at first hearing. This did not mean, however, that outsiders misjudged the true nature of Nazism. When he writes that "there was no precedent in recent European history for the murderous character of German National Socialism," and thus "for this reason most contemporaries were caught unprepared," he is off mark. The Russian Civil War was surely part of recent European history; as was the Spanish Civil War. In the latter case genocidal pronouncements on "exterminating the Red seed" were regularly broadcast over Franquista radio. But most tellingly Laqueur forgets that WW I was itself the murderous precedent. The brutality of Europe's trenches created a soul-scarred swarm of survivors who formed Nazism's first cadres, bringing the front home to German civil society, to subsequently recreate it across Europe without any pretensions of "culture" or "democracy."
Laqueur writes that "democratic societies demonstrated on this occasion as on many others, before and after, that they are incapable of understanding political regimes of a different character." This is his call for cold, hard realism - such as during the cold war, ongoing at his time of writing; or Israel's struggle with the PLO, also concurrent with the book's publication; or during the but-recently concluded US war in Indochina - all three of which he strongly supported. Laqueur's call for realism, however, seems to breed the same dilemma. Americans still shrug off My Lai and Hiroshima or respond with patriotic vitriol, as Germans did when confronting Holocaust allegations during WW II. Israelis will rationalize every IDF action in the OTs, with genocidal fantasies commonly spoken aloud on the streets. Thus either these are phenomena which transcend political labels; or there is little substantial difference between democracy and totalitarianism when vital interests are at stake.
But my third criticism goes to the heart of Laqueur's dilemma in exploring the Allied reaction to the Terrible Secret. They did not respond as he thought they should (ie, showing "profound interest in the fate of the Jews") because they did not regard the Nazi treatment of Jews as a sui generis event; but as inextricably bound with all the human suffering inflicted by the war. Jews suffered terribly, so the Allied leaders knew; and so, they continued, did Russians and Poles; or Chinese under Japanese occupation in Nanking, Shanghai, and Manchuria. None of the Allied leaders felt that Jewish suffering, on principle, should be - or must be - given greater weight than the travails of other civilians under Axis rule. To judge otherwise was to single out the Jews, as the Nazis did, or to minimize the oppression of others. Such rationale does not make them anti-Semitic. It merely underscores that they viewed the Holocaust as non-Jews and saw no reason to give it special status in wartime context. This misjudgment ("paralysis in the face of evil") leads to accusations of "betrayal." Laqueur is careful not to slap the term around, but his conclusion comes close and for the same reason.
That said, Laqueur's little book will always be a worthy addition to the Holocaust library for its in-depth recounting of how the Terrible Secret escaped its barbed wire, one drop of blood at a time.
May 12, 2022
This is an interesting and informative account of knowledge concerning the final solution. I've read so much about WW2 and events surrounding it, that I already knew a great deal of the information presented here. I did pick up some new information though, and its always helpful to evaluate information from different perspectives. Laqueur is much more forgiving than I am though. He tries to excuse the lack of action, censorship, indifference, and other factors that let the Final Solution take place while just about every nation involved knew what was happening. I don't see any reason to make weak excuses. There was no desire to save Jews. Some people in every nation desperately tried to help, but they were the minority and their governments didn't cooperate in the slightest.
Kurt Gerstein, an SS officer that volunteered intentionally to find out what was happening to the Jews, is a tragic figure. He did everything possible to get the word out. I would have thought the same way he did. "If the information is out there, with proof, the world will be horrified and allied nations will try to intervene." I would have acted on that belief as well, if I didn't have the benefit of hindsight. That poor man tried so hard. I"ve actually seen people commenting on his story with idiotic remarks about 'selling his soul' and judging him for joining the SS. Evidently those people think a completely worthless 'moral victory,' (refusing to participate) that accomplished nothing and couldn't save a single person, was a better choice than finding proof in an attempt to stop the killing. Gerstein was a hero, and he isn't at fault in any way. Lots and lots of other people are at fault, but not him.
Finland is the only country that actually defended Jews. The only one. Denmark takes a lot of credit for saving 'their Jews,' but that is definitely not a cut and dry situation. The Nazi government in Denmark at the time tipped off the population because they didn't want to deal with any backlash or chaos. The Nazis basically sat back and let the people of Denmark help Jewish citizens escape to Sweden. Of course, the actions of non-Jewish citizens were commendable, but there was also a great deal of blatant profiteering. The people of Denmark didn't risk their lives and save Jews out of the kindness of their hearts. Far from it. I'm sure that some Danish citizens did act on their beliefs and truly did help and rescue Jews because it was the right thing to do, but the entire population certainly didn't fall into that category.
Every country except Finland helped the Nazis execute the Final Solution. Most occupied countries had plenty of collaborators assisting in mass murder. My own nation, the US, should have been collectively ashamed of itself. Americans didn't have to risk their lives to save Jews. They didn't have to risk anything at all. They just had to let Jews into the country. I know that every Jewish citizen in Europe couldn't have escaped to America, but many of them could. If all 6 million Jews that died during the Holocaust had made it to the US instead, the country could have absorbed them easily. There's no excuse for American actions. Absolutely none.
Some Jewish refugees actually made it across the Atlantic and were sent back. I don't understand how anyone couldn't feel shame over such actions, especially considering the anything-but-secret nature of Nazi plans. I have digital copies of the NYT from 1938-1946 and a few collections from other newspapers at various points during the war. The Holocaust was not a secret, even for ordinary US citizens. The American government rushed to limit Jewish immigration, just like every other nation, and turned refugees away while the NYT and other newspapers were printing headlines about Nazi actions. Americans simply didn't care, and that's just the very unpleasant and shameful truth.
Kurt Gerstein, an SS officer that volunteered intentionally to find out what was happening to the Jews, is a tragic figure. He did everything possible to get the word out. I would have thought the same way he did. "If the information is out there, with proof, the world will be horrified and allied nations will try to intervene." I would have acted on that belief as well, if I didn't have the benefit of hindsight. That poor man tried so hard. I"ve actually seen people commenting on his story with idiotic remarks about 'selling his soul' and judging him for joining the SS. Evidently those people think a completely worthless 'moral victory,' (refusing to participate) that accomplished nothing and couldn't save a single person, was a better choice than finding proof in an attempt to stop the killing. Gerstein was a hero, and he isn't at fault in any way. Lots and lots of other people are at fault, but not him.
Finland is the only country that actually defended Jews. The only one. Denmark takes a lot of credit for saving 'their Jews,' but that is definitely not a cut and dry situation. The Nazi government in Denmark at the time tipped off the population because they didn't want to deal with any backlash or chaos. The Nazis basically sat back and let the people of Denmark help Jewish citizens escape to Sweden. Of course, the actions of non-Jewish citizens were commendable, but there was also a great deal of blatant profiteering. The people of Denmark didn't risk their lives and save Jews out of the kindness of their hearts. Far from it. I'm sure that some Danish citizens did act on their beliefs and truly did help and rescue Jews because it was the right thing to do, but the entire population certainly didn't fall into that category.
Every country except Finland helped the Nazis execute the Final Solution. Most occupied countries had plenty of collaborators assisting in mass murder. My own nation, the US, should have been collectively ashamed of itself. Americans didn't have to risk their lives to save Jews. They didn't have to risk anything at all. They just had to let Jews into the country. I know that every Jewish citizen in Europe couldn't have escaped to America, but many of them could. If all 6 million Jews that died during the Holocaust had made it to the US instead, the country could have absorbed them easily. There's no excuse for American actions. Absolutely none.
Some Jewish refugees actually made it across the Atlantic and were sent back. I don't understand how anyone couldn't feel shame over such actions, especially considering the anything-but-secret nature of Nazi plans. I have digital copies of the NYT from 1938-1946 and a few collections from other newspapers at various points during the war. The Holocaust was not a secret, even for ordinary US citizens. The American government rushed to limit Jewish immigration, just like every other nation, and turned refugees away while the NYT and other newspapers were printing headlines about Nazi actions. Americans simply didn't care, and that's just the very unpleasant and shameful truth.
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September 25, 2009This is the book that got me so mad at HG Wells that I went and looked up his death date to see if he lived long enough to repent his anger at Jan Karski's reports.
This isn't fair, of course. I understand why Wells, who had been duped into believing in nonexistent German atrocities in WWI, would have been suspicious of claims against the Nazis in WWII. But I would have preferred it if Wells had responded like Felix Frankfurter, who told Karski he couldn't believe what Karski reported. When Karski's fellows came forth to assert his credentials, Frankfurter replied "I do not in any way believe the young man is lying. I said I couldn't believe him. There's a difference."
This isn't fair, of course. I understand why Wells, who had been duped into believing in nonexistent German atrocities in WWI, would have been suspicious of claims against the Nazis in WWII. But I would have preferred it if Wells had responded like Felix Frankfurter, who told Karski he couldn't believe what Karski reported. When Karski's fellows came forth to assert his credentials, Frankfurter replied "I do not in any way believe the young man is lying. I said I couldn't believe him. There's a difference."
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