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Osprey Campaign #348
The Naval Siege of Japan 1945: War Plan Orange Triumphant
A highly illustrated study of the last great campaign in the Pacific Theater of World War II: the US Navy and Royal Navy's air, surface, and submarine attacks on the Japanese Home Islands.
The final months of Allied naval bombardments on the Home Islands during World War II have, for whatever reason, frequently been overlooked by historians. Yet the Allies' final naval campaign against Japan involved the largest and arguably most successful wartime naval fleet ever assembled, and was the climax to the greatest naval war in history. Though suffering grievous losses during its early attacks, by July 1945 the United States Third Fleet wielded 1,400 aircraft just off the coast of Japan, while Task Force 37, the British Pacific Fleet's carrier and battleship striking force, was the most powerful single formation ever assembled by the Royal Navy. In the final months of the war the Third Fleet's 20 American and British aircraft carriers would hurl over 10,000 aerial sorties against the Home Islands, whilst another ten Allied battleships would inflict numerous morale-destroying shellings on Japanese coastal cities.
In this illustrated study, historian Brian Lane Herder draws on primary sources and expert analysis to chronicle the full story of the Allies' Navy Siege of Japan from February 1945 to the very last days of World War II.
The final months of Allied naval bombardments on the Home Islands during World War II have, for whatever reason, frequently been overlooked by historians. Yet the Allies' final naval campaign against Japan involved the largest and arguably most successful wartime naval fleet ever assembled, and was the climax to the greatest naval war in history. Though suffering grievous losses during its early attacks, by July 1945 the United States Third Fleet wielded 1,400 aircraft just off the coast of Japan, while Task Force 37, the British Pacific Fleet's carrier and battleship striking force, was the most powerful single formation ever assembled by the Royal Navy. In the final months of the war the Third Fleet's 20 American and British aircraft carriers would hurl over 10,000 aerial sorties against the Home Islands, whilst another ten Allied battleships would inflict numerous morale-destroying shellings on Japanese coastal cities.
In this illustrated study, historian Brian Lane Herder draws on primary sources and expert analysis to chronicle the full story of the Allies' Navy Siege of Japan from February 1945 to the very last days of World War II.
96 pages, Paperback
First published April 28, 2020
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40 people want to read
About the author
Brian Lane Herder
18 books7 followersBorn in 1981, Brian Lane Herder graduated with a BA in History from the University of Kansas in 2003, and a Masters of Library Science from Emporia State University in 2009.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
January 29, 2021
THE NAVAL SIEGE OF JAPAN 1945 was about implementing 'War Plan Orange' which had been laid out 20 years before. I wonder who the Pentagon thinks we will be fighting 20 years from now? Anyway, this was an excellent book typical of the series. There were maps and photos as usual, but I have seen better artwork. Then again the artist captured the essence of the moments in an abstract way.
It is hard not to give spoilers when talking about actual history unless you give a little tease by saying, "There is a lot of new stuff here." For me, the new stuff was how they were strangling Japan towards the end of the war by the use of mines, submarine warfare, surface action, shore bombardment and aerial bombing. Cut off from overseas supplies, having enemy planes roaring unopposed overhead, and having enemy ships pounding coastal targets, it was rumored that Japan was on the brink of surrender without the US having to deploy the nuclear weapons or invasion. Now that was news to me. However, occasional little victories could have given the holdouts a ray of hope as they were preparing to arm the general population with muskets, longbows, bamboo spears and pitchforks.
Take for instance the torpedoing of the US battleship Pennsylvania. One torpedo almost sank her. Typhoon Cobra capsized three destroyers killing 790 men. One dive bomber turned the US carrier USS Franklin into a blazing inferno. Internal explosions and exploding fireballs caused the mess hall deck to rise up to the ceiling crushing as many as 400 men to death. A total of 798 men were killed and 487 wounded. But they somehow saved the ship.
When they did take to the skies to defend their homeland, the Japanese pilots were brave in the face of overwhelming odds. In one battle the Japanese aces claimed 13 US fighters shot down with only one loss. "The Oppama pilots' one loss was Chief Petty Officer Mitsugi Yamazaki, who safely bailed from his plane but was beaten to death by civilians who mistakenly thought he was American."
This was a very interesting book for me.
It is hard not to give spoilers when talking about actual history unless you give a little tease by saying, "There is a lot of new stuff here." For me, the new stuff was how they were strangling Japan towards the end of the war by the use of mines, submarine warfare, surface action, shore bombardment and aerial bombing. Cut off from overseas supplies, having enemy planes roaring unopposed overhead, and having enemy ships pounding coastal targets, it was rumored that Japan was on the brink of surrender without the US having to deploy the nuclear weapons or invasion. Now that was news to me. However, occasional little victories could have given the holdouts a ray of hope as they were preparing to arm the general population with muskets, longbows, bamboo spears and pitchforks.
Take for instance the torpedoing of the US battleship Pennsylvania. One torpedo almost sank her. Typhoon Cobra capsized three destroyers killing 790 men. One dive bomber turned the US carrier USS Franklin into a blazing inferno. Internal explosions and exploding fireballs caused the mess hall deck to rise up to the ceiling crushing as many as 400 men to death. A total of 798 men were killed and 487 wounded. But they somehow saved the ship.
When they did take to the skies to defend their homeland, the Japanese pilots were brave in the face of overwhelming odds. In one battle the Japanese aces claimed 13 US fighters shot down with only one loss. "The Oppama pilots' one loss was Chief Petty Officer Mitsugi Yamazaki, who safely bailed from his plane but was beaten to death by civilians who mistakenly thought he was American."
This was a very interesting book for me.
December 23, 2025
Today it is common knowledge that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought about Japan’s surrender in the Second World War. Less well known is the extended naval siege of the Japan by Allied naval forces that preceded it, even though it proved a significant factor in its defeat. From the end of 1944 onward, American and British naval units placed the home islands in an ever-tightening stranglehold by cutting off supplies from her shrinking empire. Starting in February 1945, this was escalated with a series of air raids launched from aircraft carriers off of Japan’s coast that attacked a variety of military, naval, and industrial targets. By July, battleships of the Third Fleet ranged up and down Japan bombarding industrial sites and underscoring for the Japanese people the Allies’ domination of their nation’s naval and air space.
This massive display or air and naval power was quickly overshadowed by the two mushroom clouds. Yet Brian Lane Herder implies in this book that it was the naval siege rather than the atomic bomb which brought about Japan’s defeat. Given the cursory nature of Osprey’s “Campaign” series, this claim is asserted rather than proven, as his focus instead is on describing the operations of the siege itself. This was the culmination of War Plan Orange, the decades-old strategy for waging a war against the Japanese empire. In its final stage, Japan’s surrender was to be achieved not by an invasion, but by an air-sea blockade supplemented by naval bombardment that would make it impossible for Japan to continue the war.
While American submarines waged a campaign of attrition against Japanese shipping from the start of the war between the two powers, it was not until the second phase of War Plan Orange was complete with the defeat of the Japanese fleet at Leyte Gulf in October 1944 that preparations for naval attacks on Japan itself commenced. The challenge was the availability of the formidable yet still finite resources of the United States Navy, which had to balance their sweeps of Japan with their commitments to the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In both cases, the focus was on immobilizing airfields and attacking naval resources that might assist the Japanese defense of the islands, with other targets a lesser priority.
This changed as the United States prepared to invade Japan itself. Fearing that growing American war-weariness would force an end to the siege before it would bring about the surrender of Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to move ahead with the invasion of Japan. With Operation Olympic – the invasion of the island Kyushu – scheduled for November, debilitating the defenses of the home islands and Japan’s wartime economy became the Navy’s top priority. Herder credits the attacks with considerable effectiveness, noting that the close-in airstrikes and naval bombardments achieved better results than the United States Army Air Forces’ B-29s attacking from high altitudes. With the remaining capital vessels of the Imperial Japanese Navy either destroyed or crippled by a lack of fuel and maritime trade between the islands under steady assault, the siege was grinding down Japan steadily, just as the planners of War Plan Orange anticipated.
Yet in the end, it was the atomic bombs that produced the desired result. While Herder latches onto the conclusion of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey that Japan’s surrender was imminent even without the bombs, such claims ultimately are unverifiable. What Herder does prove in his book is the ruthlessness with which the United States Navy prosecuted its last offensive campaign of the Second World War. In it he offers concise summaries of the numerous airstrikes and bombardments the American and British warships inflicted on Japan, as well as brief descriptions of their effects. Though his focus on the surface fleet largely ignores the extensive submarine campaign in Japanese waters that preceded it, it nevertheless offers a useful and well-illustrated introduction to Third Fleet operations against the Home Islands in the last months of the war.
This massive display or air and naval power was quickly overshadowed by the two mushroom clouds. Yet Brian Lane Herder implies in this book that it was the naval siege rather than the atomic bomb which brought about Japan’s defeat. Given the cursory nature of Osprey’s “Campaign” series, this claim is asserted rather than proven, as his focus instead is on describing the operations of the siege itself. This was the culmination of War Plan Orange, the decades-old strategy for waging a war against the Japanese empire. In its final stage, Japan’s surrender was to be achieved not by an invasion, but by an air-sea blockade supplemented by naval bombardment that would make it impossible for Japan to continue the war.
While American submarines waged a campaign of attrition against Japanese shipping from the start of the war between the two powers, it was not until the second phase of War Plan Orange was complete with the defeat of the Japanese fleet at Leyte Gulf in October 1944 that preparations for naval attacks on Japan itself commenced. The challenge was the availability of the formidable yet still finite resources of the United States Navy, which had to balance their sweeps of Japan with their commitments to the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In both cases, the focus was on immobilizing airfields and attacking naval resources that might assist the Japanese defense of the islands, with other targets a lesser priority.
This changed as the United States prepared to invade Japan itself. Fearing that growing American war-weariness would force an end to the siege before it would bring about the surrender of Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to move ahead with the invasion of Japan. With Operation Olympic – the invasion of the island Kyushu – scheduled for November, debilitating the defenses of the home islands and Japan’s wartime economy became the Navy’s top priority. Herder credits the attacks with considerable effectiveness, noting that the close-in airstrikes and naval bombardments achieved better results than the United States Army Air Forces’ B-29s attacking from high altitudes. With the remaining capital vessels of the Imperial Japanese Navy either destroyed or crippled by a lack of fuel and maritime trade between the islands under steady assault, the siege was grinding down Japan steadily, just as the planners of War Plan Orange anticipated.
Yet in the end, it was the atomic bombs that produced the desired result. While Herder latches onto the conclusion of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey that Japan’s surrender was imminent even without the bombs, such claims ultimately are unverifiable. What Herder does prove in his book is the ruthlessness with which the United States Navy prosecuted its last offensive campaign of the Second World War. In it he offers concise summaries of the numerous airstrikes and bombardments the American and British warships inflicted on Japan, as well as brief descriptions of their effects. Though his focus on the surface fleet largely ignores the extensive submarine campaign in Japanese waters that preceded it, it nevertheless offers a useful and well-illustrated introduction to Third Fleet operations against the Home Islands in the last months of the war.
November 25, 2024
Great Osprey book with particularly good maps. Makes an argument that the naval blockade was as important if not more important than the atomic bombs and the Soviet attack, although I still favor the later as the leading cause of Japan's surrender.
May 26, 2020
As usual for Osprey books, the production values are very good and the writing good for the space available. It is a very worthwhile read if you want a short treatment of a very complex period. The author did a very good job describing the naval side of the final Pacific campaigns. I think one of the best aspects of this work is that it brings into focus the coordinated efforts of the US and its allies to continue the fight to the Japanese islands. However, the discussion does not, in my opinion, cover the Army and Army Air Force contributions adequately. They are mentioned, but their contributions could use further elaboration. And I'm not so sure the "War Plan Orange Triumphant" theme rings true. My reading of this book suggests the naval (and air) siege of Japan 1945 is more the triumphant result of flexible and changeable planning done by the Allies over the course of the war.
May 8, 2020
Excellent coverage of the topic. Lots of OB and battle details.
March 31, 2021
A good resource for a part of the Pacific War that gets overlooked
A nice readable narrative with plenty of operational details. Detailed order-of-battles. This covers in detail naval operations after Okinawa. It also covers the detailed naval plans for operation Olympic, which, thank God, was not necessary. Gives a good appreciation for the mammoth naval campaign on the other side of the world.
A nice readable narrative with plenty of operational details. Detailed order-of-battles. This covers in detail naval operations after Okinawa. It also covers the detailed naval plans for operation Olympic, which, thank God, was not necessary. Gives a good appreciation for the mammoth naval campaign on the other side of the world.
January 24, 2024
I found the editorial tone of this particular "Osprey" booklet to be untypical of what one generally sees with the "Campaign" series. Usually, there's an effort to project immediacy. Here, one has a bland, dispassionate, tone that would not be out of place with official history.
Having said that, this work has two particular virtues. One, Herder treats the disparate aerial attacks, naval bombardments, and submarine operations conducted by the American and British naval forces as one campaign to "reduce" Japanese war potential to the point where further organized resistance would be futile, or would break Japanese society. Two, you can see in this whole way of war, that partook equally of blockade and siege, the paradigm of the preferred American operational system ever since, which only recently has the U.S. Navy been forced to reassess the validity of (when confronting the prospects of a war with Beijing in regards to Taiwan).
Herder concludes with a quote from the 1946 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that, even ignoring all other factors, such as the use of atomic weapons, the firebombing campaign of U.S. 20th Air Force, or the Soviet assault on Manchuria, the U.S. naval siege of Japan was probably sufficient to achieve military victory in and of itself. Perhaps. Nothing I've read negates the seeming impact of the one-two shock affect of Hiroshima, and the Soviet entrance into the war against Japan, in terms of bringing home to Tokyo (particularly the Japanese military) that all reasonable options had been expended, and the chance had to be taken that the Potsdam Declaration offered a semi-honorable exit alternative to national suicide.
On the basis of readability, I'd be more inclined to give this study a 3.5 if that were an option.
Having said that, this work has two particular virtues. One, Herder treats the disparate aerial attacks, naval bombardments, and submarine operations conducted by the American and British naval forces as one campaign to "reduce" Japanese war potential to the point where further organized resistance would be futile, or would break Japanese society. Two, you can see in this whole way of war, that partook equally of blockade and siege, the paradigm of the preferred American operational system ever since, which only recently has the U.S. Navy been forced to reassess the validity of (when confronting the prospects of a war with Beijing in regards to Taiwan).
Herder concludes with a quote from the 1946 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that, even ignoring all other factors, such as the use of atomic weapons, the firebombing campaign of U.S. 20th Air Force, or the Soviet assault on Manchuria, the U.S. naval siege of Japan was probably sufficient to achieve military victory in and of itself. Perhaps. Nothing I've read negates the seeming impact of the one-two shock affect of Hiroshima, and the Soviet entrance into the war against Japan, in terms of bringing home to Tokyo (particularly the Japanese military) that all reasonable options had been expended, and the chance had to be taken that the Potsdam Declaration offered a semi-honorable exit alternative to national suicide.
On the basis of readability, I'd be more inclined to give this study a 3.5 if that were an option.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews