Rubin describes how globalization over the last several decades has wrought havoc on the middle class in both Canada and the United States. As businesses sought out cheaper locations and much much cheaper labour, the balance between what’s good for business owners (shareholders) and what’s good for workers tilted in favour of the former who manage to convince (by lobbying) politicians that globalization and “free” or “managed trade” is in the best interest of everyone, when in fact, it’s not been so.
The Auto Pact (1965-1987) guaranteed that Canada would produce at least as many cars as were sold within its borders. However, post that deal, Rubin is particularly critical of our North American Trade deals that have since decimated our automobile industry in favour in Mexico (with its $4/hr workers and no effective trade unions). While these trade deals have been good for the owners (shareholders) of the auto companies and also auto part companies (like Magna and Linamar), our auto workers have lost out. He notes, as one example, the GM plant in Oshawa has gone from once employing over 20,000 to under 1,000. Otherwise he declines to put numbers to these auto making job losses.
He goes well beyond North America in describing the abundant supply of labour worldwide competing for scarce jobs that, in turn, put downward pressure on wages.
Rubin is not “pro” Trump as some reviewers seem to conclude. He correctly points out the appeal of Trump who recognized the discontent of workers who had lost good paying jobs in America’s rust belt. He also recognizes that Trump’s December 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was one of the largest corporate tax cuts in American history and he points out that policy allowed corporations to continue to back shares, raise dividends and also give their executives generous stock options.
Rubin, towards the end of his book, points to the appeal of politicians in various countries who see the discontented middle class and offer alternative policies such as cracking down on global tax shelters, redistributing wealth through progressive taxation, raising tariffs (to protect jobs) and raising the minimum wage. He ends it with the prediction that, because of the COVID pandemic, borders will thicken, and with broken supply chains (critical things such as ventilators were not available), there will be a backlash and much more emphasis on local sourcing (and hence jobs).
Mistakenly, he gives almost no credence to the role of automation in decimating jobs. As one example, between 2000 and 2015 output in Canadian mines increased by 100 percent, yet employment dropped by 6 percent. New and better equipment replaced mine workers rather than international trade. In manufacturing in the U. S., studies have shown significant job loss has been the result of automation rather than international trade.
As well, I’d also disagree with his ending that suggests change may be coming. The politicians who offer the alternative policies he’s noted (see above) can’t be just pontificating on the sidelines but need to be in power. As well, they also need to be in a multitude of countries (otherwise corporations will just shift their locations) before any meaningful change can actually occur. And finally, he does not give enough attention to the effects of corporate lobbying on politicians who make the rules we must live by.
Overall, written with the knowledge of the pandemic up to May 2020, his book is a very interesting read.